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Foreword
Geert Bouckaert
According to the German philosopher Kant (1724–1804), there are three key 
questions to ask when one is approaching reality: (1) what can we know?; (2) 
what must we do?; and (3) what may we hope for?
These three questions have a fundamental relevance for Public Administration 
(PA) in general, but for the bridging of PA and Philosophy in particular.
WHAT CAN WE KNOW?
Whatever the definitions of PA, or its status in the academic field (as a science, 
an art, or a practical profession), there is a need to work with ‘facts’ of a 
‘reality’, and there is a need to know these ‘facts’ and this reality. This helps 
to classify three categories: the known known, the known unknown, and the 
unknown unknown. For a practical reform agenda it is useful to have a system-
atic knowledge on what we know in the field of public administration, on, for 
example, what works and what doesn’t, where and when, and why. For a future 
academic research agenda it is essential, starting with an inventory of the 
known known, to know the unknown. It could help mapping a research strat-
egy, define coherent knowledge consortia, or determine knowledge progress 
or coverage. A major problem is the category of the unknown unknown. Here, 
we suddenly will realise that we were not aware of the relevance of something 
and of our lack of knowledge on that very issue, for example global warming. 
Whatever knowledge we have, it should be rigorous and ultimately relevant.
Defining a PA-fact, which then becomes an element of a question to be 
studied and answered, is not so easy. In studying ‘PA reform’, there are 
four levels of ‘facts’ which could be relevant: Green and White Papers or 
Government Declarations announcements which are intentions; the related 
legislation as laws, decrees, or regulations; the implementations of the deci-
sions; the reformed status as an effect. All four categories of facts are crucial, 
and one cannot be assumed or derived from the other. In literature this set is 
referred to as Talk/Decision/Practice/Results (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017). In 
studying ‘trust’, a similar problem emerges to find out what kind of fact needs 
to be investigated or observed, assuming this is possible.
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There is also an interesting shift in defining useful ‘PA-facts’ for research 
or practice. Shifting from data, to large data, to ‘big data’ changes the position 
and nature of inductive and data-driven research. ‘PA-facts’ also become 
increasingly varied: from countable objects to expectations, perceptions and 
opinions which become ‘facts’ just by mapping them. It results in trade-offs, 
balances, limits, dilemmas, contradictions, and paradoxes in describing real-
ities. A final new type of ‘PA-fact’ are experiments which could be lab-, 
field- or survey-based. A virtual and experimental ‘fact’ is created. All this 
puts pressure or at least requires qualifications for ‘evidence’-based research 
and practice.
A key question is not only what a PA-fact is (ontology), but also how we 
can know this PA-fact. This is the PA-epistemology. There are about five 
major positions and scientific logics with immediate implications for research 
methodologies.
A scientific orthodox approach takes a physicalistic model with statistical 
testing of causal hypotheses between independent and dependent variables, as 
derived from theories. A radical constructivist position explores inductively 
multiple and socially constructed meanings by interpreting language and text, 
sometimes within an egalitarian and participatory framework. Critical realism 
prefers thick descriptions within broad theoretical or conceptual frameworks 
and looks for explanations of how key processes operate within specified 
contexts to produce a particular result. These three epistemological paradigms 
do not include a closed mathematical and algebraic model where an optimal 
position can be calculated as a unique solution in full certainty. Nor does it 
include a totally open and chaotic model, even wicked model, where there is 
non-certainty on variables, data, actors, and dynamics. These five paradigms 
represent five totally different philosophical frames.
The definition of the substance of a PA-fact – its ontological status – is 
a crucial philosophical choice. The derived method used to get to know 
this PA-fact is based on a crucial epistemological position taken vis-à-vis 
‘PA-reality’. Both philosophical ‘knowledge’ questions remain too easily 
unanswered or become conveniently implicit. However, it is necessary to 
answer them explicitly. The difference between ‘belief’ and ‘science’ is that 
‘to believe’ is ‘to know without facts’, and ‘science’ is ‘to know with facts’. 
Even if PA is also practice and art, as a science we need to know with facts.
WHAT MUST WE DO?
The question about what to do is relevant for scientists (what to research 
and how) and obviously for practice. There is a need for social sciences – all 
sciences that are related to behaviour of individuals and societies – to describe, 
to explain and sometimes to predict. From a philosophical point of view, this 
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requires different frames for different purposes. ‘To describe’ requires ontol-
ogy (what is a substantial fact) and epistemology (how can we know it). ‘To 
explain’ facts and dynamic realities is important to know what we must do. It 
requires a philosophical stand, based on the five positions mentioned earlier. 
‘To predict’ implies a vision on future realities based on causal mechanisms 
that think from ‘alpha’ to ‘omega’ in terms of trajectories, scenarios … The 
other way around is also a possibility, from ‘omega’ to ‘alpha’, where an ideal 
future position, sometimes ideologically defined, is proposed. ‘Utopias’ could 
fit in this category. This requires a normative and ethical view on the futures.
It seems that there are three major sources for PA-reform: imitation, ideol-
ogy and evidence. They have three different sources of philosophical frames. 
Imitation, or ‘copy pasting’ is a mnemetic mechanism that assumes a world 
where everything is ‘most equal’ and not ‘most different’. Practice demon-
strates that ‘copy–paste’ types of behaviour are not very successful. Culture 
and religion do make a difference. A combination of too-Western PA, based 
on too-Western philosophies, for example utilitarianism, are not always, or 
even always not, travelling well. There is a need to have PA-communities 
according to different cultural communities, such as, for example, Islamic 
PA, Confucian PA, African PA, Latin American PA, or North American PA. 
Ideology, as a coherent set of values, is based on social and political philoso-
phies. Evidence-based reform follows a rational model, sometimes combined 
with (American) ‘pragmatism’ as its philosophical approach.
In answering the question of ‘what to do’, two major logics have been devel-
oped: a to-do logic of consequences and a to-do logic of appropriateness. Both 
logics are in tension and have a very different philosophical underpinning.
First of all, there is the philosophical study of ‘logic’ as such, as (mathe-
matical) syllogisms. This meta-study is also crucial in research design. Logics 
of consequences look at, mostly from a utilitarian philosophical framework, 
the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of how resources are turned into 
outcomes. Logics of appropriateness refer to, from an ethical philosophical 
framework, values, transparency, legitimacy, inclusion, openness and so on.
A major challenge is to handle the tension between these two logics and to 
marry them. One crucial vector that both logics may share is ‘trust’. A solid 
logic of consequences may result in trusting the economic, efficient and effec-
tive coherence of resources and outcomes. A solid logic of appropriateness 
may result in trusting the system and its functioning. ‘Trust’ could bring both 
logics together; however, this adds even more to the complexity of ‘trust’. This 
brings us to the last question.
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WHAT MAY WE HOPE FOR?
This is probably the most ideological and value-driven question. It is an essen-
tial philosophical question with a significant PA-dimension. It is about the 
common denominator of qualifications such as ‘good/better/best’, ‘improved’ 
or ‘progress’. It is ultimately about, for example, what ‘good’ means in ‘Good 
Governance’ or what ‘best’ means in ‘best practice’. It ultimately is about the 
‘Common Good’.
Increasingly there is also a converging or even shared view on what we 
may hope for. The acceptance, at least at the UN/ECOSOC-level of the 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) is a very visible answer to the question 
of what we may hope for. It is also clear that PA will be crucial to make that 
happen.
IN CONCLUSION
To give a substantial answer to the three PA-questions of what we can know, 
what we should do and what we may hope for, this book – now in its second 
edition – gives an indispensable and substantial contribution of a solid bridge 
between philosophy and PA. Since this bridge did not exist yet, Ongaro had to 
write this book.
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11. Introduction and rationale
INTRODUCTION
This book makes the argument for bringing philosophical thought into the 
field of public administration. A starting point is that there seems to be a gap 
in the current literatures in public governance, public administration and 
public management. This gap is about the lack of adequate exploration and 
careful consideration of the links between the topics that are debated in such 
literatures and key philosophical issues – ontological, political philosophical 
and epistemological – underlying and grounding any inquiry into these topics. 
In the study of various profiles of continuity and change in public governance, 
public administration and public management – hereafter collectively referred 
to simply by the label ‘PA’ (more on defining issues will follow later in this 
chapter) – a whole range of themes, from ontological questions to political 
philosophical debates, tend to receive only scant attention, if any.
There are, of course, a few notable exceptions. These include works focused 
on issues of epistemology in PA (epistemology concerns the bases and 
methods of knowledge): an exemplar is Riccucci (2010); or on issues of ethics, 
integrity and values in public administration (a stream of research developed 
by authors such as Gjalt de Graaf, Wolfgang Drechsler, George Frederickson, 
Leo Huberts, Michael Macaulay, Mark Rutgers, amongst others); or, more 
broadly, works in public policy and public affairs broadly intended, adopting 
a philosophical stance (Garofalo and Geuras, 2015). These are topics of high 
importance, yet they encompass only a subset of the key philosophical themes 
of significance for public administration. These works are related to the core 
topics of this book; however, as argued throughout this section, they cover 
a different terrain to the one ploughed in this book, which provides the reader 
with a systematic introduction to the ontological and political philosophical 
foundations of PA.
The work that comes closest to the terrain covered by this book is probably 
the edited volume by Lynch and Cruise (2006), collating contributions from 
a range of US scholars about individual philosophers and some lines of influ-
ence of their thought on the theory and practice of PA. There are, however, 
important differences between the two books. First, Lynch and Cruise’s is 
an edited work, whilst this is an authored book – a format that will hopefully 
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ensure higher consistency across the parts and themes addressed. Second, the 
Lynch and Cruise work hosts contributors exclusively based in the US, which 
may lead to privileging certain focuses and emphases; as a minimum, this 
book, written by a European scholar, will provide the reader with a different 
viewpoint and angle from which to tackle philosophical issues in public 
administration. Third, the collection by Lynch and Cruise is organised along 
relatively specific and loosely coupled themes and addresses the works of 
individual philosophers or scholars of public administration, whilst this book 
is organised along key thematic areas (an overview of the structure of the 
book is reported in Table 1.2 at the end of this chapter). Last, when this book 
goes to press, the Lynch and Cruise book is almost a decade from publication 
(two decades from the first edition). In sum, we argue that there is a need for 
a book-length work addressing the theme of the philosophical foundations 
of PA, and we hope this book will be able to fill this gap in a systematic and 
novel way.
The theme of the philosophical foundations of PA is part of the larger debate 
on philosophical issues in the social sciences, broadly intended (a notable 
scientific journal in the field is Philosophy of the Social Sciences), as PA can 
be defined also as the interdisciplinary social scientific study of government 
(more on definitions of PA later). It is also part of the debates in the field of 
‘public affairs’ broadly intended, to which books (e.g. Haldane, 2000) and spe-
cialised journals are dedicated (notable journals are Public Affairs; Philosophy 
and Public Affairs; and Social Philosophy and Policy). It may be noticed, 
however, that the public affairs themes treated in these journals tend to be quite 
distant from the preoccupations and the topics more often addressed by the 
scholars of public administration and management, and the linkages to public 
governance and administration are at most sporadic.
Articles touching upon a number of the themes developed in this book can 
be found in the contributions appearing in two scientific journals in the field: 
Administrative Theory and Praxis and Public Voices. The former tackles 
a wide array of themes ranging from public values and social justice to govern-
ance and the human nature, epistemology and others. Public Voices provides 
a variety of challenging and often unorthodox perspectives on the theory and 
practice of public service. However, with the exception of these journals and 
their distinctive emphases and idiosyncratic approaches to philosophy, what is 
more often detected in the literature in public governance and public admin-
istration is that philosophical considerations are brought into the analysis 
occasionally, and usually around specific issues, but never or very rarely in 
a systematic way. Nor are philosophical considerations usually brought into 
the analysis in a single-authored book format, which may allow for more 
consistency across the complexity of philosophical themes and perspectives.
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Philosophical issues are, however, ubiquitous and arise almost anywhere 
in the most serious research works in the field. Let’s take as an illustrative 
example a major edited work on the topic of contextual influences in public 
policy and management: Pollitt (2013). Pollitt takes the move from one appar-
ently unproblematic example of a well-known management tool; his starting 
point is the consideration that:
Total Quality Management (TQM) on a motor assembly line has only the faintest 
resemblance to TQM in an old person’s home who is the subject of social care, and 
that TQM in one hospital may be articulated in a substantially different way from 
TQM in the other hospital of the town. (Pollitt, 2013, p. 89)
As Pollitt promptly notices,
behind this little example lies a much-chewed philosophical problem – that of uni-
versals [and] tangled up in this is the distinction between meanings and behaviours, 
both of which exist, but independently of each other. Thus, TQM exists as a set of 
meanings, but only TQM in hospital X exists as a set of specific behaviours – the 
specific behaviour of TQM in a vehicle assembly plant may be quite different. 
(Pollitt, 2013, pp. 89–90)
This passage pinpoints that complex and widely interconnected philosophical 
issues surface almost at any point in serious attempts to investigate the field 
of public governance and management. In Pollitt’s example, one philosophical 
issue consists of the nature of the so-called ‘universals’: the matter of this 
philosophical dispute, which originated in the medieval age, is the foundation 
of universal concepts (intended as terms predicated of a multiplicity of indi-
vidual things, for example ‘human being’ or ‘animal’, and the ‘TQM system’ 
in Pollitt’s example). It regards the issue of whether: universal concepts are 
real and exist as (ideal) objects; or they are real and the product of a procession 
of abstraction by reason, but only individuals are real in the proper sense (in 
Pollitt’s example, the individual is ‘TQM in hospital X’); or they are not real 
at all (the terms and the different philosophical positions on the dispute over 
the nature of the universals are discussed in Chapter 2). This dispute is in 
many respects still raging nowadays. Importantly it may be claimed that in 
multiple respects where a PA scholar stands in terms of her/his conception of 
the nature of the field of PA depends on her/his philosophical stance over the 
nature of universal concepts (this point is developed in Chapter 2 regarding its 
philosophical foundations and in Chapter 4 for applications to PA). In sum, 
this philosophical dispute of medieval origin, far from being outdated, is of 
extreme actuality and practical significance. The other philosophical underly-
ing issue that the example of TQM in public management brings to the fore is 
the relationship between meanings, or ‘ideas’, and behaviours, the ‘here and 
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now’ or actuality of an idea that has taken shape.1 From this standpoint, philo-
sophical reflection may also shed a new light on the ways in which PA themes 
are examined and treated.
Philosophical issues are of utmost significance for PA. Prominent scholars 
in their research work have touched on related issues. Hood (1998) is a nicely 
crafted cultural analysis rooted in cultural anthropology; Schedler and Pröller 
(2007) address a range of cultural dimensions of public management (see 
in particular Bouckaert, 2007); and Pollitt (2013) is a collective work that 
tackles the issue of ‘context’ in public policy and management and by doing 
so discusses a number of philosophical themes that surface at various points. 
Debates have arisen over time about the contribution specific philosophical 
strands can make to PA, from the ‘existentialist public administrator’ (Richter, 
1970; Waugh, 2006) to phenomenological approaches to public administration 
(Jun, 2006; Waugh and Waugh, 2006). However, there remains important 
uncharted territory lying outside the terrain ploughed by these contributions: 
the whole bundle of ontological, political philosophical and epistemological 
themes and topics that are linked to the knowledge and understanding of PA 
has not been the subject of treatment in itself. This book makes an attempt to 
fill this gap by making an attempt to provide the broad picture of the relations 
between the field of PA and philosophy: it is an introduction to the theme 
(hopefully both comprehensive and accessible) that has the ambition to be 
systematic or at least complete enough to furnish a base for discussion and 
analysis of a number of the key interconnections between ‘foundational’ 
philosophical issues and some of the key themes debated in the contemporary 
public governance, public administration and public management literature. 
It therefore makes an attempt to contribute to the ‘big question’ lurking in the 
back of the mind of many attentive scholars and practitioners: what contribu-
tion can philosophy bring to the field of PA?
Tackling this question is the fundamental thrust of this book. In the approach 
we propose, the starting point is the broad overview of (Western) philosophical 
thought, a task that is carried out in two dedicated chapters (Chapters 2 and 
3; see also Table 1.2 for the plan of the book and Figure 1.1 for a graphic 
illustration of the connections amongst the chapters of the book). This body 
of wisdom and knowledge then becomes the source for selective applications 
to themes and issues of contemporary significance in PA: the task for the 
remainder of the book.
Many of the books that deal with philosophical issues in relation to PA are 
more often centred on epistemological questions. As already noticed, episte-
mology – the philosophy of knowledge – is a crucially significant part of the 
contribution philosophy can provide to PA, but it is not the entirety of such 
contribution, and ontological and political philosophical issues are equally 
important. Moreover, epistemological issues cannot be entirely disentangled 
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from ontological and political philosophical issues, and a more holistic view 
of philosophical contribution can be beneficial. There is another difference: 
usually most of the books dealing with philosophical issues in PA take the 
approach of starting from mapping the field of PA, and then ascribing PA 
scholars to different philosophical schools (e.g. Riccucci, 2010). In this book, 
we take the move from a broad overview of philosophical thought to revisit 
the field of PA from this standpoint. Our main argument is that philosophical 
knowledge and understanding provides a distinctive and constitutive contri-
bution to the knowledge and understanding of PA, alongside and beyond the 
knowledge provided by the disciplines that contribute to the field of PA.
Many other valuable works are centred on the employment of one or a few 
specific philosophical views to shed light on some specific problem in PA. 
For example, Stout and Love provide an excellent example of such works by 
shedding light on the contribution the philosopher Mary Parker Follett may 
bring to contemporary notions of public governance (Stout and Love, 2015; 
see also Ongaro, 2016); the scholar Perri 6 (2014) revisits the work of the 
philosopher and sociologist Durkheim; and Tijsterman and Overeem (2008) 
contrast Hegel’s and Weber’s views of the relationships between bureaucracy 
and individual freedom – to mention but a few. This is a highly valuable way 
of proceeding and may in many instances be the only feasible or meaningful 
way to delve into philosophical systems2 without getting entangled by their 
bewildering complexity. They do so by adopting a specific angle from which 
to look at the philosophical system, to then show how this set of philosophical 
ideas may shed light on our understanding of one specific PA problem.
Yet the broad picture and the multifarious links that tie one specific angle 
from which to look at one philosophical system may get lost in this process. 
Key ideas in philosophy can be more fully appreciated when seen in the 
broader context and longer-term perspective, and many ideas attributed to 
modern (or quite often in the PA literature ‘post-modern’) philosophers may 
be traced back to ancient philosophies and philosophers. What matters more is 
that by taking the broad and long-term perspective these ideas may be better 
understood, vetted, perused and probed. The consideration of philosophies 
and philosophical ideas in isolation from the broad perspective may lead to 
the loss of depth and understanding of the manifold implications and nuances 
of philosophical thought applied to PA. It is for these reasons that this book 
adopts the opposite approach to most of the available publications: it reviews 
philosophical thought with a strong historical perspective (from the origins in 
ancient Greece to contemporary philosophy) and a focus on individual philos-
ophers and their fundamental ontological views, and it then reconsiders strands 
of PA scholarship and especially questions and problems in PA in light of this 
broader philosophical perspective.3 By taking the broad picture of the history 
of philosophy, rather than just picking up one or a few specific philosophical 
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approaches, we hope to help the readers (scholars, students and practitioners of 
PA) form a broader view of how philosophy may inform our understanding of 
public administration, public management and public governance.
In sum, to our knowledge, no systematic introduction to the theme of the 
philosophical issues that are foundational to PA is available in a single-authored 
book format, and we hope this book may contribute to fill this gap. It is for this 
reason that the reader will find upfront a broad review of philosophical thought 
over the ages, developed in two dedicated chapters (Chapters 2 and 3), before 
this body of knowledge, understanding and wisdom is applied to contemporary 
PA themes and issues (Chapters 4–10).
It should be emphasised, however, that this is just an introduction to phi-
losophy and PA, intended as a valuable aid to those engaged in substantive, 
in-depth investigations of specific streams of philosophical thought and their 
influence on specified areas of public administration (public governance, 
public policy and management). Above all, this book is intended as an aid 
to the lay reader – scholar, student or practitioner – to grab the broad picture 
and put debates and discussions of philosophical perspectives in PA into the 
broader perspective of two and a half millennia of philosophical thought. In 
slightly more contentious words, our general assumption is that the latest sigh 
of some post-modern or post-something philosopher may possibly inspire nice 
reflections, but it does not replace the insights that may be drawn from the 
systematic reading4 of the philosophical thought from Aristotle to Kant, from 
the pre-Socratics to the contemporary schools.
DEFINITIONS: PHILOSOPHY
But what is philosophy, and why does it matter for PA? This is undoubtedly 
an arduous question. A good starting point lies in pointing out that philosophy 
– unlike ‘scientific’ disciplines – does not have a subject matter; rather, it does 
have key questions and themes such as (Kenny, 2010):
• ‘What there is’: Metaphysics/Ontology and God
• ‘Who we are/who I am’: Soul and Mind
• ‘How to live’: Ethics and Morality (axiology)
• ‘How to live together’: Political Philosophy
• ‘How to know/what we know’: Philosophy of Knowledge/Epistemology
The acquisition of rational knowledge and understanding of reality as such, 
the deployment of the ‘science of reason’ (λόγοσ [logos] is the ancient Greek 
language term for ‘reason’ or ‘word’ – the capacity to understand reality in 
and through language) is the ultimate nature of philosophy. A deepened under-
standing rather than a vaster disciplinary knowledge of a subject matter is the 
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outcome of philosophising (in the ‘positive’ meaning of the term: the exercise 
of philosophical reflection). In the original language of the people to whose 
genius is attributed the very invention of philosophy, the ancient Greek word 
for philosophy is φιλοσοφία (read ‘philosophía’), which we can translate as 
‘love of wisdom’ – the pursuit of knowledge and understanding done for the 
very love of the wisdom that is grounded in the fullest understanding of things.
Philosophy stems from the need of the human being to reach a deeper 
understanding of the totality of reality and also from the questions aroused by 
this quest: why is there being rather than nothingness? Why do I exist? What 
is this totality, where does it come from and why? It is wonder and amazement 
in front of the totality of being that originates philosophy and philosophising. 
And the very nature of philosophy and its difference from the specific disci-
plines in which knowledge is articulated brings with it a distinctive trait of 
philosophising: the absence of any need to have or gain privileged access to 
information. It is not necessary to collate special data (e.g. out of an exper-
iment, or a survey, or the access to unpublished documents) in order to be 
able to philosophise: ‘philosophy is not a matter of expanding knowledge, of 
acquiring new truths about the world; the philosopher is not in possession of 
information that is denied to others. Philosophy is not a matter of knowledge; 
it is a matter of understanding, that is to say, of organizing what is known’ 
(Kenny, 2010, p. x). Philosophy, although in continuous dialogue with the 
findings of the manifold disciplines into which knowledge is provisionally 
articulated, is ultimately based on ordinary experience.5
Indeed, it may be argued that, one way or another, all the specific individual 
disciplines have stemmed from philosophy and have detached from it over 
time:
Many disciplines that in antiquity and the Middle Ages were part of philosophy 
have long since become independent sciences … Perhaps no scientific concepts are 
ever fully clarified, and no scientific methods are ever totally uncontroversial: if so, 
there is always a philosophical element left in every science. But once problems can 
be unproblematically stated, when concepts are uncontroversially standardized, and 
where consensus emerges for the methodology of solution, then we have a science 
setting up home independently, rather than a branch of philosophy. (Kenny, 2010, 
pp. x–xi)
Philosophy, in the meantime, remains focused on reality as such, on being in 
its totality. The social sciences are among the disciplines that stemmed from 
philosophy; for example, economics originally belonged to moral philosophy 
and then set up home as an independent – albeit far from uncontroversial – 
science. It ensues from this and is worth noting that when a discipline is far 
from having its problems unproblematically stated and its concepts uncon-
troversially standardised – as it is widely and almost unanimously claimed to 
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be the case for PA (Raadschelders, 2005) – then its ties with philosophy are 
stronger and the unresolved ‘philosophical residue’ mentioned earlier gains 
in prominence. Indeed, PA has been defined as the interdisciplinary study of 
government (famously by Waldo, 1948/1984; Frederickson, 1980; Marini, 
1971), and hence not one discipline but rather a set of disciplinary approaches 
aimed at enhancing our knowledge and understanding of government in action 
– a nature that further distances PA from a science whose terms are unproblem-
atically stated and concepts uncontroversially standardised (the nature of PA is 
discussed in the subsequent part of this chapter) and hence brings it closer to 
philosophy. There is therefore a call for a ‘plus’ of philosophical reflection for 
the development of the field of PA.
Philosophy also resembles the arts, particularly in its having a significant 
relation to a canon: it does not have a specific subject matter, but a set of 
characteristic methods (Kenny, 2010, pp. xi–xii in particular). Here too we can 
detect a close connection to PA. The ‘double nature’ of PA as both a ‘science’ 
(albeit displaying high intra- and inter-disciplinary fragmentation) and an ‘art 
and profession’ has widely been upheld as a defining feature: this is a trait that 
further reinforces the claim that PA can largely benefit from being revisited 
from a philosophical perspective. The arts, notably ‘the art of government’, in 
this sense entwine with philosophy, and the art and profession of PA – and the 
many arts and professions that partake in the practice of PA – may therefore 
be better understood by revisiting them in the light of philosophical thought. 
In this sense, we argue that philosophy may shed light on PA as science, as 
well as on PA as art and profession – the art and the profession of governing 
through administration.6 Philosophical knowledge and understanding, we 
argue, is constitutive of PA broadly intended.
One other issue pertaining to the very nature of philosophising is worth 
addressing before we turn to examining the nature of PA: what is the answer 
to the question ‘is there progress in philosophy?’. In fact, we may notice that 
there seems to be a circularity in philosophy: developing a philosophical 
system or examining new problems eventually leads (back) to old philo-
sophical problems. Albert Einstein, the giant of modern physics, likened 
philosophy and philosophical systems to something written on honey: when 
you contemplate it the first time, it is marvellous, but when you go back to 
it later it has dissolved and what remains is just honey – that is, ‘reality’ and 
the same perennial questions about it. So, should the answer to this question 
be altogether negative, that there is no progress in philosophy? Only partly 
so. Following (again) Kenny (2010, pp. xii–xiii) we can observe that one 
answer to the question of progress in philosophy lies in it being an antidote to 
novel prejudices and fallacies: philosophy may not progress, but going back 
to philosophy may provide efficacious cure to intellectual confusion, which 
arises in different epochs in different forms. One prejudice of our epoch may 
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be the metaphor of the mind as a computer, a processor of information. The 
roots of this prejudice may be fully understandable given the developments 
and impacts of computer science over the decades since the second half of the 
20th century. However, philosophers over the centuries centred their attention 
on other dimensions in order to understand the nature of the mind – and there 
may be very good reason why they did so: mind is about conscience and 
self-conscience; mind is about the subject posing itself and hence the object 
as distinct from itself; mind is about intentionality; and so on (see Chapters 2 
and 3 for discussion of philosophies underlying these notions of the mind). 
What emerges from the adoption of a philosophical stance is that the mind is 
more and other than a processor of information, and any understanding of the 
mind requires a wider and deeper array of metaphors than that of a computer.7 
At another and more fundamental level, in responding to the question whether 
there is progress in philosophy it may be claimed that the appearance of new 
giants of philosophy over the epochs has brought novel perspectives to the 
ways in which the fundamental philosophical questions are being asked and 
addressed (if not answered). These may therefore have provided the later 
generations with new conceptual keys to tackle fundamental issues for under-
standing reality. For example, the ‘revolution of the knowing subject’ brought 
about by the philosopher Immanuel Kant (whereby the categories of being are 
thought to be a property of the knowing subject rather than properties of being 
as such; his philosophy is widely discussed in Chapter 3) may be problematic 
to reckon as ‘progress’ if advancement is conceptualised in terms of some 
form of ‘accumulation of knowledge’ (Kant’s philosophy does not ‘add’ to 
previous philosophies, but rather challenges and revolutionises them), but it 
represents a strikingly original approach to philosophising that enlarges the 
repertoire of viewpoints on ontology and the philosophy of knowledge, and as 
such constitutes an enduring addition bequeathed to subsequent philosophical 
reflection. Thus, although it is controversial whether and to what extent there 
is accumulation of knowledge in philosophy (because this would require the 
kind of unproblematic goal-definition, problem-statement and methodological 
agreement that characterise individual disciplines rather than philosophy), it 
does not appear improper to talk of ‘progress’ of a sort.
It is now time to briefly introduce and discuss the nature of the other main 
subject of this book: public administration.
DEFINITIONS: PUBLIC ADMINISRATION
There are countless definitions of public administration, public management 
and public governance. It seems to be widely held (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; 
Ferlie et al., 2005; Ongaro and van Thiel, 2018a, 2018b; Painter and Peters, 
2010; Perry and Christensen, 2015; Pollitt, 2016a; Raadschelders, 2005), 
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however, that public administration can be defined as a subject matter, defined 
by its subject rather than as an individual discipline that has set up home, with 
its own uncontroversial consensus on methods.8 It is considered to be ‘multi-
disciplinary’ or ‘interdisciplinary’ (the difference between the two notions 
is basically that scholars defining PA as ‘multi’ disciplinary emphasise the 
limited lack of interconnections among the findings of the various disciplines 
that are applied to the study of PA, whilst scholars who favour defining PA 
as an ‘inter’ disciplinary endeavour entail that findings can be fruitfully com-
bined and integrated for the advancement of the field). Although a discipline 
focuses on one category or dimension of natural or social phenomena and 
one method or set of methods to study them (just as we identify ‘economic’ 
phenomena studied by economics, geographical phenomena further divided 
into phenomena studied by natural geography and human geography, and so 
on), a subject matter is defined by the terrain it covers. Public administration 
has been defined as ‘a multidisciplinary endeavour with a prime focus on 
studying government in order to produce insights to improve government 
practice’ (Bauer, 2018, p. 1050). It has also been qualified by its concern with 
the processes of preparation, promulgation/enactment and enforcement of 
the law (see Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017), also considering the fact that a dis-
tinctive trait since Weber’s theorisation lies in conceiving of ‘modern’ public 
administration as operating under conditions of legal domination whereby the 
law is the legitimate source of power9 rather than charisma or tradition (Rosser, 
2018). Emphasis on the role of law also differentiates public administration 
from ‘public management’ (the latter being concerned with the relationship 
between resources consumed and results produced by public organisations); 
public administration and public management are in this respect different map-
pings of the same terrain (see Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2000, 2004). Finally yet importantly, public governance is a term employed to 
indicate the broader processes of steering of society by public institutions and 
engaging non-governmental actors into public policy, as opposed to the stricter 
focus on governmental authoritative decisions and administrative processes 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000; Torfing et al., 2012). Governance also refers to the 
broader formal and informal rules, conventions, practices and beliefs in place 
in a given political regime. We will subsequently mainly refer collectively 
to public administration, public management and public governance as ‘PA’ 
unless otherwise specified.
Many (at least amongst the scholars of public administration) would 
agree that public administration is the interdisciplinary study and practice 
of government rather than a monodisciplinary approach to one aspect of 
government (political, economic, sociological or other). Some will point to 
the extant limitations of the ways in which different disciplines contribute 
to PA and would rather talk of ‘multi’ disciplinary rather than ‘inter’ disci-
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plinary study of government (e.g. Bauer, 2018), while others will emphasise 
the cross-disciplinary status and contend that the significance and standing 
of PA is augmented rather than diminished by such status (which, inter alia, 
means that PA does not suffer but rather benefits from being a field defined 
by its subject rather than its method, Raadschelders and Vigoda-Gadot, 2015). 
Emphasis has been placed on the claim that PA lacks epistemological and 
methodological consensus because of its very inter- or multi-disciplinary 
nature, but the counter-argument (e.g. Riccucci, 2010; Stillman, 1991/1999) 
is that being interdisciplinary – exactly because it is interdisciplinary10 – PA 
provides a more comprehensive understanding of government (‘understand-
ing’ being here distinct from ‘knowledge’) than paradigm-based disciplines 
can furnish, because paradigm-based disciplines by definition ‘see’ only one 
dimension of government11 (this being in a certain sense the ‘price’ you have to 
pay for paradigmatic and methodological consensus). In this perspective, PA 
is the study of government from an inter- or multi-disciplinary perspective for 
goals of generating applied knowledge.
What are the constitutive disciplines from which PA draws? Three are 
widely held as constitutive of PA: political science, management and law – but 
others are crucial too, and these include economics, organisation science and 
sociology.
Political science is the social scientific study of political systems and their 
interactions (the latter usually goes under the label of ‘international relations’, 
although at times the boundaries may be blurred: notably, the intensity of the 
interactions occurring in a polity like the European Union can only partly 
be read through the lens of traditional international relations studies, and in 
many regards the European Union can be considered as a sui generis political 
system). It generally encompasses the whole of the political process from 
politics as mobilisation to the functioning of political institutions to public 
policy. Politics as mobilisation refers to the processes of identity building and 
creation or depletion of the sense of belonging to the political system by its 
members (citizens or others), to the dynamics of party politics, to the mecha-
nisms of the electoral systems and the dynamics of electoral competition (in 
democratic polities) or other forms whereby a party or group attains power (in 
non-democratic polities). The social scientific study of political institutions 
encompasses the three main branches of power: government (executive pol-
itics), legislative (legislative politics) and judiciary, as well as their manifold 
interactions. The analysis of public policies encompasses the dynamics of the 
policy process and the whole range of actors involved, public and non-public. 
For example, in some analytical frameworks it is spoken of ‘advocacy coali-
tion’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), whilst in others of policy sub-system 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). The policy process may conventionally be 
charted in phases: from agenda setting and the specification of alternatives, to 
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policy decision, to policy implementation and delivery of public services, to 
employ the fictional but useful notion of policy cycle (Kingdon, 1994). PA is 
significant throughout all the stages of the political process: public governance 
and public administration are significant also in political mobilisation, as well 
as the functioning of public institutions, not just pertaining to the executive 
power but also the legislative and judiciary powers; however, public adminis-
tration and public management are habitually more closely connected to public 
policy (also in the institutionalisation in the academia, with many university 
chairs being labelled ‘Public Administration and Policy’ or similar denomina-
tions). PA is about the forming of public policy throughout the whole cycle; 
public policy is about PA in action.
In this book we expand the horizon beyond political science to encompass 
the branch of philosophy from which political science originated, namely 
political philosophy. In Chapter 5 in particular we delve into the foundational 
issue of justification: what makes a political system, a public governance 
system ‘legitimate’? Other branches of philosophy are also crucial for political 
science and its contribution to PA, notably ontology, epistemology and ethics. 
We review some of these links especially in Chapters 4 and 6, after having pre-
sented the main philosophical schools in Chapters 2 and 3. The kind of inquiry 
we develop in this book is deeply resonant with Dwight Waldo’s definition of 
PA as political theory and the significance of values in the conception of the 
administrative state (Waldo, 1948/1984). To the extent this conception of the 
administrative state may be thought to be ‘overly American’, it is interesting 
to note how Stillman characterised the relations between the state and PA on 
the two sides of the Atlantic, whereby PA makes the State in the US, while the 
State makes PA in Europe (Stillman, 1999) – and possibly this framing may 
apply more widely across the globe, distinguishing between polities in which 
it has historically been the State to come first (e.g. in the Confucian tradition 
in China), and jurisdictions in which administration may to some extent 
have come first (mostly this may be the case, at least to a certain extent, for 
Common Law systems and chiefly for the US system). In either case, PA and 
political theory are intimately interconnected.
Management is a constitutive discipline for PA, notably where the emphasis 
is on the relationship between resources consumed and results produced by 
public services organisations, and the main defining problem is the improve-
ment of government practices. For Borgonovi (1973, 1984), a leading author 
in the Italian school of public management, public management should be 
seen as an integral part of the discipline of management and one of its three 
main pillars. Based on an institutionalist view, the starting point is a tripartite 
representation of society as constituted of three categories of institutions: busi-
nesses, governments, and families and third-sector organisations. Public man-
agement is placed alongside business administration and management (related 
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to the management of the first category of institutions, the businesses) and the 
management of families and third-sector organisations (third category) as one 
of the three main branches of management. Public management is the study of 
the economic dimension of the second category of institutions: public institu-
tions (more often referred to as ‘governments’ in the English language litera-
ture). According to this perspective, the fact that since the end of WWII public 
management has mainly been importing knowledge from private management, 
rather than the other way around, is purely contingent (more scholars and more 
resources are available for private management nowadays, but this was not the 
case in the first half of the 20th century, and the situation might well reverse 
again in the future), and there is no super-ordination/subordination relation 
between private and public management, that stands on equal footing. In this 
perspective, the study of public administration tends to overlap with the study 
of public management (one critique may be that this perspective emphasises 
certain dimensions, like the performance criteria of efficiency, effectiveness 
and economy, to the detriment of others in the study of PA). Distinctive but 
closely related to management is the contribution of organisation science to 
PA (Christensen et al., 2007; Christensen and Laegreid, 2018; March, 1999; 
March and Olsen, 1995, 1996).
The contribution of economics (political economy) to PA may instead be 
categorised at a distinct level. This disciplinary contribution is prominent in the 
strand of the so-called ‘public choice’ (the economic study of decision-making 
in public settings). Influential contributions are those of Niskanen (1971, 1973, 
1994) and Dunleavy (1991), amongst others. An overview of the influence of 
the discipline of economics in the field of PA, the kinds of contributions and 
the presence in public administration journals is developed by Tõnurist and 
Bækgaard (2018).
A central problem of all three these disciplines (management, organisation 
science, economics) is the study of the relationship between individuals and 
organisations. In this book we revisit some of the foundational issues surround-
ing the relations between individuals and organisations as they are investigated 
by the disciplines of management, organisation science and economics: this 
is done by taking an altogether philosophical perspective, reviewing the main 
schools of thought and the great philosophers of the past (in Chapters 2 and 
3), and then revisiting a range of PA topics from the perspectives of classical 
metaphysics, Kantian philosophy and contemporary strands like existentialism 
(see the debate on the existentialist public administrator), structuralism and 
phenomenology, amongst others (Chapters 4 and 6).
Law – notably public and administrative law – is a key contributing disci-
pline to ‘modern’ public administration. In a review of the contribution of law 
to PA, Dragos and Langbroek (2018, p. 1068) claim that: ‘[I]t may be asserted 
that public administration as a discipline owes its existence to lawyers – who 
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developed this field in the 19th and 20th century especially in continental 
European countries – and political scientists.’ Although this assertion may 
be contested, the significance of law and lawyers for the development of 
PA is hard to overestimate and ‘it was not until the second half of the 20th 
century, following Herbert Simon in particular, that sociology and organi-
zation theory switched the emphasis in the study of public administration, 
with an ever-growing tendency to talk about public management rather than 
public administration’ (Dragos and Langbroek, 2018, p. 1068). Nowadays, 
the authors continue, lawyers tend to focus on the functioning of the judiciary 
with respect to administrative processes, on court judgement, court cases and 
their influence on administrative action, as well as on judiciary supervision of 
PA and the resolution of conflicts between citizens and public administrations. 
If a divorce, or at least an estrangement, has occurred between law and public 
administration, then can bridges be regained between law and the other disci-
plines studying PA (thus making PA more ‘inter’ disciplinary and less ‘multi’ 
disciplinary)? Recent trends and topics (and fads) that require the combination 
of law and the other disciplines studying PA are ‘deregulation’ and ‘better reg-
ulation’. At another level, a candidate to perform such bridging function might 
be the (problematic and contested) notion of ‘Good Governance’, put forward 
especially by international organisations like the World Bank.
This book does not directly address the contribution of positive law12 to 
PA (let alone any discussion of the relationships between natural or revealed 
law and public governance). It does, however, examine through the thought 
of classical philosophers the relationship between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, between 
what is and what ought to be (the actual and the normative dimensions in 
the philosophical sense; see Rutgers, 2008a), which is a key underlying and 
constitutive dimension of law and its applications to PA (to take an illustrative 
example from a country with which the author of this book is familiar, it may 
be noticed that the two articles of the Italian constitution that are devoted to PA 
– articles 97 and 98 – do embody a philosophical conception of PA and provide 
a normative statement about what criteria should be employed to reckon the 
functioning of public offices as being aligned with the upheld notion of ‘good’ 
administration).
The discipline of sociology is also widely seen as constitutive of PA since 
the seminal works of Max Weber (1922). Sociological frameworks like those 
drawn from Dukheim (Perri 6 and Mars, 2008; Perri 6, 2014) and sociological 
notions like that of social mechanisms are widely employed as building blocks 
of analyses in PA studies (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998; for applications to 
PA, see Asquer, 2012; Barzelay and Gallego, 2010; Mele, 2010; Ongaro, 2006, 
2013). Given its status as one of the basic disciplines in the social sciences, if 
not the ‘king’ of the social sciences, debates in sociology delve not unexpect-
edly into ultimately philosophical questions, not least including the way in 
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which we conceive of ‘time’ (see Abbott, 1992a, 1992b) and of notions such as 
potentiality and actuality. These themes are examined – from a philosophical 
perspective – in Chapter 4 for the drawing of implications for PA, where the 
topic of social ontology is delved into.
A range of other disciplines are employed in PA studies, including psychol-
ogy and cognitive psychology (notably conceived as one of the influencing 
disciplines in the field of the so-called ‘Behavioural Public Administration’, 
recently revived; see Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017; Tummers et al., 2016; 
Olsen et al., 2018 – and the establishment in the middle of the 2010s by the 
European Group for Public Administration – EGPA – of a Permanent Study 
Group dedicated to researching this theme; see also Dunlop and Radaelli, 
2018, on learning in public organisations); cultural anthropology (an exemplar 
of the utilisation of cultural anthropological theory in PA is Hood, 1998); 
human geography, and historiography (Melis, 1996; Raadschelders, 2000; 
Rugge, 2012).
The practice of PA involves an even wider range of disciplines that relate to 
the sectors of administrative action and public policy: from public economics 
to criminology, from engineering to architecture, from informatics to medi-
cine, and so on. Indeed, PA has been seen not just as a science but also, on 
an equal footing and in an equally constitutive way, as an art and a profession 
(Frederickson, 1980; Frederickson and Smith, 2002). PA is first and foremost 
being practised and, in this sense, following Bauer (2018), PA is perhaps 
best seen as profession, as primarily interested in instrumental knowledge in 
the same sense like medicine or engineering are (Barzelay, 2019, argues for 
a conception of public management as a design oriented professional disci-
pline – in line with the ideas of the sciences of the artificial wrought out by 
Simon, 1969/1981/1996 – a conception that may flank the other notions of PA 
introduced and employed throughout this book). The aim of PA would then be 
rather optimising public administration in the widest sense, that is, making the 
state work as legitimately, fairly, effectively and efficiently as possible.
Historically a number of civil services (like the British one) used to train 
civil and public servants mainly in the humanities. Public servants were seen 
as ‘amateurs’ whose main skills lay in general culture and in learning by 
practising, learning ‘on the job’. A philosophical, historical and literary culture 
was seen as pivotal in the public service. The underlying conception was 
one in which ‘understanding’ comes before (technical) ‘knowledge’. This is 
a conception of PA in which the emphasis is on understanding rather than dis-
ciplinary knowledge, in which to be centre stage is the bridging of knowledge 
and action through understanding and on linking the explanatory (why? what? 
questions) to the normative (the ‘should’ questions, e.g. what should PA do?). 
PA is in this respect an art: it is about the capacity to bridge understanding and 
knowledge, normative and explanatory in order to create, maintain, renew an 
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administrative system (like the administration of the British or the Chinese, or 
the French or Italian State – and on occasions in history to invent new systems 
of public governance and their correspondingly novel forms of administration, 
as Walter Hallstein and Emile Noël, first President and Secretary General 
respectively of the European Commission, did when they contrived the admin-
istration of the European Union, inspired also by the likes of Jean Monnet). In 
this perspective, it is philosophical understanding we need to resort to, and it 
is philosophical understanding to ultimately underpin the theory and practice 
of PA and hence enable the bridging of specialised knowledge and action. An 
overarching aim of this book is drawing the attention of scholars and practi-
tioners in PA to this fundamental dimension.13
In a sense, this is the old question of whether governments need specialists 
or generalists amongst their staff (and whether academics must themselves be 
specialists to ensure they can go in depth and generate ‘new’ knowledge into 
the one topic of election, or generalists, and to ensure they have the broad view 
and the capacity to make meaningful connections among bodies of knowl-
edge). The answer given in this perspective is ‘both’ – but with the important 
qualification that, especially at the upper tiers, generalists provide an inval-
uable contribution: the generalist may be a dilettante (Dogan, 1996, p. 99), 
but specialisation disperses knowledge, and understanding is a fundamental 
requirement for the running and bettering of PA. Generalists’ skills include
extensive knowledge of the system of government and of relevant and related policy 
areas … knowledge of and experience in the various line and staff units of the organ-
ization where one is employed, as well as political sensitivity, deep understanding 
of the nature of the interaction between government and society, and the capacity to 
sense the various social trends. (Raadschelders, 2005, p. 618)
The study of public administration also needs generalists, that is, ‘scholars who 
make the effort to develop frameworks that help connecting knowledge about 
government from a wide array of sources’ (Raadschelders, 2005, p. 622). 
Philosophical knowledge and understanding are engine and fuel for the effi-
cacy of this effort, for achieving this overarching goal.
Last, but definitely not least in the perspective of this book, PA may also 
be seen – alongside a science, an art and a profession – as a form of ‘human-
ism’ (a conception very much in line with Waldo’s – 1948/1984). Public 
administration is in this sense part of the humanities too, administering being 
concerned also and intrinsically with the making of value-laden decisions, 
which demand the decision-makers to exercise judgement and wisdom (see 
Hodgkinson, 1978, on whose thought we return to in Chapter 4). Hence 
another perspective along which to situate the rationale for this book is that of 
bringing to the fore in an explicit way the nature of PA as a form of humanism 
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and its partaking to the humanities too (much in line with a similar call by 
other authors: Herbel, 2018, makes the case for PA to re-bond with its ties to 
the humanities, and urges it to ‘come back to the fold’ of the liberal arts from 
which – Herbel argues – it originated; in a similar vein, with a more autobio-
graphical colouring of the argument, Samier makes a plea for PA to conceive 
of itself as a humanities discipline, and even proposes a humanistic manifesto 
for PA, Samier, 2005). PA is human-made, it is made by humans for humans, 
and hence it must be informed by knowledge and understanding about the 
human nature: its traits, needs, motivations and aspirations to well-being – and 
the rights and obligations associated to our human condition (we return to 
these topics widely throughout the book).
To reinforce the case for bringing PA back to its humanities/humanistic 
roots, we can refer to the admonitions that Hannah Arendt (1951/1958) issued 
to the contemporary rulers when she referred to the death of Socrates (see 
Chapter 2) as the death of wisdom in both public governance and society 
at large: from this consideration stems her call to rediscover philosophical 
wisdom alongside and in a sense over technical expertise as the only way 
forward for a better and more humane society and public governance. Her call 
resonates as part and parcel of the rationale for this book, which aims to (re-)
introduce philosophical knowledge into the study of PA in a more systematic 
way, and with it at re-bringing philosophical wisdom (the wisdom that derives 
from philosophical knowledge and understanding) into public governance.
In sum, the nature of PA as both science and also and in an integrated way an 
art, a profession and a form of humanism, drawing from the humanities, is part 
and parcel of its nature. To the extent PA is science, we conceive of science 
in a broad rather than narrow sense: we intend science as episteme, as rigour 
in generating knowledge (more on this in Chapter 2); and we intend PA as 
a science in the academia in the sense conveyed by the German language term 
of wissenschaft, a field of intellectual inquiry conducted through an approach 
that encompasses a systematic consideration for values and meanings in the 
study of social phenomena (Gadamer, 1960/1975; Weber, 1922, 1949). Within 
the framework of this broad conception of science, we intend ‘explanation’ 
as both the process of identifying the causes of something, and the process of 
attributing meaning to something (Demeulenaere, 2011, Chapter 1).14
PA draws from the social sciences and shares with them the common prob-
lems and quandaries of social scientific knowledge (more on this in Chapter 
6); at the same time, due to its composite nature, it partly transcends those 
boundaries to enter the terrain of the canons and practices of a profession (like 
medicine or engineering), of a human activity which is also inherently an art 
(the art of governing and administering), and of the humanities (the making of 
value-laden decisions and the attributing of meaning to the public space).
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Finally, the significance of the subject of this book, that is, PA, can hardly be 
underestimated. Put plainly, ‘Once people turn from nomads living in tribes to 
individuals living in imagined communities, government, law and administra-
tion become a fact of life’ (Raadschelders, 2005, p. 604) on which an important 
part of the well-being of humans depends.
PHILOSOPHY OF AND FOR PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION
The thrust of this book is eminently one of introducing philosophical thought 
for PA (philosophy for PA) and, out of the key branches of philosophy, the 
main emphasis is on issues of ontology. What other approaches could have 
been taken to bridge philosophy and PA? As a very minimum, it is possible to 
outline three different ways of defining how the relationship between philoso-
phy and the field of PA can be tackled:
• Philosophy for PA: the fundamental thrust is employing philosophical 
speculation to enlighten facets of the study and the practice of PA and find 
new viewpoints on PA themes ordinarily debated in the dedicated litera-
ture. This approach could perhaps have been natural at the dawn and in the 
forming period of PA studies, when scholars and practitioners alike might 
have been generalists in their background, possibly literates in classics and 
philosophy, and ultimately amateurs in PA because demands of special-
ised knowledge were not as compelling as nowadays. In this approach, 
the starting point is the broad overview over philosophical thought, and 
then this huge body of wisdom and knowledge becomes the source for 
selective applications to themes and issues of contemporary significance 
in PA. However, the basic requisite lies in knowledge of the field of PA 
and the charting of it: philosophical thought is then deployed for critically 
revisiting and rethinking contemporary PA themes and issues. This book 
is structured according to this logic, as it aims to examine and discuss the 
approach of philosophy for PA.
• Philosophy of PA: this approach is based on professional philosophers 
articulating their philosophical reflection into the specific field of PA. The 
starting point is the thought of classical authors: from the seminal seeds in 
Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics to the works of authors operating 
in a period when the ‘modern’ state was already taking shape, notably 
where they more specifically theorise the role of administration within the 
state (like Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in particular §§ 287–97 on PA; 
incidentally, it may be noticed that Hegel’s foundation of the legitimacy 
of the Nation State, and hence of its administrative apparatus, as the 
embodiment of the Absolute Reason – more on this in Chapter 3 when 
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Hegel’s thought is introduced and discussed – is also a reminder about 
how powerful a weaponry philosophy may be when it comes to providing 
legitimacy to human artefacts, like administrative systems). One problem 
with this approach is that contemporary professional philosophers are lim-
itedly engaged with PA debates, also because of the almost impossibility of 
becoming specialists in both fields, and hence an apparent hiatus between 
foundational philosophical elaborations and the issues and themes that can 
be found debated in the contemporary PA literature.
• Mapping backwards from the PA field to philosophical thought: this 
approach starts from the charting of the territory of PA to then engage in 
some backwards mapping to what the philosophical premises of the PA 
scholarship being vetted might be. It is best practised by engaging with 
the individual PA scholar and asking her/him to track backwards what the 
foundations have been of her/his work – although this may be practically 
near impossible. Riccucci (2010) is an eminent example of this way of 
tackling the relationship between PA and philosophy: PA streams are 
reviewed, the work of leading scholars vetted, and then the underlying 
philosophies of knowledge tracked.
Intermediate approaches may also be identified and singled out; for example, 
an approach focusing on key topics of contemporary significance for PA 
and then inquiring into them from a philosophical standpoint is an approach 
somehow in-between philosophy of PA and philosophy for PA.
The sheer magnitude of the body of philosophical thought poses another 
challenge to any work engaged in the venture of bridging PA and philosophy. 
It is thus likely that any work will have a main emphasis, either on political 
philosophy and philosophy of ethics, or on philosophy of knowledge, or on 
ontology, depending on the background and inclinations of the author (and to 
some extent also on the kindness of the publisher in offering more text space 
to elaborate on topics). We may then tentatively chart the combination of the 
basic approach to the relationship between philosophy and PA, on one hand, 
and the main emphasis of the study, on the other hand, and work out a mapping 
of some of the works that tackled this issue. The result is reported in Table 1.1.
Importantly, this book is conceived and structured according to the logic and 
approach of being a book about philosophy for PA (after having fulfilled its 
initial task of introducing the overall set of relations between philosophy and 
PA). This means the present book is varied in the range of topics addressed, 
hopefully articulate in discussing some of the manifold ways with which 
philosophies and philosophical perspectives can be made to contribute to our 
understanding of different facets of PA, and composite in the range of themes 
being examined. Only books that, differently from this one, aim to elaborate 
a philosophy of PA can be selective and focused in the profiles of PA that is 
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Table 1.1 A mapping of the basic approach in some studies of the 
relationship between philosophy and public administration
Relation 
PA–Philosophy
Main emphasis of 
the study
Philosophy for PA Mapping backwards from 
PA to philosophy
Philosophy of PA
Ontology Ongaro, Philosophy 
and PA (this book)
Uncharted territory (but 
see Stout, ‘Competing 
Ontologies for PA’)
Plato, Republic
Aristotle, Politics
Hegel, Right
(indirectly: Hodgkinson, 
Towards a Philosophy of 
Administration)
Philosophy of 
knowledge
Uncharted territory? Riccucci, PA: Philosophies 
of Knowledge
Raadschelders, PA 
Interdisciplinary Study of 
Government
Simon, Administrative 
Behavior
Waldo, Administrative State
Political philosophy Uncharted territory? Frederickson, The New PA
Hood, Art of State
Plato, Republic
Aristotle, Politics
Hegel, Right
Waldo, Administrative State
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being examined, as those books will argue that certain dimensions of PA are 
central because those dimensions reflect the chosen philosophical premises 
(e.g. the social construction of the meaning of good public governance will 
be central to a relativist philosophy; conversely, a Hegelian conception of the 
State, and PA within it, will dwell more on the drawing of the implications of 
the ethical primacy of the State and its administrative apparatus; and so forth). 
A book like this one which puts centre stage to work out the implications of 
philosophy for PA will need to engage with the issue of how different and 
diverse philosophies may be employed to shed light on virtually all the facets 
and dimensions of PA; consequently, a book such as this one demands a bit 
more of the patience of the reader: You, dear Reader, will be accompanied – 
hopefully efficaciously – through a journey with multiple paths and threads by 
this book: it is for this reason that in the remainder of this chapter I will dwell 
at some length on the conceptual map of this journey and the articulation of 
the book. In the following section it is shown the logical structure of the book, 
also supported by a graphical visualisation (Figure 1.1) and an illustrative table 
(Table 1.2); a final section ‘how to read this book’ provides additional guid-
ance on how to make the most of the resources contained in this manuscript. 
Limitations and issues of methods are also discussed in the remainder of this 
chapter.
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OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK
This book takes a different approach than most other PA contributions tackling 
philosophical issues. Rather than starting from a chosen PA topic or issue 
to then resort selectively to philosophical apparatuses that may enlighten 
the problem under investigation, or taking the move from one philosopher’s 
thought to then discuss the implications for PA, I start from a very broad 
and as systematic as possible review of philosophical thought. Based on the 
results of this review, the remainder of the book examines how the systematic 
employment of philosophical thought may yield fruits for a deeper and suppler 
understanding of contemporary research in the field of PA.
This choice of contents is reflected in the outline of the book, which is 
visually provided in Figure 1.1 and summarised in Table 1.2. The next two 
chapters delve at first into the deeper roots of Western philosophy in Greek, 
medieval and early modern philosophical thought (Chapter 2), and then turn 
to modern and contemporary philosophy (Chapter 3). Throughout these two 
chapters, however, links to PA themes are systematically pointed out at the 
end of each section, consistently with the overall thrust of this book, which 
is mainly aimed at a PA readership. Chapter 4 is pivotal in that it applies the 
findings of the review chapters to a range of themes and issues in PA. The main 
focus of Chapter 4 is on ontological issues. Chapter 5 shifts from ontological 
to political philosophical foundational issues in PA, delving into the distinction 
between ‘common good’ and ‘social contract’ arguments for the foundation of 
the ‘legitimacy’ of a political system and their implications for the legitimacy 
of public governance and of the doctrines to reform the public sector. Chapter 
6 reviews philosophical-epistemological issues in PA. Chapter 7 revisits the 
works of three classical authors: Ambrogio Lorenzetti, Niccolò Machiavelli 
and Thomas More. They accompany us on a tour into three dimensions of 
PA, namely the role of (public) virtues, the arguments of ‘realism’ in politics, 
and the continued inspiration that utopian thinking may elicit. They will also 
guide us to reflect on crucial issues, like the immutability of human nature 
and its implications for the study and the practice of PA. Chapter 8 revisits 
the notions of ‘best’ – or ‘good enough’ – ‘practices’; ‘models’; ‘paradigms’; 
‘ideal-types’; and ‘utopias’, and how these represent powerful conceptual tools 
for the study and practice of PA, notably when utilised in an integrated way. 
Chapter 9 discusses the nature and type of contribution that philosophy may 
provide to the main intellectual traditions of PA, variedly conceived of as sci-
entific knowledge, an interpretivist venture, practical experience, or practical 
wisdom. Finally, Chapter 10 ‘looks forward’ and discusses how to advance 
a research agenda centred on bringing philosophical thought into PA, also by 
tackling some key challenges brought about by technological advancements, 
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Figure 1.1 A conceptual map of the book
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as well as the place of philosophy into the teaching of PA, to then pull the 
threads on the intellectual journey of systematically developing philosophy 
for PA.
METHODS
There are significant methodological questions the reader might be interested 
to ask at this point. What and how can we know – can the author of this book 
know – about philosophy? And what and how can we know – can the author 
of this book know – about public administration? I’ll tackle the questions in 
order – and beg the pardon of the reader for this small personal digression (you 
can safely skip this section and go directly to the last section ‘Overview of the 
book’ or to the substantive chapters starting from Chapter 2).
The idea for this book stems from a longstanding interest in philosophical 
inquiry since I chose philosophy as a major at secondary education at the 
Lyceum, in Italy. It is then that I matured the consciousness of the significance 
of philosophy for every aspect of life, and hence also for the profession I would 
have chosen. I then turned to university degrees in disciplines related to public 
management15 and soon started to devote myself to researching public admin-
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:33:15AM
via free access
Table 1.2 Sequence of the book: a summary
Chapter 1. Introduction and rationale This chapter sets the scene and argues why philosophy and 
philosophical understanding is highly valuable for the discipline 
of public administration and public governance and management 
(in short: PA). Rationale and defining issues are discussed.
Chapter 2. Key streams in 
philosophical inquiry: a selection 
and succinct overview for the field of 
public administration – Part I
The deeper roots of Western philosophy in Greek, medieval and 
early modern philosophical thought are portrayed. The chapter 
provides the reader with an introduction to the distinctive and 
everlasting contribution of earlier philosopher. Links with and 
implications for the field of PA are previewed, to be further 
developed in Chapters 4–8.
Chapter 3. Key streams in 
philosophical inquiry: a selection 
and succinct overview for the field of 
public administration – Part II
The chapter examines modern and contemporary philosophical 
streams and furnishes an overview of how these may shed light on 
overlooked profiles of contemporary PA. Links of these streams 
of philosophy with the field of PA are previewed, to be further 
developed in Chapters 4–8.
Chapter 4. Ontological perspectives 
and public administration doctrines 
and themes
This chapter systematically applies the results of Chapters 2 and 
3 and discusses how the systematic employment of philosophical 
thought may yield fruits for a deeper and suppler understanding of 
contemporary research in the field of PA. The main focus of the 
chapter is on ontological issues.
Chapter 5. Political philosophy and 
public governance: the quest for 
justification in ‘common good’ and 
in ‘social contract’ arguments and 
their significance for the debate on the 
organisation of the public sector
This chapter shifts from ontological to political philosophical 
foundational issues in PA, delving into the distinction between 
‘common good’ and ‘social contract’ arguments for the 
foundation of the legitimacy of a political system, and their 
implications for public governance.
Chapter 6. Philosophy of knowledge 
perspectives and the study of public 
administration
This chapter reviews epistemological issues in the study of public 
administration, from the philosophical roots of interpretivist, 
positivist, and realist perspectives to the actuality of the debate 
over the nature of universal concepts.
Chapter 7. Ambrogio Lorenzetti, 
Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas More: 
on virtues, realism and utopian 
thinking in public administration
If all the book is ultimately an encounter with the great thinkers 
of the Western civilisation, this chapter picks three authors in 
particular to delve into three dimensions of PA, namely the role 
of (public) virtues, the arguments of ‘realism’ in politics and the 
continued inspiration that utopian thinking may elicit. The famous 
painting The Good Government by Ambrogio Lorenzetti, the 
masterpiece The Prince by Niccolò Machiavelli and Utopia by 
Thomas More are revisited.
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Chapter 8. Utopias, ideal-types, 
paradigms, models and ‘good 
practices’: repertoire of conceptual 
tools for public administration?
This chapter revisits the notions of ‘best’ – or ‘good enough’ – 
practices’; ‘models’; ‘paradigms’; ‘ideal-types’; and ‘utopias’, and 
how these represent powerful conceptual tools for the study and 
practice of PA, notably when utilised in an integrated way.
Chapter 9. Elements (fragments) 
for the philosophical foundations of 
a theory of public administration
The chapter discusses the nature and type of contribution that 
philosophy may provide to the main intellectual traditions of PA, 
variedly conceived of as scientific knowledge, an interpretivist 
venture, practical experience, or practical wisdom.
Chapter 10. Researching and teaching 
philosophy for public administration
This chapter ‘looks forward’ and discusses how to advance 
a research agenda centred on bringing philosophical thought 
into PA, also by tackling some key challenges brought about by 
technological advancements, as well as the place of philosophy 
into the teaching of PA, to then pull the threads on the intellectual 
journey of systematically developing philosophy for PA.
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istration and management. The idea for this book was first conceived at that 
time, over twenty years ago, when I began the study of PA with somewhere 
in the back of my mind the (deep) conviction that ‘philosophy does matter 
for the study (and the practice) of PA’. I have since continued to cultivate 
philosophical interests. More recently, for the preparation of this book I have 
widely reviewed philosophical texts and journals (amongst the journals in the 
field – and without mention of journals ‘specialised’ in branches of philosophy 
like ethics, aesthetics, etc. – are Australian Journal of Philosophy; Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy; European Journal of Philosophy; Inquiry; Journal of 
the American Philosophical Association; and Mind, amongst others). And it 
goes without saying I reviewed as widely as possible those publications in 
the public administration field delving into philosophical issues (referenced 
throughout the book).
In the writing of the text, alongside continued exchanges with colleagues in 
the discipline of public administration and management, established colleagues 
in the disciplinary field of philosophical studies have been asked advice on 
excerpts of the manuscript – notably Professor Maria Rosa Antognazza from 
King’s College London. Stretching across disciplines – notably consolidated 
academic disciplines and fields – is always a challenging endeavour, and I very 
much benefited from amicable advice during the journey. It goes without 
saying, responsibility for errors in this book are mine and mine only.
In sum, this is a book written by a professional scholar in public adminis-
tration (a public administrationist) who is also an amateur philosopher (and 
long been so, since the mid-1980s), whose hope is to contribute to open a path 
(pathway) for triggering and nourishing a much-needed debate about the phil-
osophical foundation and implications of the study and practice of PA. More 
skilled public administrationists and ‘professional’ philosophers will surely 
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develop much further what is started in this book. Hopefully, however, this 
work will provide useful building materials that will help pave the way for 
a fruitful debate that may move forward our knowledge and understanding of 
PA.
LIMITATIONS
This work has a number of important limitations of which we duly need to 
make the reader aware. The first set of limitations stem from the other side 
of the coin of its very ambitions: the terrain covered by this work is huge, 
an expanse that stretches from a vibrant and multifarious field like PA to 
the immense body of reflection, understanding and knowledge that has been 
generated by two-and-a-half millennia of philosophical reflection. The choice 
of themes inevitably needed to be highly selective and very subjective. The 
preparatory work for this book entailed an extremely wide reading, but yet this 
at most can be likened to a structured, not a systematic, review of the pertinent 
literature in PA.
A second limitation lies in this book being mostly centred on Western 
philosophy. Some historians of philosophy would argue that philosophy as is 
nowadays generally conceived, that is, the rational knowledge and understand-
ing of reality as such, the science of reason, as λόγοσ (logos), was an invention 
of the genius of the ancient Greeks that then propagated itself to the Western 
civilisation (Reale and Antiseri, 1988). However, in the broadest sense, phil-
osophical understanding is proper of all human civilisations in varied ways, 
and great benefits would be reaped by joint efforts that were to bridge across 
philosophical schools to enlighten our understanding of contemporary PA. It 
was simply beyond the capacities of the author of this book to review other 
traditions such as Islamic philosophy or Eastern philosophy, for example. 
Although mentions are made to some notions in these philosophical traditions, 
no systematic treatment is attempted – it is simply a task for other books, by 
other authors. The focus of this book is thus on Western thought. I do hope this 
effort may be matched by analogous efforts from colleagues knowledgeable 
of – to continue with the previously mentioned examples – Islamic philos-
ophy and Eastern philosophy, in order to jointly contribute towards a wider 
and wider approach to the application of philosophical thought to the field of 
public administration and public governance.
Importantly, the full title of this book is Philosophy and Public Administration: 
An Introduction. The second part of the title – An Introduction – points to 
another inherent limitation of this work: given the width and depth of the 
themes concerned, this book can only be introductory, providing a very wide 
overview as well as pointing to, and hopefully offering valuable insights into, 
a wide range of applications that philosophical thought can have for PA. But 
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these are intended as just starting points, from which specific, focused studies 
and reflections will take off for venturing into one or the other philosophical 
implications for PA. This book is a – hopefully insightful – bird’s-eye view.
HOW TO READ THIS BOOK
The most obvious way to read this book is in the way it is presented, from 
Chapter 1 to Chapter 10, from the first to the last line. However, readers of aca-
demic books are often under multiple pressures to read quickly and selectively 
– be they scholars aiming at taking away the key ideas needed to finalise one’s 
own book or article, or students striving to capture the key concepts ‘necessary 
and sufficient’ to overcome the looming hurdle of a fast-approaching exam.
For any purpose, Figure 1.1 guides the reader through the intellectual journey 
of this book in graphical format, as does Table 1.2 in verbal format. So, if you, 
dear Reader, feel competent enough with Western philosophy (and indeed you 
might be much more competent than I am), then you can skip Chapters 2 and 
3, perhaps after having looked at Table 2.1, which summarises the key phases 
of Western philosophy and reports some key ideas for application to the field 
of PA. However, much of what is being discussed throughout the remainder of 
the book rests on the ideas and concepts introduced in Chapters 2 and 3, hence 
you should carefully consider the extent to which skipping those chapters 
represents a shortcut or rather risks driving you into a cul de sac later on, as 
the time spent on reviewing the thought of key philosophers may turn out to 
be very well employed for the later stages of applying those ideas to PA. As 
a quick test, you may ponder how confident you feel with such notions as: the 
coincidence of thinking and being (as in Heraclitus); or the meaning of the 
four causes outlined by Aristotle, and within the system of the four causes the 
proper meaning of the material cause. If in doubt, spending a bit more time on 
reviewing Greek philosophy, reported in the first sections of Chapter 2, may 
be worth its while.
Chapters 4 to 8 provide the core of the distinctive contribution made by this 
book: depending on whether your interest lies more in ontological, political 
philosophical or epistemological issues, you may focus primarily Chapter 
4 or 5 or 6 respectively. If your interest lies in examining some of the key 
conceptual tools that scholars and practitioners of PA often play with (like the 
notion of ‘best practice’ or the one of ‘administrative paradigm’), then Chapter 
8 is a core focus for you. If seeking inspiration out of masterpieces of the past 
like Machiavelli’s The Prince or Lorenzetti’s The Good Government, then 
Chapter 7 is a must-read chapter. However, the five chapters develop closely 
intertwined topics and resort on multiple occasions and in multiple ways to 
key streams of philosophical thought, and do so in a tightly interconnected 
way, hence a hugely more beneficial way of going through these topics is by 
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reading them in the sequence in which they are presented, starting from the 
foundational-ontological issues discussed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 9 revisits intellectual traditions in PA from the standpoint of their, 
implicit or explicit, philosophical underpinnings, and readers interested in 
this debate may concentrate on this chapter, which also attempts to sketch the 
contours of the ideational bases of a ‘theory of PA change’ – a very ambitious 
intellectual task which is carried out in only a tentative way here, and open to 
contributions and integrations: indeed this chapter is also a call to contribute 
a broader theory of PA change, by drawing also and systematically from phil-
osophical thought. Finally, Chapter 10 suggests some paths – pathways – to 
develop a research agenda for more systematically bringing philosophy into 
PA, as well as to incorporate philosophy into the teaching of PA, in educational 
programmes at all levels, from undergraduate to postgraduate and research 
degrees, as well as in executive education and lifelong learning. Whether doing 
research on PA or working at the preparation of a new course for students of 
public governance and public management, you might find inspiration in this 
final chapter, which also discusses some challenges ahead for the study and the 
practice of PA, and how philosophical thought might contribute to better equip 
scholars and practitioners alike for tackling some of those challenges.
NOTES
1. To which the Greek philosopher Aristotle refers as ‘entelechy’, see Chapter 2.
2. Many philosophies and philosophers would reject the qualification of their thought 
as ‘system’; we use the term here in a very loose sense.
3. It is, in this respect, also quite distant from the approach taken by analytical phi-
losophy and philosophers.
4. ‘Systematic reading’ of the history of philosophy should be intended at the level 
that can be attained by good handbook summaries on the subject because the opera 
omnia of such giants of philosophical thought is well beyond the scope of this 
book.
5. A feature, it may be noticed, that has made it cheaper to write this book – it has 
been essentially an armchair exercise.
6. It may be worth dwelling on the ultimate reasons why one should study the history 
of philosophy. As Kenny pointed out, ‘[T]here are many reasons, but they fall 
into two groups … We may read the philosophers of other ages to help to resolve 
philosophical problems of abiding concern, or to enter more fully into the intel-
lectual world of a bygone era’ (Kenny, 2010, p. ix). This book clearly falls into 
the former: we search in philosophical thought enlightenment for addressing the 
extant concerns of our chosen field of inquiry and practice, namely public govern-
ance and administration.
7. An objection might be that developments of information and communication tech-
nologies are bringing closer to becoming ‘real’ the possibility that, in some form 
or sense, (man-made) ‘machines’ might also acquire self-consciousness (a huge 
strand of research and technological innovation that is known to the wider public 
mostly under the label of ‘artificial intelligence’). But the point philosophers like 
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Plotinus and Hegel made nineteen and two centuries ago, respectively, is different: 
they (attempted to) explain how self-consciousness arose on a universal scale 
and what it means for the totality of reality. From this philosophical perspective, 
the fact of machines acquiring self-consciousness, while obviously engendering 
huge ethical and practical problems, would not change the fundamental terms of 
the issue: that self-consciousness and intentionality are the conditions (from the 
philosophical perspective of these two authors) for things to be. Thus, in a sense, 
philosophical reflection on the mind may bring into perspective and relativize 
even some of the most astonishing, fascinating and at the same time threatening 
changes that technological innovation may bring about.
8. Although PA is an academic discipline in its own right, its interdisciplinary nature 
and inherent openness to methodological pluralism is a defining feature.
9. And bureaucracy is under conditions of political domination.
10. Intended broadly as being capable of integrating concepts and theories as devel-
oped in diverse disciplines, the capability of relating whole disciplines (Dogan, 
1996).
11. ‘The epistemological and methodological diversity that results from this discipli-
nary variety of concepts and theories-in-use means that, ontologically, the study of 
public administration cannot but be interdisciplinary. Public administration is the 
only study of which its scholars can claim to study government as a whole (and not 
just one disciplinarily defined aspect)’ (Raadschelders, 2008, p. 944).
12. ‘Positive’ law refers to the laws and legislative systems as human artefacts, 
man-made institutions. ‘Natural’ law is a branch of philosophy and law discussing 
the existence and contents of rights and duties constitutive of the human being, of 
each and every person, irrespective of legislative activity.
13. While I was preparing the proposal for this book, I happened to listen to the 
speech – delivered at a major PA conference – of the President of the National 
School of Public Administration of one of the large European states (a school 
running large-scale training courses for civil and public servants) advocating 
(entirely unsolicited) the significance of integrating the study of the humanities 
and philosophy into the curricula of the programmes for the professional training 
of public managers. Although this is obviously only anecdotal evidence, it may 
well reinforce the argument that after some decades of administrative reforms 
emphasising the importance of technical instruments and ready-made solutions, an 
enhanced consciousness about the significance of broader interpretations of public 
administration and administrative action is (re-)emerging.
14. At times this may also mean generating an understand of the terms of the debate 
(I am indebted to the participants at a seminar held at Queen’s University Belfast 
on 27 February 2019, where I had the privilege of being asked to present the first 
edition of this book, for pointing me to this consideration).
15. BSc and MSc in Industrial Engineering with a dissertation on management 
accounting and control in the public sector; MPhil at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science and PhD at King’s College London, both with 
a thesis in public administration and management.
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2. Key streams in philosophical inquiry: 
a selection and succinct overview for 
the field of public administration – 
part I
INTRODUCTION
This and the following chapter provide an overview of key streams of philo-
sophical inquiry and delineate key lineages between philosophical ideas and 
notions and concepts employed in the study and practice of PA. These chap-
ters adopt a mainly chronological way of presenting (Western) philosophical 
thought, from its roots in ancient Greece to contemporary strands; this ordering 
criterion may further enable the reader to appreciate the development of topics 
over time, and the continued dialogue in which philosophers across the ages 
are engaged around the key issues of being, knowing, behaving, and living 
together. The repartition of topics between the two chapters is not (entirely) 
arbitrary, as the philosopher Immanuel Kant is widely considered to have 
brought about a revolution in philosophical thinking, and one which delineates 
the contours of ‘modern’ thinking and its differences from ancient, medieval 
and early modern thought. It is not by chance that the Kantian notion of the 
subject – the knowing subject and the moral subject – is the opening point and 
in certain sense a lynchpin for both the treatment of themes of ontology and PA 
and issues of epistemology and PA (see Chapters 4 and 6 respectively).
An overview of the topics illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3 is reported in Table 
2.1. Importantly, at the end of each major section of this and the following 
chapter a closing paragraph sums up some of the key implications for PA and 
relevance for philosophy for PA that can be drawn from the key philosophical 
themes and notions that have arisen in that epoch; while these succinct closing 
paragraphs can only hint to elaborations that are then developed in later chap-
ters of this book, they may represent an already useful dashboard – or at least 
a set of ‘pointers’ – accompanying the reader as to what can be learnt from 
philosophical thought which underpins and matters so much for PA.
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Table 2.1 A (very schematic) traveller’s map through Western 
philosophy for students of public administration
Epoch/Key 
themes – authors – 
relevance for PA
Key authors 
– philosophies
Themes Implications for PA/
relevance for philosophy 
for PA
Archaic (Greek 
Civilisation) 
776 bc – 500 bc
Thales, 
Anaximander, 
Anaximenes, 
Heraclitus, 
Parmenides (active 
around 500 bc)
Introduced the key 
philosophical questions, 
notably ontological: 
the nature of being, the 
relationship of being and 
thought
No direct relevance – but 
key ideas – like that of the 
coincidence of being and 
thinking – sown here
Classical (Greek 
Civilisation) 
500 bc – 323 bc
Plato, Aristotle Developed a systematic 
and enduring configuration 
of the branches of human 
knowledge and their 
articulation (philosophy as 
apex of human knowledge); 
Key notions shaping 
(Western) thinking, like 
‘form/essence’, ‘causality’, 
‘potentiality–actuality 
distinction’ all took shape 
here and inform directly 
or indirectly all ‘scientific’ 
knowledge
Enduring actuality of key 
notions like Aristotle’s 
four causes (for social 
sciences and PA); Political 
philosophy established 
in this epoch (public 
governance)
Hellenistic (Greek 
Civilisation) – 
Roman and Patristic 
Philosophy
323 bc – 476 ad
Philosophical 
movements 
(stoicism, 
eclecticism, 
scepticism, 
Epicure), Greek and 
Latin Fathers of the 
Church, Augustine
Ethical issues centre stage 
in Hellenistic period; Key 
concepts brought into 
philosophy by the Christian 
Revelation: notion of 
universal salvation and 
the foundation of rights of 
each human being – beyond 
ethnicity, status, or else – as 
God’s sons; Notion of 
creation of universe out of 
nothingness; Notions of 
eternity and time revisited in 
light of creation; Trinitarian 
conception of God and 
notions of ‘person’; Free 
will, original sin and 
individual responsibility
Pursuit of virtues (stoicism); 
Notion of Charitas as 
gratuitous and absolute love, 
underpinning notions of 
benevolence and the caring 
for each human being, and 
intellectual roots of modern 
age ‘universal’ human rights 
and contemporary notions of 
human person and welfare 
state/social rights
 
Philosophy and public administration30
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:33:44AM
via free access
Epoch/Key 
themes – authors – 
relevance for PA
Key authors 
– philosophies
Themes Implications for PA/
relevance for philosophy 
for PA
Medieval Age
476ad – 1492 ad
Anselm, Thomas 
Aquinas, Scotus, 
Ockham
The nature of universal 
concepts; The ontological 
proof of the existence 
of God; Scholastics and 
the essence–existence 
distinction as lynchpin 
(being as gifted, creatures as 
partaking of Being)
Understandings of universal 
concepts underpin different 
contemporary perspectives 
on conceptions of PA; 
Potentiality–actuality 
distinction a central issue in 
social sciences and PA
Renaissance
mid-14th to mid-16th 
century ad
Erasmus, Leonardo, 
More, Machiavelli
Humanism: human being as 
micro-cosmos; Universality 
and immutability of human 
nature in each individual; 
The pursuit of perfection 
through virtues; Prominence 
of artistic expression in 
pursuit of truth
Roots of virtue discourse 
in Public Governance; 
Contribution of 
(Administrative) History to 
knowledge generation in PA; 
Coinage of notion of Utopia; 
Significance and usage of 
artistic expressions in PA 
inquiry (e.g. Lorenzetti’s 
‘The Good Government’)
Early Modern Age
16th to 18th century 
ad
Descartes, 
Leibniz, Spinoza, 
Locke, Hobbes, 
Berkeley, Hume, J. 
Stuart-Mill
Rationalism ‘vs’ empiricism; 
Subject as starting point 
of philosophising and the 
new metaphysical systems; 
Dualism mind–matter and its 
conundrums; The scientific 
revolution and physics as 
the pattern of scientific 
knowledge
Empiricism and the origin 
of concepts in the mind; 
Rationalism and the role of 
innate ideas in PA research; 
The role of the subject in PA 
research and practice
Enlightenment (18th 
century) 
Voltaire, Wolff Critical reason as source 
of human liberation 
(‘Enlightenment’); The age 
of the revolutions – English 
revolution (17th century), 
American and French 
revolutions; Industrial and 
demographic revolutions 
– and the principles of 
universal human rights; 
Sovereignty to the people; 
Self-determination of 
peoples/the modern Nation 
State
Universalistic human 
rights; Conceptions of 
liberal-democracy and the 
form of the modern Nation 
State; Initial overcoming of 
patrimonial state and roots 
of modern administrative 
state
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Epoch/Key 
themes – authors – 
relevance for PA
Key authors 
– philosophies
Themes Implications for PA/
relevance for philosophy 
for PA
Modern philosophy 
(19th and 20th 
century)
Kant, Fichte, 
Schelling, 
Hegel, Marx, 
Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche, Comte, 
Rickert, Carnap, 
Mach, Avenarius, 
Poincaré, Dilthey, 
Windelband
Kant, the revolution 
of the subject, and the 
foundation of morality and 
the limits of the knowable; 
Historicism; Idealism; 
Marxism; Positivism; 
Conventionalism; The 
sciences of the spirit
Kant and the foundations 
of public governance in 
the knowing and moral 
subject; Historicism 
and the transformative 
dynamics of administrative 
systems; Contemporary 
epistemologies in PA 
and their roots in modern 
philosophies; Marxism, 
Gramsci and the notion of 
power in PA; The sciences 
of the spirit and the nature 
of PA as interdisciplinary 
social science, art, 
profession and humanism
Contemporary 
strands
Husserl, Heidegger, 
Jaspers, Sartre, 
Lévi-Strauss, 
James, Russell, 
Wittgenstein, 
Whitehead, 
Gadamer, 
Habermas, 
Mounier, Maritain, 
Bergson
Phenomenology; 
Existentialism; 
Structuralism; Anglophone 
streams: pragmatism, 
analytical philosophy, 
and process philosophy; 
Hermeneutics; Personalism, 
spiritualism, and 
neo-scholastics
Philosophical roots 
of conceptions and 
interpretations of PA: 
the knowability of the 
essences in PA inquiries; 
The existentialist 
public administrator; 
Social structures, social 
ontology and PA; Process 
philosophy and process 
approaches to PA studies; 
Conceptions of time and 
PA study and practice; 
Spiritualism, personalism 
and the promotion of human 
well-being as guiding 
principle in normative 
conceptions of PA
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ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRE-SOCRATICS
For the great Greek philosopher Aristotle, philosophical investigation is above 
all inquiry into the causes of things. Aristotle, who is also considered the first 
historian of philosophy, classified his predecessor philosophers according to 
the kind of cause their philosophy probed into. Aristotle himself worked out 
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a system of four types of causes: material, formal, efficient and final cause (we 
delve into this important notion later and also in Chapter 4). In this book we 
adopt a much more ‘textbook’ classification, mixing a mainly chronological 
criterion with a thematic criterion. We first illustrate ancient (Greek) philos-
ophy, then turn to early Christian and medieval philosophy, to early modern 
philosophy, and finally delve at greater length into modern and contemporary 
philosophy. We will only succinctly and selectively highlight certain main 
philosophical streams, according to an ordering process also partly guided 
by our own necessarily subjective attribution of significance of strands of 
philosophical thought for PA studies. We dwell in key passages to illustrate 
in more detail concepts and notions that are then employed in the subsequent 
chapters for addressing PA themes and debates (one such notion is that of the 
four causes, which has seen a recent revival in the field of PA (Pollitt, 2012) 
and in a broader range of social sciences, for example in international relations 
(see Kurki, 2008, as an underpinning of ‘critical realist’ accounts).
Before we begin, it may be worth recalling the cultural, religious as well 
as socio-economic and political conditions in ancient Greece that constituted 
the fertile ground that paved the way for the birth of philosophy (Reale and 
Antiseri, 1988, pp. 5–10). Ancient Greek civilisation encompassed the territory 
of contemporary Greece, southern Italy and the Western coast of the Anatolian 
peninsula, with the city of Miletus, in nowadays Western Turkey, representing 
a key centre for the initial development of philosophy. The emergence of phil-
osophical speculation towards the end of the so-called archaic period (800–500 
bc) was preceded by the consolidation of a formidable literature in the Greek 
language,1 which reached its apex in the poems attributed to the poet Homer, 
namely the Iliad and the Odyssey. It has been noticed how a key feature of 
Homeric poetry is the ‘art of motivation’, the continuous search, weaved into 
the poetic text, for the causes of the events that are narrated, the reasons why 
events occurred. Even if causes may here take a mythical form, the quest for 
the cause of things permeates the great Greek literature in a way that may have 
paved the way for the subsequent philosophical speculation. Another key trait 
of Homeric epic is its thrust towards presenting reality in its entirety: the world 
of the gods and the human world are equally represented in these poems, as 
are the just and the unjust in human life, the good and the bad, the joyful and 
the painful. The speculation on reality in its entirety, and on the position of 
the human being within it, is already prefigured in the great Greek literature, 
before taking centre stage in the full-blown philosophical speculation of the 
Classical period (500–323 bc) and the Hellenistic period (323–30 bc). Also 
Greek public religiosity displayed remarkably peculiar traits: Greek gods 
resembled human or natural qualities amplified and brought to perfection, 
rather than distant deities. It was, in many respects, a naturalistic religion that 
drew attention to fathoming nature (in Greek φύσις or physis) – a thrust that 
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characterised the Greek philosophical enterprise. Finally, during the centuries 
that immediately preceded the birth of philosophy, the Greek society changed 
significantly: it became wealthier and its economic strength freed time, at least 
for part of the population, from the constraints of material needs to devote to 
study and reflection. More importantly, however, Greek city states developed 
a climate of political liberties, identification of the ‘citizen’ (itself a Greek 
invention) with the political community, and free speech, which provided the 
breeding ground for free critical thinking that was conducive to philosophical 
speculation.
It was philosophers collectively known as the Milesians (because they were 
all from the city of Miletus) who initiated the investigation on ‘Being’ in itself 
– the study of being and becoming, of reality and existence – which is referred 
to with the term ‘ontology’: the study (λoγια, logia) of being (the genitive of 
‘to be’ ‘ον’ is ‘ὄντος’, ontos – so ontology means ‘the study of being’). Thales 
(c.625–545 bc) is generally attributed as the founder of philosophy because he 
devoted his speculation to the search for the origin or foundation of all things, 
their ultimate nature. He claimed to have found it in water, but this should not 
be intended as physical water, but rather the water is an attempt to identify and 
qualify the ingenerated principle (Greek, ἀρχή, or arché) of things, and in this 
sense the claim that water is the origin of things is not a theory of the physical 
universe, rather a metaphysical conception to refer to the totality of being.
Anaximander, a pupil of Thales, moved the search further by introducing the 
notion of ‘what does not have limits’, the infinite or unlimited (Greek ἄπειρον, 
or apeiron) as the principle of things. This principle embraces, surrounds 
and underpins all that is, exactly because each limitation (a word which in its 
Latin origin means ‘border’) can only stem from the unlimited (borderless). 
The search for the principle of all things moved further, beyond the rather 
more simplistic notion of ‘water’ (albeit metaphysically interpreted, as we 
tried to illustrate) and towards the purely intelligible notion of the infinite. 
Anaximander also addressed questions that Thales didn’t – notably why and 
how all things derive from the principle, developing an answer inspired by 
orphic myths (a religiosity of Eastern derivation that was widely practised 
privately in ancient Greece) about injustice and atonement being the sources 
of the dynamics of the world we live in, and how this world derives from the 
principle. Anaximenes, a generation younger than Anaximander, follows in 
the trail and revisits the thought of his masters. Although his reference to air, 
rather than water, as the origin of things might be considered a step back from 
Anaximander’s conceptualisation of the infinite, it represents a more ‘rational’ 
attempt to tackle another crucial question: explaining, by resorting to the very 
nature of the principle of everything (ontological foundation), how becoming 
occurs, how movement and change are introduced into the world. We will find 
some of these ideas in the thought of Heraclitus, the philosopher of becoming 
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:33:44AM
via free access
Key streams in philosophical inquiry – part I 35
and a lingering source of inspiration of all ‘processual’ philosophies, of all the 
ontologies of becoming, from the ancient times to Hegel and Whitehead.
The fragments of the works by Heraclitus (probably part of a book on 
nature) that have crossed the ages until our epoch suggest that this philoso-
pher brought to a new height the intuition of the Milesians about universal 
dynamism. If those philosophers thought of dynamism as deriving from the 
principle of all things, Heraclitus appears to have put movement and change 
itself as the principle. In sentences that have become immortal, he stated that 
everything is in motion and nothing stays still, that ‘if we step into the same 
river twice, we cannot put our feet into the same water, since the water is not 
the same two moments together’ (Kirk et al., 1983, fragment 214); the second 
moment we descend into the river, the water and we, ourselves, have changed. 
This seems to entail an ontology of becoming: that each and every moment, for 
any reality – without exception – to be something means not to be any more 
what that reality was a moment before. This poses the crucial problem of how 
can it happen that being derives from non-being, and non-being from being: 
that something that exists comes out of nothingness, and that something that 
exists goes into nothingness. This problem has puzzled philosophers over the 
centuries – and still does.
Heraclitus’s philosophy is often read in stark contrast with Parmenides’s. 
Parmenides belonged to the school of the Eleatics, whose founder is tradition-
ally identified in Xenophanes, active in the Western Greek colonies, located 
in nowadays Southern Italy. In sentences as equally immortal as Heraclitus’s, 
Parmenides claimed that (we report and adapt the translation provided by 
Kenny, 2010, p. 161): ‘what you can call and think must Being be – for Being 
can, and nothing cannot, be [and] Never shall this prevail, that Non-Being is 
… Non-Being you won’t grasp – it can’t be done – nor utter; being thought 
and being are one’. These sentences have sparked a debate that has lingered 
for over two-and-a-half millennia. It has been argued whether ‘Being’ means 
‘that to which a predicate can be attached’ and Non-Being ‘that to which no 
predicate can be attached’, or whether the claims refer to a radical ontology of 
Being as the totally positive, and Non-Being the totally negative, and hence 
that no change or movement is possible because Being is, immutable since the 
beginning and forever, and cannot trespass into Non-Being, and Non-Being ‘is 
not’ and never shall trespass into Being.2
Parmenides and Heraclitus are claimed to have set the terms of the dispute 
over whether the ultimate nature of all things and the totality of reality lies 
in ‘being’ or in ‘becoming’ (at times this opposition is narrowed down to the 
categories of ‘static’ versus ‘dynamic’ ontologies, and derived analytic appa-
ratuses – but this dichotomy might be quite reductionist), a dispute that has 
featured centre stage in the philosophical debates since.
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Before turning to the giants of classical metaphysics – Plato and Aristotle 
– we mention Pythagoras and the school of the Pythagoreans. As well as 
contributing powerfully to the development of mathematics, from a philo-
sophical standpoint they were the first to point out that reality may be read and 
understood through ‘numbers’, that the principles of the numbers are (so they 
purport) the principles that govern all things. Nowadays we are accustomed to 
thinking that nature is investigated by searching for mathematical, functional 
relations (maths is the language of modern physics and the natural sciences), 
or that sounds and music can be expressed in mathematical forms. This has 
become so obvious to us that is has led our epoch to become oblivious of how 
amazing these discoveries are: going back to the writings of these scholars 
may help resuscitate the amazement that stemmed from this discovery. Two 
fundamental qualifications are in order: first, after Aristotle we are accus-
tomed to conceiving numbers as mental abstractions, as an entity of reason. 
Pythagoreans rather conceived of numbers as ‘real’ entities, and hence the 
principles of numbers (the principles and laws of maths) are by Pythagoreans 
conceived of as principles ‘really’ underlying all things. This ushers us into 
the issue of the distinction between entities of reason and ‘real’ embodied 
entities – a distinction that is centre stage throughout philosophical speculation 
from Aristotle’s ‘metaphysics of the form’ to the ‘dispute over the nature of the 
universals’ (topics to which we return). Second, it may be stated that with the 
Pythagoreans humankind made a giant leap in that it has learnt to read reality 
through reason, albeit a specific expression of reason that is mathematical 
reason. After the contribution made by this philosophical school, the world is 
no longer seen as dominated by arcane and indecipherable powers, but rather 
it is seen as expressed in numbers: order, rationality, detectable verity become 
centre stage. Over the course of the development of philosophical thought, 
there have been gloomier visions about the penetrability of reality through 
reason, which are at odds with this Pythagorean vision – but philosophising as 
‘the science of reason’ undoubtedly made a major leap thanks to the contribu-
tion of this school.
Finally, it should be noted that for reasons of brevity we are unable to intro-
duce other giants of Greek philosophy, such as Leucippus, Democritus and 
the Atomists, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, but it is important to emphasise 
what inexhaustible sources these philosophies represent for the contem-
porary thought. One may notice, for example, striking parallels between 
Anaxagoras’s philosophy of the ‘seminal reasons’ as explanations of becom-
ing and contemporary strands of Whiteheadian ‘process philosophy’. Later in 
the book (Chapter 4) we will discuss similarities and dissimilarities between 
some contemporary trends in PA and the philosophical thought of the Sophists 
(the word being in capital to distinguish it from nowadays usage of the 
term), namely Protagoras, the doyen of the Sophists, and his many acolytes 
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who formed a highly influential school of thought active in ancient Greece. 
Sophists were the target of the darts of Socrates and his pupil Plato, and it is to 
his thought we now turn.
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: while most of the 
ideas and notions introduced in this section may not have a direct application 
to the field of PA, it would be impossible to underestimate the significance of 
these developments for virtually every form of knowledge, thereby including 
knowledge generated in the field of PA. Moreover, one thread of this initial 
section has been to highlight how contemporary discourses in philosophy and 
the social sciences have been anticipated and how they have found their seeds 
in ancient Greek philosophical debate: we have just noticed in the previous 
paragraph the parallels between Anaxagoras’s notion of seminal reasons as 
explanations of becoming and key tenets of process philosophy; we have also 
highlighted the impressive resemblance between the controversy between the 
Sophists, on one side, and Socrates (and Plato and Aristotle), on the other side, 
and the contemporary contests between relativists-post-modernists and the 
(critical) realists, not just in PA but across the social sciences.
CLASSICAL METAPHYSICS
We now discuss how ‘classical’ metaphysics was developed in the hands of 
the two giants of philosophy, Plato and Aristotle. For thematic (rather than 
chronological) coherence, we will discuss the thought of Plato to Plotinus, on 
one hand, and Aristotle’s metaphysics, briefly sketching his huge inheritance, 
on the other hand.
There is a saying that ‘Plato asked all the questions (of significance to 
philosophy), and his mentee Aristotle provided most of the answers we can 
reasonably aspire to achieve; the others added glosses’. This is obviously an 
exaggeration, but the significance of the contribution of these two masters of 
thought for the development of philosophy can hardly be exaggerated.
Aristocles, better known as Plato (428/427–347 bc), expressed himself 
through the rhetoric form of dialogues in which different philosophical stances 
are debated by fictional characters (an English translation of all his works can 
be found in Plato, 1997). Although Plato himself was not a protagonist in the 
dialogues, Socrates – who had been his mentor –systematically is, and it is 
generally pointed to what the character Socrates says for gleaning what might 
have been Plato’s ‘viewpoint’ on the philosophical issue debated. It appears 
Plato attached great significance to the dialogic form, which was not just 
a means of expression, but in a sense was for him the essence of philosophis-
ing. As well as the more public lectures that were reported in the dialogues, he 
held conversations in small groups with acolytes at the school he established 
in Athens, significantly called ‘Academy’, in which he is said to have provided 
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more in-depth understanding of what was publicly reported in the dialogues. 
The dialogue form has proven inspirational, yet not uncontroversial, and exe-
getes and interpreters have struggled over the subsequent two-and-a-half mil-
lennia to interpret his thought. We can only leave to the experts to delve into 
these crucial issues of interpretation, here furnishing but a brief introduction to 
some key traits of his philosophy.
Plato used the metaphor of the ‘second navigation’ to suggest that reality 
is in a sense two-tiered: there is the world of phenomena and a world beyond 
phenomena, meta-phenomenal or, with a term that gained currency later 
and has become conventional, metaphysical (literally meaning ‘beyond the 
physical world’). We have already pointed out how in the pre-Socratics the 
search for the ‘ultimate nature’, for ‘the totality of being’ beyond the variety 
of the elements gained traction and represented a quantum leap from previ-
ous approaches to human understanding of the world, and yet it is only with 
Plato that a distinction is introduced between the material and the immaterial, 
between the world that can be perceived through the senses and the world of 
what is intelligible: the world of ideas. It is only with Plato that nature and the 
cosmos come to be considered no longer as the totality of being, but as only 
a part of it, the totality of the things that appear to the senses as opposed to the 
ultimate totality, whose most important part is made of what is intelligible. 
Things in this world participate of ideas, of which they are a mere resemblance 
(it may be noticed this conception of ‘participation of one reality to another, 
higher-level reality’ introduces the philosophical notion of ‘analogy’).
What are these ideas? Tonnes of inks have been poured on the topic and we 
can here only scour the surface of the debate. We take as a starting point the 
commentary by Kenny to the seventh of the letters traditionally attributed to 
Plato (Kenny, 2010, p. 44, last sentence postponed), where Plato illustrates his 
doctrine with the example of a circle:
There is something called a circle; it has a name, which we have just this minute 
used. Then there is a definition, a compound of nouns and verbs. We might give 
‘The figure whose limit is at every point equidistant from its centre’ … Third, there 
is what we draw, or rub out, or rotate, or cancel. The circle itself which all these 
symbolize does not undergo any such change and is a quite different thing. In the 
fourth place we have knowledge, understanding and true opinion on these matters – 
these collectively are in our minds and not in sounds or bodily shapes, and thus are 
clearly distinct from the circle itself and from the three entities already mentioned … 
and there is a fifth thing which we have to postulate, which is that which is knowable 
and truly real.
This fifth thing is the idea of a circle: what Plato refers to as idea in itself 
and by itself. The idea is an objective reality that is not the property of any 
individual mind (this is pointed out by Plato where he highlights the difference 
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between the knowledge of a thing and the idea of the thing in itself: the circle 
pre-exists the subject getting to know it).
It may be worth noticing what is left out: in this conception there is no 
reference to empirics and the empirical (Kenny, 2010). This point is picked 
up by Aristotle for whom knowledge starts from the senses, albeit it is only 
the intellect that makes it possible. In this regard, the two contrasting positions 
between the two philosophers were made immortal in the painting The School 
of Athens by the Italian painter Raffaello, in which Plato points his forefingers 
towards the sky – the world of ideas – and Aristotle towards the earth: the 
sensible world. This picture forms the cover of this book.
The synthesis to which Plato came with the notion of the world of the 
ideas encompasses what – in different ways – Heraclitus and Parmenides had 
already introduced, albeit in very different philosophical systems: that being 
and logos (the Greek word for ‘word’ but also ‘reason’) are interpenetrated, 
that the horizon of thought is the horizon of being, that thought and being 
are the same; that Being is (Parmenides) and becomes (Heraclitus) within 
the horizon of thought. What Heraclitus referred to as the ‘intelligence of 
things’, the logos which governs all things in their incessant becoming, is what 
Parmenides referred to when he stated that ‘the same is being and thinking, the 
same is thinking and what thinking is in function of, because without being, in 
which it is expressed, you will not find thinking: in fact [thinking] is or will be 
nothing outside of being’ (Parmenides, Fragments, B8).
Plato also ordered the ideas in a hierarchy, famously placing at the summit 
the idea of the ‘good in itself’. There is a sense in which this is also an extraor-
dinary innovation from his predecessor Parmenides: by positing an order 
among ideas, it ensues the logical implication that an idea is not another idea. 
This statement enables getting out of the paradox (if we may call it this way) of 
the impossibility of change that was purported by Parmenides: ‘Being is, and 
Non-Being is not’, that is, in an absolute sense Being can never transition into 
Non-Being, but it exists a non-being (in lower-case letter) intended as diversity 
and alterity, for example a square is not a circle. Every idea, in order to be that 
idea necessarily has to be diverse from all other ideas. This concept of a sort of 
‘relative’ (as opposed to absolute) non-being will be picked up more systemat-
ically by Aristotle for combining the explanation of movement and becoming 
with the eternity of being.
Finally, Plato has developed a widely elaborated political–philosophical 
thought, notably in The Republic. His conception of the justice and the 
common good is crucial. This is discussed in Chapter 5, where the conception 
of common good is the starting point for a tour on the issue of justification of 
a(ny) political system, and its enduring and far-reaching implications for the 
field of PA.
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Plato has left a huge inheritance. His teachings have fallen on fertile ground, 
notably his influence directly exerted on his pupil Aristotle. His written works, 
an important part of which have been conserved and transmitted for posterity, 
have elicited philosophical speculations across the millennia. Many philo-
sophical strands stemmed from his work, of which ‘neo-Platonism’ (evoked 
in different guises over the centuries and indeed more often to be referred to 
Plotinus’s thought) is but one of them. It may be argued that an entire ‘fun-
damental orientation’ in philosophising, a basic stance or line of thought of 
special significance (also for its continued influences on contemporary social 
sciences and public affairs) stems from Plato’s thought: all philosophies that 
posit interiority (that is, reason, innate ideas, (self-)conscience) as the starting 
point of philosophising, rather than sensorial perception, may be claimed to 
have Plato as their ascendant. Philosophies that take as their commencement 
interiority constitute a stream that was developed – amongst innumerable 
others – by philosophers such as Plotinus, Augustine, and on through the ages 
to Descartes, one of the founders of modern philosophy, to contemporary phi-
losophers like Bergson. Descartes’s famous ‘cogito, ergo sum’ (I think, then 
I am) posits as the only certainty the doubting of everything by the subject. 
The more complete form of Descartes’s famous statement is ‘I think, doubting 
being an act of thinking, then I am’, which therefore takes interiority as the 
starting point of philosophising. As discussed widely in Chapter 4, a range of 
approaches not just in philosophy but also in the applied social sciences and 
specifically in PA have their roots in rationalism, spiritualism and the notion 
that ideas are, at least partly, innate. The roots of these philosophical stances 
can in many important respects be ascribed to the philosophy of Plato.
We can now turn to the other giant of metaphysics: Aristotle from Stagira 
(384/383–322 bc), a pupil of Plato at his Academy for over a quarter of 
a century ‘and it can safely be said that in no other occasion in history was 
such intellectual power concentrated in one institution’ (Kenny, 2010, p. 57), 
although after the death of Plato Aristotle left the Academy and Athens, to 
then return only later on and establish his own school, known as Lyceum, or 
the Peripatetic school.
For Aristotle3 (see Figure 2.1), knowledge requires both intellect and expe-
rience: one divorced from the other is insufficient to attain the knowledge of 
things. Hence, differently from Plato, the senses (apparently banal as it may 
seem, he was the first to point out human beings have exactly five senses – 
sight, hearing, touch, smell, taste – and none has been added to the list or 
subtracted since) are part and parcel of the process of knowing. According 
to Aristotle, philosophy is the inquiry into the causes of things, and meta-
physics is primarily the search of the prime causes, the causes of everything. 
He identifies four causes: material, formal, efficient and final. The material 
cause is the material element of which a thing is made. To borrow Kenny’s 
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Figure 2.1 Aristotle
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metaphor of a chef cooking a risotto (2010, p. 8), the material causes of the 
risotto are the ingredients of which it is made; in the case of a human being, 
the material causes are the flesh and bones of which she or he is made. The 
formal cause is the form or essence of a thing. For Aristotle, form is unity 
and organisation of elements, the ‘what it is’ of something (the Greek term 
is eidos, form – what gives something the form that makes it to be what it is; 
the common Latin translation is quod quid est or quidditas, what something 
is). This notion is central to Aristotle’s philosophy and to all metaphysics and 
we will discuss it further later. Continuing for the moment with the risotto 
example, the recipe for the risotto is its formal cause, the ‘order’ that makes 
ingredients to form a risotto. Material and formal causes are in a sense intrinsic 
and static: they describe what something is, not why it comes to being (or to 
corrupting and dissolving). The ‘extrinsic’ or ‘active’ causes are the efficient 
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and the final ones. The efficient causes are the forces for change, what makes 
change happen. In the risotto metaphor, the efficient cause is the chef acting 
on the ingredients according to the pattern set by the recipe: the cooking is the 
efficient cause. The final causes are the goals or ends (in Greek, telos), why 
something is brought about: the satisfaction of the clients of the restaurant who 
order a risotto is the final cause. The system of the four causes as worked out 
by Aristotle is of enduring significance. In Chapter 6 we provide a systematic 
examination of the contemporary significance of Aristotle’s four causes for PA 
(and the social sciences).
Besides the system of the four causes, Aristotle (see The Complete Works, 
English edition 1984) developed a range of concepts that have since formed 
the backbone of metaphysics.4 We have already encountered the notion of 
form as principle of unity and organisation of elements: what makes a person 
to be a person, a horse to be a horse, or a triangle to be a triangle. Aristotle 
strove with the issue of what distinguishes a specific individual from an idea 
(intended as the form or essence that all individuals having the same nature 
share – for example, that of being a human being, or a horse). In this perspec-
tive, individuals are the synthesis of matter and form, and in this process matter 
acts as the principle of individuation: two human beings share the same form 
(they are ‘human beings’, it is their essence) and are made distinct (individ-
uated) by matter: the matter composing me as the author of this book is not 
the same matter composing you, reader of this book – we share the form of 
human beings, we are distinguished by the matter. A related notion is that of 
‘entelechy’, the becoming actual of what is only potential: this happens only 
when form is given to matter (though the two – form and matter – can never be 
distinguished in practice, but only conceptually). Although, as we shall see, the 
notion of matter is not less problematic than that of idea, all philosophies and 
all approaches to the study of social realities that share a thrust towards gaining 
an understanding of the essence of the things that are being studied have, to 
a smaller or bigger extent, their roots in Aristotelian philosophy.
Other key notions were developed by the philosopher of Stagira and 
bequeathed to philosophical speculation for the subsequent two-and-a-half 
millennia. First, the notion of the categories of being: the first (foremost) cat-
egory is that of substance; the other categories are: quality; quantity; relation; 
action or acting; receiving or undergoing an action; place; and time. By means 
of these categories, Aristotle introduces ‘diversity’, and hence the possibility of 
a relative non-being, tackling the issue raised by Parmenides in the same way 
Plato did: a thing ‘is’ (nothing can be predicated of the absolute ‘non-being’), 
but it may ‘not be’ in one place, or not be at a given moment in time. In this 
sense, therefore, non-being occurs in a relative, rather than an absolute sense. 
Second, the distinction between potentiality and actuality: an embryo in 
a woman’s womb is ‘in potentiality’ an adult human being, though not in actu-
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ality. Potentiality and actuality apply to all categories. In order to explain how 
things transit from non-being to being, from potentiality to actuality, Aristotle 
in his metaphysical system posited God as the pure actuality, which enables 
all things to come into being. Third, the distinction between haphazard and 
substance: haphazard for Aristotle is a way of being that depends on another 
being and is not related to the nature of the thing (its essence or form, or sub-
stance): a human being may be seated or standing, may be tanned or pale, and 
so on, without this altering the substance or essence of what ‘being a human 
being’ is. Fourth, the notion of correspondence of being as truth, whereby it 
is the correspondence between what the human mind links, on one hand, and 
the fact that these things are actually linked in reality, on the other hand, that 
determines the ‘truth value’ of a proposition: what was later summarised in the 
scholastic philosophy (developed in the Middle Ages drawing from Aristotle) 
as adaequatio intellectus nostri ad rem: the adequacy or correspondence 
between our intellect and the thing. For Aristotle, this notion does not concern 
being in itself, rather it pertains to the field of the logic, intended as the criteria 
the mind has to apply for knowing what is real.
Indeed, Aristotle is considered the founder of logic, and he elaborated 
a method of logical reasoning, the syllogism, which for centuries has been 
synonym of the logic. In its very basic structure, a syllogism is based on 
a major and a minor premise. The major is an assertion of general validity (e.g. 
all human beings are mortal); the minor premise is a statement (like a quali-
fication) on a specific case (e.g. Plato is a human being). The structure of the 
syllogism enables arriving at a demonstration or conclusion (Plato is mortal). 
Aristotle also laid the foundations for what later came to be referred to as 
‘practical syllogism’, a way of relating means and ends. Aristotle describes in 
his Nicomachean Ethics (III book, Chapter 3, 2002 for an English edition) the 
relationship between ends and means in the following way:
We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate 
whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman 
whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone else deliberate about his 
end. They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained; 
and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most 
easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by one only they consider how it 
will be achieved by this and by what means this will be achieved, till they come to 
the first cause, which in the order of discovery is last.
Recently, practical syllogism has continued to draw the attention of philoso-
phers, for example von Wright (1971), and its theoretical potential for framing 
PA as a form of practical reasoning has been explored recently by Virtanen 
(2018).
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Aristotle also made a major contribution to ethics, and elaborated a concep-
tion of ‘virtue’ that has travelled the ages. Virtues for Aristotle are acquired. 
They are a state of character that is expressed both in purpose and in action (it 
is praxis, the Greek word for the purposeful action, the action shaped by values 
and sense of direction; Kenny, 2010, p. 213). He distinguished between two 
types of virtues: virtues as the ‘proper mean’, that is, avoiding either excess 
or defect, striking the proper balance between opposing impulses or passions 
which by their nature tend to the excess (so, for example, the temperate person 
will avoid drinking or eating too much, but also too little); and virtues as the 
attainment of perfection according to one’s proper nature. The proper nature 
of the human being as a ‘rational animal’ lies in the full deployment of reason. 
Reason can be distinguished into a practical reason and a contemplative reason. 
Practical reason is concerned with the knowledge of the mutable circumstances 
of life and, in this case, a fully rational life will be one lived in wisdom, that 
is, fully guided by the practical reason (although the philosopher of Stagira did 
not provide a systematic account of the structure of practical reasoning, the 
previous excerpt briefly hints at Aristotle’s reflections on practical syllogism). 
Contemplative reason is orientated towards the understanding of the immuta-
ble and eternal truths, which is the goal of philosophy; contemplative reason 
leads to a fully realised life, to the fulfilment of our nature as human beings: 
a notion expressed by the Greek word Eudaimonia, the living of a full life. 
This notion is central to Aristotle’s and Plato’s political–philosophical notion 
of the common good, which we specifically discuss in Chapter 5. The notion 
of virtue would permeate medieval thought and up to the modern and contem-
porary age – albeit challenged. We will ponder over its continued significance 
for public governance and public administration in Chapter 6 by revisiting the 
work The Good Government by the great artist Ambrogio Lorenzetti.
Finally, Aristotle also worked out a famous taxonomy of the forms of gov-
ernment, which he based upon a wide survey of the constitutions of Greek city 
states, a work that credited him as the founder of comparative politics (and 
comparative PA, Aristotle, 1962). He distinguished between three virtuous 
forms of government – kingship, aristocracy and politeia – and three corrupt 
forms – tyranny, oligarchy and democracy (the last one would in later epoch 
take on a more positive connotation than in Aristotle’s conception), and delves 
in insightful ways into the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of them, 
and their long-term sustainability. Aristotle distinguished between the qualities 
of an individual and the qualities as a member of a political community, that is, 
a ‘citizen’. Aristotle’s speculation about the virtues of the citizens and the gov-
ernors that enable the attainment of the well-being of all members of a given 
political community have set the bases for centuries of philosophical and civic 
thought about ‘virtue politics’ and the role of virtues in public governance and 
the significance of civic participation to the destinies of one’s own political 
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community, and notably its self-sufficiency (its capacity to remain independ-
ent and prosper). We devote an important part of Chapter 6 to this topic. 
Finally, Aristotle made some key claims that have traversed the centuries (they 
are contained mostly in Book I of On Politics): that man is a ‘political animal’, 
meaning that it is made by nature to live in a political community, hence the 
state itself exists by nature; the polis – the political community, patterned on 
the city-states of ancient Greece but by extension the state in general – is the 
ultimate form of human organisation and exists to satisfy the highest goals of 
human life; the polis shelters all the other associated forms of human life, from 
families to businesses; and it alone should be governed ‘politically’ (Ryan, 
2012, p. 83). For Aristotle the political community is distinguished from all 
other forms of social life and the notion of ‘political’ pertains in its proper 
sense only to the state. Interestingly, this may represent a point of differenti-
ation between ‘Western’ conceptions of politics and Confucian ones, which 
may tend to see the state as an extension of the family and other forms of social 
life, rather than seeing the state as pertaining to a higher order than the other 
forms of associated life, as in Western conceptions shaped by the bequest of 
Aristotle.
For reasons of brevity we skip here both the philosophy of the Hellenistic 
period (which includes major philosophical schools such as cynicism, the 
Epicurean school, stoicism, scepticism – all in uppercase to stress that the con-
tents of these philosophies are quite distinct and different from the meanings 
given to the respective terms in contemporary everyday language) and Latin 
philosophers like Lucretius and Cicero, but we cannot miss out a reference 
to the last ancient Greek philosopher, Plotinus (205–70 ac), who elaborated 
a very original and ambitious philosophical system whose influence lingers 
throughout the centuries.
The starting point of Plotinus’s philosophy is what he called the One. The 
One is not the one of mathematics, rather the supreme principle of unity. 
Plotinus was in fact the first to ask the question ‘why the Absolute is, and why 
is it what it is?’. The answer is that the Absolute poses itself. He theorised the 
One as causa sui (cause of itself), the Absolute that poses itself and in which 
necessity and free will totally coincide. He also conceived of the absolute as 
infinite, of which nothing can be predicated (this too being a point at least 
partly novel in Greek philosophy); the absolute is beyond being, thought, 
life – but is the cause of them all, as super-being, super-thought, super-life 
(the term ‘super’ being used in the Latin sense of ‘above’ or ‘beyond’). This 
poses the problem of how all things derive from the One. Plotinus introduced 
forcefully into the philosophical debate the question of unity and multiplicity, 
of the relationship between the One and the Many, which has since permeated 
philosophical investigation. The answer furnished to the question of how the 
many derive from the One is that this occurs by hypostasis or procession. The 
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argument, in a very schematic way, is as follows. The One can only think, 
or better contemplate, itself (although Plotinus warns against referring to the 
One as ‘it’ – nothing can be said that is predicated of the One). The rationale 
for this, put in a very rough way, lies in the One – the absolute unity – having 
nothing outside of itself. By thinking (contemplating) itself, a distinction is 
introduced between thinker (contemplator, the subject) and thought (contem-
plated, the object) – the totality of thought, that is, the world of ideas of Plato 
is thus posed through a hypostasis of the One. By posing itself the One also 
poses the other from itself. Plotinus develops here on Aristotle’s idea that 
thinking is inherently an activity of contemplating, and contemplating is inher-
ently creating, albeit in a sense partly different from the notion of creation in 
Christianity. This is what he called the Nous – translated as Intellect or Spirit, 
depending on what emphasis is given, whether more philosophical or more 
religious; we will refer to it here as Intellect. The Intellect is being par excel-
lence, thought par excellence, life par excellence – but the Intellect cannot be 
the ultimate reality because of the duality of subject and object, of thinking/
thinker (the act and the agent: the active) and thought (the passive), which is 
inherent to it. The ultimate reality must be above it, that is, the ultimate reality 
is the One. By contemplating itself the Intellect, in its turn, hypostatises itself 
in the Soul, which commands and orders all things and the universe. Although 
the Intellect is a life of eternal, immediate, simultaneous possession of all 
objects,5 the Soul is desire (thinking is itself desire; just as looking is a desire 
of seeing, thinking is an activity of apprehension, where apprehend is the root 
word in Latin for ‘taking’, and hence volition is inherent in thinking). By 
desiring to transfer downwards what is eternal the Soul does so in succession, 
it poses things in succession, and this continuous, restless succession is time 
(and so time derives from eternity, but eternity is beyond time). The Soul is 
life stretching and hence flowing into successive moments whilst being loaded 
with the past moments: it is time in past, present and future. By contemplating 
downwards, the Soul orders all things of the world, by contemplating itself 
it preserves itself, by contemplating upwards towards the Intellect, the Soul 
thinks (which is at the origin of its creative activity). It is in the Soul that there 
is plurality (the Many). Indeed, Plotinus distinguishes the supreme Soul from 
the particular souls: matter plays a role in it (drawing from Aristotle’s thesis 
that forms are individuated by matter), but matter itself is the soul deprived 
of its link with the One, total deprivation of the positivity that is in the One; 
matter is absence of being, or at most the last tail of being. This idea will be 
picked up by the philosopher Henri Bergson (amongst others) when he refers 
to individual living beings as an arrest of the flow of life and to spatiality as 
the arrest of the activity of the conscience (see Chapter 3). The possibility to 
contemplate upwards enables the Soul, and each soul, to return to the One (to 
the supreme unity). This occurs not like in Plato through ‘Eros’ (love) or in 
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Aristotle through virtue, but rather through ecstasy, that is, by dispossession 
of any alterity (hence any duality or multiplicity), as the only way to achieve 
the infinite accretion of the self is by dissolving the self into the One, by 
undertaking the abandonment of the individual alone on her/his own (the sole 
individual) to the Sole (the One).
Plotinus’s philosophy represents an inexhaustible fount of ideas (consider 
the inexhaustible implications of understanding of thinking as contemplating, 
creating, desiring) and a powerful reminder of what Greek philosophy meant 
when claiming that ‘the horizon of being is the horizon of thought’: one of the 
major achievements of Greek philosophy.
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: a large number, prob-
ably most of the key conceptual tools that are being used across all the branches 
of knowledge, thereby including the modern sciences, have been elaborated 
and, often, brought to the utmost levels of perfection in the Classical Age of 
the Greek civilisation. By way of example, the very notion of causality and 
the conception of knowledge as ‘understanding the causes of things’ – which 
underpins so much of modern inquiry that calls itself ‘scientific’ (knowledge 
that is achieved through rigorous methods) – has been wrought out by the 
Greek philosophers, notably Plato and Aristotle. The application of these con-
ceptual tools from philosophy may be developed in even more direct a way for 
the field of PA, which is far from having become an independent science with 
its problems unproblematically stated and its concepts and methods of inquiry 
uncontroversially standardised. An example is the usefulness of revisiting the 
four causes elaborated by Aristotle as a coherent system, whereby in the field 
of PA (like e.g. the field of international relations) it is also the final cause and 
the formal cause – not just the efficient or the material cause – to be meaning-
fully employed for the progress of knowledge in the field (this point is widely 
elaborated in Chapter 6). Importantly, the very branch of political philosophy 
as a distinct area within philosophy has been established and has taken form 
through the works of – most notably – Plato and Aristotle. Chapter 5 discusses 
the application of political philosophy more systematically to the field of PA, 
notably by focusing the issue of ‘legitimacy’, what makes a political system 
– and, as part of it, public governance and public administration – ‘just’ and 
hence ‘acceptable’ for the members of the political community (i.e. for the 
administered). Finally, ethical issues become centre stage, especially during 
the Hellenistic period, sowing the seeds for the development of the ‘virtue’ 
discourse and the key question of the significance of the practice of virtuous 
behaviour for the quality of public governance.
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PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY
The Patristic philosophy was elaborated by the ‘Fathers of the Church’ (patres 
is the plural for ‘father’ in Latin, hence the term patristic) during the first 
centuries ac. Believers in the Christian revelation, they strove for elaborating 
a deeper understanding of the revealed faith – the Christian theology – and 
by doing so they also carried out a powerful synthesis between Christian 
revelation and classical Greco–Roman philosophical thought. With the spread 
of the Christian faith across the expanses of the Roman Empire, which in the 
first centuries ac stretched from nowadays England to the Middle East, from 
Central Europe to the Sahara Desert, encompassing all the Mediterranean 
basin, the (Judeo–) Christian cultural and philosophical revolution occurred 
and informed Western philosophy and culture forever.
We dwell here briefly on some of the tenets of the Christian revolution of 
special significance for philosophical speculation. First, the very notion of 
monotheism, the affirmation of God as ‘the only one’ (‘Thou shalt have no 
other gods’, states one of the Ten Commandments proclaimed in the Bible, 
Exodus 20:3 = Deuteronomy 5:7); a theological stance radically diverse from 
Greco–Roman polytheism. Second, the notion of the absolute transcendence 
of God (hence of Being). God is conceived of as totally ‘other’ from the world 
in a way that differs from the horizon of the Greek philosophical speculation, 
which tended to see the entirety of reality – both ideal and material – within 
the horizon of immanence (with the partial exception of Plotinus’s thought). 
Third, the very notion of creation, that is, that entities are created by God out of 
nothingness. In this perspective, being is gifted to entities, entities are brought 
into being by Being (God): this is a perspective that in a sense overcomes 
the argument by Parmenides that ‘Never shall this prevail, that Non-Being 
is’: non-being is not, but entities – things that are – can come to being out of 
nothingness, and this occurs through an act of creation.
If these notions are novel to the Greek thought, at the same time the Greek 
thought contributed to shape the way in which the Christian revelation was 
culturally informed and propounded. When Christ is referred to as ‘The 
Logos’, as in the most famous prologue of the Gospel According to John, the 
findings of Greek philosophy should all be taken into account in interpreting 
the meaning of the words used by John (John’s Gospel is written in Greek): the 
Logos is the ‘Word’, and notably the most important word in any statement, 
that is, the ‘Verb’, but logos in Greek is also reason and the order of things, 
as we already saw in Parmenides: ‘the same is being and thinking, the same is 
thinking and what thinking is in function of, because without being, in which it 
is expressed, you will not find thinking: in fact [thinking] is or will be nothing 
outside of being’ (Parmenides, Fragments, B8). Being and logos as reason are 
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interpenetrated; they are the same. When John refers to Christ as The Logos 
in the perspective of creation (‘all that was made, was made through Him’), 
from a philosophical standpoint he entails that the very being of all things is 
one with the Person of Christ.
The Trinitarian conception of God has had huge implications for philo-
sophical thought. In Christian theology God is conceived of as one substance 
and three Persons, who in the order of the relation are the Father and the 
Son and the Holy Spirit, in the substance are one and only one substance. 
Later theological and philosophical speculation elaborated on the Trinitarian 
mystery conceiving of the nature of the Trinitarian relation as person. (Thomas 
Aquinas conceived of the relation of total and absolute love between the 
Father and the Son as having itself nature of person: the third Person of the 
Trinity – the Holy Spirit – is the total and absolute love between God the 
Father and God the Son; theologically and ontologically, total and absolute 
love is Person.) St Augustine [one substance, three persons that according to 
the category of relation are the Father and the Son and the Spirit], the German 
philosopher Leibniz, in addressing the Trinitarian mystery, wrote of ‘an entity, 
by which an entity is related to an entity’ – the persons of the Trinity are 
entities that cannot exist without other entities, hence essentially relational 
(see the important work on the Trinitarian theology of Leibniz by Antognazza, 
2007). The category of relation, encountered in Aristotle as one category of 
being, becomes central in philosophical reflection in and through theological 
thought: this may have sown the seeds of much of modern intellectual thought, 
including the non-theological one, in which the category of relation is centre 
stage. The turn in the 17th century from the quest for the substances of things, 
which characterises all classical philosophy throughout the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance and was still present in 17th century rationalists, to the search for 
relations that features so prominently in modern and contemporary philosophy 
(see Chapter 3) – relations between things (the search for functional relations 
between phenomena is a key trait distinguishing the natural sciences since the 
scientific revolution of the 17th century from the previous approaches to the 
study of nature) and relations between the subject and the object of knowing – 
may be argued to have been profoundly affected and informed by centuries of 
theological reflection on the mystery of the Trinity.
The faith in the incarnation of God in history in a man, Jesus Christ, brings 
with it a revolution in the conception of the human being. For the Greco–
Roman culture, the human being was simply a part of the totality and did not 
occupy any special place. It had a distinctively rational nature (the possessing 
of rationality singled out humankind from all other living creatures), but this 
distinctive trait did not endow humanity with a special place in the world. The 
Greek civilisation placed the human race as part and parcel of the cosmos, of 
the general order of the universe. With the Christian revolution, the human 
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being becomes central in the history and order of the creation (as we shall see, 
with modern philosophy the human mind as the subject of knowing will enjoy 
a special place and will become for many philosophers the starting point of 
philosophising). This entails a radical anthropocentrism – the ‘special place’ 
reserved to mankind, chosen and loved by God in a special way above all other 
creatures. The human being is conceived of as free, and with a special possi-
bility: to adhere to the will of God. The capacity to adhere freely to the will 
of God makes each and every human being occupy a special place in history, 
which, in the Christian perspective, becomes the history of salvation.
The revolution of values brought about by the Christian faith revolves 
around the centrality of love (as charity and mercy): the Greek notion of love 
as éros permeating the philosophy of Plato – a form of love that somehow 
presupposes the lover to possess ‘agency’ and to be active in striving towards 
the object of love – is reinterpreted through the lens of the total gratuity, 
whereby each and every human being is first of all recipient of the love of God 
(mercy), is first and foremost passive, rather than active, and only by virtue 
of the received love becomes active (charity). Christian love, the sacrificial 
love, the love that donates itself totally, is indicated through the Latin word 
charitas and the Greek term agape – a notion of love different from the love of 
friendship (philía), the love that drives the desire of joining the beloved (éros) 
or even love as affection and empathy, ‘liking’ someone or something (storge). 
As part of the Christian tenet of the centrality of love, the care for each person 
– irrespective of her/his origin and condition – becomes a central value. The 
seeds of principles that the contemporary women and men hold dear, like the 
universality of human rights and of ensuing ambitious political–social and 
administrative arrangements, like the building of ‘welfare states’ or ‘welfare 
societies’ aimed at ‘taking care’ with a universalistic thrust of a wide range of 
needs of the human person from education to health and social care, have been 
sown by the Christian revolution.
Christianity also introduced a linear (rather than cyclical) conception of 
time. The Greek had different notions of time, and some philosophers (e.g. 
Anaximenes) thought of it as circular, the eternal recurrence of the same, 
a notion later picked up by Nietzsche when he advocated a revolution against 
Christianity and the restoration of the spirit of the ancient Greek, the 4th 
century bc Athens (see Chapter 3). In Christianity, time is linear and proceeds 
from an origin (the creation) to an end (the Parousia, the return of Christ on 
earth and the Final Judgement). It is also in St Augustine that the conception 
of time as pertaining to the subject rather than the object becomes a central 
question in philosophy.
Christian theology brought about a new way of conceiving of evil (the giant 
of Patristic and paramount figure of spiritualism St Augustine elaborated an 
interpretation of evil as the absence of being: if all that is has been created 
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by God, then it must be good, and evil as the absence of goodness has conse-
quently the ontological status of non-being) that has since permeated Western 
thought (see notably Augustine, 397/400).
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: Christianity has 
permeated every aspect of Western civilisation and as part of it Western 
philosophy (the main subject of this book), hence it is nearly impossible 
to single out specific areas which may track the influence on the Christian 
revolution on PA more specifically. However, if one is to be pointed out, this 
would probably be the notion of charitas as gratuitous and absolute love: this 
conception underpins notions of benevolence and the caring for each human 
being which has shaped such a large part of the ways in which public services 
have been governed and provided over the centuries, at least in the Western 
world (and in many regards later on ‘exported’ though the massive forms of 
policy transfer effected by Western colonialism). Moreover and also crucially, 
however impressively complex the question is, it may be claimed that key 
intellectual roots of modern age ‘universal human rights’ and contemporary 
notions of human person have been shaped by the Christian conception of love, 
and, as a manifestation of that, that the deeper and longer term roots of social 
rights and the welfare state/welfare society also lie to a significant extent in the 
spread of the Christian conception of love as charitas.
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
We start our brief tour of medieval philosophy with the work of Anselm of 
Canterbury. Born in Aosta, located in the north-west of today’s Italy (and for 
this reason also known as Anselm of Aosta), he was monk, prior and abbot 
at the abbey of Bec, in the south-east of England. A distinguished theologian 
and philosopher, he was also involved in a dispute over a question destined to 
dominate medieval philosophical thought: the dispute over the nature of the 
universal concepts (see later). He worked out a proof of the existence of God 
that would enjoy an extraordinary longevity. The gist of the argument is that 
God can be defined as
something than which nothing greater can be conceived … But for sure, that than 
which nothing greater can be conceived cannot exist in the understanding alone. 
For suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can thought to exist in 
reality, which is greater … therefore it is beyond doubt that there exists, both in the 
understanding and in reality, a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. 
(Proslogion, c.2, reported in Kenny, 2010, p. 478)
It is the very concept of God that makes it certain that it exists. In fact, whoever 
denies the existence of God must have the concept of God, otherwise he would 
not know what he is denying. If he has the concept of God, then he is con-
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:33:44AM
via free access
Philosophy and public administration52
tradicting himself in denying it, because the very concept of that than which 
nothing greater can be conceived implies that it exists also in reality, which 
is greater than existing only in understanding. This argument has been called 
the ontological proof of the existence of God. In working out his argument, 
Anselm also introduced the notion of imaginary world, the idea of other pos-
sible worlds than the one in which we happen to be, to argue that God must 
exist in the real world. Both the ontological proof and the methodological idea 
of conceiving of alternative possible worlds to speculate about the property of 
this one would endure the centuries and are still matter for lively philosophical 
and theological debates.
We can now turn to a major figure of philosophy: Thomas Aquinas. Most of 
his work is developed in the Summa Theologiae, a systematic investigation and 
discussion of key philosophical and theological themes, and also the Summa 
Contra Gentiles. The style adopted in his works provides the author and us 
readers with rigour and self-discipline in the line of argumentation (Kenny, 
2010, p. 309): an introductory set of challenges or difficulties against the 
position in favour of which Aquinas intends to argue are introduced (usually 
a triad). These objections to the thesis argued for are followed by a consid-
eration on the other side (introduced by Sed contra: ‘Against this position’, 
or ‘But on the other hand’), usually drawn from an authoritative text. After 
this, the main position propounded by the Aquinas is developed. By adopting 
this style, in developing his main position the Aquinas has to systematically 
engage with the contrary positions of which the reader is aware and whose 
rationale and underpinnings had initially been introduced. A thorough exercise 
of self-discipline, which is carried out throughout the discussion of virtually 
all the major philosophical themes – from the existence of God to the condi-
tions of knowledge to the roots of human liberty – wrapped up in a work (see 
Aquinas, 1258/1264) which amounts to more than 2,000,000 words!
A key notion in the philosophy of the Aquinas is the differentiation between 
essence and existence, which coincide in God and are distinct in all the 
entities. The essence is the ‘what it is’ of a thing, its form: it is basically the 
Aristotelian conception of form seen above: what gives something the form 
that makes it to be what it is. If in God essence and existence coincide (because 
God is being, it does not have being), for any other entity essence does not 
identify itself with existence. This means that those things that exist could 
also not exist and, equally important, could also never have existed, and could 
not exist anymore in the future: they are contingent. The world as a whole is 
contingent: it may be or not be. The world does not exist by its own virtue, but 
by virtue of something other, whose essence is identical to its existence: God. 
It is for this reason that Aquinas’s philosophy has been called the metaphysics 
of the actus essendi, of the (contingent) ‘act of there being’. This metaphysics 
purports the metaphysical contingency of all entities: they receive and partake 
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of being, they have being (that is, they are) because they have received 
(passive stance) being and participate of it. This is a conception that relies on 
the notion of ‘analogy’, which plays a central role in Aquinas’s philosophy: 
the participation to being by entities, whereby the cause (Being, in uppercase) 
leaves a trace of it in the effects (beings or entities), although entities only have 
being: they possess it, because they have been gifted the participation to being. 
Analogy entails that between the Creator and the created things, between being 
and entities, there is only a difference of grade: what is predicated of entities 
can also be predicated of God, albeit not in the same way or with the same 
intensity. Significantly, the cause of all entities is not necessitated in providing 
the existence: being is granted as a pure gift, and it is granted by the absolutely 
other (which entails the absolute transcendence between God and the created 
entities). In this perspective the key questions that philosophy addresses can 
be formulated as (see Reale and Antiseri, 1988, in particular pp. 424–5, Vol. 
1): why being rather than nothingness (this a question at the centre of the 
philosophies of Leibniz and Spinoza; see later)? And why does being allow/
enable entities to be (this question plays centre stage in the metaphysics of 20th 
century philosopher Martin Heidegger)?
If all entities participate of the same being, because the cause (the Creator) 
has left a trace – an effect – in all things, then there is a fundamental compara-
bility of all things amongst themselves. The intellect can detect similarities as 
well as dissimilarities between things, and hence it can make judgements about 
the things of the world by applying knowledge gained about one experience 
to other experiences, that is, through reasoning by analogy. Referring in an 
analogical way to one thing means that that one thing participates something of 
another one, albeit transcending it: but knowledge may be attained by analogy 
of a known thing to unknown things. Thus, another related way of employing 
analogical reasoning pertains to the sphere of the philosophy of knowledge: 
one way of gaining knowledge about one thing is by identifying profiles in 
which that one thing participates something of another one, has something in 
common with another one, which transcends the first. This notion has been 
widely used in theology, whereby knowledge of God or God’s attributes may 
occur by analogy with things of this world, which, although completely distinct 
from God, may partake some properties – these properties being knowledgea-
ble to human beings.6 Analogy, with varied meanings and underlying defining 
and epistemological claims about ‘external validity’, is also a central notion in 
many contemporary disciplines, whereby the claim is that knowledge may be 
attained by analogy of a known thing with unknown things. This also applies 
to the field of PA, where countless studies are implicitly or explicitly based 
on analogical reasoning: transferring knowledge generated in one domain to 
another domain, grounded on commonalities of properties between the two. 
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We return to reasoning by analogy in Chapter 3 when discussing issues of 
philosophy of knowledge, notably certain critiques to Popper’s epistemology.
As it has clearly arisen, the distinction between potentiality and actuality is 
central in the philosophy of Aquinas.7 All entities of the world, all events of 
history may be but also may not be. Apart from God, whose essence also entails 
the existence, all other things are simply a potentiality to being, an attitude to 
exist (‘id quod potest esse’, ‘that which can be’). The potentiality–actuality 
distinction is of crucial significance not just in the realm of metaphysical spec-
ulation: this notion is also central in any realm of the individual and social life, 
and hence notably, for the specific purposes of this book, for all the applied 
disciplines such as management or public administration that aim at ‘making 
things happen’ (one definition of ‘management’). The underpinning of this or 
any similar definition statement about management and public management 
is the distinction between potentiality and actuality, and how to transform the 
potential into actual. Leading scholars like Bardach (1998) noticed that in the 
social sciences, and notably in public administration and policy, there seems to 
be an inadequate treatment of the notion of potential (for example, what is the 
meaning of the claim that if a ‘good practice’ had one effect under a given set 
of circumstances, then it would make similar effects apparent under different 
circumstances? How do we deal with this ‘potential to make change happen’, 
and also how do we deal with the counterfactual arguments that a practice, 
which allegedly ‘worked’ in one case, ‘could have had’ another effect under 
only slightly changed circumstances in the other case?). Counterfactual argu-
ments are crucial in many design sciences where the objective is to shape the 
world in a different way (by adopting a new management technique or a new 
public policy, by appointing a new ‘leader’, and the like) in order to achieve 
‘better’ outcomes.
Another key distinction in Aquinas’s philosophy is between ontological 
truth (adequatio rei ad intellectum dei: the adequacy of a(ny) thing to God’s 
intellect) and logical truth, which concerns us as the subject of knowing: the 
adequacy of our intellect to the thing (adequatio intellectus nostri ad rem). 
The notion of ‘truth’ is a widely debated issue over the history of philosophy: 
Aquinas’s position, following Aristotle’s, is that the criterion of verity is the 
correspondence of the concepts in the intellect with ‘how things are’ – although 
this does not mean that the concept is the thing, but simply that correspondence 
to things is the truth criterion.
Aquinas was an influential intellectual of his time, but he also had an incred-
ibly powerful afterlife in the form of a philosophical school of thought, called 
‘scholastic’, which continued for centuries and still is alive, generally referred 
to as neo-scholastic; this stream of thought has been developed over the 
centuries based on the body of philosophy elaborated by St Thomas Aquinas. 
Philosophers belonging to the scholastics are also called ‘schoolmen’.
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Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: like for Classical 
Greek philosophy, medieval philosophy has provided a huge repertoire of 
conceptual tools that permeate knowledge generation – notions that can prob-
ably more easily be applied in a direct way in a field of inquiry that is far from 
having become an independent science with its problems unproblematically 
stated and standardised methods. More specifically, we revisit neo-scholastics 
and possible implications for PA in Chapter 4, notably in relation to the key 
notion of the distinction between potentiality and actuality.
THE DISPUTE OVER THE UNIVERSALS AND ITS 
CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE
A philosophical dispute that raged during the medieval time, and whose 
significance hasn’t lost its actuality, is that over the nature of the universals8 
– a problem whose terms are fraught with implications also for the more cir-
cumscribed purposes of our book, namely outlining some path(way)s for more 
systematically employing philosophy into PA. The matter of the dispute is the 
foundation of universal concepts intended as terms predicated of a multiplicity 
of individual things, for example ‘human being’ or ‘animal’. It regards the 
issue of whether universals are real (of which there are two versions: they do 
exist as ideal objects, more a Platonic position; or they are the product of a pro-
cession of abstraction by reason, but yet only individuals are real in the proper 
sense – Thomas Aquinas) or not. The latter position is called nominalism: uni-
versals are only nouns (flatus vocis, the utterance of voice). The dispute over 
universals produced an incredibly lively debate during the 12th, 13th and 14th 
centuries. Giants in this debate were scholars Guillaume de Champeaux (in 
English: William of Champeaux, 1070–1121), Pierre Abélard (1079–1142), 
Roscelin of Compiègne (Latinised as Roscellinus Compendiensis or Rucelinus, 
1050–1125), St Bonaventure (1221–1274), Robert Grosseteste (1175–1253), 
Joh Wycliff (1320–1384), St Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), William Ockham 
(1285–1374) and John Duns Scotus (1265–1308).
The first position is that of (radical) realism, initially stated by William 
of Champeaux: universals are metaphysical entities actually subsisting. The 
problem with this position is that if universals exist as things (albeit conceptual 
things), then all individuals should be the same, not just in the sense of having 
the same characters (like Siamese twins), but exactly the same (what else 
explains the mingling with haphazard elements?). More subtly, the objection 
(e.g. in Pierre Abélard in Le Pallet, 1079 – Chalon-sur-Saône, 21 aprile 1142) 
is that the universal for its very nature is something that can be predicated of 
a plurality of entities (in Latin: quod notum est predicari de pluribus). If this 
holds, it cannot be a thing in itself, an objective entity which, as such, cannot 
be predicated of another entity (in Latin: res de re non praedicatur). On a more 
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evaluative rather than analytical note, it may be reckoned that the individual 
would be fundamentally de-valued if it were not an individual, if each individ-
ual were at most a manifestation of one and the same universal thing.
At the very opposite we find the position of (radical) nominalism: nothing 
exists beyond individuals (in Latin: nihil est praeter individuum) – universals 
do not exist, what remains of them is the physical utterance of a voice. For this 
position universals are at most vague labels used to classify objects – but they 
cannot be predicated of things (they don’t say anything of what a thing is, ‘of 
what which is in common with a class of other things’, to use a modern-day 
terminology drawn from the study of logic).
A third position called moderate realism can be delineated as follows. It 
is individuals that exist, but reason can distinguish, separate and, in a sense, 
abstract the characteristics that qualify and are in common to all individuals 
of the same species. It is on these elements in common (similitudo or status 
communis), as captured by the mind, that universals – universal concepts and 
notions – are founded. Universals are concepts. They lie in the mind (of human 
beings, as God’s intelligence may differ), and signify the status communis, the 
common elements or properties that qualify a species or category of individu-
als (the common properties of all human beings, or of all dogs, or of all Total 
Quality Management systems, to hint back to Pollitt’s example recalled in 
Chapter 1, because the notion of universal concept applies not only to ‘natural’ 
entities but also to man-made entities, artefacts like the deliberately engineered 
social systems for the running of a public organisation, like a strategic planning 
system, a management accounting and control system, a human resources 
management system, a Total Quality Management system, and the like).
Another way to formulate the problem is whether universals are ante rem 
(first universals exist, then things are made as copies from that pattern); post 
rem (universals exist only in the mind that abstracts them, if they exist at all), 
or in re (universals exist only in concrete individuals, from where they are 
abstracted by the mind) (Reale and Antiseri, 1988, pp. 396–400).
The dispute over the universals continues to our days, often intermingling 
with the issue of how to interpret Plato’s ideas. Logicians and analysts of lan-
guage have tried out a variety of approaches: Frege’s propositional logic and 
predicate calculus; the theory of classes; the notion of ideas as paradigms, and 
so on. However, it seems that in crucially important respects the basic terms 
of the problem are still the same on which medieval scholars debated quite 
a number of centuries ago.
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: as widely discussed 
later in the book (Chapter 6), the actuality of the medieval debate over the 
nature of the universals is witnessed by the observation that where a scholar 
stands in that debate may be closely linked to where s/he stands in conceiving 
of the social sciences in general and of public governance specifically. Realist 
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positions in the conception of the universals appear hardly compatible with 
radical social constructivism, which tends to be aligned with a nominalist con-
ception of the universals, and it appears the opposite may also hold: nominalist 
positions in the conception of universals are difficult to reconcile with realist 
positions across the whole gamut (we refer the reader to Chapter 6, where 
contemporary social constructivism and critical realism in PA are extensively 
discussed).
LATE MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
If the scholastic philosophy tended to dominate the 13th and 14th century, 
the criticisms moved it to pave the way to a ‘crisis’ of the entire medieval 
philosophy and, later, to the dawn of the philosophy of the modern age. Such 
crisis was triggered also by the critiques formulated by John Duns Scotus and 
especially William of Ockham.
Scotus advocated taking simple or univocal concepts as the starting point 
of philosophising, and claimed the univocal, individual entity to be object of 
intellection (his writings are collated in Duns Scotus, 1950).9 Taking a differ-
ing stance from analogical reasoning, he claims that transcendental predicates 
are univocal, not analogical, and transcendental disjunctions apply to whatever 
there is: every being must be either actual or potential, either necessary or 
contingent, either finite or infinite – and this property of transcendental dis-
junctions to be univocal applies to God as well. (As we shall see later, Kant 
turned this perspective upside down and located transcendentals in the mind 
of the knowing subject, rather than as properties of being as such.) Scotus also 
introduced a subtle distinction between subjective and objective potentiality. 
Subjective potentiality is for Scotus what the Aristotelian notion of potentiality 
is about: for Scotus, Aristotle by potentiality intended the potentiality of the 
‘subject of the power’ to become something (the potentiality is ‘endowed’ to 
whoever or whatever holds the power of becoming something), for example 
an embryo can become a child, a child an adult human being, and so forth. 
Objective potentiality occurs when something receives the potentiality to 
become: it is the terminus (recipient) of the power as opposed to the subject of 
the power to become. For Scotus, things can also come into being as terminus 
of power held elsewhere. This paves the way to the notion of synchronic 
contingency: possibilities, not compatible in one world, are possible in differ-
ent possible worlds – a notion employed by modern philosophers who have 
widely used the notion of alternative possible worlds. (Leibniz, who famously 
spoke of this as the best of all possible worlds, is attributed the introduction 
of the notion of ‘possible worlds’ into philosophical debate, but the roots 
of this concept lie in the notion of objective potentiality introduced by John 
Duns Scotus, and before him in the structure of the argument formulated by 
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Anselm to demonstrate the existence of God.) To gauge the significance of this 
notion, it may be considered that any time a counterfactual argument is used 
(arguments like ‘what would happen/would have happened if something were 
different/had been different from what actually occurred?’, ‘what alternative 
outcomes would occur/would have occurred if something had been different 
from what actually happened?’), we are somehow resorting to the philosoph-
ical notion of alternative worlds,10 whose way was paved by Scotus’s notion 
of objective potentiality. Counterfactual arguments are crucial in many design 
sciences (Simon, 1969/1981/1996), like PA, whose goal is taming knowledge 
for shaping the world in different ways in order to achieve alternative ‘better’ 
outcomes (e.g. what alternative outcomes may be attained by adopting a certain 
new public management technique or a new public policy, by appointing a new 
‘leader’ at the helm of an organisation, and the like).
The crisis of medieval philosophical thinking is strongly associated with 
the critiques to the scholastic formulated by Ockham11 (see for key writings 
Ockham, 1985), and notably his criterion of investigation of reality known as 
‘Ockham’s razor’, which is stated as follows: ‘entia non sunt multiplicanda 
praeter necessitatem’, that is, ‘you must not add any entity or notion that is 
not strictly necessary’ (in order to explain something). It is a very ‘modern 
scientific’ approach to theorising whereby parsimony in theorising is highly 
valued. From his philosophy – whose corpus is obviously much wider than just 
the statement of the criterion of the ‘razor’ – it is entailed that we as human 
beings cannot know the essence of things, only the qualities or accidents of 
things that experience reveals to us (this is the starting point of much of the 
philosophical tradition of the empiricism, which will flourish in Britain). Nor 
can we know by analogy – there is a hiatus between finite and infinite, and 
only the pure act of creative will of God can link the two. Ockham goes the 
other way around than the ancient Greeks, at least in Plato’s tradition because 
Aristotle has a differing stance on this, for whom the core question is: how 
does individuation derive from ideas (ideal archetypes)? Instead Ockham’s 
position is that reality is ‘all in the singular’, only individuals are real. This 
position may of course be criticised – and it has been widely – but it had 
a huge influence on subsequent philosophical thought. Amongst his many 
contributions to philosophy, Ockham also introduced the distinction between 
mental terms (which is the same) and verbal terms (oral or written, which 
change across languages), a concept that prefigures the notion developed by 
the linguist Chomsky of the distinction between superficial and inner structure 
of a sentence (the superficial structure changes between languages and within 
a language, the inner structure is the same): a notion widely used in linguistic 
studies and that represent a major component of contemporary philosophical 
research work – as well as of discourse analysis, which is widely employed in 
the humanities and the social sciences alike.
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Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: like for medieval 
philosophy more widely, late medieval philosophy has furnished the modern 
scholar with key concepts that permeate knowledge generation, like the prin-
ciple of parsimony in introducing notions when theorising or the notion of 
counterfactuals, which have a prominent role in PA inquiry.
RENAISSANCE
Situated between the medieval and the modern age, Renaissance as an epoch 
stands out, distinct from both medieval age and modern age. The Renaissance 
had its birth as well as its zenith in the Italy of seigniories, principalities and 
republics, and of the innumerable genial artists that operated in the peninsula 
during the period that spanned, approximately, from the second half of the 
14th century to the first half of the 16th century. From Italy, the Renaissance 
as a philosophical, artistic and cultural movement spread throughout Europe, 
in different waves and with highly varied impact. Also referred to as ‘human-
ism’, Renaissance put the human at the centre (intended not just as the human 
species, but all that is ‘human’). It is a multifaceted epoch, immensely rich 
from a cultural viewpoint, where artists and literates are the main protagonists, 
possibly more than philosophers in the strictest sense, and here we can only 
touch upon a very few of the ideas that were delved into and debated across 
Europe during the Renaissance.
One is the idea of the vocation to perfection of human beings, omnipresent 
in humanistic writers: we will discuss its significance for government and 
public administration when we debate the role that virtues play in good gov-
ernment and good governance in Chapter 6. Another powerful idea, of clear 
neo-platonic imprint, is the notion that each human being is a micro-cosmos; 
it is the idea that all that is in reality is somehow reflected in each and every 
person: a powerful reminder that in investigating reality scholars always hold 
two options: alongside the option of ‘watching out’ to what is empirically 
detectable, scholars also always hold the alternative – complementary – option 
of looking inside oneself, into our own conscience and soul. For example, 
what is ‘ethical’ in the behaviour of public servants may be studied by 
observing actual behaviours, but also by deriving from our conscience what is 
meant by ethical behaviour, under given circumstances, possibly also thought 
experiments.
A third key idea is that of the immutability and universality of human nature, 
which is powerfully summed up in a key motto of Renaissance: homo sum: 
nihil human mihi alienum est – ‘I am a human being, nothing that is human 
is alien to me’ – meaning that each and every human being encapsulates in 
herself/himself the entirety of humankind. Key thinkers of this epoch who 
strongly argued about the immutability and universality of human nature are 
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Machiavelli and Guicciardini. In the field of PA there are different positions 
on this theme, and the implications of the immutability, or otherwise, of 
human nature are of enormous magnitude for the way in which the discipline 
is studied and practised. One such implication is whether we can learn from 
history or not. Machiavelli argues that we can, and one underlying reason is 
exactly that human nature stays the same over time – which is not to say that it 
is impermeable to influence from the environment, but that the nature of mind 
and soul (the capacities to understand and the motives to act, when conditions 
allow) stay over time and across latitudes. Releasing this assumption may lead 
to very different inferences about what we can learn from history – indeed it 
may ultimately mean giving up the very possibility of learning from history.
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: the education of the 
Christian Prince – hence the question of what skills and qualities are required of 
governors – has been central to Renaissance thought, which has thus furnished 
the posterity with reflections whose enduring value cannot be underrated about 
the ‘profession’ of governing and administering, and the requisite virtues and 
skills required for this purpose. Indeed, some of the key contributions we 
discuss widely in Chapter 7 for their contemporary significance and relevance 
to a range of PA topics – like The Prince by Niccolò Machiavelli and Utopia 
by Thomas More – are literary masterpieces of Renaissance.
THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION
It does not appear an overstatement to say that the scientific revolution that 
occurred over the 16th and 17th century, and the ensuing Industrial Revolution 
of the 18th century, changed the world.
The two revolutions are deeply interlinked, and the philosopher Francis 
Bacon (‘the philosopher of the industrial age’) is probably its leading expo-
nent: knowledge must be capable of helping practice, and he famously linked 
knowledge and power in the statement that ‘knowledge is power’. Many of the 
tenets of ‘modern’ science were conceived during this epoch, by Bacon as well 
as physicists like Galileo and Newton, including the notion that knowledge 
is public (the procedures whereby knowledge is gained must be made public 
to ensure replicability), inter-subjective, progressive and cumulative (given 
the statement of problem and method, consistent accumulation of knowledge 
becomes possible), grown and tested through repeated observations. From 
this conception derived a different organisation of intellectual work and of the 
academy: one akin to our contemporary conception of knowledge production 
by groups of researchers studying similar problems with public methods of 
inquiry and repeated, precise observations. Knowledge, in this perspective, 
proceeds step by step from induction based on a larger and larger number of 
observations, and it does not rely on the authority of the past, in stark contrast 
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with the primacy of the auctoritas, the idea of appealing to the authority of 
illustrious scholars of the past to justify a claim, which characterised medieval 
thought. Indeed, in the new intellectual ambiance of the scientific revolution 
the authority of the past may, and in a certain sense must, be challenged: 
‘Nullius in verba’ (‘nothing is in words’) is the motto of the Royal Society of 
London for the Promotion of Natural Knowledge, chartered in 1662 by King 
Charles II and whose establishment was heavily influenced by Bacon’s philos-
ophy. Facts and experiments,12 not the authority of past thinkers – or the idola, 
idols, that society and tradition produce and that encumber the understanding 
of things – drive the way forward for Bacon and his contemporaries, in what 
came at the time to be termed ‘scientific knowledge’. This is in many respects 
still the way in which not only the natural sciences but also the social sciences 
proceed – or at least this is the conventional term of reference propounded for 
how they should proceed, although alternative paradigms contend this claim 
(we will discuss the terms of this contention in the field of PA in Chapter 4).
Bacon also provided insightful views into the way in which the social 
context, within which scientific production occurs, may powerfully affect 
(and ‘bias’) the production of scientific knowledge. He may in this sense be 
attributed the qualification of the first sociologist of knowledge.13 Bacon also 
introduced the idea of the elimination by induction of false theories, in order 
to leave but one ‘correct’ theory. This is known as the experimentum crucis, 
‘the crucial experiment’ or literally ‘the experiment of the crux’, as a way to 
call between two competing theories and discern which one holds and which 
one to discard. The episteme of this method for testing theories, however, was 
criticised by Karl Popper (on the ground that infinite alternative theories can 
always be produced, hence no experiment is really a test between two theories) 
as well as by Pierre Duhem and others (see Chapter 3). Indeed, in the natural 
sciences, and even more so in the social sciences, rarely can it be spoken of 
‘crucial experiments’ that can decisively discriminate between two or more 
theories and attribute validity (albeit provisional) to one theory and rule out on 
a definitive basis the others.
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: the modern concep-
tion of ‘science’ and scientific knowledge was conceived of in Europe in this 
epoch, and these notions remain the term of comparison for all endeavours to 
set up any ‘science of PA’ or the ‘administrative sciences’. Although social 
sciences took off mostly a century later during the Enlightenment and the 19th 
century, many of the seeds of modern social sciences have been sown in this 
epoch.
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EARLY MODERN PHILOSOPHY
The commencement of early modern philosophy is often associated with the 
French philosopher René Descartes (see notably Descartes, 1637; and more 
widely the collection of readings in Descartes, 1998) and with his most famous 
approach of the ‘methodological doubt’, summed up in the statement: ‘cogito, 
ergo sum’ ‘I think, then I am’. The statement is however crippled of a key 
component, the full statement being: ‘I doubt, then I think (doubting being an 
act of thinking), then I am’. The doubting by the reflective subject becomes the 
commencement of philosophy because nothing else can constitute a ‘certainty’ 
from which philosophising can take the move. It is in this sense that Descartes 
has brought about the ‘revolution of the subject’ that characterises modern 
philosophy: the thinking subject is the commencement of philosophy (and for 
Descartes the only thing of which the thinking subject may be certain is its 
own doubting).
He also introduced a duality that is still haunting the contemporary man: the 
dualism materiality/spirituality, that has permeated the debate to our days, owes 
much to Descartes’s distinction between res cogitans (literally ‘the thinking 
thing’, the thinking substance) and res extensa (literally, ‘the extended thing’, 
the thing whose defining property is to have an extension). It has been noted 
that this distinction, and especially the notion of matter as inherently defined 
by its having an extension, was profoundly attuned to the Newtonian physics 
that was emerging at the time, but is put into question by the developments of 
modern physics. The argument of Descartes in a nutshell is that what remains 
of every material object, after decomposing it, is its extension, and hence this 
is its ‘substance’. But modern physics has shattered this perspective: the func-
tional equivalence of energy and mass (stated by Einstein’s famous equation), 
the indeterminacy of position and movement of small objects like atomic and 
sub-atomic particles,14 and recent (though contested) notions like dark matter 
and antimatter15 are all casting serious doubts on the property of extension as 
being the qualifying feature of matter.
However, Descartes’s conception of the universe as made of simple, dull 
matter everywhere, without ends (in both the finalistic sense and the physical 
sense), without borders and without purposes was a perfect fit for the way 
in which Newtonian physics was progressing, and the way in which it was 
getting rid of medieval and Renaissance notions of nature. Nature is in this 
conception not made of substances to be known, it is just matter whose rela-
tions and interactions can be measured, that are entirely expressible through 
mathematical formulas. The discovery of such mathematical formulas was the 
task of physics. It is at this time that physics becomes the ‘second discipline’ 
in ranking after philosophy. In this epoch physics and philosophy become the 
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trunk and the roots, respectively, of knowledge, with all the other disciplines 
being placed in a subsidiary position. During this period the idea also arises 
that animals could be just machines (Descartes added a question mark to the 
statement: it was a question he posed, not a claim he made). In this dull world, 
the human being is singled out as unique amongst living beings because it is 
the only one to be made of two substances at the same time: the thinking thing 
and the extended thing.16
Descartes, like other constructors of novel metaphysical systems like 
Spinoza and Leibniz, can be ascribed, broadly speaking, to the camp of 
‘rationalism’, at least in the very basic sense that they make the assumption 
that ideas are at least partly innate and hence that reason can proceed, to some 
extent, ‘on its own’ in knowing the world. In this scheme, the camp opposite 
to that of rationalism is empiricism, where this means assuming that all ideas 
derive from the senses. This is by far an oversimplification, but somehow may 
serve the purpose of shedding light on one key point distinguishing diverse 
philosophies: those belonging to the camp of rationalism and those in the camp 
of empiricism. The distinction between rationalism and empiricism lingers 
and appears far from being overcome, and today scholars still tend to fall 
(though not squarely) into either camp (in the field of PA, this point is stated by 
Riccucci, 2010; see Chapter 4 in particular where she works out a classification 
of the philosophical stance of contemporary public administrationists).
We can now turn to the other builders of great metaphysical systems of the 
17th century: Spinoza, Leibniz and Malebranche. Baruch Spinoza was the 
philosopher of ‘pure necessity’ and the immanence of all in God; Wilhelm 
Gottfried Leibniz of the transcendence of the absolute Being-God.
Spinoza (for an English edition of his main works see Spinoza, 1951; see 
also Spinoza, 1677) is rationalist in that his philosophical thought commences 
from one idea that does not derive from experience: there is only one sub-
stance, this is God – the demonstration of whose existence occurs along the 
lines of the ontological proof – and all the rest is derived according to the crite-
rion of absolute necessity. In this perspective, nothing exists that is contingent, 
and hence nothing exists outside of God. This position may be classified as 
belonging to pantheism (all is God) and monism (there is only one substance). 
For Spinoza, the res cogitans and res extensa are just two out of infinite attrib-
utes of God-Being (God as the totality of being). The assertion of the category 
of necessity as the ‘dominant property’ of Being is part of the bequest of 
Spinoza that will have a huge influence on later modern philosophers, notably 
Hegel (whose philosophical system also owes to Spinoza the pantheistic 
vision, although for Hegel it is more appropriate to talk of panentheism: all 
is ‘in’ God). Classical metaphysics relied on the transcendental disjunction: 
something that is, either it is necessary or it is contingent. It did not claim that 
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one of the two would be the only ‘dimension’ of Being. Spinoza instead leans 
towards asserting that necessity is the only category of being.
Leibniz was a genial thinker, active in governmental roles for most of his 
life, and his philosophical intuitions furnished a wealth of materials for philo-
sophical speculation over the centuries. It is only recently that the majority of 
his writings have become available, and recent discoveries have shed new light 
on this genial thinker (see Antognazza, 2009, 2016; for a previous collection of 
his writings translated into English, see Leibniz, 1988).
Leibniz developed an original philosophical system: the theory of monads 
(a philosophical system which at face value is quite hard to come to grips 
with because it is far from intuitive, especially for the contemporary man not 
plunged into the culture of the epoch). Monad is a word of Greek origin for 
unity, and it has its roots in Aristotelian notions, notably the notion of form 
(which we have already encountered and that refers to ‘unity and order’ as 
the essence of a thing) and the notion of ‘entelechy’ as the becoming actual 
of what is otherwise only potential. Such notions are reinterpreted by Leibniz 
in original ways by conceiving of Monads as whole worlds or micro-cosmos 
(an idea of neo-platonic origin that enjoyed wide currency during the 
Renaissance). For Leibniz, reality is made of monads, whole worlds intercon-
nected (harmonised is the term used by Leibniz) amongst themselves by God. 
Importantly, for Leibniz reality is made of whole things, intended as objects 
of intellection: thus, a human being is not made by the cells, molecules and 
atoms that compose her/him at a given moment: this is a spatial understanding 
of things – but for Leibniz a human being and a cell are two different objects of 
intellection, and as such they co-exist next to one another, harmonised by God, 
rather than ‘composing’ one another in relations of parts and wholes. Leibniz 
also made an ingenuous attempt to harmonise modern physics (to whose 
development he himself contributed) and metaphysics, endeavouring to pursue 
a synthesis that was probably never attempted any more in modern times after 
the passing away, in Hanover in 1716, of the Philosopher of Leipzig.
Methodologically, Leibniz asserted (assumed) that certain principles, like 
the a priori principles of non-contradiction and of sufficient reason, are innate, 
and therefore he may be firmly ascribed to the camp of rationalism.
Nicolas Malebranche is regarded as the main exponent of the philosophy of 
occasionalism (a stream of thought with a long history in both Christian and 
Islamic thought, also in relation to the central question of explaining God’s 
miracles and the ‘disruption’ they bring about to the ‘natural’ cause-end-effect 
chains): centred on the idea that God (as natura naturans, shaper of everything) 
is the one and only true cause of everything (natura naturata, nature as 
created), occasionalism is critical of the causal power of creaturely causes, 
and in its purest form (global occasionalism) treats all other causes as at most 
‘occasional’ (thence the name of ‘occasionalism’) and God as the only genuine 
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cause of everything, while in more moderate forms (local occasionalism) it 
allows in certain domains of reality for creaturely causes to exercise their 
power, while always upholding that God is the ultimate genuine cause of all 
(a systematic review of the philosophy of occasionalism, to which we refer 
widely here, is elaborated by Lee, 2008/2019). The main underpinning of 
occasionalism is the argument about conservation of the created world to lie in 
an ‘act of continuous creation’ by God. In a nutshell, the key question here is 
how the world is kept into being (conservation) by God: if this occurs through 
a direct, non-mediated act of continuous creation by God, then in the strongest 
sense God is the only and genuine cause of everything – the logical alternative 
being that if it suffices that God ‘merely conserves’ things into being, then 
these creaturely things can wield causal power over each other (and hence their 
influence cannot be reduced to that of merely occasional causes); intermediate 
positions may explain forms of local occasionalism.
The nuts and bolts of the philosophy of occasionalism (Malebranche, 1997) 
can be better appreciated when set in the context of the 17th-century debates 
on mind–body interactions triggered by Cartesian philosophy, with questions 
dominating the debate like: what is the causal power of bodies (the extended 
things) on the thinking things, and vice versa? Or do extended things only have 
causal powers on other extended things, and thinking things on other thinking 
things? And so forth. To better set in perspective occasionalism, it is mean-
ingful to ponder on the logical alternatives to it (Lee, 2008/2019): Cartesian 
interactionism, allowing for creaturely causes to wield power on each other, 
and Leibnizian ‘pre-established harmony’, whereby substances (monads) 
only wield causal power on themselves, while it is God’s harmonised order 
of the universe to enable change to occur in a coordinated fashion amongst 
substances (Leibniz held the view that finite substances do not have the causal 
power to bring about change in other substances, though they can be causally 
active in causing their own successive states).
We can now pause for a moment and reflect on the directions that philos-
ophy has taken at the dawn of modern thought. From Descartes, via Spinoza, 
Malebranche and Leibniz, to Hegel we witness in continental Europe the 
development of the great metaphysical systems. These philosophers are not 
just attempting to criticise or integrate previous metaphysics (mainly, Plato’s 
and Aristotle’s metaphysics) as most medieval philosophers have been doing. 
Rather, they strove to re-establish metaphysics through a new system that 
attempts to supersede all the previous ones. The same thrust is shared by Kant, 
although his direction is in a sense the opposite: not to establish a new meta-
physics, but to draw the limits of any future metaphysics (as testified by his 
significantly titled work Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will 
Be Able to Present Itself as a Science). What we here behold are attempts to 
a radical re-foundation of philosophy. These attempts were mainly continental 
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European, notably in France and especially Germany. On the other hand, 
British and American – Anglophone – philosophy took a different direction, 
more in continuity with the idea of criticising and integrating previous philos-
ophies than re-founding the whole philosophical discourse. The roots of much 
of Anglophone philosophy are probably to be found in empiricism. It is to this 
stream that we now turn.
EMPIRICISM
Empiricism is a philosophical strand central to the development of both natural 
and social sciences (and that should be kept distinct from its ‘offspring’ known 
as positivism, which we discuss later), and it is a mainstay, it almost embodies 
a ‘stance’ that constitutes a multifarious and yet central stream of thought for 
the field of PA (see Riccucci, 2010, who neatly distinguishes empiricism from 
positivism and its neo- and post-variants).
Some of the roots of empiricism can be found in the critique of the know-
ability of the ‘substance’ by the human mind, already surfaced in Ockham 
and, in different terms, in Scotus.17 It is a central theme in John Locke’s Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding: substance, intended as what underlies and 
sustains18 what we can perceive through the senses, is, he claims, unknowable 
(it may be noted that Locke does not deny the existence of the substance, but 
rather its knowability). This argument is in many respects a precursor to Kant’s 
conception of substance (he will use a different term: ‘noumenon’) as the pure 
limit to human reason; the unknowable, but yet necessary, limit of knowledge. 
Knowledge for Kant and for Locke can only be developed on phenomena – for 
Locke knowledge is knowledge of those properties of things that manifest 
themselves ‘empirically’ and that we capture through the senses. This is a key 
claim of Locke’s philosophical contribution, although we should immediately 
alert the reader that the analysis of how human knowledge unfolds, developed 
by the English philosopher, is far more articulate and sophisticated than this 
bare statement. His influence on subsequent developments of philosophical 
and scientific inquiry can hardly be exaggerated, because much of modern 
philosophy distanced itself from the search for the substance of the things and 
concentrated instead on what of their properties is knowable. In a certain sense, 
much of modern philosophy has adopted the basic stance, if not the specific 
terms, of Locke’s philosophy (his writings are collated in Locke, 1975).
This central statement of the Essay has been the target of harsh critiques. 
The question is whether the notion of substance as ‘what sustains’ is a per-
tinent depiction or rather a caricature of what classical metaphysical philos-
ophers meant. Is ‘that which sustains’ what Aristotle or Aquinas meant with 
substance? Or is it rather essence, the form of things that they meant with 
substance? For example, dad, mum or our partner in classical metaphysics 
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‘are’ first and foremost persons, and then they also hold qualities like having 
an extension, having a colour of their skin or their eyes, and so on, and they 
are not just a collection of perceivable properties (their extension, colour of 
skin and eyes, etc.)? These properties are not the whole, or indeed the essence 
of mum or dad or the partner, who are persons. Substance in classical meta-
physics may well be something different and more than just ‘what lies under 
and sustains’. And so, we are back to the fundamental question: is the idea of 
substance to be tucked in the category of the useless, or of the useful? As the 
reader will guess, the question is not over and the issue of the human possibil-
ity of knowing the substance of things resurfaces in different guises in different 
epochs, from idealism and neo-idealism to phenomenology, as we shall see in 
Chapter 3.
Another key author of British empiricism is Hobbes, who developed a met-
aphysics of corporeism. Hobbes is famously associated with the notion of the 
state as a ‘Leviathan’, a theory of the state developed is his homonymous work 
Leviathan (1961/1996). The Leviathan is a sea monster (referenced in the Old 
Testament) to which Hobbes likens the state as a necessary evil. Given that 
human beings are mutually a potential life threat, the only remedy that can 
realistically be deployed lies in the concentration of the monopoly of the force 
into an impersonal entity, the state. The state, a produce of human beings, is 
inherently ‘invasive’ into individual liberty, and yet in its absence the world 
would be worse because it is the sole guarantor of the possibility of a relatively 
safe life (in Locke, another essential function of the state is also as guarantor of 
the safeguard of private property). We will return to the political philosophy of 
Hobbes in Chapter 5, in relation to the notion of a ‘social contract’ perspective 
to the foundation of the legitimacy of a political system. Here we notice how 
Hobbes’s argument still lurks ubiquitous in contemporary politics and PA 
studies: is the state invasive of the private sphere, or do private organisations 
like businesses and corporations have the upper hand and capture the state 
(or the portions of it that are of interest for the pursuit of their own interest)? 
Does the state ‘invade’ the private sphere in overall equitable and fair ways, 
or rather inequitably and unfairly (e.g. by treating people differently from 
different social and ethnic groups)? These and related questions recurrently 
surface in the field. Hobbes’s critique may elicit pertinent and yet at times 
forgotten questions. Let’s take by way of example the practitioners’ as well as 
academic’s debate on the benefits and challenges of ‘joined up government’, 
‘whole of government’, ‘holistic government’, and the like. It is widely held 
that a more coordinated government would almost by itself be beneficial, but 
from the perspective of Hobbes’s critique, wouldn’t a holistic government, 
empowered with modern technologies of collection of personal data and coer-
cive means unthinkable at Hobbes’s time, also be a major threat to individual 
liberty? And what if government is not democratic or respectful of human 
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rights, with appropriate checks and balances in place? What if portions of the 
coercive apparatus of the state can be captured by closed, unaccountable social 
groups, perhaps by means of corruptive or collusive behaviours? The actuality 
of Hobbes’s concerns lingers.
A ‘radicalisation’ of empiricism occurred in George Berkeley and David 
Hume. Berkeley (see Opera Omnia) claimed that ‘matter does not exist and 
that material objects are only ideas that God shares with us, from time to time. 
His slogan esse est percipi – to be is to be perceived – was widely quoted and 
widely mocked’ (Kenny, 2010, p. 560). Berkeley’s bequest19 will be picked up 
by idealist philosophy within a different frame.
Hume’s poignant critiques of the possibility of knowledge – notably of the 
limits of empirical knowledge, which for the philosopher is the only possible 
form of knowledge – still occupy centre stage in contemporary culture (Hume, 
1777). A contested claim made by Hume regards whether the notion of causal-
ity is ultimately significant, or rather what humans can see when they think to 
be observing causality in action (that ‘A is the cause of the effect B’) is only 
a regular conjunction of events, a temporal order whereby we first observe 
A and then after a temporal lag we observe B. His philosophical inheritance 
furnishes continued stimuli to constantly be vigilant and aware of the uncertain 
bases of human knowledge and to draw the borders of the knowable and the 
validity of what is known; Hume’s formulation of the notion of ‘belief’ has 
also been widely picked up in sociology, whereby the observation that beliefs 
lead human beings to undertake certain courses of action rather than others 
is a useful starting point for innumerable streams of sociological research; 
equally influential has been Hume’s notion of moral sentiments and the idea 
that sympathy for other human beings may represent the root of natural virtues 
such as meekness, clemency or generosity (Kenny, 2010, p. 697).
However, there seems to be an irrational drift of empiricism with Hume: 
in his thought, empiricism might have pushed itself beyond healthy critical 
vigilance and awareness of the limits of human knowledge, over the cliff of 
irrationality (Reale and Antiseri, 1988, pp. 430–1).
Empiricism continued to dominate British philosophical thought, and, 
amongst others, John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic (1843/2011) continued 
the great tradition of the British empiricism.
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: as aptly indicated by 
Riccucci (2010), the dichotomy between a key tenet of rationalism (that ideas 
are at least partly innate) and of empiricism (that ideas can only be formed 
though sensorial perceptions, though they cannot be reduced to perceptions) 
remains a key point of contention in the PA debate. This topic is elaborated in 
Chapter 6, where possible ways for a fruitful integration of both perspectives 
for the advancement of PA studies are discussed.
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ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE AGE OF THE 
REVOLUTIONS
Enlightenment is a cultural–philosophical movement that came to define an 
epoch spanning the 18th century, which had its epicentre in France and spread 
throughout Europe. It is marked by the praise of the critical reason and an 
ambition to bring humankind into adulthood by the use of reason. The roots 
of many social sciences, like economics, can be traced back to this epoch. 
Also key notions like that of universal human rights (as codified for example 
in the UN charter of human rights) were fully theorised in this epoch, which 
is also the epoch of eventful moments for political thought like the American 
and the French revolutions. Indeed, this epoch brought about four major 
revolutions that have forever changed the course of history: the revolution in 
England, the English and notably the Glorious Revolution towards the end of 
the 17th century, which put to the fore the political philosophy of liberalism 
and the notion of human rights, and the idea of representative (parliamentary) 
democracy; the French revolution, which redefined the notion of sovereignty 
(belonging to the people of a country) and established the compelling idea of 
the universal rights (the rights of the human being as such, of each and every 
human being, as well as the rights of the citizens of a country, in the famous 
French expression: les droits de l’homme et du citoyen), as well as introducing 
forms of direct democracy; the American revolution, establishing the right of 
each people to self-determination and propounding the ideal of democracy; 
and the industrial revolution, which has pushed through a quantum leap in the 
possibilities of manufacturing goods by resorting to non-animal power force 
– revolutions which have redefined the West (and the world), and which con-
tinue to define the West and its quest for the affirmation of universal human 
rights and liberal democracy as the principles underpinning public governance.
Turning to Enlightenment as a philosophical movement, this philosophical 
stream has emphasised the centrality of critical reasoning and stressed the 
power of reason to free humankind from its prejudices, and to lead it into con-
tinuous progress, both intellectual and material. A number of social sciences 
that are central to PA, like economics, became independent disciplines in this 
century (notably, economics detached from moral philosophy to become the 
discipline which studies the problem of making decisions on scarce resources 
to achieve objectives which are alternative and can, at least to some extent, 
be prioritised and ranked in terms of preference). It is not an overstatement 
to claim that the ideals of the Enlightenment represent a continued source 
of inspiration for many contemporary scholars, in all disciplines and this 
includes PA. The very idea of the encyclopaedia as an orderly collection of 
all human knowledge without establishing any special hierarchy amongst 
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the branches of knowledge (encyclopaedias are in alphabetical order) is an 
invention of the Enlightenment, and continues to be an inspiration, including 
for PA (the second decade of the 21st century has witnessed a flourishing of 
encyclopaedias dedicated to PA, like for example the Oxford Encyclopaedia 
of Public Administration or the Springer General Encyclopaedia of Public 
Administration, Public Policy and Governance).
One author we pluck from this epoch for the significance of his thought on 
the philosophy of public administration is Christian Wolff (1679–1754). The 
definitions and distinctions he proposed wielded a large influence particularly 
on German philosophical thought over the century, notably his distinction 
between those disciplines that proceed by way of reason – for which the 
principle of non-contradiction is the ultimate criterion of truth – and those 
that proceed by way of empirical evidence. Importantly he was one of the first 
to develop a justification for state intervention in society beyond the strict 
regulatory function of protecting fundamental rights and administering justice. 
His thought is deemed by some PA scholars to be foundational to the modern 
theory of PA conceived of as a branch of knowledge: a concept encompassed 
in the German notion of staatswissenschaften, which might be translated as 
‘political science’, but is a wider, more encompassing notion to indicate the 
range of disciplines that, combined, enable the knowledge of government in 
action (Drechsler, 2001b).
One dominant note, and possibly one key limitation, of the Enlightenment 
is an emphasis on a temporal knowledge. A dominant narrative of the 
Enlightenment is about the critical reason rising above prejudices that had 
accumulated in history and performing a liberating role from prejudices: the 
past is seen not so much as constitutive of the present, but rather as a source 
of errors that critical reason can amend. This assumption of human reason, 
now rid of prejudices operating at a sort of ‘year zero’, has informed important 
strands of social sciences. Indeed, the very idea of analysing a phenomenon 
starting from the assumption that t = 0 (time equals zero) is drawn from the 
consolidating method in the natural sciences after the scientific revolution 
and has gained traction in the social sciences as well. As we examine in the 
next chapter, philosophers like Hegel reacted harshly to this assumption and 
Hegel’s dialectical approach where the whole of the past is conserved in the 
present through the synthesis of thesis and antithesis presents an abysmally 
different philosophical stance.
In conclusion, although it is up to historians to gauge the extent to which 
the Enlightenment still inspires contemporary scholarly work across the disci-
plines, and notably for our purposes in the disciplines related to PA, it appears 
a warranted claim that much of the thrust of the Enlightenment in terms of 
scholarly inquiry being aimed at dismantling prejudices, unveiling biased 
opinions and, by resorting to critical reasoning, shedding light on phenomena 
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is something that still enthuses scholars and the self-conception that social 
scientists have of their mission. Equally, the idea that critical reason can amend 
past errors and make mankind start from ‘year zero’ still finds adherents in 
different milieus, both of scholars and practitioners.
The dawn of what we nowadays call ‘the modern age’ also gave rise to 
another distinctive feature: the conception of innovation (in any dimension: 
not just technological or industrial, but more broadly social and political) as 
a permanent thrust of a society has become a defining trait of European civili-
sation first, and the entire world later on.
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: the Enlightenment 
provided the intellectual environment for the establishment and development 
of the social sciences (e.g. economics) in the terms in which they are conceived 
of nowadays. Also the conception of the ‘encyclopaedia’ and the idea of taking 
stock of existing knowledge without putting it in a hierarchy but rather, more 
humbly, listing what is known in alphabetical order originated in this epoch. 
The mushrooming ‘encyclopaedias of PA’ of these days are the direct heirs of 
this idea matured in 18th-century France. France – alongside England and the 
US – also gave birth to the notion of universal rights and the universal rights 
discourse that is so centre stage in nowadays politics, and thence it ought to be 
also in the PA debate. Implications of the rights of every human being as such 
and the rights of the citizen in her/his capacity as citizen of a country (in the 
famous French expression: les droits de l’homme et du citoyen) are also crucial 
to making sense of the development of social rights, the welfare state, and to 
contemporary notions of welfare governance and welfare society.
NOTES
1. It is interesting to note that the Greek alphabet, which originated from the 
Phoenician signary (Phoenician is a West Semitic language like Hebrew. In fact, 
‘aleph’ and ‘bet’ – in their Hebrew form – are the first two characters of the 
Semitic system, from which the Greek term ‘alphabet’ originates), is in itself an 
ingenuous invention of the Greek, in a sense preparatory to philosophical specula-
tion. As explained by Sansone (2009, pp. 37–9), while in the Phoenician signary 
the fourth symbol (dalet, represented by the symbol Δ) may represent any one of 
the syllables da, de, di, do or du, the fourth character of the Greek alphabet (delta 
or Δ) represents that which the syllables da, de, di, do, and du have in common 
(the sound ‘d’). The Greek letter delta ‘stands for something that cannot be pro-
nounced independently and can be defined in abstract terms: the Greek alphabet is 
analytical, in a way that Phoenician is not, in the sense that it reduces the sounds of 
the spoken language to its elements, beyond which it cannot further be reduced. In 
fact, “elements” (stoicheia) is the word used to refer to the letters of the alphabet, 
the same word they used to refer to the material elements of the physical world’ 
(Sansone, 2009, p. 39). The Greek language – even the alphabet – was conducive 
to abstract, speculative reasoning. The German philosopher Heidegger even 
claimed that ‘Being’ revealed itself in different epochs in one preferred language: 
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first Greek, then Latin, then German. This statement was indicted as ‘ontological 
racism’, that is, that one specific ‘national’ language conveys and leads to Being 
itself in ways that other languages cannot, and we concur with the accusation. 
However, the power of the Greek language and alphabetic system undoubtedly 
facilitated the giant leap in philosophical speculation that occurred during the 
Classical period of the Greek civilisation.
2. The English language may be misleading here, because of the presence in ‘being’ 
of the suffix ‘ing’, which denotes movement and change. This is not the case in the 
Greek ὄν, on, or the Latin, esse. Linguistic considerations also raise challenging 
speculative questions about the structure of the Greek language, which is a pre-
dicative language, differently from other languages (like for example Chinese), 
which are not: would the very formulation of Parmenides’s propositions have been 
different in a non-predicative language? And would it have conveyed the same 
meanings? This question also relates to the role the Greek language, its structure 
and configuration, may have had in triggering the ontological quest that has been 
part and parcel of the Greek civilisation.
3. A footnote on Aristotle’s bequest might be worthy of attention, especially for 
readers schooled in countries which place a great emphasis on teaching the 
achievements of the modern natural sciences, but less emphasis on educating 
pupils, at secondary school, also on philosophy and metaphysics (such may be the 
case, e.g. for a number of Anglophone countries): it is in these contexts very often 
pointed out at school two things which Aristotle did get wrong: the principle of 
inertia in physics, and the geo-centrism in astronomy. This may leave the student, 
at least in the back of her/his mind, with some sense of fallacy associated with 
Aristotle’s thinking across the board. It should be pointed out that Aristotle is 
a giant of metaphysics, who was limited by the available observations at the time 
as regards the advancement of physics, but crucially the questions he addressed 
are metaphysical in nature, and it is on these terms – that of metaphysical thinking 
– that Aristotle’s contribution to human knowledge should be gauged.
4. Aristotle is also credited with having first introduced the distinction between 
specific disciplines or sciences (in Greek, episteme), characterised by a specified 
subject matter and method, and philosophy as such.
5. Aristotle already posited that the actuality of intellect and the actuality of intel-
lect’s object is one and the same. Renaissance’s thought, heavily inspired by 
a neo-Platonism mediated and actually mostly derived from Plotinus’s thought, 
conceived of a form of immortality for the contemplating person. Those living 
a life attaining the contemplation of fundamental truths enjoy a form of immortal-
ity: when contemplating, the contemplating intellect and the contemplated object 
are one and the same. The person contemplating an ‘eternal truth’ partakes of that 
very truth and of its eternal character and therefore enjoys a form of immortality 
by partaking of the eternality of the truth it contemplates.
6. This is also referred to as ‘positive theology’. Negative theology develops a form 
of knowledge of the divine by discerning what properties of worldly things are not 
participated by God.
7. Aquinas proposes a number of proofs – five to be precise – of the existence of God, 
which cannot be illustrated here. But the reader will have at this point surmised 
one and probably the favourite one takes the move from the contingency of all 
entities: only pure actuality – God is being – can enable potentiality to become 
actual – entities have being. If all is just potential, and at some point in time should 
have not existed, there has to have been a moment in time when nothing existed. 
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But how can something come out of nothing? A cause that is not contingent must 
be posited: and this is God.
8. Establishment of universities and the foundation of the religious orders of mendi-
cant friars were two events of eminent importance to the development of philos-
ophy (alongside the full translation and circulation of Aristotle’s body of works), 
as witnessed by the belonging of the main protagonists of the dispute over the 
universals: William Ockham and John Duns Scotus were Franciscan friars (‘Friar 
Minors’, ‘Grey Friars’) like St Bonaventure; Thomas Aquinas was a Dominican 
friar (the so-called ‘Black Friars’ because of the name of their habit, or ‘Friar 
Preachers’). They taught in the newly established universities of Oxford and Paris.
9. For Scotus, it is not matter to be the principle of individuation (like in Aristotle): 
it is neither matter nor form nor the composite to individuate a thing, but a third 
thing, its haecceitas or ‘thisness’ (being ‘this’), to make individuation. To illus-
trate with an example, in Socrates we have both a common human nature (essence 
or form) and an individualising principle (‘this’ specific human being is Socrates, 
not anybody else). This principle of individuation is an attempt to address the 
major problem of what makes something univocal and distinguishable even if it 
belongs to a species or categories (there is a strong echo here of the dispute over 
the universals which continued to rage at the time Scotus was writing), as well 
as an attempt to revisit the issue of the One and the Many. It has raised severe 
criticisms. Two major problems can be identified. One definitional regarding the 
haecceitas: what is it? Is this notion useful in order to better our understanding 
or not? Ockham would answer negatively and would suggest to eliminate it as 
a non-useful concept: it falls under the axe of Ockham’s razor, a notion that is 
introduced in the following paragraph. The second problem concerns the implica-
tions of foregoing matter as the principle of individuation: if it is neither form nor 
matter to be the principle of individuation, what is left?
10. A distinction should be made between the conceptualisation of a whole alternative 
world (with properties different from those of this world) and a different state 
of affairs to what actually happened (as in counterfactual arguments), where the 
properties of this world are assumed to continue to be in place.
11. The main thrust of Ockham’s philosophy is limiting the scope of what can be 
explained by reason in order to give way to faith (although interestingly in his 
proof of God’s existence he emphasises the ‘remaining into being’ of entities, 
rather than the act with which they are initially created and enter into being as 
the proof of God’s existence: a line of reasoning that seems to tie closely with 
Aquinas’s philosophy whereby things receive their being by Being-God).
12. Including mental experiments, like those carried out by Galileo – a method which 
subsequently came to be neglected, at least until an entire theory that revolution-
ised physics, the theory of relativity worked out by Albert Einstein and initially 
entirely based on mental experiments – reinstated in the community of scientists 
a heedful attitude towards the significance of mental experiments.
13. The sociologist Karl Mannheim, also drawing from Marxian thought, as well as 
a range of prominent sociologist like Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton, Werner 
Stark and many others developed the branch of the sociology of knowledge in the 
20th century.
14. According to Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy and Schrödinger’s famous 
equation, it is impossible to estimate with absolute precision the position and 
movement of a particle: the better the position is known, the more imprecise the 
movement of the particle can be estimated, and vice versa. What we are left with 
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is a distribution of probability of presence of the particle (a ‘cloud’ where the 
particle is), although we may be somewhat reassured by the fact that Schrodinger’s 
equation states that the integral of the position of the particle equals 1, that is, that 
the particle is somewhere in the universe!
15. Recent astronomical theories postulate the existence of an invisible dark matter 
that can be detected only due to the gravitational field it causes, that is, it appar-
ently is a causal agent because it generated a gravitational field, but it is impossible 
to locate in space, and hence its extension cannot be measured – if it exists at all.
16. It goes without saying many philosophers radically objected to both these prop-
ositions: that animals are machines and that the human being is a mix of two 
difference substances. We will see the radical critique formulated by Bergson in 
this regard by advancing an alternative metaphysics of life and the universe.
17. The British medieval philosophers (whom we have already encountered) who had 
already ploughed the terrain of Anglophone empiricism. However, an important 
part of their works was written in the then lingua franca – the vehicle language – 
of the medieval time – which was Latin rather than English.
18. The Latin etymology of the word substance is ‘what lies underneath’, and in this 
sense can also be interpreted as ‘what sustains’.
19. A popularisation of this idea is purveyed by the movie Matrix, where human 
beings are portrayed to live an altogether mental life.
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3. Key streams in philosophical inquiry: 
a selection and succinct overview for 
the field of public administration – 
part II
KANT AND THE REVOLUTION OF THE SUBJECT
Kant’s philosophy is a major attempt to set the limit of what is knowable to 
human rationality. To this purpose, Kant (see Figure 3.1) introduces the dis-
tinction between phenomenon and noumenon, a distinction which is the lynch-
pin of his philosophical system. Phenomenon is here defined as the thing as it 
appears (the term derives from the Greek phainesthai). The term noumenon1 
refers to the thing in itself, the thing ‘as it is’, which is also the thing as thought 
by the intellect. In order to better grasp this passage, it is useful to recall that, as 
the Greek philosophy unveiled, being can be properly understood only within 
the horizon of thought. The term noumenon derives from the Greek noein, 
which means ‘to think’, and according to Kant, the noumenon is something 
we can think but we cannot know. If the reader is confused about it, s/he may 
perhaps be comforted by the fact that Kant himself strove with this notion, 
which is part and parcel of his philosophical system. Moreover, this problem-
atic issue was exactly the point of lever used by idealist philosophers just a few 
years after Kant’s passing away for turning Kant’s philosophy entirely upside 
down by establishing a (dialectical) identity between the thinking subject 
and the thought thing, and by means of this to overcome the limits posed by 
Kant to human knowledge. According to Kant, human knowledge can only be 
restrained to phenomena, albeit in a sense profoundly different from empiri-
cism. Things in themselves can only be grasped by an original intellect (God) 
in the act in which it poses them into being (it creates them), but not by human 
beings.
Knowledge is about ‘correct’ judgements by the reason, and a judgement is 
a connection of two concepts, one being the noun and one the predicative: what 
is claimed about the subject of the sentence. Kant outlined a typology of judge-
ments. What is predicated about the subject of the sentence may be implicit in 
the noun (for example, that all bodies are extended because corporality entails 
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extension2); these judgements are called ‘analytical’. Alternatively, what is 
predicated about the noun may not be implicit in the noun (for example, that 
all bodies are heavy); these judgements are called ‘synthetic’. Analytical 
judgements are universal and necessary, but do not add to knowledge because 
what is known was already implicit in the subject of the sentence. Synthetic 
judgements add to knowledge by predicating of the subject of the sentence 
something that was not already implicit in it. Judgements may then be before 
experience (‘a priori’) or after experience (‘a posteriori’). We may then have 
different categories of judgements. First, analytical judgements a priori: 
these are universal and necessary, but do not add knowledge because what is 
predicated of the subject of the sentence was already implicit in the subject, 
nothing was added through experience; they are in a sense tautological. Then 
we have synthetic judgements a posteriori that add knowledge –and through 
experience, something is predicated of the subject of the proposition, but not 
in a universal and necessary way. The question for Kant thus became whether 
propositions that both add knowledge and are universal and general in kind are 
possible. The answer to this question has brought about a Copernican revolu-
tion in thought (Kant explicitly referred to his philosophy as bringing about 
a Copernican revolution in knowledge of the kind that Copernicus brought 
about in cosmology when discovering that it is the Earth that revolves around 
the Sun, and he was conscious that after him philosophy would not have been 
the same any more).
The revolution (in the etymological sense of the Latin revolvere: to turn 
things upside down) brought about by Kant can be outlined as follows (Kant, 
1781/1787). Rather than being the subject to revolve around the object, that 
is, rather than being the subject trying to discover the properties or laws of the 
object, it is the object that revolves around the subject, it is the object that must 
adapt to the properties of the subject that knows it. The categories, that is, the 
modes and conditions of being that for classical metaphysics were the condi-
tions of Being as such, are for Kant the conditions of the knowability of objects 
by the subject (he refers to these categories with the term ‘transcendental’, 
borrowed from classical metaphysics but re-interpreted in the sense we have 
just specified). These are conditions of the object only in relation to the subject 
and as posed by the subject.
This assertion has powerful implications, for example for the notions of 
space and time, although not altogether new because other philosophers 
had already dealt with similar perspectives:3 space stems from the relations 
between things, time from the succession of things. In Kant’s philosophical 
conception, time is not in things; instead it is in the subject that knows things 
phenomenologically. More specifically, time is the form of the intuition of all 
phenomena after they are perceived by the subject and hence become interior 
to the subject. Likewise, space is the form of all the external phenomena, of 
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all phenomena before they are caught by the senses (and then become ‘inte-
rior’ to the subject). Things are in space and time because the subject orders 
them in space and time. Space and time do not exist outside the subject. The 
other categories of being (in classical metaphysics) are also not properties 
of the object but forms of the subject. Categories like possibility/impossibil-
ity, necessity/contingency, existence/inexistence, causality and dependence 
(cause-and-effect), and the others (for which Kant worked out a frame, 
identifying twelve categories and relating them to the kinds of judgements the 
subject can formulate. These categories are grouped into four classes: quan-
tity, quality, relation and modality) are therefore forms whereby the knowing 
subject orders phenomena. To re-state: categories are not leges entis (laws of 
the entity), but leges mentis (laws of the mind): ways in which the mind knows 
the entity.
If the foundation of the object is in the subject (the object supposes the 
subject), then every representation (perception) of the object in the subject 
presupposes a unity of the subject which remains itself, immutable in the 
face of the mutable representations that ‘flow’ on it (Kant refers to it as ‘tran-
scendental apperception’). This is also the unifying point of all the syntheses 
that the thinking subject operates (that is, of all the judgements made by the 
subject according to the twelve categories) and it is also referred to as the 
‘I think’. This is not the individual ‘I’, but rather the structure whereby every 
subject capable of rational knowledge is a thinking subject, it is what makes it 
a rational subject.
To summarise, perception by the subject (experience) has two forms – space 
and time – and intellect has twelve categories. Together they shape the condi-
tions of knowing. This, for Kant, is how we know and all we can know.
One key consequence is that human knowledge is confined to phenomena. 
In this regard, Kant argues that three key ideas – that of God, soul and world 
– are unknowable to the human being. We cannot demonstrate the existence 
of God, nor can we demonstrate the non-existence of God. We cannot know 
the soul as an ontological substance; we can only be conscious of the activity 
of thinking (the ‘I think’), but not of the noumenic substance of our own ‘I’ 
(because it transcends experience). We cannot know the world, intended not as 
the physical world but as the totality of things and their causes. (We may also 
add that this statement is and remains a significant caveat to modern astrophys-
icists to refrain from jumping from empirical discoveries to ultimate assertions 
about the beginning, end or nature of the universe.) However, the human being 
as a rational entity has an irresistible, unstoppable thrust towards transcending 
experience, and this occurs through the three ideas of God, of the world, and 
of the soul. These are unknowable and their existence, or non-existence, inde-
monstrable, but they serve a regulatory function: they provide coherence and 
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:34:18AM
via free access
Philosophy and public administration78
in a sense an overarching framework to the use of intellect to make judgements 
about experience.
A big question arises: is it therefore impossible for human beings to be in 
a deeper relation with the ‘things in themselves’, beyond phenomena? Are 
we confined to phenomena without having any ‘connection’ with things in 
themselves? For Kant, the answer is that in terms of knowability, things in 
themselves will always escape the grasp of our mind, but we human beings 
can accord with them, in a certain sense, through both the moral and the aes-
thetic4 life. In a major attempt in the whole history of philosophy to establish 
the foundations of morality, Kant introduced and elaborated the notion of 
categorical imperatives in his 1788 work Critique of Practical Reason (where 
‘practical’ in the title refers to the question ‘how to behave’ and does not have 
any utilitarian denotation). Imperatives are something that must be complied 
with, irrespective of the effects produced by the action: only categorical imper-
atives are moral duty. For example, a tax-payer may return the self-assessment 
for fear of sanctions, for simple habit, or with the intention of complying with 
her/his duty; only in the last case the behaviour is moral. It is interesting to 
note that the state does not have any means to impose the kind of intentionality 
with which the tax-payer acts – although it may be more or less effective in 
ensuring tax compliance. In other words, external entities may hold sway on 
the actual behaviour of somebody, but not on the intentionality with which 
an action is accomplished (at least in Kant’s conception): intentionality is 
the realm of morality. Consequently, for Kant, behaviours based on external 
motives – whether they are the compliance with the customs and mores of the 
place where you live, or the pursuit of happiness, or the perfecting of yourself 
through virtue, or the adhering to the Will of God – are heteronomous ways 
of behaving. Whatever the behaviour is founded on, some external content or 
motive is not moral in the sense Kant means.
The categorical imperative, or moral law, does not depend on specific con-
tents; it is rather the pure form of a general moral legislation that is valid for 
each and every being which is rational. For Kant this is also the foundation of 
liberty: it is the conscience of our5 duty, of having a duty to comply with, that 
makes us conscious of our liberty. Kant would frame this claim more or less 
this way: ‘by doing your duty, you recognise that, for the very reason of being 
doing your duty, you are free’ (otherwise the moral duty would be meaning-
less). In this way, the human being is told of her/his liberty (s/he recognises to 
be a free will), even if s/he cannot have any knowledge of its liberty because, 
as demonstrated in the critique of pure reason, only phenomena are knowable 
and liberty is not a phenomenon but a thing in itself, and hence it is not know-
able. It is through morality that the human being can recognise its liberty and 
freely adhere to the order of being, to the world of noumena. Adherence to 
reality beyond phenomena can only be chosen by doing the moral duty. Liberty 
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is the independence of our free will from the laws that regulate phenomena. 
This can be summed up as: ‘You must, hence You can’ – you must adhere 
to moral law, hence you are free because you could also have not adhered to 
moral law. It is from the fact that you did your duty that you can infer that you 
are free: first comes morality, then freedom – however weird this might appear 
to us. (Immanuel Kant was the most regular of persons. He lived an extremely 
regular life doing exactly the same things every day, he did not marry or travel, 
or have any activity or hobby. He devoted himself totally to philosophy, and 
yet he was one of the most revolutionary people history has known – in terms 
of originality of thought.)
One might wonder at this point what formulation of moral conduct capable 
of guiding practical action can be drawn from this notion of morality. This 
problem engages Kant who, in the Critique, seems to have wavered a bit to 
then formulate the criterion that moral behaviour must conform to rules that if 
they became universal laws rather than just guiding the conduct of the person 
who formulates them, they would be acceptable. However, drawing practical 
guidance from this criterion proved not to be immune from contradictions. He 
eventually formulated the (most famous) statement of moral conduct ‘Act in 
such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, never simply as means, but always at the same time 
as end’ (Kant, 1785/2005). The underlying assumption is that each and every 
human being belongs to a ‘kingdom of ends’: every rational being is an end, 
and must be treated as an end and never as means (better: as means ‘only’ 
– as Kant recognises that in everyday circumstances we all need each other 
in instrumental ways: I need the baker for having fresh bread, the physician 
when I am ill, etc. – but I must never treat the baker or the physician in only 
an instrumental way because this would be tantamount to negate the humanity 
that is in each of them).
The reader may have noticed this represents a sort of ‘rational formalisa-
tion’ of the commandment of mutual love between human beings that can be 
found in the Gospels. Interestingly, in this regard there is another argument 
developed by our philosopher: given perfection in morality cannot be achieved 
in this life, Kant argues that we need to postulate the immortality of the soul 
in order to enable it to adhere to morality in a total way; the rational being is 
a moral being and hence it ‘must’ endure eternally in order to fulfil its very 
nature of being rational and hence moral. In Christianity, the human being has 
a natural predisposition to perfection, but is not left to walk all the way to per-
fection alone, but is instead helped by the incarnate God to fill the (abysmal) 
gap determined by the original sin. Kant in a sense halts a step before: because 
the categorical imperative is a regulatory ideal that can never be fully accom-
plished in this world, it must be postulated that full accomplishment will be 
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achieved, and hence that the rational human being will be endowed with the 
immortality required for perfection to be achievable.
The rational subject, as Kant conceives of it, is limited in terms of what it 
can know, but it is a ‘strong’ subject in all other respects, very far from rep-
resentations of it as the malleable product of societal conditioning depicted by 
some relativist or post-modernist contemporary philosophical strands. Indeed, 
this subject – always an end, never just a means – is, we argue, a key term of 
reference in public governance, public administration and public services man-
agement. Kant provides a major attempt to establish a moral foundation of not 
just individual life but also social life, and hence public life: he then provides 
a major attempt, and an inescapable one, to the normative foundation of the 
practice of public governance and administration. Since morality as founded 
in Kant’s philosophy does not depend on any external motive (although it does 
not exclude those motives which will be influential on actual behaviour but 
cannot ground morality), the ultimate foundation of the moral behaviour of 
all the citizens of a political system, and of public servants in particular with 
regard to public governance, is ultimately grounded in the moral law of always 
behaving in such a way to treat humanity, whether in one’s own person or in 
the person of any other, never simply as means, but always at the same time 
as end. This is a universalistic foundation of public governance, applicable 
anywhere and anytime6 in any system of public governance that human (i.e. 
rational) beings establish.
It should be noticed that for Kant behaviours can comply with external 
motives, all these lying outside the foundation of morality as Kant intends it. 
Behaviours driven by external motives are diverse in nature from the behav-
iours that are patterned on the morality that a rational being is demanded of 
as such, for its very being a rational being. Compliance with the customs and 
mores of the place where one lives, the pursuit of happiness, the perfecting of 
yourself through virtue, or the adhering to the Will of God, are therefore all 
totally acceptable, and any concrete system of public governance could and 
should incorporate and be tolerant towards all these behaviours. But it should 
not assume them as the ultimate foundation of morality and, one might argue, 
of the moral legitimacy of public governance.
Any attempt to provide grounding to ethics – and notably for the purpose of 
our book ethical behaviour in the public service – cannot renounce confronting 
itself with Kant’s attempt to an ‘absolute’ foundation of moral behaviour.
The work of Kant has been hugely influential on philosophy. Similar for 
other masters of philosophy, it can be stated that his thought is inescapable – 
nobody after Kant can philosophise setting his contribution aside. At the same 
time, no human philosophy can provide the last word or represent a full stop: 
his claims have both been resisted from a classical metaphysics viewpoint 
and turned upside down from the viewpoint of the philosophy of idealism. 
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Figure 3.1 Immanuel Kant
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The philosophical debate around the knowability and the very meaning of the 
‘thing in itself’ continued over the subsequent two centuries, and still endures. 
Philosophical movements like phenomenology (see later) interpret the phe-
nomenon more as a door open – or at least ajar –to the knowledge of things in 
themselves rather than as a compelling limit. Philosophers rooted in classical 
metaphysics, like neo-Scholastics, tried to reconcile the subject of Kant with 
the overall frame of Aristotelian–Thomist metaphysics. However, it is ideal-
ism that, only a few years after the passing away of Kant, first challenged his 
philosophical system, carrying out a major attempt to turn it upside down. It is 
to this philosophy we now turn.
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: Kant’s ‘revolution’ in 
philosophy, that brought the knowing subject and the subject of moral judge-
ment centre stage, has not been without its critiques (as we shall right from the 
next section); however, it continues to potentially represent a major starting 
point for any conception of public governance, by providing a grounding 
for what any human being (indeed, any rational being), hence any and every 
member of any political community, may be able to know and by providing 
the moral compass for value-based decisions by any member of the political 
community: we discuss this possible usage of Kantian philosophy widely at the 
incipit of both Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 (from the angle of the moral subject 
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and the knowing subject respectively): the Kantian subject of knowledge and 
capable of moral judgement can be taken as a starting point of attempts to 
ground the foundations of public governance.
IDEALISM
There are two crucial underpinnings of Kantian philosophy: first is the notion 
of noumenon as the thing in itself, which is the condition of knowability but is 
not itself knowable to the human being,7 and second is the ‘I think’, the unity of 
the thinking subject as condition for knowing to occur.8 By giving a different 
interpretation to these two buttresses of Kant’s philosophical edifice, idealist 
philosophers have turned Kantian philosophy upside down.
Idealism is associated chiefly with three philosophers: Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and Georg Wilhelm Hegel. The 
thought of each of them has been vetted in countless books, and in the 20th 
century there has been a reassessment of Fichte’s and Schelling’s original 
thought as an autonomous body whose reach goes well beyond the interpreta-
tion of it as just a ‘preparatory phase’ paving the way to Hegel and Hegelism: 
an interpretation that was indeed spread by the same Hegel and his numerous 
acolytes, who held a dominant position in German academy over the 19th 
century. However, the extreme synthesis that we are forced to do in these few 
pages leads us to focus, exclusively for reasons of brevity, mainly on Hegel’s 
philosophy, whose influence has loomed large over philosophy. The so-called 
dialectical method he worked out and the derived conception of how history 
progresses have figured prominently in the humanities and the social sciences 
since, and also have far-reaching implications for the field of public admin-
istration. Hegel’s conception of the state has been extremely influential on 
debates in public governance.
Fichte’s philosophy is the starting point of idealism. By providing a revolu-
tionary interpretation of Kant, in the literal sense since he turned Kantism upside 
down,9 Fichte reverses the traditional assumption of classical Aristotelian met-
aphysics that first something needs to be, then it acts (action follows being; in 
Latin: operari sequitur esse) into its opposite – it is action that precedes being 
(in Latin: esse sequitur operari), where the very action that precedes any other 
is the action whereby the ‘I’ poses itself in what Fichte calls the principle of 
identity as I = I, and by posing itself also poses the non-I. Both are contained 
in the unlimited I that poses all reality by acting. The ‘I think’ that in Kant was 
the function of thinking, more methodological premise for rational knowledge 
to occur than ontological principle, here becomes the absolute foundation of 
reality: the thinking of the ‘I think’ establishes reality. This ‘I’ really deserves 
the use of the capital letter that the English language attributes to the pronoun 
designating the first person in the singular (unlike most other languages that 
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use the lowercase character for the first person in the singular, for example in 
French ‘je’, in Spanish ‘yo’, in Italian ‘io’ and so forth).
Schelling adds another key component to the idealist philosophy:10 nature is 
conceived of as the ‘non-I’, that stands in opposition to the pure ‘I think’.11 He 
then re-interprets the principle of identity (which led Fichte to pose the I = I), 
taking the move from Spinoza, into an absolute identity of I and non-I in God, 
and hence arriving at a form of panentheism (that everything is in God12). In 
the last phase of his thought, Schelling profoundly modified his philosophy, 
especially by re-introducing the distinction (which played a central role in 
medieval thought) between essence and existence, leading to outcomes that in 
many respects preconise the dissolution of idealism.
Hegel’s philosophy synthesises the absolute ‘I think’ of Fichte and the 
nature as non-I of Schelling in a way that trespasses both. The starting point 
of Hegel’s philosophy is the dialectical method and the ‘triadic’ logic of 
thesis–antithesis–synthesis that he applies at heights so ambitious that they had 
probably never been attempted before, nor have since.
Initially conceived of in ancient Greece by the works of the Eleatic school, 
and elaborated especially by merit of the philosopher Zenon, classical dialec-
tic was brought to its zenith by Plato. But in Hegel’s interpretation dialectic 
acquires a dynamic thrust it did not have in classical metaphysics. Since in 
Hegel reality is becoming, the three moments of thesis, antithesis and synthesis 
acquire a specific meaning. Often in Hegel the thesis is seen as an assertion 
made by the intellect (which for him is static, inadequate to comprehend the 
inner tissue of reality), then reason (often in Hegel written with the initial in 
capital: Reason) intervenes to trespass and overcome the limits of the intellect 
by positing the negation, or contradiction, of the thesis, namely the antithesis. 
The action of posing the antithesis, in which the thesis seems to dissolve, is 
the negative function of the reason: this is followed by a positive function of 
the reason whereby, dynamically, thesis and antithesis as the two opposites 
are synthesised into a superior unity: the unity of the opposite determinations. 
This synthesis is the positive function of reason, also called by Hegel ‘the 
speculative moment’. Thesis and antithesis continue to live in the superior syn-
thesis: in fact, Hegel utilises the terms, in the German language, of ‘aufheben’ 
(to overcome) and ‘aufhebung’ (the overcoming) to express the speculative 
synthesis. The point is that the German term aufheben has three meanings: it 
indicates the negation of something, as when a law is repealed by a new law; 
the preservation of something, the securing of something for the future; and 
the lifting up of something, the putting of something on a higher level. Thesis 
and antithesis then get overcome yet maintained and ultimately heightened in 
the synthesis.13
Having reached this point, Hegel’s famous statement that ‘all that is rational 
is real, all that is real is rational’ should not be as a surprise for the reader. 
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This is not to be intended as a proposition whereby the predicate (in the first 
part of the sentence: ‘is real’) is predicated of the noun (in the first part of 
the sentence: ‘all that is rational’), but as a dialectical synthesis: there is no 
distinction between rational and real. The rational ‘I think’ of Kant has now 
radically changed function: it poses reality, and indeed the ‘I think’ dynami-
cally is reality, because there are no longer any borders between reality and 
rationality. Equally, it should be clear why for Hegel the past is never ‘past’, 
but it is all kept (preserved) into the successive superior synthesis, every time 
more perfect (analogously to Spinoza’s philosophical system, a key category 
in Hegel is that of necessity: all that is real is necessary, which also means 
that all events of history happened by necessity – and each of these necessary 
events is kept in the ever more perfect progress of history).
To follow the ambitious application that Hegel made of dialectic reasoning, 
the reader should at this point fasten the seatbelt because Hegel’s philosophi-
cal system aimed at reaching heights rarely if ever seen before and after him. 
Indeed, no realm of human history, philosophy, art, religion or any other 
conceivable aspect of reality is left outside Hegel’s philosophical system; with 
Hegel philosophy is not just placed at the apex but it becomes all-encompass-
ing. Indeed, for Hegel the Absolute Spirit takes full conscience of itself in 
philosophical speculation, which reaches its apex in his own philosophy: 
put directly, for Hegel, God fully takes conscience of itself in his (Hegel’s) 
philosophical system (humbleness was not a virtue of our philosopher). We 
can only hint here to some phases of one of the most intellectually fascinating, 
genial, ambitious – and often derided – journey that human mind ever con-
ceived. In Logic (1816/1975), Hegel starts from the ‘being’ of Parmenides as 
the thesis posed by the intellect (‘being’ here is for Hegel a static notion), to 
then conceive of non-being as the antithesis (the challenge or negation posed 
by reason performing its negative function), to finally interpret Heraclitus’s 
‘becoming’ as the synthesis (speculative reason making the synthesis of thesis 
and antithesis). In this beginning there is already all ontology (Parmenides and 
Heraclitus), but this commencement (the first dialectical synthesis of Hegel’s 
system) is just one of some thirty stages of the ‘Idea in Itself’. The second stage 
is when becoming gives rise to something determinate (becoming ‘makes 
something happen’, and hence produces something determinate), that is, it 
gives rise to determination. Determination is negated by ‘something else’, the 
otherness of something, but the something else of something is always in turn 
overcome by something else, and so on giving rise to the indeterminate, that 
is, to the infinite, or the notion of infiniteness. This is the second synthesis in 
Hegel’s philosophical system. Here Hegel makes a detour to emphasise the 
significance of the infinite and to ridicule all philosophers who claim that 
the finite is the only reality. For Hegel, any philosophy that attributes true 
being to finite being as such simply does not deserve the name of philosophy 
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(unless this is conceived as just a dialectical moment of a superior synthesis). 
Contemporary philosophers, who appeal to Hegel for explaining the becoming 
of being and at the same time claim that the finite is the only reality, should be 
equipped to wrestle with this peremptory statement made by the German giant 
of philosophy.14
From the infinite, Hegel then moves to the being for itself and the being out 
of itself: ‘the One and the Many’ central to the philosophy of Plotinus. This is 
part of the third stage of dialectical synthesis that Hegel examines. These three 
stages are just the initial ones of something like thirty stages of what Hegel 
refers to as the accomplishment of the ‘Idea in itself’. One might well consider 
this to be enough, but the Idea in itself is, in Hegel’s system, followed by nine 
stages of the ‘Idea outside of itself’, that is, nature. Hegel discusses the whole 
of the natural world, from space and time as dialectical moments of ‘place and 
movement’ (which is the synthesis), and so on to systematise the entirety of 
the physical and biological world (and of physics and biology as disciplines).
And (the reader is advised to keep the seatbelt tightly fastened) all this is just 
preparatory to the utmost moment, the philosophy of the Spirit or ‘Idea that 
returns in itself’. In this part of his gigantic framework,15 Hegel first treats the 
soul (thereby including all anthropology and psychology), then the whole of 
history and the foundation of the State (including law, morality and ethics – the 
last one being the superior moment for Hegel), to then most famously conclude 
his journey with the renowned statement that art (the arts, from Greek art to 
Medieval, Renaissance and then Reformed art), religion (from Greek religios-
ity up to Christianity) and finally philosophy (from Greek philosophy to medi-
eval Christianity up to modern German philosophy as the accomplishment 
of philosophy) compose the supreme dialectical moments of the Absolute 
Spirit: in speculative philosophy God itself ‘knows, enacts, makes and enjoys 
eternally’ reality as a whole – that is, God itself is now fully revealed to itself. 
Hegel’s journey is vertiginous.
The reader can now respite, unfasten the seatbelt and appreciate why most 
of the philosophy of the two subsequent centuries has (also) been a reac-
tion to Hegel’s extraordinarily ambitious philosophical construction (Hegel, 
1807/1977, 1816/1975; see also the collection in Hegel, 1968).
Whatever the criticisms that can be moved to such comprehensive, sys-
tematic account of reality, Hegel’s historicism and the dialectical method 
occupy a central place in the humanities and the social sciences. So does one 
other part of Hegel’s thought, namely his conception of the state – the rational 
state – a theme mainly developed in Philosophy of Right (1821/1991; here we 
follow mainly the summary in Ryan, 2012, pp. 688–94 in particular). Hegel’s 
approach to the state and its role is – needless to say – triadic. The trio is 
represented by the constitution, international relations and the stage of world 
history. The last term is the one that engendered most contention, especially 
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where a claim is made that ‘peace among nations … would produce stagnation’ 
(Philosophy of Right, p. 324). This has been interpreted by commentators and 
critics as legitimating war, and notably the wars later led by the Prussian State 
(of which Hegel was a citizen), especially after the unification of Germany; in 
other words, of having legitimated Prussian aggressive nationalism, up to the 
totalitarian form it later took under Nazi Germany. It is, however, more likely 
that Hegel simply had a realistic view of war as an instrument of the state, not 
much dissimilar from the realist tradition in the field of international relations. 
The point is that when this view is wrapped into the Hegelian framework of 
the dialectical progress of history in which each and every historical event is 
interpreted as a necessary stage of the life of the Absolute Spirit, the claim 
about war salvaging the world from stagnation may definitely look like an 
outright legitimation of war.
The other element of major interest (for the purposes of this book) of 
Hegel’s conception of the state is his confidence in the administrative capacity 
of the modern state, a theme worked out in Philosophy of Right (notably §§ 
287–29). Hegel seems to show a great reliance in the capacity of the state to 
control its territory and efficiently manage its citizens. Indeed, in this frame 
citizens play mainly the part of ‘subjects’ of the state; whether enough room is 
given in Hegel’s system to ‘citizens as citizens’ (in the contemporary liberal–
democratic sense of the notion) is questionable, although arguably this may 
be a circular relation: the citizen fully becomes a citizen through the state, and 
an end of the state is providing the conditions for citizenship. What emerges 
from Hegel’s view is the vision of a strong state endowed with a strong admin-
istrative apparatus, served by a civil service which becomes a distinct social 
class: the instruments for building such bureaucratic apparatus delineated by 
Hegel were to be further worked out – based on profoundly different, though 
perhaps not so radically as it is often considered to be the case (Tijsterman 
and Overeem, 2008), philosophical premises – in the thought of a country 
fellow of Hegel: Max Weber. The vision of the modern state as being endowed 
with a strong administrative apparatus, independent, or at least endowed with 
a degree of autonomy from politics, and tasked with both implementing the 
laws and with contributing to framing new ones based on its capacity to provide 
impartial advice to political organs, is in many respects still around nowadays, 
entrenched and deeply enculturated as part of the conception of governance of 
the contemporary German state and a number of other continental European 
states (and beyond). Whether the capacities that Hegel purported the state to 
hold are actually still there in the contemporary continental bureaucracies hol-
lowed out by New Public Management-inspired reforms, slashed by budgetary 
cuts, poached by powerful transnational corporations controlling assets greater 
than those of many countries, is an empirical question. However, the vision of 
the state that Hegel propounded seems to linger and have remained with us two 
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:34:18AM
via free access
Key streams in philosophical inquiry – part II 87
centuries later, continuing to permeate contemporary debates (e.g. Tijsterman 
and Overeem, 2008).
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: we have seen how 
Hegel’s philosophy of the state can form the basis of a philosophy of PA: 
a specific way of conceiving of public governance and administration (and 
notably one in which the bureaucracy does not have to be tamed, like in many 
liberal conceptions of the state emphasising the protecting of citizens from 
bureaucratic ‘interference’ into their lives, but rather the civil service is seen 
as a constitutive and essential part of a free state: ultimately, a constitutionalist 
account of bureaucracy and an ‘optimistic’ view of its role can be ascribed to 
Hegel’s conception of administration); developing such distinctive philosophi-
cal conception of PA is not within the remit of this book, which aims at provid-
ing an introduction to the use of philosophy for PA (see Chapter 1) – it would 
be a fascinating task for another book, by other authors (and see Tijsterman 
and Overeem, 2008, for an insightful revisiting of the contemporary signifi-
cance of the Hegelian philosophy of administration for contemporary public 
governance). At another level, it is in Hegel’s thought that can be found some 
of the key roots of conceptions of the state as a central integrating force within 
society, a key trait of the Rechtsstaat model of state which permeates the basic 
culture of governance of many contemporary administrative systems across 
the world (Pierre, 1995, p. 8; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017, pp. 60‒2).
Hegel is also the author at the roots of the philosophical approach known 
as historicism, and of a conception of time which still plays a role as a term of 
reference to be confronted with for virtually any weltanschaung (world view) 
that can be elaborated: we vet into some implications of conceptions of time 
and history for PA in Chapter 4.
THE INHERITANCE AND THE OVERCOMING OF 
HEGEL; MARX AND GRAMSCI
Judgements of Hegel’s philosophy are bitterly divided. As aptly summed up 
by Ryan (2012, p. 654, who seems indeed to lean heavily towards the critical), 
‘To those intoxicated by his system, he has seemed to illuminate the universe 
in ways unparalleled by any other thinker. Those who have thought it all hot 
air have dismissed him (in Schopenhauer’s memorably abusive phrase) as a 
“nauseating, illiterate, hypocritical, slope-headed scribbler”.’ Whichever the 
slant (and for a more positive appraisal of Hegel’s inheritance, see Stewart, 
1996), the bequest of Hegel is huge.
Soon after his philosophical system came to be formed, he started to have 
acolytes, especially in Germany where his academic influence burgeoned. It is 
commonly distinguished between a Hegelian right and a Hegelian left, bitterly 
divided on two key issues: politics and religion. Whilst the right Hegelians 
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generally maintained, in the political sphere, that the Prussian State as it 
stood embodied the development of the Spirit, the Hegelian left riposted that 
the Prussian State was just a stage of a larger process and should have been 
dialectically overcome. In religion, the Hegelian right interpreted Hegel’s 
philosophy as broadly compatible with the dogmas of Christianity, whilst the 
Hegelian left found Hegel’s philosophy irreconcilable with Christendom.
We here focus the thought of one philosopher whose philosophical system at 
the inception can be ascribed to the Hegelian left, although he later developed 
an original thought that went beyond Hegelism and occupied large swathes 
of the philosophical debate and of politics alike during the 20th century: Karl 
Marx.
To better appreciate the distinctive thought of Marx, it is important to 
consider the harsh critiques he moved not just to Hegel (with whose system 
lineages can however be tracked), but also to the Hegelian left (let alone the 
Hegelian right) and, beyond the Hegelian system, to classical economists like 
Smith or Ricardo, to the stream of thought of the so-called ‘utopian socialism’ 
associated with Babeuf, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen (amongst others), and 
to other forms of socialism like the one advocated by Proudhon (one of the 
preferred target of the darts of Marx). Marx propounded a scientific socialism 
that was – for him – different from the socialism of benevolence of the Utopian 
socialists and Proudhon: it was based on an understanding of the economic 
bases of societal and cultural-ideological processes, whose proper investiga-
tion required the overcoming of classical political economy.
Before we shift from the critique (pars denstruens) to the pars construens 
of the thought of Marx, some qualifications are required. First, a distinction 
has been drawn by historians of philosophy between the thought of Karl Marx, 
to which we refer as Marxian philosophy, and Marxism as an ideology whose 
huge influence shaped an important part of the history of the 20th century. 
‘Marxian’ refers to interpretations of Marx’s original thought.16 ‘Marxism’ is 
an ideology, or a gamut of ideologies, which spread and had a huge influence 
during the 20th century. The influence of Marxism on political thought, and 
hence also on the debate about public governance and the organisation of the 
public sector, can hardly be exaggerated. It has had a huge influence through-
out the 20th century, and entire political regimes have been inspired by inter-
pretations of Marx’s thought – and still are, either directly (Cuba) or indirectly 
(mediated by Maoism and pre-existing conception of governance, notably 
Confucianism, in China and other countries) at the time this book goes to 
press. We cannot track these influences within the limits of this book: it would 
simply be impossible here – it is a task taken up by innumerable other books. 
Nor can we even hint to the countless books devoted to the analysis of Marxian 
thought that fill university libraries across the world. We will outline here just 
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some key traits of his thought that we deem of most direct significance for the 
purposes of this book.
A key influence on Marx is another philosopher, Ludwig Feuerbach, and 
notably his critique of religion. Feuerbach’s criticism is rooted in the Hegelian 
conception of history: in this perspective, the dialectical unity of finite and 
infinite, of human and divine is assumed, but rather than being the human to be 
eventually absorbed into the divine as in Hegel, in Feuerbach it is the divine to 
be interpreted as a projection of the human and be absorbed within the human. 
This is seen as a historical process, and it represents a major point of difference 
from the Enlightenment critiques of religion. Those critiques were in many 
respects metahistorical: the reason of the Enlightenment enables the human 
species to escape the myths and legends, the prejudices of human infancy and 
see the world through adult eyes – and for some scholars of that epoch this 
meant getting rid of the religious phenomenon as something related to the 
infancy of humankind (for others it meant ‘theism’, a sort of rational religion; 
for still others it meant a renewal of the way in which the Christian faith was 
lived). For Feuerbach, the development of religion is a historically necessary 
process, which leads to objectivise the suffering of the human species, and in 
this perspective God is conceived of as the conscience of the human species.17 
This claim was a powerful influence on Marx, who pursued through his phi-
losophy a sort of turning upside-down of Hegel’s framework, starting from the 
material conditions rather than the Intellect of the ‘I think’, while keeping the 
dialectical logic as the key conceptual tool for the explanation of the becoming 
of things and history.
The dialectical method is central in Marxian thought. He borrows the idea 
from Hegel, but reverses the perspective: from dialectical idealism into dia-
lectical materialism. History proceeds through contradictions that are solved 
into superior syntheses, but these occur at the level of the material, concrete, 
economic conditions – whilst juridical, moral, philosophical, religious ideas 
are derivatives of these underlying dynamics occurring at the level of the eco-
nomic structures regulating society. This is probably the key bifurcation where 
the distinction can be made between those who recognise the contribution of 
Marx to philosophy and sociology but do not adhere to Marxism as an ideol-
ogy, and those who adhere to Marxism. For the former group, economic struc-
tures and conditions do have an influence on ideas and on the cultural, moral 
and spiritual life of a community and humankind at large: but these influences 
are not deterministic, it is not a one-way (from the material conditions – the 
relations in economic production processes – to the cultural and spiritual), 
but rather a two-way influence, and the cultural, moral, spiritual dimensions 
have their substantive autonomy from the economic dimension. For the latter 
group, instead, the study of economic structures is the key to understanding 
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the totality of human phenomena: this assumption is not philosophical – it is 
ideological.
Marx elaborated other key notions that have entered the philosophical and 
social science debate, including that of alienation:18 the dispossession of the 
fruit of the labour of the worker by capitalist-dominated structures.19 Equipped 
with these conceptual tools, he famously described history as a struggle 
between classes for the control of production means. If the bourgeoisie 
managed to overthrow the ruling noble class of the feudal society (and by 
gaining control of economic structures to impose its values over the values 
of the nobility-led medieval age), it was now capitalism to being on the verge 
of collapsing, by generating with its own hands the proletariat, which, once it 
had taken conscience of its condition of alienation, would have led to a rev-
olution, spreading from the countries where capitalism was more advanced 
to the rest of the world. At first, the state would have controlled the means of 
production, but that would have been just a transition phase towards a world 
without private property, without division between manual and intellectual 
work, without alienation and, notably, without the state; a return of the human 
being to her/his fully human condition. A famous slogan coined by Marx is ‘to 
everybody according to his needs, everybody in accordance with his capaci-
ties’ (Critique of the Gotha Program, 1875).
Marxian forecast has not materialised, though, and the reasons for this have 
been widely debated (and we can here only refer the reader to innumerable 
books on the topic); but what is left of Marxian analytical apparatus for the 
study of the field of PA? I will take an illustrative example that combines: 
an original interpretation of Marx, the one developed by the Italian thinker 
Antonio Gramsci, to show how some of the concepts originally developed by 
Marx may bear fruits as analytical tools in contemporary governance and PA 
debates. The starting point is the work of the Marxian philosopher Antonio 
Labriola, who interpreted the dominance of the economic moment as the 
influence of last instance (some might interpret it as a sort of concession to the 
Marxian orthodoxy), but he argues that the interrelations between economic 
structures and cultural superstructures are two-way and articulate, rather than 
being one-way and deterministic. This is a starting point for Gramsci (his 
main work, Lettere dal Carcere [epistles from jail], was written in the 1930s 
whilst Gramsci was in jail, during the Mussolini regime and was published 
posthumously; see Gramsci, 1947). He theorised that a class, in order to 
become dominant, must first shape common sense and common wisdom: 
it must permeate the superstructure with its values, it must infuse its values 
in the larger ‘civil society’ (a notion and political science category that he 
contributed to introduce into political thought, and which he interpreted as 
opposed to the ‘narrower’ political society). Only later and as a consequence 
of this process of acquisition of ideological dominance in the national culture, 
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the class that wins the battle of the values will also take control of the political 
society, and of the state apparatus by achieving the office of government. In 
this vision, intellectuals become an instrument of cultural domination: they are 
defined by Gramsci as ‘organic intellectuals’, where ‘organic’ means part and 
parcel of the political party that represents the class and whose function is to 
elaborate and spread the values of the political party to which they belong by 
acting as the elaborator in intellectual forms of the needs of the masses – the 
proletariat, the workers class – that the party represents and aims at bringing 
to hegemony.20 In Gramsci, the political party performs the role the Prince 
plays in Machiavelli (see Chapter 7) – like the Prince, the political party must 
be properly educated for developing the skills necessary to grab and keep 
power. Indeed, this synthesis of Marxism and a distinctive interpretation of 
Machiavelli’s thought is highly original, and one of the most interesting contri-
butions to political thought provided by the Italian thinker. For Gramsci, rather 
than an individual, it is an organisation to play the key role in the struggle 
for political power that Machiavelli considered the essence of politics. And 
the war for political power may be won not necessarily in a decisive, one-off 
battle, but rather it may be conquered because the enemy – that is, for Gramsci, 
the other classes and the other parties representing those classes – get worn off, 
and this happens because the winning party imposes its values over society.
This vision of brutal, ruthless conflict for power might look horrific from 
an evaluative standpoint, but it contains important conceptual tools for anal-
ysis, at the interfaces and interstices between bureaucracy, political parties 
and other organised forms for conquering political power, that should not be 
overlooked by PA scholars. Let’s see an illustrative example: Marxism was 
the ideology of the largest communist party in Western Europe, the Italian 
Communist Party, until at least the middle of the 1980s. Inspired by Gramsci’s 
thought, and operating under conditions making the immediate conquest of 
political power via elections largely impracticable, the ruling elite of the Italian 
Communist Party pursued a strategy of shaping the values of civil society. 
A key target became the education of the younger generations, which in Italy 
occurred mostly in the public school system. Soon after the cooling of political 
tensions in the aftermaths of WWII, when it became clear that Italy would stay 
in the Western camp, the public education apparatus became one of the main 
targets of the Italian Communist Party. The key link in the transmission chain 
was identified in the production of school texts and handbooks, and hence in 
the role performed by the intellectuals that write them (and to some extent the 
publishers who distribute them, but as these were driven mainly by commer-
cial logics, they were considered easier to steer). The indoctrination of school 
teachers was part of the process of shaping, in the long term, the values of the 
successive generations of Italians, educated (but in Gramsci’s perspective the 
most appropriate term is ‘indoctrinated’) in the values of the working class 
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(as interpreted by the party). By changing the values of society as a whole, 
over a number of decades getting to the office of government for the Italian 
Communist Party would then have been the almost automatic resultant of such 
a process.
As known, the takeover by the Italian Communist Party never happened, 
and so the result of this ‘social experiment’ cannot be observed. To make 
a long story short, this happened because the Communist ideology inspired 
by the ‘Soviet beacon’ (Gramsci was a fervent admirer of the soviet regime) 
at first tottered and then faltered and collapsed when the Berlin wall fell, 
bringing down with it the very Italian Communist Party, which changed name 
and nature over the subsequent decades. (The story should be completed by 
also noticing that the other parties did not stand still: the Christian Democratic 
Party notably exploited its position of office-holding by wielding an influence 
on the functioning of the education administrative apparatus – recruitment, 
career progression, and the like: often micro-managed by political appointees, 
see Cassese, 1993; Ongaro, 2009 – a move also aimed at counteracting the 
influence of the Communist Party on the Italian school system. It is in fact 
instructive to note that, although Italy generally had coalition governments, the 
post of minister for education was always held by an exponent of the Christian 
Democratic Party over the entire period 1948–92, that is, since the collapse of 
the Christian Democratic Party in the early 1990s.) But there are in Gramsci’s 
thought a number of conceptual tools – like the emphasis on the significance 
of changing publicly held perceptions by infusing the national culture with the 
values of one’s own party; or the analyses of the dynamics whereby political 
parties, especially the best equipped ones for grabbing power, strive to capture 
segments of the public sector in order to advance the party political agenda by 
manipulating the administrative apparatus – that should be part and parcel of 
the toolkit of PA scholars. We discuss this perspective of inquiry into public 
governance and administration issues in more detail in Chapter 4.
We can now complete this tour of post-Hegelian philosophy by turning to the 
critiques of Hegel’s philosophy stemming from different standpoints than the 
Marxian, always keeping in mind that contemporary philosophy is in a number 
of respects the product of the reaction to Hegel’s system. The Copernican 
revolution in philosophy brought about by Descartes, Kant and Hegel gave 
the subject a sort of absolute centrality in ontology: with it, prominence was 
acquired by another key property of the (human) subject: will and willpower. 
An original interpretation along this line is provided by the philosopher Arthur 
Schopenhauer. For Schopenhauer, our very body, and notably the muscles 
through which we exercise our will and which get resisted by the forces that 
oppose us, reveal that in essence we are willpower. Since willpower is conflict 
and tearing, life is in essence pain.21 Liberation from pain can only occur by 
means of the abandonment (transcending) of will towards the non-will, for 
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which the Latin language has a specific word, noluntas, the negation of the 
voluntas (willpower). The abandonment of will, the giving up of any act of 
will, occurs through art and, ultimately, religion: religious ascesis through 
unconditional love (charitas or agape) can free humankind. The underlying 
philosophical conception is that it is an act of will, rather than cognition, to 
establish the world – or more precisely its representation: for Schopenhauer 
the world is representation – and this is an implication of the centrality given to 
the subject in the ontology of modern philosophy. Schopenhauer interprets the 
world as a representation of the subject, on which we strive to exert our will: 
the only possibility to discover the intimate nature of what we are is through 
willpower, and our only possibility to liberate ourselves is through giving it up.
This might appear quite abstract philosophical speculation, but this phil-
osophical conception may be linked in ways closer than one might deem to 
social constructivist approaches (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). If reality 
is socially constructed, then not only cognitive capabilities, but also the 
intertwining of acts of will provide the building materials. The main point 
of difference between most of the contemporary social constructivist debate 
and Schopenhauer is the direction undertaken: rather than taking the route 
of individuals negotiating among themselves a shared narrative of good 
governance as means to making sense of a socially constructed reality and 
somehow bettering it, which is the way towards betterment that is referred to 
in some social constructivist approaches (see Abel and Sementelli, 2004, in 
particular for a highly elaborated presentation of this argument in the field of 
public governance; this point is widely discussed in Chapter 4), Schopenhauer 
suggests to simply abandon this representation, that is, to abandon the world 
altogether. Admittedly, in Schopenhauer’s approach inspired by a religious 
afflatus there is very limited scope for public administration and public ser-
vices: at most, they should act as enablers of artistic and religious life, which 
ultimately leads to salvation in Schopenhauer’s perspective. Schopenhauer 
has been an influential philosopher and, although his legacy does not include 
a school proper (there are no ‘Schopenauerians’), his bequest lingered and 
affected subsequent philosophical elaboration, and notably (we deem) social 
constructivist approaches.
The road of putting willpower at the centre was pursued to the extreme, 
and to utterly surprising consequences, by another German philosopher, 
Friedrich Nietzsche. He famously proclaimed that ‘God is dead’ and the 
world dances on chaos, and advocated a sort of return to the world of the 4th 
century bc Athens – that is, before Socrates and before Christendom, who for 
him corrupted mankind. Nietzsche’s thought is imbued with soteriological 
elements, albeit fiercely adversarial of the Christian faith. Indeed, most of his 
philosophy is an attempt to ‘make sense’ of living in a world without God and 
exploring paths to cope with its consequences. The path to salvation lies in the 
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acceptance of the tragic dimension of life (as fathomed by the masterpieces of 
Greek tragedy) and the pursuit of the spirit of Dionysus, the deity that in Greek 
mythology is associated with grape harvest and wine as well as with acting 
and drama, and ‘what wine and acting on stage have in common is that they 
allow a person to set aside temporarily his or her ordinary, everyday identity 
and so the worship of Dionysus is characterized by a momentary suspension 
of the roles that society imposes on individuals’ (Sansone, 2009, p. 140). What 
is possibly suggested by Nietzsche with the advocacy of a return to the spirit 
of Dionysus consists of setting aside the roles imposed by a society fraught 
with ‘Christian values’ and, through ritual madness, achieving a different self 
by fully embracing life. What is advocated is a pure acceptance of mankind 
as it is, attained by getting rid of revealed religion, of piety and mercy, and 
of the weak amongst human beings. One of the many provocative claims of 
Nietzsche is that during Renaissance the Borgia pope (notorious for his far 
from irreprehensible behaviours, and at the same time extraordinarily active in 
making of Rome even more than it already was the concentrate of artistic mas-
terpieces we all admire) almost succeeded in getting rid of Christianity ‘from 
within’ and re-affirming the spirit of Dionysus at the very heart of the papacy. 
But his near achievement was – notices ironically Nietzsche’s with his abra-
sive satire – thwarted by Luther, whose predication (as known, it formed and 
forms the basis of Christian reformed churches) re-instated Christendom for 
five more centuries. In sum, making a very long story short, for Nietzsche the 
pursuit of the spirit of Dionysus would bring about the so-called super-human 
or ‘beyond human’, a new creature (new in the existential sense, not in the 
biological sense) that would establish its own values rather than being subdued 
by the values of revealed religions.
It may at this point be noticed that a risk of drifting towards the irrational 
and the dominance of capricious, arbitrary will and the irrational over the 
rule of reason (and at times also over reasonableness) somehow lurks in any 
philosophy where both rationality and the subject are treated as ‘weak’. These 
approaches are undoubtedly also a produce of the reaction to the absolute, 
omnipresent reason of Hegel. However, we would argue that extolling the 
irrational and willpower to the detriment of rationality (like the critical reason 
of the Enlightenment and Kant) also brings with it a high dose of risk of sliding 
down the path of the dominance of the capricious and the arbitrary will.22
Finally, Nietzsche also brought another element of the Hegelian system to 
its extreme: for Hegel (borrowing from Spinoza), the key category of being is 
that of necessity: all that is, necessarily is. This notion has been taken up by 
Nietzsche (in particular in the work Zarathustra) to the point of re-proposing 
the theory (already present in ancient Greek philosophy) of the eternal recur-
rence of the same: because everything obeys to the law of absolute necessity, 
every event will repeat itself indefinitely. This is meant literally: the same 
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:34:18AM
via free access
Key streams in philosophical inquiry – part II 95
person will be re-born infinitely and will re-do the same things in the same 
circumstances. We would argue, however, that the ultimate thrust of this 
claim is not proposing a new cosmology, but rather it is undertaking a way 
to make sense of life: it is ultimately a way to find salvation (in the spirit of 
much of Nietzsche’s work, which is about finding a way to make sense of 
a world without God: how to cope with the abysmal challenges posed by the 
consequences of living in a world in which ‘God is dead’). The only choice, for 
Nietzsche, is to accept this eternal repetition willingly, to embrace our destiny 
of the ‘here and now’ being the only reality, although this gesture too will have 
already followed an infinite number of cycles beforehand.23
Nietzsche in a sense showed the contradictions in bringing to the extreme 
the absoluteness of the ontological category of necessity. It is the critique of 
the category of necessity as the only category of being (to the detriment of 
the category of possibility) that represented a key contribution to the dissolu-
tion of the Hegelian system brought about by the Danish philosopher Soren 
Kierkegaard. His thought was extremely influential on the philosophical 
movement of existentialism, which we examine later and which has had a dis-
tinctive influence on PA.
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: Marxism and the 
thought of Gramsci continue to provide a range of conceptual tools and 
guiding ideas for researchers and practitioners alike in the political realm; 
for PA scholars specifically, it brings to the attention the centrality of the 
notion of power, a key trait of any political system which may be problematic 
to operationalise (March, 1999), and it has surely been overlooked by PA 
scholars, yet retains a key role for any deeper understanding of the dynamics 
of administrative systems.
We have also briefly hinted to how the Copernican revolution in philosophy 
brought about by Descartes, Kant and Hegel, which has given the subject 
a sort of absolute centrality in ontology, re-interpreted through the lenses of 
the subsequent ‘crisis’ (crumbling) of the ‘strong’ subject wrought out by 
these philosophers has paved the way for forms of subjectivism, relativism 
and (radical) constructivism that constitute an important part of contemporary 
social sciences, and a relatively small but quite vocal stream in PA (which we 
discuss widely in Chapter 6).
HISTORICISM, THE SCIENCES OF THE SPIRIT AND 
THE PLACE OF VALUES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 
WEBER
We can now go back to the main track of German historicism, stemming (or at 
least heavily affected) by Hegel’s inheritance, where we encounter a number 
of key figures whose studies have provided major conceptual tools to the 
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social sciences, and to PA specifically, notably Wilhelm Dilthey and Wilhelm 
Windelband. We owe to Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911; see a collection of 
selected writings in Dilthey, 1976) the notion of the ‘sciences of the spirit’ as 
distinguished from the natural sciences, that were at the time (19th century) 
developing at astonishing speed and apparently establishing a paradigm for 
the progress of human knowledge in general (an idea elaborated by the philo-
sophical strand of positivism, to which we turn later). The sciences of the spirit 
are characterised by the fact that what they study are expressions of human 
life (in German, Erleben), objectivations of the spirit in the form, typically, of 
institutions (churches, states, religious or cultural–philosophical movements, 
and the like). When studying these objectivisations of the spirit (erlebnisse), 
the investigator, that is, the subject of the process of knowing, who is him/
herself a human being, is in a sense identical with the object of the process of 
knowing, which is the life historically lived by other humans who by means 
of their collective action effected historical events (the spirit in action). For 
example, when a scholar studies Luther and the Reformation, and then the 
councils and the Catholic Counter-Reformation, s/he is in a sense re-living 
those events, partaking of them, and finally and ultimately seeing the world 
in a different way by means of having gone through those events by having 
re-lived them through the study s/he has pursued.
It is in this fundamental sense that the sciences of the spirit are radically dif-
ferent from the natural sciences. They are inherently historical (different from 
the natural sciences that are a-historical), and by being the investigator a histor-
ical being him/herself, as is the object investigated, the kind of knowledge and 
understanding that can be gained in the sciences of the spirit is qualitatively 
different from the natural sciences. When studying the development of admin-
istrative capacity at the federal level in the US at the turn between the 19th and 
the 20th century (as is done in the excellent work by Skowronek, 1982), or the 
forming of bureaucratic autonomy in American federal agencies (Carpenter, 
2001) or the parallel developments of public services in sectors like health, 
education and policing in Belgium and England since WWII (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2009), the investigators (and we as readers) are in effect re-living 
experiences historically lived by public servants and changing ourselves and 
our view of the world through this experience. A key message for the disci-
pline of PA, which partakes with the other social sciences the nature of science 
of the spirit, is that there is inherently and constitutively more than detached 
data collection and analysis or experimentation along the road of achieving an 
understanding of public institutions and their inner workings.
A genial precursor of philosophical historicism is the Neapolitan philoso-
pher Gianbattista Vico (1668–1744). One of the first philosophers of history, 
he may be considered a forerunner in many areas of the social sciences. 
A crucial contribution by Vico, which in many respects anticipates and 
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:34:18AM
via free access
Key streams in philosophical inquiry – part II 97
informs Dilthey’s notion of the sciences of the spirit, is the so-called principle 
that ‘truth is made’. Vico, abiding by a notion of knowledge as correspondence 
(‘the conformity of the mind with God’s order of things’, see The First New 
Science, 1725, p. xxiii), famously stated the verum factum principle, that is, 
that truth is made: what he means is that the social world is man-made, and for 
this reason it is also the part of the world that we can know better. Contrarily to 
what seems to be nowadays common wisdom, that is, that the natural sciences 
set the paradigmatic form of knowledge and the social sciences should follow 
the pattern, Vico states that we can attain full knowledge only of the human 
world, because it is the only world of which we can trace the causes (also by 
means of imagination, speculation, pure reasoning) for the very reason that it 
has ultimately been made (been laid down) by humans, throughout the history 
of civilisation.24
This philosophical stance is based on the rediscovery of an old maxim: 
‘Latinis “verum” et “factum” reciprocantur, seu , ut scholarum vulgus loqui-
tur, convertuntur’ – ‘for the Latins “true” and “fact” are reciprocal, that is, as 
the common school people state, they may be swapped’. In other words, we 
may get to know, we may have knowledge of the causes only of what has been 
made by human beings, because we as human beings are the authors of it (in 
Latin, ‘factum’ is both ‘fact’ and the past participle of ‘to make’, so ‘factum’ 
here refers to something that both is a ‘fact’ and that has been ‘made’). This 
entails that a different kind of knowledge is possible of man-made reality 
than what is attainable of natural (let alone divine) reality. In sum, for Vico 
the ‘weak’ sciences are the sciences of nature, and the ‘hard’ sciences are the 
sciences of human-made institutions, the social sciences. This is a big chal-
lenge for the many contemporary tendencies to put a premium on imitating and 
reproducing the protocols of knowledge generation and ‘verification’ of the 
natural sciences into the social sciences: a trend to which public administration 
is far from being immune. For Vico, those who pursue that direction are simply 
heading the wrong way.
Other anticipatory discoveries we owe to Vico include his reflections on the 
role of institutions. For Vico, institutions – although originally the creation of 
human activity – once established become powerful shapers of what is appro-
priate behaviour to which human courses of action have to comply, albeit with 
a larger or smaller leeway. This theoretical perspective might on face value 
look nothing new, given the wide currency nowadays enjoyed by the so-called 
‘logic of appropriateness’ in explaining how decisions are made in organisa-
tions, as well as the diffusion of the strand of the theoretical perspective of nor-
mative neo-institutionalism (see March and Olsen, 1996; Peters, 1999/2005); 
however, about three centuries ago this way of looking at human-made institu-
tions was profoundly innovative, and proved seminal (although the lineage to 
Vico’s thought is not always fully acknowledged). Another genial conceptual 
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novelty introduced by Vico are his reflections on the ‘heterogenesis of the 
ends’, that is, in more contemporary social science language, on the unantici-
pated consequences of purposive social action (Merton, 1936).
Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915) coined another conceptual distinction, 
which proved seminal for later developments of the social sciences: it is the 
distinction between nomothetic and idiographic approaches to the investiga-
tion of social phenomena. In nomothetic approaches, the thrust is towards the 
‘discovery’ of covering laws, of regularities in empirical phenomena so sys-
tematic to deserve being entrusted the status of a ‘law’. Idiographic accounts, 
conversely, are thicker and deeper in terms of knowledge gained of the intrin-
sic case, the historical event or concatenated series of events (episode) about 
which an understanding is acquired by the investigator, and yet without the 
pretension to draw from this generalisations of sort; in fact, quite the opposite 
– it is the uniqueness of the happening of a certain episode that is the focus and 
the thrust in idiographic accounts. In later interpretations, the idea arose that 
so-called ‘limited historical generalisations’ can be drawn from idiographic 
accounts, notably when such accounts are treated through the comparative 
method (Ragin, 1987), but also from single (idiographic) case studies, in such 
ways that knowledge initially generated by means of an idiographic approach 
is capable of producing transferrable knowledge, that is, knowledge ‘useful’ 
also elsewhere in different circumstances. In the field of public administration 
and management, this approach has found fertile ground – traditional exem-
plars include Selznick (1956); examples of recent works include Barzelay 
(2001), Cejudo (2003), Gaetani (2003), Gallego (2003), Mele and Ongaro 
(2014), Ongaro (2006); and a recent advocacy of rediscovering idiographic 
accounts in PA is Terman (2011).
Another major figure is Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936), who introduced the 
distinction between factual judgements and evaluative – value-based – judge-
ments. This notion would be widely elaborated by Max Weber (1864–1920), 
the giant of sociology, philosophy – and PA. Weber, a founder of the discipline 
of sociology and a central figure in PA, introduced a number of key concepts 
that still constitute the lynchpin around which some crucial discussions in the 
social sciences occur. First, the distinction between factual judgements and 
evaluative judgements, that is, judgements based on values and the consid-
eration of what ‘ought to’ be alongside what currently is. Weber famously 
theorised that the selection on what is investigated with scientific method, 
out of the immensely wide complexity of reality whose entire exploration is 
beyond reach, occurs on the basis on the values of the investigator. A crucial 
difference between Rickert and Weber is that for the former the values tran-
scend individual consciences and the ‘ought to’ is presupposed of any value 
selection made by one, specific social investigator. Weber seems instead to 
lean more towards an inherently subjective view of what values will actually 
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guide social scientific investigation: the problems and the intellectual curiosity 
that guide social scientific investigation are more historically contextualised in 
Weber, and they ultimately lie in the individual investigator.
A second key notion distinguishing the human sciences and the social 
sciences from the natural sciences is that of interpretive approach: under-
standing (Verstehen) is required in the social sciences and the humanities, and 
knowing/explaining (Erklären) characterises the natural sciences.
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: the authors exam-
ined in this section are central and directly relevant for PA thinking and they 
introduced key concepts on which PA, and the social sciences at large, widely 
rely, like the notion of the ‘sciences of the spirit’; the conceptualisation of 
nomothetic and ideographic knowledge; the distinction between factual judge-
ments and evaluative judgements. We have also noticed the significance of 
historicism and how conceptions of how history unfolds, and of conceptions of 
time, for PA studies (these are discussed in Chapter 4) Weber also introduced 
the method of the ideal typing, that we discuss later in Chapter 8. Also cru-
cially for PA, Weber elaborated the so-called bureaucratic model, or – named 
after him – Weberian model of public administration, based on the notion 
of power as grounded in the primacy of the law, rather than in tradition or 
charisma. Also most famously, Weber outlined the conception of ‘politics as 
vocation’, and its implications for the role of charismatic political leadership, 
on one hand, and conceptions of citizenship and the underpinning notions of 
negative and positive freedom enjoyed by citizens, on the other hand. These 
crucial topics are not further discussed here because they have been widely 
covered in a deluge of other PA works (for an overview and review of the 
inheritance of Weber in Europe and the US, see Rosser, 2018). The treatment 
of Weber’s thought25 here is disproportionately brief only because it is already 
so extensively discussed within the discipline of PA, and the thrust of this book 
is bringing to light contributions from wider philosophical streams than those 
already enjoying wide currency in the field of PA.
POSITIVISM, CONVENTIONALISM, POPPER
Positivism lies quite at the opposite of historicism, in terms of ontological 
and epistemological stances. Positivism is a philosophical movement that 
was born and grew rapidly in the 19th century and whose key tenets include 
a total, indeed fideistic, reliance on the primacy of ‘scientific knowledge’. It 
is, in important respects, an offspring of empiricism, but with its distinctive 
twists. Scientific knowledge, patterned on the natural sciences that had been 
consolidating since the 17th century in Europe, is deemed to be the only form 
of knowledge. Notably, the method(s) of the natural sciences (summed up as 
‘verification’ of theories by testing them against ‘facts’) is also considered 
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applicable to the study of society: the method of the natural sciences is the 
model for the social sciences as well.
This total reliance on scientific knowledge is coupled with a very optimistic 
view of the benefits that can derive from progresses in such knowledge: scien-
tific knowledge was considered by 19th century positivists as the key resource 
for addressing and ultimately solving all the problems that had historically 
afflicted mankind: progressivism and optimism are thus qualifying traits of 
positivism. In this perspective, the ‘fact’ is the only solid foundation of knowl-
edge and indeed of the organisation of individual and associated life: idealism 
and spiritualism are rejected and dejected as ‘metaphysical’ (it is with positiv-
ism that the term ‘metaphysic’ acquires the negative connotation which is so 
widespread nowadays). Leading figures of positivism include Auguste Comte 
(1798–1857), Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) and Roberto Ardigò (1829–1920).
To better situate positivism in historical perspective, it should be noticed 
that a number of key tenets that can be found in positivism, like the primacy 
of the critical reasoning searching for ‘facts’ to unmask and dispel prejudices, 
were flags already flown by the Enlightenment and before by the protagonists 
of the scientific revolution in the 17th century. On the other hand, the factual 
scientific progresses that had been brought about during the 18th and 19th 
centuries and the material progresses engendered by the deployment of the 
effects of the Industrial Revolution that started in England in the 18th century 
and was spreading throughout Europe have surely inspired that optimistic – 
‘positivistic’ – view of human development that characterised 19th century 
Europe. European nations, although deploying an aggressive colonialism in 
Africa and Asia, were enjoying a historical and political context of limited 
warfare in Europe (with the exceptions of the Crimean and Franco–Prussian 
wars), and the worldwide dominance of Europe through colonialism in Africa 
and Asia was the breeding ground of a form of political–cultural dominance 
of the Western civilisation across the world. All these contextual factors might 
help explain the ‘optimism’ that pervaded the epoch, and its philosophical 
movements.
From an epistemological standpoint, one key tenet of positivism is the 
importance of induction for knowledge. This has to be situated in the frame of 
a harsh polemic towards the notion of the ‘syllogism’ (of Aristotelian origin 
and widely upheld during the medieval age) as the lynchpin of logic. John 
Stuart Mill developed a harsh critique of it: if the major premise is indemon-
strable (e.g. all humans are mortal), then the minor premise and the derived 
consequence (Wellington is human, and hence Wellington is mortal) become 
wrong (Mill, 1843/2011). The critique is that it is only through inductive 
reasoning that we can achieve reliable knowledge (in the example, knowledge 
about the major premise of the reasoning: that all humans are mortal), and 
therefore the demonstration could occur only via empirical, factual testing 
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(Wellington at that time was alive and well, and his mortality for Stuart Mill 
could not be proven via the major premise, as in syllogistic reasoning). This 
critique has opened as many problems as it has allegedly settled: although 
forms of inductive reasoning, like statistical inferential analyses, are everyday 
tools of the social scientist, problems about how to generalise from induction 
are still unresolved and continue to haunt logicians and social scientists. Mill 
also introduced the distinction between heteropathic and homopathic laws 
(Mill, 1843/2011), by contrasting two modes, the ‘mechanical’ and ‘chemical’ 
modes, in which causes may act conjointly. For Mill, the gist of the mechanical 
mode lies in the property that the total effect of several causes acting in concert 
is identical to what would have been the sum of effects of each of the causes 
acting alone: in mechanics, the vector of the forces is the sum of each of them 
(considering the direction and verse of each force in the space); this is the 
homopathic effects of each individual component of a system operating under 
homopathic laws: that is, the total effect is the sum of the effects produced 
individually by each part. The gist of the chemical mode, conversely, lies in 
the fact that the joint action of multiple causes is not the sum of the effects of 
each cause had they been acting individually, as shown by a chemical reaction, 
whose effects are not the sum of the effects engendered by each component 
in isolation; this is the heteropathic effect of each individual component of 
a system operating under heteropathic laws. This notion has paved the way for 
the elaboration of the notion of ‘emergence’ and of emergent properties, and 
the ensuing stream of thought called emergentism, discussed in Chapter 4 in 
relation to social ontology and its application to PA.
Positivism has a revival in the 20th century embodied in the so-called 
neo-positivism. A key promoter was the ‘School of Vienna’, led by such 
figures as Moritz Schlick (1882–1936) and Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970).
One major strand of critiques to positivism came from a movement known as 
conventionalism. Authors in this strand include Mach (1838–1916), Avenarius 
(1843–1896), Poincaré (1854–1912), Duhem (1861–1916) – although not all 
of them can be placed, at least not squarely, under the label of conventional-
ism. Mach developed a critique of the assumptions of absolute space, time 
and movement of Newtonian physics that paved the way to its crisis and, later 
on, the acceptance of the astonishing implications for the conception of space 
and time brought about by theory of relativity elaborated by Albert Einstein. 
He minted the conception of scientific knowledge as economy of thought: the 
more valuable a theory is, the more it covers a wide range of phenomena with 
explanations that are the simplest possible. The criterion of parsimony (already 
encountered in William of Ockham) that permeates current conceptions of 
what a ‘good’ theory is owes much to Mach. The key contribution by Mach, 
which constitutes the essence of conventionalism, is more revolutionary than 
the criterion of parsimony though: it is the claim that theories do not have, or 
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do not necessarily need to have, an intrinsic validity in terms of detecting the 
causes; they are just functional relations ‘that function’ for predicting a range 
of phenomena; they are a ‘fit for purpose’, apt convention and hence the mint 
of the term ‘conventionalism’ to describe this philosophy of science. Like any 
convention, they may be replaced by another if it proves to be more suitable.
A key contribution by Avenarius is the notion that experience, in order to 
be an acceptable ‘valid’ source of knowledge, has to be made public through 
verbal assertion. This methodological assertion embodies both a critique and 
an assumption. The critique is to the very possibility of the experience of the 
interiority, in direct criticism of Descartes’s methodological approach of the 
‘I think’ and all the followers, a critique that he brought to the point of dis-
solving any psychological experience and reducing it to the purely biological 
element. The assumption is that for experience to be valid, it must undergo the 
requisite of being public: the publicity of the research process and the proce-
dures for their replicability, which has become a widely held criterion in the 
natural and social sciences alike (‘always conduct your research as if a fellow 
scientist were behind your shoulders observing all you are observing’), 
although in the social sciences this may be far from being totally unproblem-
atic, let alone always feasible.
Poincaré elaborated the notion of science as a rule for action. The starting 
point is the consideration that not all facts can be given heed, and hence it is the 
scientist to select what facts deserve being observed and studied – a statement 
that resonates in Weber’s notion of values guiding the choice of phenomena 
to be observed and studied. In this perspective, ‘valid’ theories are those more 
productive of results in terms of being useful and ‘handy’ for studying phe-
nomena – or just handy: so Euclid’s geometry for Poincaré does not contain 
a higher degree of truth value than other geometries, but it is widely used 
because it is the most handy of geometries, at least for the problems of the 
common people.26 Implications (quite astounding on second thought) include 
that theories, contradictory amongst themselves, may co-exist in explaining 
different phenomena, or phenomena seen from different angles, like in theoret-
ical physics where the theory of relativity and quantum theory co-exist, albeit 
being partly contradictory (but they are applied to different phenomena, the 
theory of relativity applies to the cosmic scale of the extremely big, quantum 
theory to nuclear and sub-nuclear particles and the extremely small27), or like 
the ‘double nature’ of light, described as a wave or as a sheaf of particles, 
depending on how it is observed.
Duhem developed a critique of the experimentum crucis conceived by Bacon 
(Chapter 2). He argued that any time a hypothesis is tested, what is tested is 
effectively a whole range of hypotheses, auxiliary to the one being tested, not 
just the one allegedly undergoing the crucial experiment. For this reason, it 
cannot be drawn from the result of the experiment that the alternative, oppo-
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site hypothesis is ‘verified’ (if the experiment leads to discard – falsify – the 
tested hypothesis). Karl Popper went further in this line of critique, arguing 
that it is also not possible to formulate only one alternative hypothesis to that 
which is tested: infinite alternative theories can always be produced, and hence 
no single experiment is capable of testing which one to retain and which to 
discard between two theories.
Concepts and notions worked out by conventionalism are now part and 
parcel of the toolkit of the natural and the social scientist alike, and public 
administrationists are no exception: it is hard in this respect to overestimate 
the influence of these ideas on contemporary scholarly research in the field 
(a simple browsing of books on the methodology of the social sciences, and the 
less numerous books dedicated to researching PA, points to this, e.g. van Thiel, 
2013). It is equally impossible to overestimate the influence of Karl Popper on 
the philosophy of knowledge (Popper, 1934/1977).
Karl Popper made a major contribution to the epistemology of the sciences 
as well as to politics and liberal political thought. For reasons of brevity, here 
we only touch very briefly on one key contribution he made, namely the cri-
tique of induction and inductive knowledge that forms such an important part 
of both positivism and conventionalism, as we have seen. For Popper (making 
a very long story short), induction does not exist and it cannot ground any 
knowledge. Knowledge is always the product of the testing of a theory – not 
any theory, but those that are most parsimonious and capable of providing 
explanations of phenomena, provisionally valid if they successfully undergo 
the testing, until they get falsified, that is, until evidence can prove the theory 
wrong. The theory is not immediately entirely rejected: it may still serve the 
purpose of providing a partial explanation of some phenomena (Newtonian 
physics is still widely retained and employed for its capacity to explain 
most phenomena for the purposes of most branches of applied engineering; 
however, it is falsified when it comes to explaining phenomena in the very 
macro-scale of astrophysics or the very micro-scale of particle physics), but 
it will eventually be replaced by a more supple and apt theory, which will be 
held ‘true’ only insofar as, and until, it will be disproven by novel evidence 
and experiments: it is the so-called principle of falsification. But where do 
theories come from? For philosophers like Charles S. Peirce the observa-
tion of surprising facts may be a powerful source of conjectures and hence, 
ultimately, theory generation. Popper is more open to a multiplicity of paths 
towards theory formulation. The mind for Popper is not tabula rasa, a blank 
sheet or a blackboard on which, through induction, ‘veritable’ knowledge can 
be written through accumulation of experience, and false knowledge, that is, 
prejudices, should be wiped out with a board rubber. Popper does not criticise 
Peirce, for whom induction was just a source of opportunity for thinking of and 
elaborating a novel theory to then be tested, but rather Positivists, who claimed 
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that accumulation of scientific knowledge could occur through pure induction. 
Knowledge for Popper always starts from expectations or ‘hypotheses’ that 
are already in our mind: they may derive from tradition, from philosophical 
speculation, and most often these expectations presuppose a metaphysics and 
derive from it. But, hypotheses must always pass through the sieve of empir-
ical testing and experimentation. Only the hypotheses (and the sets of related 
hypotheses that constitute a theory) that provisionally pass empirical testing 
can be held as ‘provisionally’ true, until further testing will disprove them. For 
Popper, there is asymmetry between falsification and verification: thousands 
of controls cannot ‘verify’ a theory, cannot prove it is true. One disproval is 
enough to falsify a theory.
Popper’s epistemology has been seminal for a huge debate about how 
scientific knowledge proceeds, and notably whether it proceeds only through 
theory-testing, or also through induction, of which there are different forms. 
No final word can of course be uttered on this gigantic problem of philosophy 
of knowledge. According to Popper’s epistemology, scientific inquiry is seen 
as a competition between scientific paradigms: sets of core hypotheses, a sort 
of nucleus of assumptions which as such are never directly tested, but from 
which a range of hypotheses are derived and tested. To the extent they ‘pass 
the test’ of empirical falsification, they are provisionally held as true; and 
they are encompassed into wider and more sophisticated theories. However, 
often these sophisticated theories rely on a core of untested hypotheses. When 
one or more experiments lead to discard some of the consequences of such 
hypotheses, theories may be adapted or refined to encompass the disconfirm-
ing evidence. It may also happen that new evidence cannot be accommodated 
into pre-existing theories. This may lead to the old paradigm running into crisis 
and a new paradigm to arise and ultimately replace it – temporarily before 
it is also challenged by newer paradigms (which at times may represent the 
re-proposition of old and forgotten ideas). The philosopher Kuhn (1962/1996) 
is associated with the conceptualisation of scientific knowledge as proceeding 
through an alternation of periods of ‘normal science’ in which accumulation of 
knowledge (in the form of convergence, consistency, problem-solving capac-
ity, see Riccucci, 2010) occurs within one dominant paradigm, and periods of 
paradigmatic revolution in which a new paradigm replaces the old one in the 
given discipline (Reale and Antiseri, 1988). It is questionable (and questioned 
in heated debates), however, whether in the field of PA it is possible to speak 
of ‘dominant paradigm’ and ‘accumulation of knowledge’. It seems more 
appropriate to speak of a plurality, if not a babel, of co-existing paradigms 
(Riccucci, 2010).
Popper’s epistemology has raised huge questions. Is this the whole story? 
Does knowledge progress only through theory-testing, and then conceptual 
tools like reasoning by analogy have to be dumped and ruled out of the array 
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of possibilities available to the investigator? The story might be more nuanced 
– and fascinating. First, is ‘reasoning by analogy’ to be ruled out?28 What is 
meant by reasoning by analogy is (in a very synthetic way) a process whereby 
knowledge of some other entity (the targeted object of knowledge) is attained 
by means of the knowledge of one entity which partakes with the target entity 
certain features. It also generally means the more ‘strictly’ metaphysical 
assertion that the knowledge of entities participating of being is a way to reach 
an imperfect knowledge of being as such (and it forms a branch of theology 
relating to what can be known of God through knowledge of entities: see in 
Chapter 2 the philosophy of Aquinas). These questions are more contemporary 
than usually thought of, although in contemporary ‘scientific’ journals they 
are usually discussed in different guises. When asked the question ‘what is 
a theory and how does theory-construction proceed?’, contemporary social 
scientist and organisation theorist Karl Weick provocatively answered that 
theory construction would be about standard theory validation (whereby 
a hypothesis or set of hypotheses are tested by empirical means) if such a thing 
existed at all: However, ‘the reason it does not is that validation is not the key 
task of social science. It might be if we could do it, but we can’t’ (Weick, 1989, 
p. 524). Rather, he depicted theory validation or verification as the resonating 
of a theory to the experience of other experts; and what is the ultimate source 
of the ‘experience’ of other experts? It is the experiential knowledge of other 
things, with which they compare the claims of the proposed theory; ultimately, 
we would argue this is a form of reasoning by analogy re-proposed, albeit in 
partly different guises than traditional metaphysics, to the attention of con-
temporary social scientists as the way to theory construction. Weick (1989) 
went further to advocate the usefulness of metaphors in theorising in organi-
sation studies. The conclusion we can draw is that reasoning by analogy may 
enjoy much broader currency in contemporary social sciences than generally 
considered.
This line of argument is not meant to dismiss the huge influence of Popper 
on the philosophy of science. Popper has been a hugely influential philosopher 
and scholar. A highly significant approach in contemporary social sciences, 
referred to as ‘critical realism’ and propounded by prominent scholars like 
Pawson (2006; Pawson and Tilley, 1997), is significantly indebted to Popper’s 
philosophy. It is instead meant to remind of other, alternative paths of inquiry 
that have roots in century-old traditions of philosophising and that may con-
tinue to contribute to knowledge.
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: concepts elaborated 
by these philosophers are crucial for the epistemology of social sciences in 
general, and notably for PA (it may also be noticed that positivism, and its 
intellectual heirs, have shaped a major intellectual tradition in PA, which is 
widely discussed alongside other traditions in Chapter 9). We will return to 
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Popper in the next chapter and in Chapter 5 (where we also discuss the political 
philosophy of the ‘open society’ and its ‘enemies’) as well as in Chapter 6 and 
8.
PHENOMENOLOGY
Phenomenology is associated with the work of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), 
who is considered the founding father of this movement, and philosophers 
like Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, Rudolf Otto, Edith Stein, amongst many 
others. Alongside its distinctive contribution, phenomenology also had a major 
influence in the development of another philosophical movement of the 20th 
century, namely existentialism, to which we turn at the end of this section.
Crucial for the development of phenomenology are the works of Bernhard 
Bolzano and Franz Brentano. Bolzano is a logician and mathematician who 
vehemently opposed the claims of psychologism about the origins of math-
ematical and logical concepts lying in psychological processes; instead, he 
claimed that the truth value of a proposition lies in itself, that verity is given 
in each and any valid proposition, irrespective of whether it is expressed or 
not, or whether it is thought or not (thus in certain respects returning to claims 
of classical metaphysics). Franz Brentano highlighted the intentionality of 
psychic phenomena, which are characterised by the fact they are always 
referred to as something that is other than the psychic phenomenon itself 
(when a subject endowed with psychic activity thinks or feels, the thinking 
or feeling is inherently intended towards ‘otherness’: in psychic processes of 
representation, the object is purely ‘present’ in front of the thinking subject; 
in psychic processes of judgement, the object is affirmed or denied; in psychic 
processes of sentiment, the object is, at the most basic level, loved or hated). 
This also has roots in classical philosophy: in the Scholastics, intention refers 
to the concept in its inherent characteristic of indicating something diverse 
from itself (tending to something, stretching out to something other than itself). 
Brentano was a mentor of Edmund Husserl.
The starting point of phenomenology is the possibility of knowing the 
essences (Husserl, 1913, English transl.); it is a movement aiming at ‘going 
back to the essences’ of things, beyond psychologism – whereby concepts are 
considered to be the product of psychological processes – as well as beyond 
positivism – whereby knowing is observing facts. For phenomenology, facts 
are not the ultimate reality; instead they are doors open to the essences – phe-
nomena are not the limits of knowledge (like in Kant), but the door through 
which the things in themselves may become known. When conscience catches 
a fact ‘here and now’, it always gets an essence, for example this colour is 
a particular instance of the essence ‘colour’, this sound is a specific instance of 
the essence ‘sound’, this triangle is an instantiation of the essence ‘triangle’, 
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and so on; and although the fact is contingent (this sound might also not there 
be) and facts are varied (the sound of a piano, a violin, a trombone, etc.), 
in each and every experience of a sound we may recognise an essence, the 
common essence of a(ny) ‘sound’. This is a point of difference with empir-
icism: knowledge does not occur by abstracting common features by means 
of comparison of similar observations; it is first and foremost knowledge by 
means of intuition of the essence of things (even ‘similarity’, used in empir-
icism to compare ‘similar’ observations – is already an essence we know, 
before we use it: we use the essence of similarity in order to compare).
The method for knowing essences lies in the process of ‘epoché’ (from the 
Greek έποχή, a term derived from the philosophical movement of scepticism), 
which is intended as the suspension of judgement; that is, the bracketing of 
judgement in order to ‘enable’ things to manifest themselves to the conscience 
(this process is technically known as ‘phenomenological reduction’). It should 
be noticed here that the English term ‘epoch’ has the same origin: it also refers 
to a process of suspension to let the distinctive trait of one historical period 
emerge and qualify that period, which thus becomes a distinctive ‘epoch’ of 
history. The knowledge of essences is articulated into a formal ontology, the 
general knowledge of essences, and regional ontologies, the knowledge of 
essences pertaining to certain areas, like nature, morality, society or religion. 
Research in these areas has led to philosophical investigations of moral values 
(like in Scheler’s work), or of the religious experience of the sacred (as in 
Otto’s work).
There is – we may say – much of Aristotle in the knowability of things 
through phenomena. However, there is also the modern philosophy of the 
Cartesian ‘methodological doubt’ and the centrality of the subject. For 
Aristotle, like for the entire Greek civilisation, the subject, notably the human 
subject, was ultimately a part of the universe, without any special role to play 
in Being and the knowing of Being. But for modern philosophy after Descartes 
and Kant, the subject is a starting point. Also in Husserl, what cannot be the 
object of phenomenological reduction is the conscience, or subjectivity, which 
is labelled the ‘phenomenological residue’ and which cannot be bracketed: the 
world, according to Husserl, is constituted by the conscience. The question 
is whether ‘constituted’ means that it is established by the subject, or just 
revealed and given meaning by the subject. It is at this juncture that we find 
the distinction between idealist phenomenology and realist phenomenology. 
Idealist phenomenology, to which Husserl adhered in the last part of his life, 
stresses the subject as establishing the world, whilst realist phenomenology 
sees the subject as the ultimate recipient of the revealing of the world and the 
giver of meaning to it, but the world ultimately ‘pre-exists’ the subject.
Both strands, however, share an opposition to positivism: the observation 
and measurement of ‘facts’ detached from the essences that may be intuited 
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does not lead to knowledge, or at least does not lead to profound knowledge: 
it may at most scan the surface of things. (Neo-)Positivist philosophers have 
retorted that the assumption that inside ‘facts’ it is always possible to capture 
essences simply adds a ‘morass’ of (what Neo-Positivists argue to be) ‘inter-
pretations’ and vague concepts that hinder rather than advance clarity of 
knowledge. Phenomenologists in turn reply that the investigation of essences 
is conducive to a deeper and more meaningful knowledge of reality than the 
measuring and labelling of things that characterises the positivistic stance.
On a concluding note, it should be clarified what, in our view, phenomenol-
ogy is not: it is not social constructivism/constructionism in its idealist or in 
its realist variant. First, it is not ‘social’: Husserl placed the absolute subject 
at the centre, rather than inter-subjectivity which is centre stage in social 
constructivism (inter-subjectivity is a notion that originally figured in Hegel’s 
philosophy). Nor is reality ‘constructed’ in a phenomenological perspective: 
the world may be ‘constituted’ by the subject (in the idealist perspective, see 
earlier); but things can be known in their essence rather than being constructs 
– knowledge is penetration of essences, getting to know essences by means 
of phenomena as open doors. If these qualifications of phenomenology are 
appropriate, then some applications of phenomenology to PA (see Waugh 
and Waugh, 2006) appear ungrounded. We discuss this claim when applying 
phenomenology to PA.
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: we discuss applica-
tion of phenomenology to PA – as part of a larger approach to inquiring and 
investigating society, for example including moral values, religious values – in 
Chapter 6.
EXISTENTIALISM
Existentialism is, like phenomenology, a philosophical movement that occu-
pies a major place in 20th-century philosophy. It is associated with philoso-
phers like Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers in Germany, Merleau-Ponty and 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1938, 1943) in France, and Nicola Abbagnano (1946/1963) 
in Italy. In this very concise summary we will refer mainly to Heidegger, first 
to his masterpiece Being and Time (1927), and then to the works after the 
so-called ‘turn’ in Heidegger’s thought, namely all the subsequent works.
The entry point for understanding existentialism is to describe what exis-
tential analytics is about: the very word ‘existentialism’ derives from the root 
word of ‘to exist’, that is, ex-sistere: ‘to stay projected towards the outside’. 
For existentialists, the experience of existence, which is ultimately unique and 
irreducible to anything else, is the starting point of philosophising. But the 
experience of existence requires being analysed with its proper method, which 
is referred to as ‘existential analytics’. Key experiences (in the plural) of exist-
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ence become centre stage for the understanding of Being: the human being is 
in fact that special entity (the root word for entity in Latin means ‘what that is’, 
what has the property of being) that interrogates itself on the sense of Being. 
It is, in this sense, the door open to being (existentialism and phenomenology 
both look for a door open towards Being, but while phenomenology searches 
for it in phenomena, existentialism heads towards the experience of existing in 
itself as the pathway towards Being). In this respect, existentialism shares with 
modern philosophy the starting point of the subject interrogating itself and the 
world, although the emphasis in existentialism is on the ‘lived experience’ 
rather than the pure act of thinking by the thinking subject, as in Descartes.29
The distinctive trait of the human being as ‘existence’ in its very nature of 
being a ‘possibility’ is brought centre stage:30 the existence is never a simple 
‘being present’, the existence is never ‘an object amongst other objects’; it is 
always constitutively a projection, the concrete possibility of becoming some-
thing but also something else (and in this outright rejection of the category of 
necessity as the sole category of being it is evident the lineage of existentialism 
to the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard, a harsh critic of Hegel’s philosophical 
system). Key traits of existence are the ‘being-in-the-world’ (in the original 
German: in-der-Welt-sein), the ‘being-with-the-others’ and the ‘caring’. The 
world is not originally something to contemplate, but instead it is a set of 
possibilities and instruments for each human being to use in order to accom-
plish its own existential project. For this reason, for Heidegger the problem of 
whether the world exists and how its existence can be demonstrated (one may 
consider here both the Cartesian methodological doubt or the scepticism of the 
empiricist David Hume) is pure non-sense: there cannot be a subject without 
a world, nor is there an ‘I’ without the others (for Heidegger, like for Husserl, 
the others are not inferred as other ‘I’ alongside one’s own ‘I’: they are origi-
nally given – the other ‘Is’ (the plural of ‘I’) are originally and constitutively 
given to the individual ‘I’). If the existence is originally in the world as a set 
of possibilities, then existence expresses itself in ‘caring’, in taking care of 
the world. Existence can also be authentic or inauthentic: it is inauthentic, or 
anonymous, when it is dominated by chatter and by fatuous curiosity, when, 
ultimately, the existence renounces its distinctive trait of choosing what to 
become and lets itself be driven by impersonality, for example by maxims like 
‘everybody does it’, ‘everybody says it’.
This constitutive dimension of existence has been picked up by scholars 
of PA (see Waugh, 2006), especially during the 1970s, for depicting the 
distinctive figure of the ‘existentialist public administrator’ who ‘cares’ and 
‘takes responsibility’ for the general public rather than accepting impersonality 
as the key trait of bureaucratic behaviour. It is the profiling of the so-called 
‘pro-active public administrator’, the administrator for whom ‘caring’ is 
a central notion, and possibility rather than necessity is the dominant onto-
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logical category. It is a philosophy of responsibility and decision in public 
administration different and possibly at odds with the Weberian conception 
– or at least at strain with certain interpretations of the Weberian bureaucracy. 
We return to this perspective in Chapter 4.
By developing his existential analytics, Heidegger (like Jaspers) arrives at 
the constitutive dimension of existence – which is its death. Death is here con-
ceived as the possibility that all other existential possibilities become impos-
sible. Death is the possibility of the impossibility of carrying out any project, 
that is, of accomplishing one’s own existence. This is the ‘being-for-the 
death’ that characterises existence, and which is ultimately a totally individual 
experience – nobody can take upon her/himself the dying of somebody else. 
Put simply: each of us has to face her/his own death, and ‘death’ is ultimately, 
always, my death. This means that in order to live an authentic existence each 
of us has to ‘live-for-death’, not in the sense of effecting it through suicide 
(this is not at all Heidegger’s thought), but rather in the sense of living every 
moment of the existence in the consciousness of death. This consciousness is 
not an intellectual act, but is embodied in the experience of anguish. Anguish is 
the sentiment of nothingness, of non-being. It is the consciousness of ultimate 
annihilation that characterises each and every existence. It is in this sense dis-
tinguished from fear, which is the dread of some other entity – we fear a threat 
posed by an entity, but we feel anguish in front of the non-Being as such.
Existentialist reflection on the nature of the being-for-the-death led 
Heidegger to what he referred to as ‘the turn’ in his philosophical reflec-
tion. The turn is a shift from the centrality of the individual existence and 
the analysis of it (the existential analytics developed in Time and Being, 
probably the single book that most shaped existentialism as a philosophical 
movement) to the orientation towards Being ‘in itself’. The turn consists in 
the rediscovery of the process of ‘unveiling’ of Being or, to use Heidegger’s 
favourite expression, the non-hiding of Being: the keyword here is the Greek 
‘ἀλήθεια’ (aleteia), and the non-hiding of Being is a historical process, but yet 
revealing the transcendence of Being. Heidegger carried out a radical critique 
of all metaphysics, from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel and even Nietzsche, as 
having led astray philosophical thought. Starting from Plato’s world of ideas, 
he considered it as the point of departure from the main road tracked by the 
pre-Socratic philosophers: the very notion of idea – whose root word in Greek 
is ‘to see’ – entailed a dominating role by the subject who sees, and hence first 
sowed the seed of that ‘willing of possession’, denounced by Nietzsche, that 
has dominated all (Western) philosophical thought throughout two-and-a-half 
millennia, impeding philosophy to become the venue of the unveiling of 
Being, rather hindering it. Of central significance are his reflections on the 
question concerning ‘modern’ technology (and its difference to the techne, or 
technê from the ancient Greek language, of the Greeks), where he suggests that 
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instrumental understandings of technology are shallow, remain to the surface 
whilst something deeper happens when technology affects the relationship 
between humankind and Being. One main road towards the rediscovery of 
the unveiling of Being is represented by the arts, to which Heidegger – a man 
with an incredibly vast culture spanning the divinities, the humanities and the 
arts – assigns a special power in enabling an understanding that philosoph-
ical reasoning has lost (he elaborated a distinctive aesthetics, or philosophy 
of the beauty, in his work Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry; Heidegger, 
1981/2000). His philosophy gives both a special and a specific significance to 
the artwork: each artwork is a ‘whole world’ where the non-hiding of Being 
occurs, and hence contemplating a masterpiece is a source of understanding. If 
art is revelatory beyond what philosophy and the sciences can shed light upon, 
then the contemplation and appropriate interpretation (exegesis, hermeneutics) 
of the artwork is a way for gaining distinctive and otherwise unreachable 
insights, and the study and the interpretation of artistic masterpieces can 
provide a source of insights into reality.
This applies to all ‘regions of being’. In this sense, it can be argued that it 
also applies to public governance and administration. We claim that this is also 
the case with the masterpieces that have addressed the world of governing, of 
public governance and of public administration – and we illustrate this through 
the discussion of Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s famous masterpiece The Good 
Government, which we examine in Chapter 6, based on consolidated scholarly 
work on the theme.
There is another key notion in Heidegger’s analytical apparatus that deserves 
mentioning – also for its implications for PA. Heidegger carried out a radical 
critique of the notion of ‘time’ that is used in the sciences as they consolidated 
since the 17th century. In Being and Time, Heidegger develops an analytics 
of time that takes the move from the notion of ‘ecstasy’, in the etymological 
meaning of ‘staying, or lying, outside (of oneself)’. For Heidegger the funda-
mental dimension of time is the future: existing means projecting; the primary 
meaning of any (human) existence lies in its projection to build her/his own 
future in the world through the activity of ‘caring’. But ecstasy applies to all 
dimensions of time: if the future is lying outside of oneself towards what will 
be, the past is staying outside of oneself towards a situation of fact to accept 
it (something which is past cannot be changed, although it can be interpreted 
and accepted); the present, finally, is lying outside of oneself to stay next to 
the things. There are two ways of ‘living the time’: authentic and inauthentic. 
Authentic is when existence as the being-for-the death lives by assuming death 
(one’s own death) as a qualifying trait of existence: this way one lives without 
being overcome by the mundane things of life. The authentic present becomes 
the living of the present as ‘instant’, in which the human being decides her/
his own destiny, and the authentic past is when the existence accepts and 
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re-lives the possibilities that tradition has given us. A key implication of this 
conception of time is that the time used by the natural sciences and – in most 
cases – the social sciences (that is, the time that can be dated and measured) 
is inauthentic time: it is not the time of life, nor is it the time in which we may 
gain any authentic understanding of being. This is a fatal blow for most of the 
‘knowledge’ that is generated through ‘scientific’ procedures. The challenge 
applies, perhaps even with a special intensity, to the scholarly study of political 
communities and the ways in which citizens’ lives unfold in them: is the ‘real’ 
time of lives of the citizens unfolding in their communities taken into account 
in studies of PA – even those that adopt qualitative methods, longitudinal 
perspectives and forms of direct, participant observation? 
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: existentialism has 
inspired and elicited a strand of studies in PA, which has also led to minting the 
term, and profiling the figure, of the existentialist public administrator, widely 
discussed in Chapter 4. Separately, we also return on Heidegger’s notion of 
time and its implications for PA also in Chapter 4.
STRUCTURALISM
Quite at the opposite of existentialism, the starting point of structuralism are 
– as the name conveys – the deeper structures that, according to this philo-
sophical movement, explain society and humankind. The human subject or ‘I’, 
whose utmost prominence we have encountered in modern philosophy since 
Descartes, is dethroned by structuralism to give way to the inner structures into 
which the ‘I’ dissolves.
One of the founding fathers of structuralism, Claude Lévi-Strauss, in exile in 
Brazil during the 1940s while war was raging in Europe, carried out a famous 
study on the populations of the Amazon and, based on findings from his study, 
claimed to have identified certain elementary structures of kinship that appear 
to characterise that distant society – distant from both Eastern and Western civ-
ilisations (Lévi-Strauss, 1949). His contention was that his study shed light on 
‘laws’ that characterise societies across time and space (famously, he studied 
the prohibition of incest). Analogously, Michel Foucault, a very prolific and 
highly influential author, devoted his attention in a range of renowned works 
to exploring how epistemic structures perform as key drivers of historical 
processes. The work of these and other philosophers aims at uncovering the 
deeper structures31 that govern human societies.
Structures are a key category of analysis in both the natural and social 
sciences in order to explain phenomena (‘features that, prima facie, seem 
likely to affect the process of public management reform [..] include structural, 
cultural and functional elements’, to stick to the subject matter of our book 
and mention a much-cited book in the field of public management: Pollitt and 
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Bouckaert 2004, p. 40). The findings of the previously mentioned scholarly 
works about deeper structures influencing society, either its constitutive family 
bonds like in Lévi-Strauss’s work, or the transition between epochs on which 
Foucault’s study sheds light, might be accommodated quite laically within 
a variety of philosophical perspectives. But what characterises structuralism is 
the suffix ‘ism’ at the end, something which we might translate (from ancient 
Greek) as ‘all is’ or ‘the entirety of being is’: so structuralism as a philosophy 
asserts that structures explain everything. This is the philosophical meaning of 
structure: deeper, unconscious structures are the ultimate explanation of reality 
(or that part of reality which is within the reach of some form of human knowl-
edge). Structuralism is thus an attitude that pretends to explain the human and 
the social in terms of deeper structural influence in which the human subject, 
the ‘I’, the conscience and the self-conscience are ultimately dissolved. This 
is also the problem with structuralism: structures are part and parcel of the 
explanation of human societies, but why the hidden dynamics and why should 
the hidden ‘reasons’ of deeper structures be the reality, the totality of being? 
And what criterion of truth enables the identification and distinction of the 
‘true’ ultimate structures of being? In fact, if we follow the central claim of 
structuralism, we are led to a contradiction: human rationality and conscience 
should at the same time be the judge about the truth value of the claim that 
reality ultimately consists of deeper structures whilst they themselves dissolve 
into these structures; human conscience is at the same time claimed not to 
exist other than dissolved into structures that transcend it, and yet at the same 
time this assertion can only be grounded by a rational conscience stating it. It 
is these questions that pose serious limits to the pretensions of structuralism to 
qualify as an ontology. However, the findings of the manifold studies in this 
stream are evidently important contributions to the understanding of social 
dynamics, and by themselves can quite easily be accommodated into different 
philosophical viewpoints and accepted within a wide range of perspectives. 
The influence of structuralism on the social sciences is undoubted, and there 
is still much that can be borrowed from it, notably in the study of public 
governance, by plucking into the toolkit of structuralist thinkers. Moreover, 
a structuralist perspective may represent a critical alternative framework to 
other approaches, that when combined may shed additional light on human 
and social phenomena (one might contrast the structuralist anthropology à 
la Claude Lévi-Strauss with cultural anthropology and the notion of human 
culture as an irreducible act of creativity à la Tylor, 1920; Kroeber, 1952, in 
order to see how fruitful the combination of different perspectives may be in 
shedding light on social phenomena).
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: structuralism and 
notably the potential multiple applications of the notion of social structure 
to the advancement of PA studies is discussed in Chapter 4, where also and 
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more broadly the topic of how PA can tap from, and benefit of, the findings 
of social ontology is developed. Social ontology may be seen as a branch of 
ontology, a regional ontology whose focus is on the nature and foundations 
of social entities and their constituent or essential properties. Its lineage is in 
many respects in structuralism, as well as in Vico’s thought, and we will return 
to these philosophies when discussing in Chapter 4 the implications of social 
ontology for PA studies.
OTHER KEY 20TH-CENTURY STRANDS: 
PRAGMATISM, PROCESS PHILOSOPHY, 
ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY, HERMENEUTICS, 
POST-MODERNISM, PERSONALISM, SPIRITUALISM
We now turn our attention to another array of philosophical movements. Their 
common characteristic (albeit we promptly recognise this is a quite subjective 
classification) lies in featuring more of an emphasis on a distinctive aspect or 
dimension of philosophising than a doctrinal or ideological corpus proper.
Pragmatism
The first one we review here is American pragmatism. It is probably the first 
distinctive philosophical movement to originate in the US (hence its qualifi-
cation of ‘American’). In this philosophy, the truth of a notion is traced by its 
‘respective practical consequences … What difference would it practically 
make if this notion rather than that notion were true’ (James, 1907, p. 45). 
This assertion by James provides an effective depiction of the key emphasis 
of pragmatism. It is easily recognisable that it is more a philosophy of knowl-
edge than a philosophical system tout court. It also places an emphasis on 
a process vision of reality as becoming, which seems to resonate deeply with 
the American culture: ‘True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, 
corroborate and verify … The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inher-
ent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its 
verity is in fact an event, a process’ (James, 1907, p. 201). To illustrate with an 
example: ‘what is 90 degrees? Is it hot or cold? The pragmatist would ask, are 
you boiling water or are you playing basketball? The truth is in the experience, 
the problem and the context’ (Shields, 1995). The influence of pragmatism on 
the development of the social sciences in the US can hardly be exaggerated, 
although the specific influence on PA studies is matter for finer-grained studies 
aimed at gleaning its distinctive influence out of a range of philosophical 
approaches affecting the study of this field (Snider, 2000).
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Process Philosophy
Linked to pragmatism, at least in its emphasis on becoming, is the so-called 
process philosophy. It is a radical ontology of becoming, whose roots can man-
ifestly be traced in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (see in particular 
Whitehead, 1929), an influential author, notably in the Anglophone world, 
but also beyond it (a Whiteheadian society is still up and running, featuring 
regular meetings and a kaleidoscope of initiatives, and some of its members 
are scholars active in the field of PA). The key notion for Whitehead is that 
of ‘event’: it is events and the becoming of things that we need to understand 
for gaining a deeper comprehension of reality, rather than substances; and it 
is interactions, mutuality of actions that shape the becoming of things – these 
interactions and mutuality are what Whitehead termed of ‘concrescence’.32 
Whitehead stresses how this philosophy is more consistent with modern 
physics notions of events occurring in the space–time of the Einsteinian theory 
of relativity as opposed to the old Newtonian physics centred on the notion of 
an absolute time and an inertial matter as the ‘substance’ of things. Research 
works centred on ‘process accounts’ are a notable feature of social scientific 
research in general, and political science and public administration research 
in particular, notably in American strands of research (one may think of the 
works of Abbott, 1992a, 1992b on general epistemological issues in the social 
sciences; Allison, 1971 in political science; and Barzelay and Campbell, 2003; 
Barzelay and Gallego, 2006, 2010; Asquer and Mele, 2018; amongst others in 
the field of PA). An interpretation of the thought of Mary Parker Follett along 
the lines of a Whiteheadian philosophy of becoming as its key ontological 
underpinning is developed by Stout and Love (2015; see also Ongaro, 2016; 
Stivers, 2006), drawing implications for how we conceive of public govern-
ance, on one hand, and workplace in PA, on the other hand.
Analytical Philosophy
The language turn in philosophical studies also features prominently in the 
20th century. The emphasis here is on the analysis of language to frame 
logical–philosophical problems: Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein 
are key authors, and the universities of Oxford and Cambridge in the UK 
have become worldwide centres of the analytic movement and the philosophy 
of language. This movement is also intertwined with the developments of 
modern logic (in its turn intimately tied to developments in mathematics in the 
19th and 20th centuries, like most notably the establishment and impressive 
growth of set theory, a theoretical stream associated to the thought of the 
mathematician Cantor and which pushed mathematics beyond its core remit of 
investigating the nature of numbers and of geometrical points and properties of 
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space, interlinking it even further with logic), and notably with the work of the 
Italian logician and mathematician Giuseppe Peano as well as with the works 
of Frege. These developments have not gone unnoticed in the field of PA: the 
development of formal logic was a major intellectual aim of the philosopher 
Carnap and the school of Vienna, and this was a major influence on Herbert 
Simon, a towering figure in the field of organisation studies and PA (we elabo-
rate more widely on Carnap’s influence on Simon and PA research in Chapter 
6). More recently, a thoughtful application of Frege’s principles to the public 
administration debate about the nature of context and contextual influence in 
PA is developed by Bouckaert (2013). What is considered as ‘modern’ logic 
(as opposed to classical logic founded by Aristotle and centred on the syllo-
gism) owes much to its encounter with the analytic movement, as does contem-
porary linguistic analysis. Subsequent developments like those brought about 
by Noam Chomsky are also indebted to the analytic movement. Chomsky has 
worked out, inter alia, the distinction between superficial structure and deeper 
structure of a sentence. He worked out a method to analyse the transformations 
whereby the deeper structure of a sentence, its non-ambiguous meaning, can 
be transformed into different structures, of which there are many, and that can 
in turn be expressed in compliance with the grammar rules of any one of the 
extant specific human languages that can be detected throughout the world and 
in history. Other key developments in contemporary language studies include 
the notion of ‘sign’ as the relation between a signifier and a signified, a notion 
that enjoys wide currency and extensive usage across the humanities and the 
social sciences in textual analyses. Analytic philosophy has acquired a notable 
status, highly influential if not dominant, at least in Anglophone contemporary 
philosophy. More limited or indirect appears the influence of this philosoph-
ical movement on PA studies. Putting it directly (and a bit simplistically), it 
seems there is room for importing tools and approaches from the methodolo-
gies developed within the analytic movement into the field of PA.
Hermeneutics
Hermeneutics is a philosophical movement chiefly associated with Hans Georg 
Gadamer (Truth and Method, 1960/1975). His work provided an approach to 
the interpretation of texts, based on the notions of ‘pre-comprehension’ and of 
the text seen not just as an object in front of the reader, but rather as impinging 
and clashing on the reader. In this perspective, the effects of a text become 
part of the text beyond the original intentions of the author (that the author 
may have intended). This configures the hermeneutical cycle. In Gadamer’s 
philosophy there is also a re-valuation of prejudices, that he intends as 
pre-judgement – they are deemed to be the inevitable starting point of any 
approach to a text. This is a view at odds with Bacon (see Chapter 2) and much 
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of the Enlightenment approach whereby philosophical reflections consists, for 
an important part, of erasing and rubbing away all prejudices. For Gadamer, 
prejudices deriving from intellectual ‘authorities’ are a starting point of any 
comprehension of a text, provided – as the Enlightenment suggested – they 
can be criticised rather than demanding uncritical allegiance. For Gadamer, 
the encounter with a book is ultimately ‘making an experience’ – the dialectic 
experience – and it is a form of knowledge well distinct from the ‘collection 
of observations’ at times acclaimed as the only starting point in knowledge 
generation (in opposition, for example, to positivism). Within this encounter, 
conceived of as ultimately an individual experience (Pareyson, 1971), truth can 
be attained, but truth does not exhaust itself within any one individual’s exis-
tential experience and encounter with it. The hermeneutical method has been 
applied to a wide range of fields; this includes in legal studies and, notably 
in relation to the field of PA, it is interesting to note the application of the 
hermeneutical method in administrative law, to the administrative procedure.33
Post-modernism
Another, and multifarious, philosophical strand goes under the label of 
‘Post-modernism’. It is hard to define it because the very authors working 
in this tradition incessantly repeat that post-modernism is undefinable. 
Amongst its key authors may be included the philosophers Michel Foucault, 
Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida. One attempt to capture some 
traits can be by means of a cultural–philosophical parallel of the transition 
from the industrial society to the information society, from material goods to 
information-based services, and hence from the values, premises and philo-
sophical foundations (like positivism) of the industrial society to an undefined 
society where those features are no more extant but where others and new ones 
have not yet taken shape. It has for this reason also been defined as a combi-
nation of hypermodernity and pre-modernity (Lyotard). In the social sciences 
it is often associated with social constructivism (Berger and Luckman, 1966) 
and the hyper-accentuation of the role of the (weak) subject in construing 
reality, and also with forms of inter-subjectivity and inter-subjective agree-
ment in construing society and reality at large. It enjoys a certain consolidated, 
although quite delimited, remit in the field of PA, with key authors, journals 
(mainly Administrative Theory & Praxis) and recurring claims, which will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
Often contrasted to post-modernism is critical realism (Pawson, 2006; 
Pawson and Tilley, 1997), centred (in our interpretation) on an attempt to 
combine classical realism (of Aristotelian imprint) with the role of the subject 
in modernity brought about by modern philosophy. This is also discussed 
further in Chapter 4.
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Personalism
Personalism is a philosophical movement associated with the philosopher 
Emmanuel Mounier, owing also to the works of Neo-Scholastic philosophers 
like Jacques Maritain and phenomenologists like Scheler, who applied the 
phenomenological method to the investigation of the essences of moral values. 
Personalism advocates a radical humanism and stresses the flourishing of 
the totality of the human person, as opposed to any reductionism, which for 
Mounier is any philosophy that ends up with a one-sided depiction of the 
human being (be it ‘the economic man’ or the Nietzschian ‘super-human’).
Mounier propounded a return to a radical humanism, a new Renaissance 
centred on the notion of ‘person’. His thought can be better appreciated in 
the perspective of the polemic he engaged with both Marxism and capitalism, 
which for him are philosophies that ultimately operate a form of reductionism, 
emphasising one aspect of the human person to the detriment of its totality 
and entirety. For Mounier the three dimensions of the person are vocation, 
incarnation and communion. Vocation is the call to realise a project that 
each and every person has – or receives – and that for Mounier is a qualify-
ing trait of human life. Incarnation refers to the fact that the body is always 
part-and-parcel of a person, contrary to those philosophical strands that tend 
to conceive of the human being as an abstract ‘I think’. Communion refers to 
the perspective whereby it is only in the belonging to a community of persons 
that the individual person can accomplish her/himself and fully develop its 
vocation. It is a relational rather than atomistic conception of the human being 
and her/his flourishing. Communitarianism in the version propounded by 
Mounier is closely associated to the philosophical movement of personalism. 
Later in the book we query whether this perspective can enable getting beyond 
the common good versus social contract traditional dichotomy – this argument 
is developed and further discussed in Chapter 5.
But with philosophers like Carl Schmitt the notion of communitarianism 
went down an altogether different route: a nationalistic interpretation, whereby 
ethnic ties get pre-eminence. In this perspective, individual liberty must be 
tempered by the responsibility of the individual towards the community, con-
ceived of at the national level, as the national community forged by ethnical or 
linguistic-cultural bonds. This altogether different interpretation of the notion 
of ‘communitarianism’ is also discussed in Chapter 5.
Spiritualism
Spiritualism may be seen as a distinctive stream within a larger movement 
that emerged between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 
20th across Europe, mostly – at least at its inception – as a reaction to posi-
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tivism. Spiritualism is a movement whose main tenets include the claim that 
philosophy cannot be absorbed into science and scientific knowledge; the 
consideration of the specificity of the human being, and the significance of 
her/his interiority, liberty, conscience; and relatedly, that introspection and 
conscience are part-and-parcel of any investigation of reality, and that the 
interiority of conscience is a door open to transcendence and God. Key authors 
to whom this movement refers go back in time to Plotinus and Augustine, 
and then to the founder of modern philosophy – Descartes – and to cultural 
movements that have defined epochs of Western civilisation, like Renaissance 
and romanticism.
An author in the spiritualist stream and the Platonic–Augustinian tradition, 
but whose philosophical elaboration displays highly original traits, is the 
French philosopher Henri Bergson, on whose philosophy we conclude the 
chapter and our introductory journey across Western philosophical thought. In 
the next chapter, the philosophical ideas introduced are applied to key issues 
and problems of the field of PA.
The key thrust of the philosophy of Bergson is getting a deeper understand-
ing of life as actually lived by ‘real’ living beings, and notably self-conscious 
living beings. Against any reductionism of life to its chemical processes, he 
claims that life has a unity that reductionism completely misses. But how to 
understand this unity?
Before we turn to this, we should ponder on the rationale behind the fierce 
polemic that Bergson conducted against any metaphysics that conceives of 
entities as immersed in a present without real duration. The starting point of 
his philosophy is the notion of time as duration (worked out in his first major 
philosophical work, Essai sur les Données Immediates de la Conscience, 
1913, English edition 1989). By taking the move from the lived time that each 
human being experiences (an approach whose methodological premise are 
in Descartes: the investigation of the self as the most undoubtable evidence), 
Bergson develops what is now a classic critique of the very notion of ‘state 
of conscience’, where the critique is to the stability or static nature implicit 
in the usage of the term ‘state’ in the expression ‘state of conscience’. In fact, 
Bergson argues, any sensation, representation or volition that occurs in our 
conscience never ceases to mutate and change over time, albeit changes may 
be so small as to be almost imperceptible and it is only when attention is given 
to the accumulation of such changes that the self perceives to have transited 
from one ‘state’ of conscience to another and different ‘state’. But conscience 
is – as vividly expressed through a very famous metaphor – a snowball. It 
continually grows by absorbing the future through the lived present into an 
ever-increasing past and, like snow for a snowball, the whole of the lived time 
is kept and constitutes any living being: we are the totality of our lived past. It 
is only for purposes of action that selectively certain ‘parts’ of the past are arti-
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ficially plucked and brought into the spotlight through the process of remem-
bering, because it is the abstraction operated by intelligence that artificially 
distinguishes and re-aggregates moments of our life under certain abstract 
labels (so, our ‘professional life’ gets distinguished from our ‘private life’, our 
‘youth’ from our elderly age, and so on). The key innovation brought about by 
Bergson to the philosophical thought is that for Bergson the ‘self-conscious I’ 
is an activity continuously open outside of itself (projected towards the future 
via the present) and ‘at the same time’ (so to speak) constituted by duration, 
that is, by the conservation of the totality of its past activity: the totality of 
the past of the lived time gets conserved in what is conceived of as a process 
of accretion.34 In Bergson’s philosophy there are profound analogies with the 
Aristotelian notions of form and unity, but the distinctive novelty brought 
about by the French philosopher lies in conceiving of the time as the tissue of 
which every (living) being is made.
In this philosophical perspective, time is the tissue of which reality is made. 
Duration is the continuous advancement of the past that grows on its very 
activity of ‘gnawing’ the future, bite by bite, and yet conserving the totality 
of itself. The activity of remembering is an intermittent activity that occurs 
if and when possible, but the totality of the past does not need the activity of 
remembering for keeping the totality of itself: the past conserves the totality of 
itself by itself, and we are constituted – in other words, we are – the totality of 
our past. All that we have perceived, felt, thought and wanted since our infancy 
constitutes what we are. It is only for purposes of usefulness and practical 
action that our conscience rebuffs most of our past and lets only what is neces-
sary for the purposes of the most immediate action pass to our attention. Our 
(as living beings) volitions, emotions or thoughts do not transit continuously 
from non-being back into non-being by staying an indefinitely little moment 
(instant) into being; instead, the totality of our past volitions, emotions or 
thoughts is conserved, whilst we continuously project towards the future, and 
the new volitions, emotions or thoughts are absorbed into our ever-growing 
past (which shapes what we are: what is referred to as ‘our character’). Here 
Bergson distinguished between the time of mathematics (and physics: hence 
a famous contention with Albert Einstein on the nature of time) and the time 
of life. The time of mathematics is a spatialised time, the time of the pure 
instantaneity: the world, for mathematicians, dies and is born again at every 
instant;35 this time that does not last, that has no duration, is not the real time 
of life. From this also derives the crucial distinction between remembering and 
memory: memory is the totality of our past that constitutes us. Remembering 
is for the action: we only remember what is required for action.
A key question addressed by Bergson is whether the living body is a body 
– a ‘portion of matter’ – like any other or not? Although it obviously occupies 
and carves out a piece of matter, and it can be sectioned and portioned (through 
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vivisection and dissecting), the main difference between a portion of matter 
and a living body is that in a portion of matter the present does not contain any-
thing more than what was already present in the causes that have determined it 
to reach that given status, whilst the living body lasts: its past is all contained 
in its present, there remaining real and active. It is for this reason that a living 
body passes through phases, changes and eventually gets old – because it does 
have a history. Bergson does not deny the fundamental identity of organic and 
inorganic matter, but rather the claim is that any portioning of the reality of 
a living body would not be the living body as such, for example a thousand pic-
tures of Paris from any imaginable angle simply are not Paris. Anywhere there 
is life, a registry where time is written is open. The most immediate analogy is 
therefore between each living body and the universe as a whole – not portions 
of it – which is also constituted by the totality of its past. From this originates 
the idea that the universe is in continuous accretion, enhancement of the whole, 
in every act of will by living, organic beings (although Bergson is cautious to 
remind the reader that the universe as a whole is a construction, different to the 
‘reality’ of a living being).
But what does it mean talking about ‘life in general’ in the frame of 
Bergson’s philosophy? For Bergson, life is like a current, flowing from one 
living being to another one through the germinal cells (as outlined in his 2005 
work ‘L’Evolution Créatrice’). The evolution of species is thus an endogenous 
process: it is not caused by pre-determined efficient causes (in the Aristotelian 
definition of the system of four causes) because assuming these causes would 
be denying the reality of duration, and because all that happens would already 
be in the causes when they are ‘present’. Nor is the evolution of species caused 
by final causes because analogously assuming these causes would entail that 
all life is simply present in front of these final causes without having a real 
duration (and this is a point of difference between Bergson and Leibniz, or 
at least the part of Leibniz’s thought that was known at the time Bergson was 
operating). Life is a flow, like a current: famously summed up in the expres-
sion ‘élan vital’ (‘the vital thrust’).
It remains the open question of the source of this élan vital, the source of life 
that shapes matter, unfolds through the multiplicity of individuals and yet is 
a single stream that penetrates through each individual and that unites them all. 
Evolution occurred through the unfolding of life along different sub-streams, 
against the resistance of matter. One direction has brought the accumulation 
of energy in the vegetal world. Another direction has brought the capacity of 
channelling and deploying energy in the most rapid ways, like in arthropods 
and vertebrates. Finally, in human life a qualitative change occurred by having 
broken through the counter-movement of matter and having achieved the 
liberation of conscience. The super-conscience that is at the origin of the élan 
vital has in the human species liberated itself – it can now pursue liberty, free 
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acts rather than the automatism of instinct. And where is mankind – and life 
– soaring through it? Mysticism is for Bergson the true religion that enables 
getting beyond the limits of humanity towards the absolute/transcendence (the 
theme is developed in his last work: Les Deux Sources, 1932).
Bergson by proposing a distinctive philosophical interpretation of the evo-
lution of life (quite diverse from the one proposed by Darwin, 1859, and closer 
to the one proposed by other scientists, like the biologist De Vries), addresses, 
from a very original angle, the philosophical issue of the relation between 
conscience and brain (a key question in the philosophy of the mind). What is 
the brain for Bergson? In a famous metaphor he likened it to the blade of the 
dagger (conscience): the brain is not the totality of the conscience (as the blade 
is not the totality of the dagger, but a part of it), but it is that part that enables 
action. And conscience for Bergson is definitely not a product of the brain. 
Rather for our philosopher it is life that shapes matter – in other words, the 
distension of the spiritual activity is matter – not matter that makes life. Space 
is conceived of as extension of conscience, and matter as consolidation and 
inertia of acts of creation/acts of will.
Another highly innovative and original contribution by Bergson lies in his 
conception of intelligence and its relation with instinct. For Bergson intel-
ligence is the capacity to classify and search for relations between things, 
looking at them from the outside. It is the intelligence of the natural sciences 
(and of most of the social sciences). Intelligence is the capacity to make use 
of inorganic matter by shaping it in the most functional ways. But intelligence 
stays at the surface of things, turns around its object without ever penetrating 
it (because it operates in a spatialised time where duration disappears). The 
capacity of penetrating the essence of things only occurs to instinct. Instinct 
is the faculty of utilising organic instruments for the pursuit of goals that are 
administered by nature itself: the eye for sight, the mouth and jaws for biting 
and eating, and so on. Instinct has an inner knowledge of things, but instinct 
by itself is blind – it can only repeat what it is apt to. Instinct and intelligence, 
which have a common origin and still keep trace of this commonality, are 
complementary: instinct drives into things, intelligence knows relationships 
amongst things. It is only intuition, instinct accompanied by conscience, that 
can get to know the things, those things that by itself intelligence can only 
relate. This poses a problem: that intelligence (the intelligence labelling and 
searching for relations) loses contact with the essence of things and their 
‘real life’ in becoming. And isn’t this an experience that many researchers, 
including public administration researchers, have undergone? The sense 
that the real life of an organisation, or a public policy process, is lost when 
what is sought are relations that are treated in a spatialised time that does not 
correspond to what happened to the real organisation, made by real, living 
people? According to Bergson, when time is bracketed in research work, what 
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is triggered are the faculties of the intelligence, which takes multiple views of 
the time-less (life-less) object from the outside, for purposes of classification, 
detection of relations and ultimately intervention on the surveyed object for 
practical purposes. But life – the life of individual human beings making 
the organisation, and hence in a certain sense the life of the organisation as 
a community of living beings – gets lost, the unfolding of life in time wanes, 
fades away. This might be the philosophical, metaphysical underpinning of the 
experience researchers have when shifting from research methods intensive 
in contact with real lives (like ethnomethodology or case studies – especially 
longitudinal, thick, in-depth case studies) to research methods that require 
bracketing time, taking static views of people and organisations (snapshots: 
but a thousand pictures of Paris, even if taken from any possible spatial view-
point, will never be Paris – as a living community made by living people).
We conclude the chapter on this famous metaphor: a thousand pictures 
of Paris from any imaginable angle are not Paris. We have so far hinted to 
possible implications of philosophical (ontological, epistemological) ideas for 
PA from innumerable angles, but we have not yet addressed the developments 
that may be brought to the field of PA by the more systematic application and 
examination of such ideas. It is to this task – walking the Paris of PA from 
within rather than hinting to it from a kaleidoscope of angles – that we turn in 
the next chapter.
Implications for PA/Relevance for Philosophy for PA: there are manifold 
implications for PA that, not unexpected, the many and so diverse streams of 
philosophical thought carry with them for PA. It is a purpose of this book to 
shed light on the potential contribution that a range of philosophical streams of 
thought can provide to PA: these are discussed throughout Chapters 4, 5 and 6, 
and from a different angle in Chapter 9.
NOTES
1. One of the few ‘technical’ philosophical words that we maintain in this book, 
hoping not to bemuse the reader, given the centrality it enjoys not just in Kant’s 
thought but in the philosophical reflection that stemmed from it.
2. Although this notion, which seemed evident to Kant based on Newtonian physics, 
is not in modern physics (see, for example, the debate on ‘dark matter’ – its effects 
are felt, but it is not clear ‘where’ it is, and in what sense it is extended, and there-
fore it may be not all bodies might be ‘extended’). We return to this point later.
3. The philosopher Leibniz, for example, developed a conception of space and time 
whereby these are conceived as ‘ways in which things appears to the subject’: 
space and time stem from the relations with which they are ordered by the subject.
4. Kant conceived of the beauty as the sentiment of order and harmony, of what is 
liked beyond any instrumentality associated to the object, and of the sublime as 
the sentiment of the infinite. Through aesthetic experience (reflective judgement, 
in Kant’s terminology), the human being can partake through sentiment what is 
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denied in terms of knowability of both the finite and the infinite. This conception 
will prove hugely influential on romanticism.
5. In the sentence ‘our’ refers to we humans as rational beings.
6. This truly embodies the spirit of the Enlightenment, which Kant so powerfully 
brought to vertiginous heights.
7. Kant never reduced reality to the phenomenon; rather he postulated that phenom-
ena are the perimeter of human knowledge.
8. The thinking subject is the main point of departure of philosophising since 
Descartes; however, Kant like Descartes before him and many other philosophers 
later on have struggled to come to grips with the nature and foundation of the unity 
of the thinking subject.
9. Fichte had the highest esteem of Kant, and he even hints in this works that maybe 
Kant did not reveal the consequences of his thought (consequences that Fichte was 
claiming to now be shedding light on) because he (Kant) possibly did not consider 
his times ripe enough for people to understand the revolution that was on the verge 
of being brought about.
10. This is the interpretation Hegel gave to his thought: as we have already seen, 
Schelling’s thought should not be seen as just one phase towards the Hegelian 
philosophy; moreover, Schelling transformed quite radically his thought more 
than once over his lifetime.
11. The philosophy of nature was centre stage during the epoch of the romanticism, of 
which Schelling was an influential exponent.
12. Different from pantheism that assumes that God is everything.
13. I am indebted to Wolfgang Drechsler for having pointed out this three-fold 
meaning of the German term aufheben and its usage in Hegel’s dialectic.
14. To better set Hegel’s statement in context, it is important to notice that Aristotle 
conceived of the infinite (in mathematical terms) as a potentiality, not an actuality 
(a notion that can be conceived of in potentiality but can never actually occur), and 
this has been the prevailing wisdom over two millennia, and still was at the time 
of Hegel. Later in the 19th century, the German–Russian mathematician Cantor 
argued that, under certain formal definitions of the concept of infinite, the notion 
of infinite as a mental entity could be thought to exist in actuality; indeed, Cantor 
even argued that there be different orders of infinite, that is, in a bit of a vulgate, 
over-simplistic expression, that some infinites are ‘more infinite’ than others, 
meaning that an infinite defined in such a way to be obtained through a certain 
mathematical process is, according to Cantor’s theory, of a higher order than 
another one (however counterintuitive it may prima facie be).
15. Part of this argument is masterfully delineated in an earlier work of Hegel, which 
many commentators deem to have embodied heights unparalleled in the rest of his 
production: Phenomenology of Spirit (1807/1977).
16. It is very difficult to refer to something like ‘the original thought of Marx’ – in fact 
his philosophy has been subjected to multifarious readings and used as source of 
inspiration to carry out massively impactful social experiments across the world. 
It is nowadays virtually impossible to disentangle an ‘original’ thought from such 
array of interpretations and experiments.
17. According to this perspective, theology originates in anthropology.
18. The notion of alienation was already in Hegel, defined as the objectivisation of the 
ideal that when it meets the material world becomes ‘other’ from the subject who 
acted in the pursuit of it. For Hegel, alienation is inherent to the process of objec-
tivisation, as a resultant of a dialectical process. Hegel gave a larger ontological 
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meaning to the notion of alienation than Marx. For Marx, alienation was a deviant 
product of society; for Sartre, any social act becomes modified by the other(s) and 
the very encounter with materiality, and for this very reason the meaning of the act 
is modified and its concrete manifestation ‘becomes’ other than that the subject 
initially wanted through the act – the act becomes stranger to the will who pursued 
the act, feeds back becoming alien to the will, and hence the process of alienation.
19. It may be interesting to notice that the most famous work (alongside the Manifesto 
of the Communist Party, 1848) by Karl Marx, The Capital (1867), was written in 
a world capital of capitalism like London, where Marx lived after he was exiled 
from Germany, France and Belgium, toiling to earn a living and with almost no 
livelihood but the support and the help of his lifelong friend Friedrich Engels 
(who edited the second and third volumes of The Capital after the passing away of 
Marx). Engels’s original thought is also a key inspiration for Soviet Marxism.
20. Many of us scholars, who uphold intellectual independence as a condition for the 
exercise of the research work only at the service of the search for truth, may well 
find this interpretation of the role of intellectuals repugnant.
21. A notion Schopenhauer derived from Indian philosophical thought, notably the 
Upanishad, with which Schopenhauer was in contact through the frequentation of 
the orientalist Friedrich Mayer.
22. The incomplete notes for a projected book ‘The will of power’ that Nietzsche 
never finished were later arbitrarily manipulated and interpreted as justification 
of the pursuit of power by the strongest, and furnished ideological backing to 
Nazism. Although this is probably not what Nietzsche would have meant (because 
he fiercely opposed any philosophical ‘system’ and the very idea that one principle 
can explain reality, and because his concerns were more about furnishing a sense 
to a barren post-Christian existence: his focus was more on individuals desperate 
about how to live one’s own life after ‘the death of God’, and all his philosophy is 
very far from entrusting any salvation power to the State), but when irrational will 
and the orgiastic dimension of life become prominent and acquire a salvific status, 
the risks of fatal drifts arise.
23. On a more subtle interpretation, it may be argued that perhaps Nietzsche intended 
that one has to choose to live ‘as if’ everything recurred the same infinitely, so that 
she/he might ‘take control’ of her/his destiny by accepting its necessity.
24. ‘questo mondo civile egli certamente è stato fatto dagli uomini, onde se ne 
possono, perché se ne debbono, ritruovare i principi dentro le modificazioni della 
nostra medesima mente umana’ (‘This civil world [that is, society] has certainly 
been made by humans, and it is for this reason that it is possible, and we must, 
discover its principles within the modifications of our own human mind’ –Vico 
(1725).
25. The notion of disenchantment of the world is another key notion elaborated by 
Weber, which we cannot even touch upon here. It is the progressive intellectual-
isation of the way in which humankind investigates the world, and the problem 
of the meaning of the world – and of our presence in the world – which scientific 
reason will never be able to respond to.
26. Indeed, it was the discussion on the famous fifth postulate of Euclidean geometry 
that sparked the debate about whether a foundation of geometry (and sciences 
more at large) on ‘undoubtable’, self-evident truths could be established, or 
whether the starting points of geometry (as well as the sciences) can ‘only’ be 
attributed the status of mere ‘conventions’. In the Euclidean tradition, self-evident 
truths are referred to as either ‘axioms’ (assumptions valid in geometry as well as 
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across fields of knowledge) or postulates (self-evident truths typically pertaining 
to geometry) – and conventionalism questions the very notion of ‘self-evident 
truth’.
27. At least partly because recent developments in physics seem to expand the scope 
of application of quantum theory.
28. We should also add another caveat, derived from a renaissance thinker: 
Guicciardini who is notable for his empiricism to which he added a strong caveat 
towards the challenges of generalising from induction: ‘È grande errore parlare 
delle cose del mondo indistintamente e assolutamente e, per dire così, per regola; 
perché quasi tutte hanno distinzione e eccezione per la varietà dellle circunstanze, 
le quali non si possono fermare con una medesima misura; e queste distinzione e 
eccezione non si truovano scritte in su’ libri, ma bisogna le insegni la discrezione’ 
[‘It is a huge mistake to make judgements about the things of the world based on 
law-like generalisations, in a way that is indistinct and absolute; because almost 
in anything there is the need to distinguish and find out the exceptions to the 
rule, which depend on the varied circumstances; and such varied circumstances 
cannot be treated in a one-size-fits-all way; in order to learn how to distinguish the 
varied circumstances and spot the exceptions it is necessary to wield discretion, 
because this know-how cannot be learnt in books’], Ricordi, n.6 (online at: https:// 
letteritaliana .weebly .com/ discrezione -e -fortuna .html – accessed 7 April 2020).
29. At the end of his search Martin Heidegger will also go back to the pre-Socratics, 
that is the philosophers before Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, for discovering the 
unveiling of the mystery of being, and he will thus in a sense reject both classical 
and modern philosophy.
30. There is here a strong influence of the 19th-century Danish philosopher Soren 
Kierkegaard, considered a precursor of existentialism and whose philosophy is 
centred on the critique of the metaphysical category of necessity as constitutive 
or inherent of Being, as in the Hegelian, and before the Spinozian, system of 
philosophy.
31. There are manifold definitions of structure, and debates on the meaning of the 
term ‘structure’ are countless. One that may suffice for the purposes of the present 
introduction is that of structure as ‘a system of self-regulating transformations’ 
(e.g. Piaget).
32. Parallels may be drawn between Whiteheadian notion and the seminal reasons of 
change worked out in ancient Greek philosophy especially by Stoic philosophers. 
As the readers will have noticed, and to the risk of repeating this point as a refrain, 
it is a key emphasis of this book to stress how taking the broad and long-term 
philosophical perspective may be enlightening in contextualising and setting in 
perspective modern and contemporary thinkers.
33. I am indebted to Fabrizio Fracchia for having pointed out this line of application 
of the hermeneutical method of direct relevance to PA studies.
34. This approach distinguishes his philosophy from Descartes’s, and is a very 
insightful way of addressing a range of critiques that were moved to Descartes, 
including the one by Locke’s (in his Essay) where he distinguished between the 
‘self-conscious I’ and the observable qualities of its activity, or the criticisms 
by Maine de Biran where he highlights how the Cartesian ‘I’ is a purely passive 
substance, a sort of blackboard recipient of what is thrown over it.
35. From which, for Bergson, Descartes erroneously derived his notion of continued 
creation – from a creationist perspective, the partaking of being by the contingent 
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entities as a gift of the absolute Being is maintained by living beings as they are 
the totality of their past.
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4. Ontological perspectives and public 
administration doctrines and themes
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we revisit a range of key themes in public administration and 
management, in light of key philosophical ideas introduced in the previous 
chapters. Our thrust is making a contribution to bring fundamental issues of 
ontology, as arisen over the centuries in (Western) philosophical thought, into 
the PA discourse. Differently from other major books dealing with philosoph-
ical issues in PA (Raadschelders, 2011; Riccucci, 2010), this book takes as its 
starting point not the classification of strands of inquiry in PA to then delve 
into their philosophical foundations and premises, but rather it starts from 
philosophical approaches, themes and schools, to then delve into some of the 
implications for the study and practice of PA. In this sense it is quite deductive 
and ambitious in taking the broad perspective – and in many respects it embod-
ies a very ‘European’ scholarly tradition and approach.
This chapter deals with themes more pertinent to ontological issues, whilst 
political philosophical issues are discussed in Chapter 5 and epistemological 
ones in Chapter 6.
The chapter is structured around key themes. They are listed here, with 
some captivating questions highlighting the gist and the significance of each 
theme for PA, to then be briefly introduced in the remainder of this section and 
discussed in depth throughout the chapter:
• The foundation of the subject capable of moral judgement and knowledge-
able assessment of administrative courses of action? The Kantian transcen-
dental subject as a possible grounding of contemporary public governance.
• Deeper societal structures bearing explanatory power? The contribution 
of the philosophical movement of structuralism to PA by enlarging the 
gamut of explanatory factors to include structural explanations alongside 
institutional, cultural and functional ones.
• Social structures and social ontology: revisiting the ontological underpin-
nings of the relationship between agency (individual freedom) and social 
structures in social scientific explanations.
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:35:06AM
via free access
Ontological perspectives and PA doctrines and themes 129
• Power, power, power? Neo-Marxism and Gramsci and the significance of 
the notion of power for PA studies and practice.
• Caring for the world? The Existentialist Public Administrator.
• Past, present future: do we really understand them? Time in the study and 
practice of public administration, and implications of the perspective of 
philosophical historicism for PA.
• It is, it can be or it might be? Necessity and possibility as categories of 
being (transcendentals), and their significance for PA.
• One human nature or many? How conceptions of human nature may 
inform the study and practice of PA.
The chapter thus first examines some implications of the Kantian transcenden-
tal subject, discussing the extent to which it may provide a foundation to the 
field of PA. It then turns to discussing societal structures and their explanatory 
power, through at first revisiting the contribution the philosophical movement 
of structuralism may bring to PA, to then discuss issues of social ontology 
and notably the ontological underpinnings of the relationship between agency 
(individual freedom) and social structures in social scientific explanations. 
Next, we examine Neo-Marxism and notably Gramsci’s always-of-actuality 
contribution, notably in taking the notion of power to the fore of PA studies 
(never oblivious to the fact that the bureaucratic apparatus is a centre of power 
in perennial interplay with other power centres like, most obviously, the politi-
cal party as the modern Prince – a topic which is further elaborated in Chapter 7 
where the actuality of a thinker, Niccolò Machiavelli, inspirational to Gramsci 
as well as to so many other thinkers across the ages is introduced). In quite 
sharp contrast with Gramsci’s thought, the notion of ‘caring’ as wrought out in 
the philosophical stream of existentialism is then discussed in its application 
to PA: most notably, the profiling of the figure of the ‘Existentialist Public 
Administrator’. The chapter then turns to key ontological topics like the notion 
of time and the notion (technically called ‘transcendental disjunction’) of the 
contraposition ‘necessity–possibility’, and their significance for the ways in 
which we study and understand PA; some reflections on the significance of 
metaphysical contingency and ontologies of possibility (as opposed to ontol-
ogies of necessity) are presented. Finally, in a most classic ‘last but not least’, 
we turn to considerations about human nature and what this may mean for PA, 
notably by delving into the issue of (alternative or complementary) concep-
tions of human nature and how they may inform understandings of PA, a topic 
which is situated in-between ontology and political philosophy and thence also 
furnishes a bridge to the subsequent Chapter 5 (as well as to later chapters: 
the actuality of Machiavelli is in fact manifest here too, since the Florentine 
writer forcefully argued about the immutability of human nature and its signif-
icance for underpinning any claims about the very possibility of learning from 
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history, with significant implications for any philosophy of knowledge in the 
humanities and the social sciences, which we discuss in Chapter 6, as well as 
for better appreciating Machiavelli’s ever-valid teachings, which we explore 
further in Chapter 7).
KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT
Like for much of modern philosophy, the thought of Immanuel Kant represents 
a consolidated and well-grounded starting point. Normatively, the foundation 
of morality and ethics in the rational human subject attempted by Kant aims at 
providing a universalistic foundation to practical behaviour driven by values: 
a notion generally indicated with the Greek word praxis, which denotes pur-
poseful action, action shaped by values and sense of direction, the performance 
of an activity that has moral significance.
This foundation to practical behaviour takes the form of moral law or cat-
egorical imperatives guiding the behaviour of each and every human being. 
Epistemologically, the knowability of phenomena grounded in the very ration-
ality that constitutes the human being furnishes grounding for the possibility of 
a limited yet founded scientific knowledge that can guide collective behaviour. 
Although the political philosophy of Kant is a relatively limited area (but we 
notice that Kant did a very important foray into public, and notably global, 
governance by making an attempt to outline a system of global governance 
capable of going beyond the then consolidating Westphalian order: he did it 
in the essay On Perpetual Peace, 1795, often seen as a philosophical inspi-
ration behind the establishment in the 20th century of the League of Nations 
and, subsequently, the United Nations) and his general philosophy does not 
prescribe per se how to build a competent and accountable (Rainey, 2003) 
system of public governance, it does provide the grounding for argumentation 
about the criteria and the foundations that such a system might have, by fur-
nishing the underpinning about what is knowable and what is moral for each 
and every member of the political community. The road from the principle 
of moral law as Kant formulated it – ‘act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never 
simply as means, but always at the same time as end’ – to any design prescrip-
tion about public governance is a long one, and yet a foundational criterion 
is provided against which to normatively assess any governance system (i.e. 
public governance systems must be designed and effected in such ways to 
always treat humanity in every person never only as means but also always as 
an end); analogously, knowledge of phenomena is grounded in reason in the 
Kantian philosophical system, and hence he furnishes a foundation for any 
knowledge claim about social and public phenomena; ultimately, the human 
being, in the philosophy of Kant, is equipped with both the capacity to know 
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and the capacity to act morally. In this sense, any attempt to provide grounding 
to ethics – and notably for the purpose of our book ethical behaviour in the 
public service – cannot renounce confronting itself with Kant’s attempt to an 
‘absolute’ foundation of moral behaviour (see, for example, Lynch and Lynch, 
2006, pp. 71–2 in particular): treat the humanity in your person and any other 
person always as an end and never only as means – the kingdom of ends. This 
philosophical underpinning endows the public administrator in the administer-
ing of public powers with an overarching criterion against which to gauge her/
his course of action.1
The foundation of morality in Kant has been challenged in innumerable 
ways; possibly the loudest one is that which takes a relativist slant and argues 
about the impossibility of any absolute and universalistic foundation of 
morality. However, criticisms have also come from altogether different phil-
osophical angles. In fact a powerful challenge to the Kantian assumption that 
moral behaviour and considerations of interest and advantage must be entirely 
distinct, notably when it comes to issues of foundation of public governance, 
comes from a philosopher active over two millennia before: Plato. As aptly 
summed up by Bird (2006), if complying with morality does literally nothing 
to promote anyone’s interests, or actually works against them, then this 
poses a problem for the legitimacy of a political system: even if it complies 
with criteria of morality, if a political system does nothing for promoting the 
well-being of its members, what is its rationale, its raison d’être? We return to 
this point in Chapter 5.
A philosophical approach that ‘dissolves’ the Kantian moral subject into 
‘impersonal’ structures is the philosophical movement of structuralism. We 
turn to this topic in the next section, before delving into the issue of how to 
combine individual agency (epitomised in the Kantian subject) with social 
structures in the subsequent section, devoted to discussing more at large the 
topic of social ontology.
STRUCTURALISM AND PA
Structuralism is a philosophical approach that puts at the heart the analysis 
of social structures, notably those deeper, universal and immutable structures 
which (according to this approach) characterise societies across time and 
space. As discussed when introducing this movement (see Chapter 3), it is 
more an emphasis and a focus of analysis than a philosophical system stricto 
sensu, at least if decoupled from the highly problematic philosophical assertion 
that ‘structures explain everything’, that is, that the human and the social, the 
‘I’ and self-consciousness can be entirely dissolved into deeper structural 
influences. Social structures, in this strong sense, must be distinguished from 
institutions. Differently from institutions, structures are not man-made (human 
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products) – they somehow pre-exist or at least are not amenable to deliberate 
design; instead, they constitute the bases on which deliberately designed social 
interventions may be engineered (at least to the extent that structures enable 
rather than constrain individual freedom – as we have seen, in the perspective 
of structuralism, individual agency tends to be disparaged).
Structuralism has been employed in various strands in the social sciences, 
like the field of communications studies, but (to our knowledge) very limitedly 
if at all in PA. If we ask the question ‘to what extent are the findings of structur-
alism and the analyses of social structures taken into account in PA studies?’, 
the direct answer seems to be ‘very limitedly’. This may be due to a number 
of reasons: possibly because social scientists operating within a structuralism 
frame are not interested in PA, and/or complementarily because PA scholars 
are not trained in the kind of analyses carried out in structuralism; or possibly 
PA scholars have deliberately rejected the kind of social determinism which 
seems to be entailed by structuralism, that leaves so small room – if at all – 
for human agency and deliberation. Moreover, structural factors may well be 
reckoned by PA scholars as but one set of explanatory factors, perhaps likened 
to environmental factors, which can be set alongside functional and cultural 
factors (to stick to a quite common way of framing ‘explanatory factors’ in the 
analysis of public organisations, see Christensen et al., 2007; Christensen and 
Laegreid, 2018). Thus, it is possibly the recognition of the limits of structur-
alism by PA scholars to have driven it out almost entirely (to our knowledge) 
from the field of PA.
However, it would be inappropriate to dispense with structuralism lightly. 
In fact, it might be argued that, to the extent these limitations are taken into 
account (and this means notably that alternative categories of factors are 
weighed in, individual agency is given its proper room, institutions are not 
dissolved into structures but rather considered as human artefacts that survive 
their initial creators and have enduring effects on society), the analyses 
of societal structures worked out in studies in this stream may be a useful 
addition to the field of PA. They may also improve our understanding of 
political–administrative institutions in relation to social structures. They may 
enhance our understanding of individual agency, especially where agency is 
seen contextually as ‘being empowered to do something in particular’ rather 
than as a property of human beings (Clarke, 2013, p. 32), and hence the anal-
ysis of structures may be a way to further shed light on what are context and 
contextual influences (Pollitt, 2013), notably by enabling to better distinguish 
those features that are universal and immutable across societies – hence 
a-contextual, as they are a permanent and universalistic trait – from those that 
are mutable and context-dependent proper. In sum, there seems to be room for 
some, probably overall limited yet significant, introduction and diffusion of 
structural(ist) analyses into the field of PA.
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The key issue with structuralism – and the root of the scepticism by PA 
scholars towards this approach – lies in the suffix ‘-ism’: whether all can be 
dissolved into deeper structures is an ontological position at odds with any 
philosophy claiming individual agency – human freedom – is real. If we take 
the ‘soft’ version of structuralism: the emphasis on investigating social struc-
tures – then we have a philosophical movement which has contributed and can 
continue to contribute to querying the explanatory power of social structures: 
an issue which underlies not just sociology (in itself a contributing discipline to 
PA), but the social sciences more broadly (and thence PA an interdisciplinary 
field drawing on a range of social sciences).
We have noticed in the treatment of structuralism the ontological assump-
tion about social structures pre-existing human action and underpinning 
it – and not being man-made. This philosophical point is contested by other 
authors engaged in efforts to elaborate an understanding of social structures 
from different ontological perspectives. It is then appropriate to devote our 
attention closer to the notion of social structure (here more loosely defined 
than in structuralism, e.g. – following Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 86 – by defining 
a social structure as ‘the causal powers of a specific social group’, a group 
of interacting social individuals, possibly including social norms or social 
positions), and the related philosophical debate about social ontology, whose 
roots may be traced also to a philosopher who put centre stage the notion of the 
man-made (made by the human beings) world: Gianbattista Vico (Chapter 3).
SOCIAL ONTOLOGY
We have seen in Chapter 3 the original contribution of the Neapolitan philos-
opher Gianbattista Vico, who famously stated the verum factum principle, that 
is, that truth is made, by which (in a nutshell) he referred to the idea that, being 
the social world man-made, it is for this reason also the part of the world that 
we can know better. Hence, contrarily to what seems to be nowadays common 
wisdom about the natural sciences setting the paradigmatic form of knowledge 
that trailblazes, and the social sciences being urged to follow in the trail, Vico 
(see Chapter 3) argued that we can attain better, and indeed potentially full 
knowledge, only of the human world (and not of the natural world), because 
it is the only world of which we can trace the causes for the very reason that 
it has ultimately been made (been laid down) by humans, throughout the 
history of civilisations. For this ontological reasons, knowledge of society 
(as the human-made world) can be attained through multiple means, thereby 
including imagination, speculation, and pure reasoning – alongside empirical 
observation and analysis.
In Vico’s thought it may also be traced the foundations of the field of social 
ontology, a notion which only recently has acquired wider currency and has 
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become an area of active inquiry. In a nutshell, social ontology may be seen 
as a branch of ontology, a regional ontology whose focus is on the nature and 
foundations of social entities: ‘the study of what sort of things exist in the 
social world and how they relate to each other’ (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 4). Its 
focus is on the constituent or essential properties of social entities, and on the 
generative mechanisms that bring about social entities.
Durkheim introduced the notion of social fact and the central question of 
when – under what conditions – a fact is ‘social’ (Durkheim, 1894/1964 and 
1897/1952). He did so also by delving, in a most famous essay, on the nature of 
suicide: by demonstrating the influence of social conditions on even such most 
individual act, that is, the choice of taking one’s own life, Durkheim aimed to 
uncover the ‘reality’ of social facts and their influence – causal power – on 
individuals’ lives. Social entities encompass such entities like: social groups, 
social conventions, customs and habits of a society, social norms, institu-
tions and organisations, social practices, social processes, social structure. 
To complement this definition, it can be defined by contrast, rather than by 
enumeration/illustration, what is non-social: it is considered to be non-social 
the physical, the biological (e.g. the neural activity of the human brain, or the 
genetic make-up of the human body), the psychological, and so forth; so, an act 
of eating together by two or more human beings is social (a social event), the 
act of the stomachs of each of the two individuals digesting the food is not (it 
is a biological event) – although the distinction might not be so clear-cut, and 
conceptually as well as practically it may quite often be problematic to distin-
guish the social from the psychological, for example to assess whether or not 
an act can be attributed the quality of being social (e.g. somebody gesturing to 
offer to shake somebody else’s hand) without the corresponding psychological 
state of the person doing it not being attributed the quality of being social, on 
the ground that the latter is psychological.
A key debate in social ontology is the one framed in the terms of ‘meth-
odological individualism vs holism’: that is, whether social facts (practices, 
events, processes and the like) of any kind can be explained ultimately by 
direct reference to the actions of its constituents, and the ultimate constituents 
of social worlds are individuals, or conversely whether macro-social entities 
carry explanatory power. The question, from a philosophical standpoint, is 
linked to the issue of the ontological status of social structures. We have 
already encountered the (radical) structuralism position whereby social struc-
tures are conceived of as pre-existing and underpinning human action. An 
alternative ontological position posits that social structures ultimately only 
exist within human minds and bodies (a position often associated, e.g. to 
Giddens, 1984), while the position asserting the reality of social structures as 
sui generis entities is often traced back to the work of Durkheim.
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The question whether social structures ultimately exist (at least in some 
sense) only within human individuals, or (again, at least in some sense) 
outside of human individuals, is an ontological question, notably a question 
of that regional branch of ontology which is social ontology (the debate has 
seen leading sociologists being involved, like Giddens 1984; Bourdieu, 1984; 
Archer, 2003). The related question whether social structures hold causal 
power (they may explain social phenomena ‘on their own’), or not, is also an 
ontological question. And – of course – the very nature of individual agency, 
of what is meant when referring to ‘individuals acting socially’, the capacity 
of individual human beings to act socially, is also an ontological question 
evoking the question of what is free will, and what is the scope for individual 
will to be ‘free’ (whether human beings can make choices; whether choices 
humans can make are only circumstantiated and contextualised, or whether 
there is the possibility for human beings to make ‘uncaused’ choices, choices 
unaffected or at least undetermined by social circumstances, although they 
may then bear significance in the subsequent course of action undertaken by 
the individual, which will be socially impactful).
Ultimately, it may be noted that the foundations of social ontology lie in 
ontology tout court. Scholars whose ontology admits the existence of collec-
tive entities beyond the individual minds will tend to accept or even forcefully 
claim the existence of social structures (e.g. in ‘impersonal’ social structures 
like in the Marxian/Marxist tradition, Chapter 3). Scholars whose ontology is 
orientated to place centre stage the individual mind will be inclined to underpin 
social ontology in the individual (see e.g. the contribution of the thought of 
Locke – Chapter 2 – on social ontologies centred on the individual, and the 
ensuing major debate about methodological individualism: for an insightful 
overview, Demeulenaere, 2011).
Certain approaches to social ontology may claim to be based on relatively 
undisputed assumptions, but they are not. For example, theories of emergence 
and the so-called emergentism aim at offering justifications for claims of 
causal efficacy that are often presented under the label of being ‘scientific’ 
whilst ultimately they are – and they can only be – metaphysical. Emergentism 
is a vast philosophical-epistemological-sociological stream of thought whose 
clout encompasses both the natural and the social sciences which is predicated 
on the notion of emergent properties, whereby the whole is more than the sum 
of the parts and it holds a distinctive causal power which the parts separately 
considered do not have. So for example the component parts of a vegetable 
or animal substance do not lose their mechanical and chemical properties as 
separate agents but at the same time, as an aggregate whole, they also acquire 
physiological or vital properties in addition; so for example the cell of a living 
body is more than the chemical components of it, in its distinctive capacity to 
grow and reproduce itself that it possesses only by virtue of its new order (the 
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terms ‘emergence’ was coined in 1875 by G.H. Lewes drawing from a distinc-
tion introduced by John Stuart Mill – see Chapter 3 – between what Mill called 
homopathic and heteropathic laws – Lewes, 1874‒79). A robust and coherent 
argument for emergentism2 to underpin a certain social ontology is worked out 
by Elder-Vass (2010).
Emergentism is at times presented as a relatively self-evident, undisputed 
starting point, but far from that, it is instead predicated on certain metaphys-
ical assumptions, and it is totally incompatible with a range of ontologies 
developed throughout the centuries. For example, the claim that the mental is 
an emergent property of the biological, which in turn is an emergent property 
of the physical-chemical, is at times presented as plainly evident, whilst it is 
profoundly contested and an entirely metaphysical assertion. Let’s take the 
following claim that ‘mental phenomena, both when we are conscious of them 
and when we are not, are somehow produced by the networks of neurons 
that make up a large part of our brains’ (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 90). Thought 
is produced by the brain! This assertion is presented as evident – and it may 
look like this for the ordinary man or woman of the 21st century accustomed 
to bowing before ‘science’ and any claim which is presented as ‘scientific’ 
(meaning it is upheld by the current state of the art of knowledge in the natural 
sciences) – but it is utterly metaphysical, and far from being ‘evident’. Let’s 
take the philosophical perspective of Kant or of idealism (in this aligned): from 
this perspective, the oft-heard assertions like the one above that thought is the 
product of the brain, and related statements ‘the newly developing sciences of 
the brain will help us to answer [the mind/body question that has preoccupied 
philosophers since Descartes]’ (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 90) are total nonsense: 
thinking is being, and brains do not think (active form of the verb), rather they 
are thought (passive form). For Kant and the Idealists (Chapter 3), like for 
Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato and Plotinus, thinking and thought come first, 
and the horizon of being is the horizon of thought, an understanding of things 
for which we are indebted to the ancient Greeks (Chapter 2) – and the brain and 
the neurons are objects of intellection, if they are to be (to exist) at all. What is 
disconcerting here is not the taking of a philosophical stance, but the ignorance 
of the metaphysics on which it relies, and the ontologies that it pretends to 
sweep away without even noticing!
Also the reference in passing to Descartes is misleading: Descartes grounded 
its metaphysics on the assertion that the material (res extensa, literally, ‘the 
extended thing’, the thing whose defining property is to have an extension) and 
the mental (res cogitans, literally ‘the thinking thing’, the thinking substance,) 
are two diverse substances: they, so to speak, belong to parallel ontological 
orders, hence it cannot be claimed that one ‘produces’ the other; indeed other 
philosophers even posed all causal power only in God, treating mutual influ-
ences between substances as at most occasional causes, like in the philosophy 
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:35:06AM
via free access
Ontological perspectives and PA doctrines and themes 137
of occasionalism of Malebranche (for more on the philosophy of Descartes 
and Malebranche, see Chapter 2). Other philosophers, like Spinoza (Chapter 2) 
even claimed (metaphysically) that there are infinite modes of being, of which 
the material and the thinking are but two; in fact, for Spinoza the res cogitans 
and res extensa are just two out of infinite attributes of God-Being (God as 
the totality of being). And still other giants of metaphysics, like Leibniz, have 
wrought out metaphysical systems totally incompatible with emergentism: 
for Leibniz (Chapter 2), reality is made of whole things (monads, see Chapter 
2): thus, a human being is not made by the cells, molecules and atoms that 
compose her/him at a given moment (contra to emergentism); for Leibniz, 
a human being and a cell are two different objects of intellection, and as such 
they co-exist next to one another, harmonised by God, rather than ‘composing’ 
one another in relations of parts and wholes. As the reader will have noticed, 
seen from the vertiginous perspective of metaphysical thinking, how problem-
atic apparently unproblematic claims that ‘thought is produced by the brain’ 
look!
This is not to say that we do not recognise that emergentism is an impor-
tant strand in the contemporary philosophy of both the natural and the social 
sciences – contributing amongst other to complexity theory – yet what we 
highlight is the lack of philosophical consideration about the ultimate ontologi-
cal groundings of a(ny) social theory. Social ontology ultimately is based upon 
and relies on ontology as such (social ontologies are grounded in the general 
ontology of the philosophy – philosopher or philosophical stream – on which 
they are built), and ontological considerations have to be treated seriously 
and explicitly, on their full terms, if social theories are to be provided of their 
underpinnings.
Based on these premises, philosophy for PA has to engage with social ontol-
ogy as a field of inquiry, given PA is a social entity and partakes of society. So 
for example social ontological approaches to conceiving of ‘institutions’ and 
‘organisations’ as complex social structures that hold causal power beyond 
those held by ‘simpler’ norm circles is a major contribution that PA can tap 
from social ontological thinking, given institutions and organisations, and 
notably public institutions and organisations, are a central object of inquiry 
of PA studies (in Simmel’s terminology – Simmel, 1955 – an example of 
a norm circle is the one dictating to individuals in certain societies that ‘when 
you meet somebody, you have to shake their right hand’; the point here is that 
the properties of normative institution to wield influence on what is ‘appro-
priate’ behaviour for individuals, or the properties of organisations to hold 
causal power by virtue of their capacity to provide coordination of individual 
behaviours, go beyond those of norm circles, and therefore digging into the 
social-ontological underpinnings of those additional causal powers – as 
Elder-Vaas, 2010, Chapters 6 and 7 does – contributes to an enhanced under-
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standing of how public institutions and organisation affect social systems). PA 
may benefit from the findings of social ontology, notably where this branch of 
knowledge sheds light on essential properties of social entities, like institutions 
and organisations, of specific significance for PA themes and problems.
Another key author who – amongst many other influences – can also be 
seen as lying at the roots of social ontology, and whose thought we have not 
yet explored in relation to the advancement of the field of PA, is Karl Marx.
NEO-MARXISM AND GRAMSCI
In Chapter 3 we briefly outlined some elements of Marxian thought. These 
include, alongside the notions of alienation and class conflict, the perspective 
of dialectical materialism, according to which history proceeds through contra-
dictions, that is, struggle, of conflicting poles (thesis and antithesis), operating 
primarily at the level of economic structures, that are solved into superior 
syntheses. We have also dwelt on the limits in terms of forecasting power 
of Marxism and Marxian thought, whose predictions simply did not materi-
alise. In particular, we dwelt on the limits of deterministic, linear causality 
proceeding from the economic to the meta-economic, noticing the interesting 
interpretation of Marxism provided by the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci, 
who elaborated an original synthesis of Machiavelli’s thought about the role 
of the political party as the modern ‘Prince’ with a two-way interpretation as 
reciprocal influence of the economic and the meta-economic, noticing how 
the grasp of power for the political party passes through shaping the dominant 
values in the pertinent jurisdiction: conquering civil society to then conquer 
the office of government and the state apparatus, although the state apparatus 
may also be targeted selectively in order to wield influence over society: we 
saw in Chapter 3 the case of the Italian Communist Party attempting to hold 
sway over the public education apparatus to inform pupils’ values, and using 
the work of the so-called ‘organic intellectuals’ as means to infuse and inform 
societal values. The general point to be made out of this example is that the 
bureaucratic apparatus of the state can also, always, be seen as a powerful 
instrument that can be put to the service of specific, partisan interests, and 
ultimately as an instrument in the pursuit of power, or for the retention of it, 
if the actors intending to use instrumentally the bureaucracy are already in 
power. The Weberian ideal-typical conception of the administration as neutral 
and subject only to the law (see Chapters 3 and 8) can be, and to some extent 
will always be, aspirational, but cannot dispel the alternative, however gloom-
ier, vision of it as, potentially at least, instrumental to specific interests (see 
Arellano-Gault, 2020, for a detailed discussion).
We may now question: what does Gramsci’s thought have to say for now-
adays discussions of public governance? A major work of translation and 
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reinterpretation is necessary, inter alia to incorporate the effects of globalisa-
tion processes which were simply out of the picture of Gramsci’s reflection. 
However, lineages, or at least parallels, may be drawn with later approaches 
that enjoy wide currency in contemporary debates. We here hint at a few of 
these. First, studies on the links between neo-liberal agendas and the diffusion 
of the New Public Management (NPM). The argument has been put forward 
that global capitalism requires independent regulatory institutions for creating 
trust in markets: these represent a key element in NPM recipes for reforming 
the public sector, hence, the argument goes, NPM doctrines are aligned to, 
or even originate from, the interests of organised global capitalism (Roberts, 
2010). More broadly, studies have pointed out the links between NPM and the 
neo-liberal ideology, with some seeing the former as a product of the latter. 
Although studies like Roberts (2010) draw from different theoretical sources 
than Marxism, there is a flavour of Marxian acumen in dissecting societal 
forces and reading complex phenomena through the analysis of the economic 
processes and notably the lens of the struggle for the control of resources. 
More specifically, there seems to be much of Gramsci’s original interpretation 
and acuity in reading the doctrines that come to be propounded globally (in our 
nowadays globalised world) as being at least partly manufactured by economic 
interests striving to achieve cultural dominance as an instrument to shape 
the common wisdom and way of thinking (in our case, of the way in which 
the public sector should be organised) in order to advance their own agenda 
and priorities. The public discourse about the way in which the public sector 
should be organised is not an immaculate terrain where free thinkers debate 
about the best possible conceivable solutions to common good problems, but 
rather a battleground in which organised interests (which in Gramsci were rep-
resented by the political party as the modern Machiavellian Prince) are active 
alongside free thinkers, and seek to advance their own agenda by achieving 
dominance in the shared values, locally or more often globally, and hence to 
shape the organisational form of the public sector in order to most expand their 
clout. Gramsci reminds us that the search for ideological domination (which 
we independent scholars see as a danger) may be part and parcel of contem-
porary public management doctrinal debate (indeed, Gramsci probably would 
have been a perpetrator of such attempts to ideological domination, were he 
active today).
This line of intellectual inquiry brings us back to re-considering how power 
be quintessential to public governance and any understanding of its dynamics. 
Power in its basic definition as ‘the capacity of A to make B do what A wants’ 
as well as in more elaborate interpretations of it. What is especially salient for 
PA studies is that administrative apparatuses are part and parcel of any power 
struggle among organised groups (political parties or others, like organised 
forms of representation of labour – like the trade unions – or of capital).
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Gramscian thought also chimes, perhaps unexpectedly, very well with 
contemporary, in vogue approaches to public governance like ‘governmental-
ity’ (originally elaborated by the French philosopher Foucault; and recently 
critically discussed for applications to public management, see Ferlie and 
McGivern, 2014; Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015, Chapter 3) or ‘metagovernance’ 
(e.g. Baker, 2015), which share the basic guiding idea that ‘making people 
think in such a way that they will behave according to the desiderata of the 
actors in power’ is a very powerful instrument indeed (this is an idea which 
dates back to the very first attempts to establish ‘successful’ political regimes 
since the origin of humankind, but on which authors such as Gramsci provided 
further original elaborations and interpretations). It seems that taking stock of 
the bequest of the Marxian apparatus, notably in the elaboration worked out by 
Gramsci, for the field of PA is a fruitful task yet to be accomplished – although 
this is an assignment for other books, by other authors.
From structures and collective entities like political parties we now turn to 
the individual in the most fundamental metaphysical sense.
THE EXISTENTIALIST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR
Although the origins of the movement have to be found in the German phi-
losophers Heidegger and Jaspers, existentialism was popularised particularly 
by the works of Jean-Paul Sartre. ‘Existentialist philosophy was the rage on 
college campuses and intellectual circles during the 1960 and 1970s’ (Waugh, 
2006, p. 511) in the US as well as in France and elsewhere, at least in the 
‘Western world’. The key notion of ‘caring’ was brought to bear significance, 
notably on the shoulders of the public administrator who in this perspective 
should take responsibility over and beyond her/his tasks and duties strictly 
defined, in order to address the pressing issues of the day (Richter, 1970). The 
philosophical roots and justification for this approach are to be found in the 
notion of ‘caring’ as constitutive dimension of human existence, as well as in 
the very conception of existence as ‘project’ and projection towards the future, 
which are distinctive traits of existentialist philosophy – an authentic life is 
a life that cares (see Chapter 3). Based on these philosophical notions, the 
freedom to act of public administrators was evoked and invoked, and public 
administrators – tenured officials – were encouraged to embark in a call to 
address urgent societal needs that entailed some form of political activism. 
The argument was that ‘bureaucrats, as they gain more and more knowledge 
of cause–effect relationships and how that knowledge might be applied, have 
a social obligation to exercise their free will in the public interest’ (Waugh, 
2006, p. 514, emphasis in original). The backdrop was the ample evidence – at 
least in the US debate – that administrators of the time were quite often not 
free to use their own judgement, even when remedial actions to clearly per-
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ceived policy failures were widely evident. Indeed, whistle-blowers often paid 
dearly for their behaviour, and frustration about the apparent unwillingness of 
top officials to correct programmatic deficiencies, even when solutions were 
known and available, was the fuel underlying this call to a different role for 
public administrators (a call which is continuing to be evoked, for example by 
O’Leary, 2020).
These circumstances seemed to point out that authentic organisations 
sensitive to the true essence of reality were possible (Waugh, 2006, p. 515) 
and could be effected by the commitment of public administrators engaging 
in the authentic life (and professional life is part and parcel of life tout court) 
that existentialism envisages. It was a ‘call to act’ grounded in the existen-
tialist philosophy, driven by a possibility to know reality beyond ‘technical’ 
value-neutral tools of administration, a kind of knowledge grounded in phe-
nomenology (see Chapter 3 for an overview, and Chapter 6 for applications 
to the field of PA). This call left a mark on the first Minnowbrook conference 
on the state of the art of PA, which occurred in 1968 (Marini, 1971), as well 
as on the conception of the ‘new public administration’ as later elaborated and 
systematised by Frederickson (1980). These influences may also be found in 
the later works of Dwight Waldo, who played a key role in the organisation of 
the Minnowbrook conference, and in the scientific production, inter alia, of 
Robert Denhardt and Maria Aristigueta.
An interesting and original perspective to public governance, shifting the 
emphasis from the administrator (as in earlier applications of existentialism to 
PA) to the citizen, is developed by Jun (2006). He aims at elaborating a sophis-
ticated synthesis of existentialism with the perspectives of hermeneutics and 
phenomenology, blended with ethnomethodology, post-modern thinking and 
critical theory. Jun (2006) is probably one of the most effective spearheads of 
the relativist school in PA – to which the author adds insightful analyses of the 
influence of administrative cultures across Eastern Asia (mainly South Korea 
and Japan) and the West (mainly the US), respectively the places where he 
grew up and where he spent his professional life. The work has a value-driven 
and normative tone – as appropriately declared by the author at the outset ‘My 
approaches can be characterized as self-consciously value-laden and norma-
tive, rather than nominally value free and descriptive’, and this is surely a man-
ifesto of the opposition to Neo-Positivistic approaches, which is a key trait 
of the interpretivist and constructivist school. A tenet of his approach is the 
active involvement of citizens in promoting public values, and his book aims 
at outlining a process for the social construction of public administration in 
a democratic context – the social construction of a democratic public adminis-
tration where employee participation, citizen involvement, empowerment and 
consultation are centre stage, not just as outcome but in the dialectical process 
of construing a public administration and an administrative theory in which 
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the emphasis is on public in the administrative process. Jun’s perspective is 
as much interested in the ‘existentialist citizen’ as it is in the existentialist 
administrator. He advocates a social design approach that encompasses both 
the general public and the governmental sides of public administration. Social 
design is intended as an evolutionary, developmental, integrative process that 
should contribute to the construction of shared realities (or intersubjectivities), 
leading to a process of invention, evolution and self-governance (Jun, 2006, 
Chapter 4, p. 83 in particular) in order to improve democratic governance 
without sacrificing the unique individuality or autonomy of each person, and 
changing organisations by relating the organisation and the individual, the 
administration and citizens (p. 258) – although it is not always crystal clear 
what is the difference between the advocated novelty of ‘social design’ so 
intended and participatory approaches to public governance. Although Jun’s 
work probably fits the post-modern thinking more than existentialism, his 
original work is a worthy contribution emphasising the citizens’ side of public 
governance, a contribution which highlights the enduring influence of existen-
tialism in the field of PA. Revisiting existentialism may thus equip with novel 
perspectives about the responsibility of the public administrator and the citizen 
in public governance, and may represent a valuable viewpoint from which to 
look at issues of public ethics and the relationship between citizens and public 
administrators.
However, the existentialist perspective must deal with the key issue of the 
foundations of public accountability: to what extent active responsibility by 
the public official, as far as becoming political activism, is compatible with 
being held accountable to the public (Bovens et al., 2014)? This issue was 
present in the debate in the early 1970s, when it was questioned whether such 
activism by public administrators would meet the conventional democratic 
test of administrative responsibility; the counterargument was, and is, that 
not using expertise and experience to address socio-economic problems was 
both unprofessional and poor citizenship (Waugh, 2006, p. 523). But the issue 
remains, possibly exacerbated in constitutional frameworks other than the US. 
It may be argued, notably, that Weberian (and Neo-Weberian) conceptions of 
bureaucracy, fundamental in PA theory and widely diffused across continental 
Europe (Rosser, 2018), set up a system of public accountability that may be 
ultimately at odds with the existentialist perspective of the active, engaged 
public official: what are the criteria for holding activist public officials to 
account? How is bureaucratic impartiality (a principle inscribed in the consti-
tution of many countries) compatible with behaviours that trespass into politi-
cal activism by tenured officials? These are tough questions that remain to be 
addressed in an existentialist perspective, and the warnings about the dangers 
of personal passions in public services formulated by Paul du Gay remain in all 
their actuality (du Gay, 2000).
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Whatever the appraisal that may be given of the dilemmas of public accounta-
bility and responsibility in public administration elicited by existentialism, this 
philosophical school provides a powerful reminder that public organisations 
and administrative action are ultimately made by free individuals. Bureaucrats 
and all those wielding responsibility for public services and the public good, 
elected and tenured officials, policy entrepreneurs or simply engaged citizens, 
are persons existentially involved and engaged, operating in circumstances 
that place huge demands on them, also because of the very nature of public 
services which often deal with issues of the meaning of life vis-à-vis death (the 
consciousness of death as defining existence is a key tenet of existentialism, 
see Chapter 3) – one can think of healthcare professionals, or professionals in 
the sectors of homeland security or defence whose jobs are inherently about 
others’ lives, either because they cure or because they may be demanded to end 
somebody else’s life. It is also a reminder that human existence is never ‘an 
object amongst other objects’, but rather constitutively a projection towards 
the future, a project that can be characterised as (in Heidegger’s terminology) 
‘being-in-the-world’ and ‘being-with-the-others’, and hence caring for the 
others is a defining trait of each and every human existence. This consideration 
brings with it a perspective irreducible to any simplification of human behav-
iour in a public setting as responding only to logics of utility maximisation, or 
to neutral-impersonal rule following, or to habit-following. Existentialist phil-
osophical thought is for scholars and practitioners alike a powerful reminder 
that the globally human, existential dimension of the practice of PA irreducibly 
transcends any modelling or simplification; existentialism reminds us of the 
practice of PA as praxis: an activity that has moral significance and that in the 
original usage of the term by Aristotle meant notably a special kind of human 
activity, the life of the citizen devoted to the political. Stylised models may be 
of aid for highlighting specific relations between phenomena that may support 
administrative action, but it is not possible to reduce human agency – and 
human agency in public services – to those stylised behaviours.
HISTORICISM AND PA
So far in this chapter we have scarcely devoted attention to time, history and 
the historical perspective in explaining reality. In Chapter 3 we examined the 
thought of scholars like Gianbattista Vico, Wilhelm Dilthey and Wilhelm 
Windelband, and we reckoned the significance of the conceptual tools they 
provided contemporary social scientists with. These conceptual tools include 
Windelband’s distinction between nomothetic and idiographic accounts and 
the enduring significance of the latter for the social sciences and for public gov-
ernance and administration. It also includes Dilthey’s notion of the ‘sciences of 
the spirit’ as distinguished from the natural sciences and characterised by the 
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fact that what they study are expressions of human life. We therefore noticed 
that the investigator, him/herself a living being, is in a sense identical to the 
object of the process of knowing, which is the life historically lived by other 
humans who by means of their collective action effected historical events (the 
spirit in action), concluding that the sciences of the spirit may in a sense lead 
to a deeper knowledge than what is enabled by the natural sciences. This line 
of argumentation had already been anticipated by Vico’s verum factum prin-
ciple (whose literal sense is that ‘truth is made’), meaning that we can attain 
a fuller knowledge of the human world than of the natural world because for 
the former we can trace the causes not just by empirical investigation but also 
by means of imagination, speculation, pure reasoning, for the very reason of 
the commonality of nature between those who made and those who behold the 
human world, that is, human beings. The human world is, in the deepest sense, 
‘historical’.
In contemporary PA scholarship there are manifold ways in which ‘history’ 
is made to weigh in in explaining administrative phenomena. A large commu-
nity of scholars work widely in the theoretical perspective of historical new 
institutionalism (Peters, 1999/2005) – scholars like, to mention but a few, 
Bezes (2009), Kickert (2011a, 2011b), Ongaro (2009, 2011, 2013), Parrado 
(2008), Spanou and Sotiropoulos, 2011, Di Mascio et al. (2013, 2017). At 
another level, Raadschelders (2000) and Rugge (2006), amongst others, have 
delved into the significance of historiography for public administration, and 
produced interesting accounts on various profiles of administrative history. 
Pollitt and Bouckaert have dedicated two books to navigating ‘timeship’ 
(Pollitt, 2008; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009). From partly different epistemo-
logical premises, Asquer, Barzelay, Gallego, Mele and others have advocated 
‘processual institutionalism’ as a methodological approach to the study of 
public management (Asquer and Mele, 2018; Barzelay and Gallego, 2006, 
2010; also Ongaro, 2006), centred on a radical historicism (namely, that 
knowledge can be attained only of historical episodes in their historical 
context) which is close to philosophical historicism stricto sensu (whereby 
being only reveals itself in history, over time, and there is no knowability of 
things beyond their happening in time).
These are all significant examples of the manifold dimensions along which 
‘history’ and ‘time’ are brought into the field of PA. However, there seems 
to be some reticence even in the PA scholars most attentive to the historical 
dimension to further explore the implications of the philosophical thought of 
Vico, Dilthey and Windelband and explicitly make the argument about the 
distinctive nature of the study of ‘the world made by humans’ as contrasted 
to the study of the natural world, and about the kind of knowledge that can be 
attained by the investigator, her/himself human, through investigation of the 
unfolding of human action in history; recalling the illuminating citation from 
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Vico mentioned in Chapter 3: ‘the civil world has certainly been made by 
humans, and it is for this reason that it is possible, and we must, discover its 
principles within the modifications of our own human mind’ (The First New 
Science, 1725 at: http:// www .historyguide .org/ intellect/ new _science .html). 
A dialogue between the PA scholarship most heedful to the historical dimen-
sion and philosophical historicism might prove fruitful for the advancement of 
PA (and might possibly also offer novel, interesting and possibly challenging 
material to professional philosophers in this stream).
There is, of course, a major philosophical theme underlying any debate on 
history and historicism – the key topic of the philosophical foundations of the 
very notion of time. It is to this topic we now turn.
TIME IN THE STUDY AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION
A limited but very significant stream of works, notably by Christopher Pollitt 
and Geert Bouckaert (Pollitt, 2008; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009; Bouckaert, 
2007), have addressed the theme of how the temporal perspective is treated in 
public management and policy. Pollitt (2008) proposes a frame for navigating 
‘timeship’, tackling inter alia the crucial issue of the appropriate time horizon 
to be adopted for the proper understanding of administrative phenomena. 
Bouckaert (2007) has delved into manifold cultural conceptions of time and 
how they affect public administration and management (whereby, e.g. certain 
culturally construed notions of time define it as ‘linear’, evolving from a begin-
ning to an end, or at least moving from a neatly distinguished ‘before’ to 
a sequence of ‘afters’; other notions of time conceive of it as circular, returning 
to the same, or similar, point after having effected a cycle; other conceptions 
of time separate neatly the spheres of the past, the present and the future, while 
others consider past, present and future as at least partly overlapping; and so 
forth). The specific take to the topic that this book deploys is that of consid-
ering the implications for public administration studies of revisiting certain 
foundational issues lying in the very notion of ‘time’ as it has been debated in 
philosophical thought.
The French philosopher Henri Bergson famously introduced the distinction 
between the ‘spatialised’ time of physics and time as duration, the latter being 
the time of life, according to his line of argumentation. In the Bergsonian 
perspective (see Chapter 3), the past is conserved and kept in its entirety into 
the present: time is the tissue of which each living being is made, as is the 
universe as a whole, although not inanimate portions of it (Bergson, 2005). 
Life for Bergson (like for Heidegger in this respect, although within a different 
philosophy) is continued projection towards the future by plunging oneself 
into the present, and accumulating progressively every instant of the lived 
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life into our past, like a snowball that continuously grows along the way and 
conserves in itself the totality of the snow that it has encountered. This is the 
time people live, according to Bergson. If we accept this ontology of time, then 
it follows that this is the real, lived time of public administrators at all levels, 
as probably most ethno-methodologists, and more widely students employ-
ing techniques fit for reaching out in a more holistic way to administrative 
phenomena, would acknowledge. Such distinctions, indeed contrast, between 
the ‘spatialised time’ of social phenomena when they are studied ‘from the 
outside’ and the lived time as duration when plunging into social phenomena, 
has been widely employed in many domains across the social sciences (e.g. in 
communications studies, see Kember and Zylinska, 2012), but yet its potential 
has so far not been reckoned (at least to this author’s knowledge) in discus-
sions about change and continuity in public administration and governance; at 
the very least, this attention to the notion of time adopted is not made explicit 
and mainstreamed as a methodological point in the vast majority of the works 
in the field of PA. However, it is tautological to state that the time of life is 
the one practitioners experience in acting (administering), and hence it may be 
queried – on the foundational, ontological ground of the underlying conception 
of time – the kind of fit currently existing between the knowledge supplied by 
the PA scholarly community and the demand for employable knowledge by 
those practising public administration. Part of the often-evoked misfit between 
scholarly knowledge on offer and the knowledge demanded by practitioners 
may also possibly lie in the implicit underlying conception of time employed 
by the two groups respectively in the creation and usage of such knowledge.
A philosophical perspective of central significance for any analytical 
frame in which the past bears explanatory power is the dialectic approach, 
famously associated with the great German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel (see 
Chapter 3). In this perspective, the thesis and the negation of it (antithesis) 
do not annul each other, but rather they are synthesised dynamically (that is, 
over time) in a superior unity of the opposite determinations, in which they 
both continue to live, albeit transcended in their initial reality. A dialectical 
process being in operation has sometimes been evoked in longitudinal studies 
in public policy and management. The debates on ‘the trajectories of public 
management reform’ (nourished by seminal works like Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2000, 2017) is one sheer example, notably when they introduce the model of 
the Neo-Weberian State (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, 2000/2011; Drechsler 
and Kattel, 2008; see also Ongaro, 2009, Chapter 7), which – we suggest – 
implies the thesis–antithesis–synthesis logic that is predicated of the dialectical 
method for analysing historical progress: the thesis is the Weberian model, the 
antithesis is the managerial model, and the Neo-Weberian model is the synthe-
sis (albeit ‘progress’ is here detached from the inherent determinism, driven by 
a logic of necessity, that can be found in Hegel, as well as in significant por-
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tions of the philosophical stream of historicism). In short, a Hegelian concep-
tion of time may be deemed to underpin explanations of public management 
reform trajectories pointing to a Neo-Weberian synthesis. In Hegel’s dialecti-
cal perspective, after one pole and its contradiction (thesis and antithesis) have 
occurred, history is no more the same. Evolution of history, for Hegel, is like 
a helix: there is both circularity in the movement from thesis to synthesis via 
the antithesis and progress or development, an overall ‘trajectory’. For Hegel, 
time constitutes things – it’s not just merely the backdrop against which things 
appear (come to being) and disappear (return to non-being); therefore, after 
having occurred, two poles will not repeat any more, they will not re-present 
themselves identical.
Adopting a dialectical philosophical stance also entails rejecting any model 
of history as the oscillation between two poles: as a continued alternation 
between two poles that recur fundamentally unchanged, a philosophical posi-
tion which brought to the extreme evokes the eternal recurrence of the same 
(which is another philosophical stance with a very long history whose roots 
can be traced back to a stream in ancient Greek philosophy), brought again into 
the philosophical debate of the 20th century by Friedrich Nietzsche (Chapter 
3). Hegel’s philosophical position constitutes a challenge to the extreme posi-
tion of the eternal recurrence of the same but also more generally to ‘pendula 
approaches’ whereby history repeats itself in similar guises. Such pendula 
approaches form part and parcel of much of the common wisdom in PA, as it 
has been shaped by ‘classic’ works, like Simon’s ‘proverbs of administration’ 
(1946) or Hood and Jackson’s administrative arguments (1997). These works 
do not claim that administrative history actually oscillates between poles; 
instead, these studies were pitched at the level of administrative argumenta-
tion, noticing how prescriptions often come in opposite, potentially contradic-
tory pairs (Simon, 1946), or how ‘new’ doctrines on public sector organisation 
may actually embody old positions that show up again in new guises. Based 
on these and other considerations, some studies have taken the longer-term 
perspective and, by means of time series or other techniques, have pursued the 
objective of detecting patterns in administrative doctrines and practices, and 
notably of detecting whether a pattern of alternation between two poles may 
have explanatory power. These are empirical studies, but it may be noticed the 
ontological assumption of the search for such patterns is that one state of affairs 
‘dissolves’ when the pendulum swings, to then ‘reappear’ when the pendulum 
sways back. Although this logical passage may have gone unnoticed, this is not 
an empirical datum but an ontological assumption, and one that runs counter to 
the Hegelian dialectical perspective: for Hegel (and for historicism at large, as 
well as for other philosophies) the passing of time forbids returning to the same 
state of affairs, in the most fundamental sense, because the past is incorporated 
into the present and is constitutive of it.3 In short, helix-like or pendula-like 
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conceptions of administrative change are predicated on different and contrast-
ing ontologies. As argued throughout this book, making such ontologies more 
explicit, and debating their implications also for empirical scholarly work may 
benefit the reach and depth of PA as a scholarly endeavour.
The Hegelian conception of the dialectical evolution of history also poses 
a big question for the foundation of the theoretical perspective of historical 
(new) institutionalism (HI). HI is a theory to explain the enduring influence of 
past choices over contemporary institutions and policies (Peters, 1999/2005; 
for a later review, Ongaro, 2017). The foundational question in HI lies in 
the explanation of causality: why do past choices about the structure and 
processes of government cause present effects? What is the causal foundation 
of path dependency? One theoretical justification for HI is grounded in the 
perspective of the ‘logic of appropriateness’, whereby institutions are deemed 
to shape what is considered appropriate by decision-makers, and hence con-
straining the boundaries of what is considered to be feasible or opportune by 
decision-makers. Another theoretical justification for explaining path depend-
ency lies in rational choice and argues that institutions shape the opportunity 
structure within which decisions are made. But both causal logics presuppose 
that the past is influential because it has produced something that has remained 
and is ‘present’ at the moment the causal effect is produced: institutions 
remain, they continue into existence, and it is their very presence to be the 
causal factor. Without that cause which is ‘present’, no effects would be pro-
duced. This is a widely held assumption in scientific – including social scien-
tific – discourse, yet things might be more complicated.4 The assumption that 
only what is present may have an influence (it may be the cause of something) 
is a specific epistemology based on distinctive philosophical foundations. But 
other philosophers thought differently: Hegel and Bergson, albeit from very 
different angles, both point to the past being influential in a more constitutive 
way: the totality of the past constitutes what we are (what everything is) 
and construes and enables the possibility for individually and collectively 
projecting ourselves towards the future. This applies both to individual lives 
(Bergson) and to broad, collective historical processes (Hegel): the question 
then becomes whether it applies to institutions as well.
In a riposte to those who claimed that ‘the past is dead’, the novelist William 
Faulkner in Requiem for a Nun puts into the mouth of a citizen of the fictional 
city of Jefferson, Mississippi, the following comment: ‘The past is never dead. 
It’s not even past’ (cited in Sansone, 2009, p. xv). Time may matter in a more 
fundamental sense than too often held in scholarly inquiry, and also by those 
who are most heedful to bringing time and the temporal dimension into social 
science explanations (Abbott, 1992a, 1992b; Pettigrew, 1990, 1997; van de 
Ven, 1992, van de Ven and Poole, 1990) and notably in the field of PA (Asquer, 
2012; Barzelay and Campbell, 2003; Barzelay and Gallego, 2010; Bouckaert, 
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2007; Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015; Mele, 2010; Mele and Ongaro, 2014; Ongaro, 
2006; Pettigrew et al., 1992; Pollitt, 2008; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009).
If the totality of the past is conserved, is maintained and shapes the present, 
then this very consideration poses a fundamental challenge to all epistemic 
approaches (and notably for the purposes of this book those applied to studying 
administrative phenomena and public governance) that take the move from the 
apparently innocuous and self-evident assertion that phenomena can be studied 
by setting a system ‘at t = 0’ (or ‘given t = 0’, that is, resetting time to zero), 
because t never equals zero, according to these philosophical perspectives.
Another challenge comes from the conception of time as ecstasy elaborated 
by Heidegger (‘ecstasy’ in the etymological meaning of ‘staying – lying – 
outside of oneself’, see Chapter 3). For Heidegger, the future is projecting 
ourselves towards what will be; the past is stretching ourselves towards a situ-
ation of fact to accept it, and the present is lying outside of oneself to stay next 
to the things. The question thus becomes: what do we ultimately do when we 
study past cases? For Heidegger, more than detecting causal nexuses, we are 
ultimately ‘accepting’ them – which is quite a different stance. What do we 
ultimately do when we ‘draw lessons’ for the future? The drawing of lessons is 
but a part of a broader constitutive, existential dimension of projecting out of 
ourselves, in a Heideggerian perspective. What do we ultimately do when we 
apply knowledge to present situations? For Heidegger, application of knowl-
edge is but a part of the fact we are ‘caring’ for things, we are lying outside of 
ourselves to stay next to the things. The big problem raised by Heidegger is 
that the time of science (both the natural and the social sciences) is inauthentic, 
while the life we live and experience together with the others occurs in the 
authentic time whose tissue is the projecting of the individual existence outside 
of oneself: hence an irremediable gap between the scientific–technological 
knowledge accumulated (in our case, by the administrative sciences) and the 
practice (praxis) of – in our case – administration and administering.
However, to strike a more positive note to end this reflection and look 
towards possible bridges connecting this apparent chasm between philosophi-
cal notions of time and the everyday practice of PA studies, certain approaches 
in PA may be more sensitive than others to this issue. For example, Barzelay 
and Campbell’s treatment of time in the book Preparing for the Future, an 
account of strategic visioning in the US Air Force (Barzelay and Campbell, 
2003), is based on a processualist approach that owes much to such philos-
ophers as Mary Parker Follett (herself a major contributor to organisational 
studies alongside philosophical studies; see Feldheim, 2006; Stout and Love, 
2015; Ongaro, 2016), and represents an interestingly distinctive approach in 
the field of public management. In a similar vein are the works by Asquer 
(2012), Barzelay and Gallego (2010), Mele (2010), Mele and Ongaro (2014), 
Ongaro (2006), Pettigrew et al. (1992) – authors active in public management 
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drawing from works in the broader social sciences by scholars such as Abbott 
(1992a, 1992b), Pettigrew (1990, 1997), Pierson (2004), van de Ven (1992) 
and van de Ven and Poole (1990).
POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY
In Chapter 2 we briefly hinted at the endurance of the thought of Thomas 
Aquinas over the centuries. His thought and the tradition of the Scholastics 
is a continued and highly influential presence in the philosophical debate. In 
the 19th and 20th century, the neo-scholastics is associated with philosophers 
such as Desiré Mercier (1851–1926), Jacques Maritain (1882–1973), Étienne 
Gilson (1884–1978) and Francesco Olgiati (1886–1962). Two notions widely 
elaborated within this tradition are worth plucking for the purposes of this 
book. The first one is that of metaphysical contingency and the actus essendi 
(act of being); the second one is that of analogy. We have already discussed 
the latter in Chapter 3 in relation to – and as a conceptual tool for the critique 
of – Popper’s philosophy of science. Here we discuss (briefly hint to) some 
implications of contingency metaphysics.
In Aquinas philosophy, things are contingent in the most metaphysical 
sense: all entities of the world, all events of history may be but also may not 
be. They have the potential to exist, but their existence is contingent (only in 
God does essence also entail existence). This is a crucial metaphysical tran-
scendental, defining a type of ontology based on the category of the possibility. 
Other ontologies we have encountered claim the opposite: that all things that 
are, necessarily are (like in Hegel, who derived this notion from the philosophy 
of Spinoza – see Chapter 2; as we have seen earlier, Nietzsche also theorised 
the necessity of being up to the point of predicating the eternal recurrence of 
the same).
Within the realm of the category of possibility, the potentiality versus 
actuality distinction is crucial. Put simply: the potential for a thing to exist is 
different from the thing actually existing. To show the practical implications of 
this philosophical category, it is argued that a proper consideration of this phil-
osophical theme may shed light on key topics in public management like the 
‘can it work?’ debate: can NPM reforms work in context ‘X’? What happens 
if doctrines ‘Y’ are transferred to context ‘Z’? How can a practice ‘A’ that has 
proved successful (generated the effects ‘B’) under circumstances ‘C’ replicate 
its effects under circumstances ‘D’? And crucially, could the same effects 
(‘B’) have been obtained otherwise (caused by a practice ‘E’ rather than ‘A’)? 
And could ‘A’ have not generated the effects ‘B’ under circumstances ‘C’, 
maybe due to chance events? These and many similar questions are considered 
very ‘practical’ questions, and yet their philosophical premises raise hugely 
problematic issues. Key to these issues is the question of the potentiality–
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actuality distinction in philosophy, and whether the underlying ontology is 
one based on the transcendental category of ‘possibility’ or on the category of 
‘necessity’. Put, again, very simply, if one adopts an ontology of necessity the 
answer to the question above – ‘could ‘A’ have not generated the effects ‘B’ 
under circumstances ‘C’, maybe due to chance events?’ – is ‘no’, whilst if one 
adopts a contingent ontology is it ‘yes’.
Similar considerations apply for counterfactual argumentations, which try 
to grapple with the crucial questions: what would have happened otherwise? 
What if (things had gone differently)? Sophisticated techniques have been 
developed in the social sciences to come to grips with these questions, like the 
synthetic control methods, which aim at providing a systematic way to choose 
comparison units in comparative studies by using a combination of comparator 
units for construing what ‘would have happened’ in the absence of a certain 
policy intervention (Abadie et al., 2015). The key point to notice here is that 
such methods, to be meaningful, presupposes an ontology of possibility, rather 
than one of necessity. A point with huge implications, to which we can only 
hint here, as we do in the following section.
OF NECESSITY OR OF POSSIBILITY?
The idea of the necessity of being (all that is, necessarily is) was introduced, 
at least in modern philosophical thought, by Baruch Spinoza (see Chapter 2) 
and then came to dominate the philosophical system of Hegel and many of 
his philosophical heirs (see Chapter 3). The rejection of the Hegelian system 
goes hand in hand with the contestation that it is possibility to be the over-
arching category of being (as vehemently argued by the philosopher Soren 
Kierkegaard): that things that are, might also have not been, and vice versa.5
We argue that across the social sciences research, and notably for the 
purposes of this book, the PA research, the very basic stance towards this 
fundamental ontological issue – whether necessity or possibility is the 
overarching category of being – draws a major differentiating line in terms 
of the fundamental stance of the researcher. For example, when Pollitt and 
Bouckaert in their study of the trajectories of administrative reforms and their 
antecedents and consequences argue for ‘chance events’ playing a role (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2004, 2000/2011), they seem to recognise more explicitly than 
other authors their basic stance about possibility as the ultimate category of 
being.
If we assume Popper’s perspective that it is ontological assumptions to drive 
scientific inquiry, the question is: in the scientific research in PA, what onto-
logical perspective drives the investigator when studying the administrative 
phenomena? Is the investigator assuming that what is observed is ultimately 
inherently necessitated (ultimately, it could not have been diverse6)? Or, is 
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what is observed assumed to ultimately be just one possibility out of many; 
that is, ultimately, things could have been otherwise? Chance, free will, 
otherness-transcendence (what is outside the immediate horizon) all weigh 
in in this latter ontological perspective, which will tend to see the world as, 
literally, a world of possibilities, while they tend to be ruled out in the former, 
which will tend to see the world as tantamount to one big chain of necessitated 
causal relations. The question arises as to what is the role of the PA scholar 
in either world? In the latter (a world of necessary causation), the PA scholar 
will probably resemble more the detached observer, not engaged with the 
world (because the world cannot be changed, if it is necessitated), focused on 
discovering at least some proximate rings of the huge causal chain of which the 
world is made. In the former, the PA scholar will be more akin to an engaged 
student, who sees the world as malleable and which can be shaped by human 
beings, through the exercise of free will and intent (along an intellectual line 
from medieval thought and the role of intentionality in human actions to 
modern-day existentialism): a vision of human liberty enacting purposeful 
designs to change the world – and public governance and public policy within 
it – also thanks to being equipped by the findings of PA research.
BETWEEN ONTOLOGY AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: CONCEPTIONS OF HUMAN NATURE 
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE 
ORGANISATIONS
A major object of philosophical inquiry of high significance for the field of PA 
as well as across the social sciences is the investigation into the main traits of 
the notion of ‘human nature’, a central yet at least partly elusive concept. The 
topic is located across the philosophical branches of ontology, on one hand, 
and political philosophy, on the other hand. It pertains to ontology insofar as 
the investigation into the reality of humanity is part and parcel of the inquiry 
into the nature of being, and it pertains and it is in a sense the starting point for 
political philosophy as well as ethics, since the questions about ‘how to live 
together’ and ‘how to live well’, which are, respectively, the central question 
of political philosophy and of ethics (Chapter 1), rely on the understanding 
of human nature to be addressed, and notably the question about ‘how to live 
together’ cannot be addressed unless the question of the ultimate nature of the 
beings who have to live (well) together, that is, humans, is also addressed; as 
we shall see in Chapter 5, an inquiry into human nature is exactly the starting 
point of Plato’s argument about the ‘common good’ as the criterion that pro-
vides legitimacy to a political system. The very possibility of using the term 
‘nature’ and talking of human nature, which ultimately means talking about 
the ‘essence’ of the object of study, is premised on the analyses carried out by 
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the philosophers Vico and Dilthey, who identified the distinction between the 
natural sciences, on one hand, and the ‘sciences of the spirit’ and the study of 
the ‘man-made’ world, the world made by human beings, on the other. These 
philosophers highlighted the very possibility for scholars and beholders of the 
human world to gain a deeper understanding of it, for the very reason that the 
subject of the process of knowing, her/himself a human being, is in a sense 
identical with the object of the process of knowing: the human-made world. It 
is for this reason that talking about the ‘nature’ of the object of study does not 
appear inappropriate nor ‘unscientific’, quite the contrary.
Bringing this topic to the forefront of research in the field of PA is not an 
altogether novelty: an explicit and very insightful attempt to probe into the 
link between human nature and the management of public services (notably 
the performance of public services) is provided by Talbot (2005), who elabo-
rates on the implications of the human being characterised as ‘the paradoxical 
primate’. In his work, Talbot takes the move from the (ontological) consider-
ation that human beings are inherently paradoxical (hence the human being as 
the ‘paradoxical’ primate) for drawing implications for the ultimate foundation 
and justification of the criteria against which to assess the performance of 
public organisations and public programmes.
Considerations about human nature and whether and how it enables to 
uphold certain values also suffuse practitioners’ understandings of PA. For 
example, the code of conduct of the British civil service asks civil servants to 
always uphold four core values:7 integrity (defined as ‘putting the obligations 
of public service above one’s own personal interest’), impartiality (defined 
as ‘acting solely according to the merits of the case and serving equally well 
governments of different political persuasions’), honesty (defined as ‘being 
truthful and open’) and objectivity (defined as ‘basing one’s advice and 
decisions on rigorous analysis of the evidence’). (It may be noticed the call to 
the highest standards of both intellectual objectivity and intellectual honesty, 
a notion very much tied to the ‘stewardship’ conception of the UK civil 
service: civil servants as stewards of the government of the day, by ‘serving 
equally well governments of different political persuasions’.) While the status 
of these values may be questioned (whether they are a basic standard, for civil 
servants never to be found faulty of), or rather are more an aspiration, urging 
civil servants to always strive in the pursuit of these obligations, they surely 
raise questions about whether human nature enables or hampers the attainment 
of such a high-level bar of expected behaviour.
What arises from this brief review of the topic is that issues of values (public 
values) and issues about human nature and whether and how it may – or may 
not – enable to uphold certain values are centre stage for any inquiry into the 
foundations of PA.
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Hodgkinson (1978) sets out a highly significant attempt to develop what 
he calls ‘a philosophy of administration’, where by administration he basi-
cally means the executive function in all organisations, public or private. An 
important preliminary qualification here is that that the scope of Hodgkinson’s 
book is different from this one: the difference between Hodgkinson’s work and 
this is that the present book is about public organisations, while Hodgkinson 
is interested in examining human nature – its essence and its behaviour – in 
every organisation, public or private, and sees organisations and the organi-
sational phenomenon as a crucial field of the social space where human life 
takes place. Moreover, the meaning in which the term ‘administration’ is used 
is different between the two books: Hodgkinson by administration intends 
the exercising of the executive function in an organisation, whereby admin-
istrating is intended as ‘the art, science and profession’ of making decisions 
in organisations (broadly intended it is tantamount to the managerial function 
in an organisation); this book is about ‘administration’ intended in a different 
sense, as a dimension of the public sphere, a reality of the living together of 
human beings in a political system endowed with a public administration. 
Finally, Hodgkinson’s work aims at proposing a philosophy of administration: 
the function of the preposition ‘of’’ is here crucial, as his focus lies in working 
out a synthesis of diverse (at times disparate) philosophical positions in order 
to attain an original synthesis which aims at constituting a standpoint on the 
phenomenon considered (see Chapter 1 on the distinction between philos-
ophy ‘for’ and philosophy ‘of’ public administration). With this important 
qualification in mind, Hodgkinson’s work is relevant for the purposes of this 
book insofar as he develops on a crucial ontological issue, the human nature, 
and applies an understanding of human nature to the theory and practice of 
organisations, thereby encompassing the public organisations. There is thus an 
overlap with the remit of this book to the extent that: (a) Hodgkinson’s find-
ings and theoretical propositions may be applied also to public organisations 
(as a subset of the category of organisations in general, though his focus is 
always on the individual organisation rather than on, for example, the broader 
public administrative system, or public governance more widely, which are 
instead part of the object of study of this book); (b) the executive function is 
one aspect of central significance of public administration (although not the 
only dimension of PA); and (c) it is kept in mind that Hodgkinson aims at 
advancing his own philosophical propositions (philosophy of administration), 
rather than exploring how philosophical thought in its varied streams may be 
brought into the field (philosophy for public administration). Having set out 
this important clarification on the differences between Hodgkinson’s work 
and this one, we can now turn to review the original contribution made by 
Hodgkinson’s ‘Towards a Philosophy of Administration’.
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Hodgkinson’s starting point is that administration (as the performance of 
the executive function) is both an area of applied logic (practical reasoning, in 
Aristotle’s framing of the issue) and an area where the exercise of value judge-
ment is quintessential. Thence, philosophical knowledge and understanding is 
part and parcel of the essence of the activity of administering an organisation. 
Hodgkinson very effectively reviews a disparate literature on organisations 
and decision-making in organisations to pave the way for the core of his 
analysis: the relations between the perennial human nature as it embodies over 
the ages in individual human beings, on one hand, and organisations as the 
field where administrative action (the exercise of the executive function) takes 
place, on the other hand.
A key tenet of his approach is the distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought to be’, 
a key philosophical notion which we have encountered and examined. Based 
on this notion and the centrality of values in human action, and hence also in 
human action within organisations, Hodgkinson outlines an analytical model 
of the concept of values, which places values for human beings at three levels; 
simplifying a lot, at one level we can find values associated to ‘pleasure’ 
(affective and hedonistic dimension: what the individual ‘likes’); at another 
level values which are assessed for their consequences or their appropriateness 
(from social consensus to desirability of expected outcomes of social action); 
at the third level values whose foundation belongs to the moral order or on 
religious or faith grounding: the ‘principles’, like the Kantian categorical 
imperative, or the guiding imperatives that derive from adhesion to a religion 
or a faith. Whilst this tripartite model of human motives may be criticised on 
manifold groundings (as an even very rapid skimming of the pages above in 
Chapters 2 and 3 might indicate), yet the purpose of ‘modelling’ value-based 
human behaviour for the objective of understanding human behaviour in 
organisations is laudable and part and parcel not just of a philosophy of admin-
istration but valuable starting point for a philosophy of public administration 
too, and calls for such efforts are most welcome.
An especially brilliant chapter in Hodgkinson’s so insightful book is Chapter 
9 (pp. 151‒70), which delves into the pathologies of administration, that is, the 
pathologies inherent with the dynamics whereby human beings strive to reach 
the apex of organisations, to be ‘successful’ in their professional life, whereby 
the measure of such success lies in enjoying the concentration of power that 
can (allegedly) be found when attaining the top posts, when becoming admin-
istrators at the top of an organisation. It is here that philosophical perspectives 
are at the front of the analysis and make Hodgkinson’s study so distinctive and 
penetrating.
His insights into the pathologies of organisations take the move from the 
dilemmas of the Platonic guardians: those with the virtues for wielding power 
do not have the predisposition to pursue it: they would rather withdraw from 
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power, not strive for it, and compete with the aggressive people to attain 
it. Ambitious men and women, not the philosophers, will have the drive to 
achieve success in organisations (as in the saying: ‘nice guys finish last’). This 
poses a dilemma for the administration of any organisation, if human nature is 
such that those less versed in the art of administering it are the same who strain 
most to reach the hierarchical apex, then negative or adverse selection may 
be the natural equilibrium for an organisation. This argument may be further 
reinforced if we assume the Machiavellian prince (Chapter 7), or indeed the 
stylised version of it depicted in the following passage, as the model of human 
nature:
a thoroughgoing Machiavellianist will righteously scheme for the betrayal and 
downfall of his superiors and will use his peers and subordinates as means. Not, 
as Kant would have it, as ends in themselves … Yet withal he will not let this be 
seen; it must not be perceived or at all obvious in any way that this is going on: 
quite the opposite, especially in a culture which elevates the values of sociability, 
co-operation, and conformity. It must be well-concealed and disguised … He 
will necessarily become adept in all the arts of human relations manipulation and 
acquire the full panoply of political skills, arts and skills … he may even succeed 
in deceiving himself by resort to several species of rationalization: he is doing 
it for the family, his dependents or, even, for his organization, his country or, 
pseudo-philosophically, because if he doesn’t somebody else (much worse) will. 
(Hodgkinson, 1978, pp. 160‒1)
Another pathology of organisations starts from another trait of human nature: 
aggressiveness. The problem here lies in the fact that aggressiveness may be 
seen as a feature facilitating the climbing of the organisational ladder: ‘One is 
unlikely to climb far in the organisational hierarchy without it’ (Hodgkinson, 
1978, p. 162). The problem becomes organisational when this trait of climbers 
in organisations is coupled with the nature of administrative roles as authori-
tative ones, that ‘are functionally dependent upon the attitudes of compliance 
and the zones of acceptance or indifference’ (Hodgkinson, 1978, p. 162); the 
issue is that:
compliance can be construed as a way of abdicating responsibility … Conscience 
can be suspended [so that] ‘any competent manager of a destructive bureaucratic 
system can arrange his personnel so that only the most callous and obtuse are 
directly involved in violence. The greater part of the personnel can consist of men 
and women who, by virtue of their distance from the actual acts of brutality, will 
feel little strain in their performance of supportive functions. They will feel doubly 
absolved from their responsibility. First, legitimate authority has given full warrant 
for their actions. Second, they have not themselves committed brutal physical acts’. 
(citing Milgram, 1974, p. 122) (Hodgkinson, 1978, pp. 162‒3)
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A consideration which brings us to another key aspect of organisations: that 
they may act as decoupling individual morality from ‘organisational morality’:
formal organizations are in certain critical aspects antagonistic to ordinary morality 
… This antagonism comes about because of the organizational value of rationality 
and the nomothetic principle of depersonalization. In the complex bureaucracy, 
individuals are not whole persons but role incumbents … they are parts, replaceable 
and substitutable … Morality, in glaring contrast, is a function of total personality 
and overflows any role [however] Organizational goals combined with rational pro-
cedures for their attainment … make organizational life analogous to chess. Within 
the game there are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ [in the sense of morally just or unjust, our 
note] moves, only those of more or less efficacy given the set system of rules which 
cannot in itself be challenged … even the administrator is not an author of acts but 
an agent, one who does things in the name of others … the agent is not personally 
or morally responsible for the acts which are under the authority or the authorship 
of the collectivity … and outwardly benevolent organizations can become latent 
collective forces of evil. (Hodgkinson, 1978, pp. 172‒3)
We find these insights provided by Hodgkinson into the nexuses amongst 
human agency, responsibility, and organisational malevolence enlightening 
(echoing here issues of responsibility in organisations, and notably in the exe-
cution of evil in organisations – ‘the banality of evil’ – which are also raised 
in the section on the existentialist public administrator, earlier in this chapter).
Other pathologies of organisations include busy-ness and superficiality; 
pseudo-machismo and anti-intellectualism; the cult of leadership (till the 
emperor is shown to be in the proverbial underwear); the over-infusion of 
organisations with values (notably a characteristic of military organisations, 
which necessitate to counter their nature of agencies of naked power for the 
nation state).
What is enlightening of the approach worked out by Hodgkinson is that 
he takes as starting point philosophical conceptions of human nature, to then 
combine them with the findings of social sciences and notably managerial and 
organisational studies, in order to work out the implications for the value-laden 
problems of the performance of the administrator, that is, the ‘executive’ or 
‘leadership’ role in organisations (Hodgkinson also dedicated later works to 
the study of leadership).
Hodgkinson’s work highlights a number of dimensions which are crucial to 
any attempt to link philosophical conceptions of human nature and the study of 
organisations: it highlights that values judgements are inherent in making deci-
sions in public organisations (and private alike) and that decision-making is 
not and cannot be a value-free activity. This consideration points on one hand 
to the significance of moral philosophy for an understanding of the issue of 
individual and organisational responsibility, on the assumption that the human 
being belongs not just to the natural order, but also to the moral order (as out-
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lined in the opening of this chapter in reference to Kant’s moral philosophy). 
On the other hand, the consideration of decision-making as a value-charged 
activity also points to the issue of the motives of human behaviour as key 
drivers for understanding people in organisations; for example, in Chapter 7 
we shall see the significance that pride takes as a driver of human behaviour 
in Machiavelli’s thought, or the emphasis the Florentine writer places on the 
desire to enter History (with the capital ‘H’: entering History in order to be 
remembered forever) as a key driver for human beings when aspiring to the 
highest public office: the amoral, if not outright immoral, drivers of human 
nature.
The quest for models of human nature (‘model of men’) has been driving 
philosophical inquiry over the centuries, a stream of inquiry rife with conten-
tion which, in the end and after centuries of harshly debating, may have led 
to exhaustion – and outright scepticism – about the value and usefulness of 
working out ‘a model of men’, in Herbert Simon’s memorable phrasing. It is 
interesting to point out that prominent social scientists have tended to refrain 
from entering the field of modelling human nature and rather prefer to restrain 
their claims to the level of the (working) assumptions underpinning a paradigm 
of research in the Kuhnian sense (Chapter 3): for example, Raymond Boudon 
gives his theorisation of ‘ordinary rationality’ – as opposed to Simon’s bounded 
rationality and other rationalities theorised about – the ontological status not of 
a philosophical statement describing the essence of men, but rather of a pos-
tulate of the social sciences: ‘My claim that the social actor should be treated 
as rational, in the sense of the Theory of Ordinary Rationality, is a postulate 
for the social sciences, not a philosophical statement describing the essence of 
men’ (Boudon, 2011, p. 48, emphasis in original).
In this sense, the question arises whether social scientific ‘motivation theo-
ries’, which have been wrought out over the decades and represent an area of 
major inquiry in organisation studies, suffice at least to describe the observ-
able behaviour of human beings in organisations, that is, whether debates on 
human nature can be boiled down to motivation theories for the purposes of 
understanding people’s behaviour in (public) organisations, and for related 
purposes like designing ‘adequate’ compensation systems that reflect (to 
adopt a wording on which there seems to be some general agreement, at least 
terminological) the extrinsic, intrinsic and pro-social dimensions of people’s 
motivation in organisations. We would argue, as is the case for other ‘modern 
social scientific disciplines’ employed for the study of PA, that here too there 
is a philosophical residue (see Chapter 1): whilst social psychology and organ-
isation studies have in most respects ‘settled down’ and built their home as an 
autonomous science with their problem statement, research objectives, and 
consensus over the methods, and notably as part of it have set up what we refer 
to as ‘motivation theory in organisations’, the research topic of human motives 
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and what drives human behaviour (thereby including human behaviour unfold-
ing in organisations as a part of it) cannot be stated in a totally uncontested 
way, and there is a ‘plus’ about the understanding of human behaviour that 
transcends what can be achieved by means of the application of the ‘scientific 
method’.
Indeed, as it often happens with core philosophical issues, we doubt that the 
thirst for knowledge about the ‘ultimate nature of human beings’ will ever be 
quenched, even more so when the area of inquiry is so ripe with implications 
for questions of such saliency like ‘how to best organise society and the realm 
of the political’. Moreover, to the extent a field of inquiry does not content 
itself with observing social phenomena (as could be the case for sociology) 
but is also about intervening on society for changing it and making it in some 
sense ‘better’ (as is the case for PA as public management), the intertwining 
of ‘is’ and ‘ought to be’ will inevitably call for grounding in philosophical 
arguments any claim that is being made about how to manage people in public 
organisations and administer public policies and public services.
NOTES
1. It should here be noticed that the Kantian foundation of morality is not utopia, 
contra to what is claimed in Garofalo and Geuras, 2015. We discuss the normative 
and regulatory functions of utopias in Chapters 7 and 8, starting from the work of 
the author who first minted the very term: Thomas More.
2. Although the challenging question remains for philosophers and scientists adher-
ing to the emergentist perspective to answer: in what regards is the notion of emer-
gence ultimately distinguishable and novel compared to the notion of formal cause 
– the form or essence of a thing – and material cause as wrought out by Aristotle 
(Chapter 2)? In fact, in Aristotle’s line of argumentation there was no doubting 
that a thing – for example, a brain or a hand – was composed by smaller elements 
that materially constitute it (material cause), but that the same material elements 
in a different order are not the thing – a brain or a hand – because it is only in that 
order (which is the form or essence) that they are indeed. Emergentism may be 
a philosophical perspective attuned to accommodating the implicit world-view of 
the contemporary man/woman, who takes the discoveries of the modern natural 
sciences as a self-evident ‘starting point’ (something which obviously the ancient 
Greek did not), but whether the notion of emergence is a novel concept, or one 
which may displace the notion of essence or causal form, this is far from evident.
3. We have seen in Chapter 3 how our German philosopher aimed at incorporating all 
the epochs of human history and philosophical thought into progressively superior 
syntheses, placing his own philosophy at the top.
4. It seems they are also more complicated in the natural sciences and notably in 
physics, where developments over the 20th century have challenged many previ-
ously held assumptions. Quantum physics refers to ‘distribution of probability of 
presence’ of particles, whose combined ‘position plus movement’ can never be 
determined with a precision superior to the limit posed by the constant of Planck: 
the very notion of ‘presence’ seems to be shattered. Shifting from the extremely 
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small to the extremely big, Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity poses a limit to 
the causal influence: an object ‘present’ can only influence those possible future 
events that are within the reach of the speed of the light departing from the object; 
beyond that limit, an object cannot wield an influence, cannot perform as a cause.
5. It goes without saying, in the presence of a necessitating cause, an effect will by 
definition follow of necessity – but the issue here is whether the totality of reality 
and history is ultimately governed by the category of necessity or by that of 
possibility.
6. Even if the inquiry eventually led the investigator to formulate propositions in the 
form of probabilistic causation, perhaps because nothing better could be found due 
to limits to our methods.
7. See https:// www .gov .uk/ government/ publications/ civil -service -code/ the -civil -ser 
vice -code (accessed 21 October 2019).
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5. Political philosophy and public 
governance: the quest for justification 
in ‘common good’ and in ‘social 
contract’ arguments and their 
significance for the debate on the 
organisation of the public sector
INTRODUCTION
Following up on the previous chapter centred on issues of ontology, this 
chapter turns to explore political philosophical issues. We focus the issue 
of the legitimacy of public governance, which we consider to be a theme 
of central significance – a perennial issue, and yet possibly nowadays even 
further accentuated by the multiple ‘crises of legitimacy’ affecting various 
jurisdictions and redefining the relation between (public) administrators and 
those who are administered – and one distinctively philosophical (leaving 
to other books, by other authors, to explore other entry points for bridging 
political philosophy and PA – amongst these: the topic of comparative political 
regimes and PA, first introduced by Aristotle, the notion of regime change, 
whose initial conception may be ascribed to Polybius, and the relevance for PA 
of the political thought of key philosophers like Christian Wolff – see Chapter 
2 – and Georg Hegel – Chapter 3).
This chapter then tackles the key question of ‘justification’ – that is, what 
grounds the legitimacy of a political system1 – to then delve into how political 
philosophical thought may shed light on a number of contemporary debates in 
public governance and management about how the public sector and public 
services ‘ought to’ be organised.
The puzzle of ‘justification’ – what justifies a political order and makes it 
‘just’ – is a very old issue in philosophy and poses formidable questions to 
whichever set of doctrines is proposed to change PA (which is not the entirety 
of a political system, but an important part of it). Justification, roughly speak-
ing, is concerned with ‘giving reasons to value something’, notably to value 
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a political system, and the way in which PA is organised into it. Legitimacy is 
concerned with gaining the consent of the members on the very foundations 
of the polity under consideration, with being able to command loyalty to the 
political system from its participants. It is, in sum, one of the key public gov-
ernance questions.
These are hugely problematic issues that have engaged political philoso-
phers (and statesmen, and lawyers) over millennia. One additional problematic 
issue regards the specific meaning of the legitimacy of PA within the broader 
question of the legitimacy of the political system. On the one hand, legitimacy 
may be claimed to pertain to the political system as such, rather than to PA – PA 
as the organisation and processes of the public sector is to be seen as just a part 
or component of the broader political system. However, even going down this 
path of a narrower view of PA (an alternative and broader view is to conceive 
of PA to encompass more widely public governance systems and arenas), it 
may be argued that the functioning of the public sector and the reforms of it 
(administrative reforms, public management reforms, sectoral reforms) may 
have a distinct impact on the legitimacy of the political system: if reforms 
are attempts to ‘make the public sector in some sense work better’ (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2004, p. 16), then it may be queried what ultimately ‘better’ 
means, which entails having a notion of what is ‘good’, and hence what are 
the implications of a ‘reformed public sector’ – and more broadly of reformed 
public governance – for the legitimacy of the overall political system. On the 
other hand, the legitimacy of PA in itself is a question in point: is legitimacy of 
PA derived from its subordinate status to politics (PA as subjected to political 
domination, as in a Weberian conception of bureaucracy, whose influence 
lingers well into our days and still retains a prominent position; see Rosser, 
2018)? Is that the only criterion of legitimacy? Or should (highly problematic) 
concepts like that of public interest be evoked, as Herring (1936) does, and 
legitimacy of administrative action be derived from the fulfilment of the public 
interest and the effecting of public values (Bozeman, 2007; van Wart, 1998)?
Legitimacy is a central yet highly elusive concept for PA: Waldo makes 
the case that legitimacy is a historically contextualised state of administrative 
thinking and practice (Waldo, 1948/1984, 1971; for a highly valuable com-
mentary, see Jordan, 2006). Albeit slippery to be defined, legitimacy is widely 
dealt with empirically by political scientists and public administrationists. 
At roughly the time the first edition of this book went to press, the American 
Society for Public Administration (ASPA) and the European Group for Public 
Administration (EGPA) dedicated the twelfth edition of the ‘Transatlantic 
Dialogue’ conference series to the theme of legitimacy.2 Determinants of legit-
imacy may be searched in such categories as ‘satisfaction’ by users of public 
services (van de Walle, 2018); trust (van de Walle and Bouckaert, 2003); 
performance, variously intended (Bouckaert and Hallighan, 2008; Rainey, 
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2003; van Ryzin, 2013; van Dooren et al., 2015); citizen engagement; equity 
in access to public services (Rutgers, 2008a); and social equality (for example, 
across generations with regard to who bears the costs of environmental protec-
tion, or in encounters with the state, Epp et al., 2014) – amongst others.
In this chapter, consistently with the general thrust of the book, we provide 
the reader with some, necessarily mostly introductory, examinations of the 
underlying philosophical grounding of legitimacy, that is, the political–
philosophical issue of the quest for ‘justification’ (Bird, 2006) to then discuss 
applications to the issue of the legitimacy of PA within the broader political 
system. In the remainder of this chapter we outline a number of approaches 
to justification of a political system. Such approaches to justification can be 
grouped as follows: common good arguments, social contract arguments, the 
liberal proposal worked out by Rawls, and person-centred arguments (derived 
from the philosophical strand of personalism, see Chapter 3). We then make 
an attempt to tackle one, big question: how can legitimacy arguments found 
a theory of PA, or at least what linkages may tentatively be drawn between PA 
theories and underlying philosophical rationales for justification of the broader 
political system? And how can political–philosophical approaches to justifica-
tion be employed to reckon doctrines about how the public sector should be 
organised and reformed? We confine our effort to an attempt to sketch some 
elements that may pave the way for continued, more systematic reflection and 
research on this major, but yet so far mostly overlooked, theme.
‘COMMON GOOD’ ARGUMENTS: PLATO’S 
CONCEPTION
One way of tackling the issue of justification is that of establishing whether 
the political order and public governance in a given jurisdiction advances the 
‘common good’. The issue of the common good is a topic debated at least 
since the great philosopher Plato (see Chapter 2). A key issue discussed in his 
renowned work, The Republic, is the link existing between the ‘common’ and 
the ‘individual’ good. The history of the inquiry into the nature of the common 
good is the story of various efforts to confront and answer questions into the 
link between justice (in the sense of a just society) and considerations about 
the interests, happiness, well-being and overall enhancement of the lives of the 
people belonging to a community:
common-good arguments … form a very broad church and have come in many 
shapes and sizes. Despite these many differences, however, they share a distinguish-
ing feature. They all assume that the value of political arrangements and forms of 
collective organization, along with the beliefs about justice and other ethical ideals 
that hold them in place, must ultimately be explained in terms of their contribution 
to the well-being and happiness of everyone living within them … in the words of 
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Plato ‘to determine which whole way of life would make living most worthwhile for 
each of us’ (1992 translation, p. 21). (Bird, 2006, p. 33, emphasis added)
In the remainder of this section it is discussed to some length the history of 
this important idea and how related key questions have been addressed, such 
as: how do we determine whether the life of someone else is enhanced in 
some relevant sense (which is the problem of the (in)commensurability of the 
well-being for different persons)? Compared to what? And how do we ensure 
that everyone’s interests are taken impartially into consideration? Like for most 
other fields of philosophy, the enduring merit of Plato is that of having asked 
the crucial questions – if not all of them, most of them. The first big question 
concerns the relation between the public and the private life. Nowadays, we 
are probably more accustomed – at least in Western societies – to separate the 
two: this is generally stated with sentences by and large formulated in such 
ways like: ‘in a liberal democratic society everybody has the right to live her 
or his own life, and none should prevent it, even if it is evident that somebody 
is making a mistake that would eventually harm her/him’. It is the idea that 
private life is an inner space separated (and protected) from somebody else’s 
influence, and notably from state’s influence. This might be called democratic 
justice, justice according to principles of liberal democracy that protect the 
individuals from external interferences. But the counter argument can be 
formulated as follows: ‘If I wrecked my life, what consolation is it that I did it 
“my way”? Doesn’t being implicated in our own failures only make our hells 
more hellish?’ (Bird, 2006, p. 38).
It is following this line of reasoning that Plato made the famous (some say 
infamous) argument that just selves and just societies are interlinked: that if 
a just society is one in which everyone lives well, then justice must have the 
property of enhancing the lives of all those who live it: justice – what justifies 
a political order and makes it just – is such that it enhances the lives of those 
that are socialised into it. It derives from this that such kind of justice would 
command the rational approval, hence the loyalty, of all those who belong to 
a political system informed by such kind of justice. But in order to realise such 
kind of justice, the inner world of the self and the outer public world cannot 
be separated, and justice becomes something that the individual possesses, not 
just a property of the political order. Connecting the self and the outer world 
entails that somebody – namely, for Plato, the philosopher – knows what is 
good for the self: an argument that attracted the darts of critics like Popper, 
who saw in Plato the theoriser of the totalitarian state – as well as the critique 
of ‘paternalism’ directed at Plato’s notion of common good (Popper contended 
that any society in which a superior – hence ultimately unchecked – authority 
imposes criteria of what is good for the entirety of the people will ultimately 
end up closing itself to the possibility of learning, adapting and remedial 
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action; he also argued that there is only one ‘open society’ which is formed 
by the interconnection of all the jurisdictions in the world which uphold this 
liberal, open-ended view of how to organise the political system, see Popper, 
1963).
Plato indeed went down that route, and advanced a theory of the tripartite 
psyche (which is a way of addressing the second big question: in order to know 
what a just society is for us, we need to know who we are): each human being 
is for Plato endowed with three basic capacities and forms of action to which 
correspond three basic types of interests. At the first level there is the capacity 
to experience pleasure and pain, to which is associated the natural inclination 
to seek the former and avoid the latter – a first set of interests thus corresponds 
to this capacity, namely the satisfaction of certain physical needs and the 
removal of pain. At a second level, there is the capacity to throw yourself into 
projects – a second set of interests thus lies in recognition and appreciation by 
the others of our character, efforts and activities. At a third level, there is the 
capacity for intellectual curiosity, for investigating the world – a third set of 
interests thus lies in achieving knowledge and understanding.
This categorisation may well be challenged by more recent psychological 
theories about human needs (Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is a famous one and 
widely resorted to in management and public management studies; Maslow, 
1943), but the basic philosophical argument made by Plato transcends the spe-
cific psychological model of the human being adopted. The argument is that 
for mobilising the capacities and being successful in promoting the well-being 
two requirements must be met. First, at the individual level all these capacities 
must be properly enacted and guided: this is a sort of politics of the self that 
requires reason (better in capital: Reason) to be in control of ourselves – it 
is virtuous behaviour that is required (Aristotle further developed this line 
of inquiry elaborating a full-fledged philosophy of virtues in Nicomachean 
Ethics). Second, Plato recognises the principle of social dependence: we all 
depend on each other for self-realisation, and yet the talents and skills for 
building a just society are not – for Plato – evenly distributed across the pop-
ulation (and this is the third big question that Plato set for the centuries to be 
discussed: to what extent are we ‘equal’ whilst being differently talented?). 
Thus, in order for a society to enhance the lives of all its members, given our 
interdependence, what is needed is that the political order reflects and incor-
porates into its very configuration the knowledge of what is good for the self: 
philosophical knowledge must shape the political order.
In order to achieve this goal, Plato drew a conclusion that has left the poster-
ity perplexed: the suggestion that only intellectually gifted individuals should 
hold positions of political power. This is a disconcerting claim, and many 
would counter that intellectuals have not proven to be more capable than others 
in running the state and wielding political power in ways that have advanced 
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the good for all. As we hinted at earlier, the very idea of concentrating too 
much power over individuals may also be challenged – trusting the state or 
public officials to impart how to live may be a terrible idea (the liberal cri-
tique). Equally, it may be argued that trying to prevent somebody from making 
a mistake is itself a bad idea, because, as the popular adage also suggests, 
making mistakes may at times be the only way to learn and improve (and by 
the way this may well apply to philosophers as well, who should allegedly be 
on the transmitting side of knowledge: when is a philosopher so ‘intellectually 
mature’ to be trusted to make judgements that advance the good of all?).
These critiques touch the crucial point of the liberty of the individual and 
the equality in rights and duties even if we are differently talented. However, 
focusing only on these issues may lead to formulating critiques quite conven-
tional for the sensitivity of our epoch and ultimately to lose sight of the depth 
of the argument wrought out by Plato. Plato’s argument is not so much about 
the subjection of individuals to a superior enlightened power (this could be 
Plato’s riposte to the famous accusations made by Popper), rather it is about 
the key issue that individuals are socially dependent and about the profound 
sense in which just individuals and a just society are interlinked:
[O]n Plato’s account, then, being ruled by reason and wisdom is not necessarily 
the same as being ruled by one’s own rational judgements. Rather, in many cases it 
requires a settled disposition to defer to the rational judgements of better-qualified 
others. So, even as it enhances the quality of individuals’ lives by inducing the 
required psychological dispositions, being properly ruled by reason is for Plato 
an inherently social achievement … individuals are socially dependent in a strong 
sense. The achievement of their well-being depends crucially on the pattern of social 
forms surrounding them and the terms in which they are encouraged to participate in 
them. Properly understood, justice describes the conditions under which the terms 
on which individuals are encouraged to participate will tend to promote, rather than 
hinder, everyone’s well-being. It is in this sense a common good.3 (Bird, 2006, 
pp. 42–43)
If we search for an example of the significance of this conception that heavily 
involves the way in which public services work, we may think of education: 
the future life of a child is crucially dependent on the rational judgement of 
better qualified others – parents and school teachers working jointly for the 
enhancement of the life of an adult-to-be. A child may well have the right to 
‘live life in her/his own way’, and may well need to ‘learn from one’s own 
mistakes’, but the outcomes of living void of the guidance and care of qualified 
adults may be tragic: a child is socially dependent in the strongest sense on 
others for her/his future life to be a full, accomplished one.
This is an inherently perfectionist research agenda, which assumes ‘that 
Plato’s ideal of a well-lived life is the ultimate end for the sake of which social 
and political arrangements exist and relative to which they ought to be evalu-
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ated’ (Bird, 2006, p. 44), and that there is ultimately one human nature – the 
‘essence’ of all human beings – possessing certain basic traits whose knowl-
edge can be achieved, and the acquisition of such knowledge is a requirement 
for designing a better society where everyone can thrive.
Finally, it should be noted that other interpretations of Plato’s thought 
emphasised the importance of treating Plato’s claim about philosophers 
ruling society not so much in its literal sense (it is doubtful that Plato really 
considered its claim to be easy if at all possible to implement), but rather as 
a heuristic: a tool for critiquing extant governance arrangements by using as 
comparator the ‘ideal’ system of public governance if the philosophers were 
in the ruling posts.4 In this sense, The Republic is interpreted as a utopia (we 
revisit this interpretation of Plato’s work in a subsequent chapter when discuss-
ing utopian thinking taking the move from Thomas More’s Utopia).
UTILITARIANISM AS A VARIANT OF COMMON 
GOOD ARGUMENTS
Common good arguments rooted in the Platonic tradition have been critiqued 
on the ground they are based on ‘paternalistic’ considerations, whereby some-
body who is allegedly ‘wise’ somehow determines what is ‘just society’ and 
‘just political order’. It is also as a reaction to this paternalistic element that 
it is possible to see a set of common good arguments rooted in a distinct (and 
distant) stream of thought: utilitarianism. In a utilitarian perspective, ‘actions 
and practices are said to have “utility” to the extent that they bring about 
overall happiness, and “disutility” to the extent that they produce overall suf-
fering’ (Bird, 2006, p. 47). The basic idea in this approach is that if the effects 
of some policy or institution on the utilities of the individuals who stand to be 
affected by it can be calculated, then some form of ‘aggregate utility’ can also 
be derived, and this aggregate utility can be used as a measure of the common 
good – but in this perspective rather than evoking philosophers’ wisdom, the 
assessment of what is good is made, literally, ‘on an individual basis’, leaving 
it to each individual to determine what is good for him/her.
It should immediately be pointed out that utilitarianism is not an advocacy 
of the selfish pursuit of one’s own interest, but is universalist in thrust – it aims 
to provide a criterion for designing any good society and its political institu-
tions; it is a political philosophy for the betterment of political systems which 
takes the individual utility as its methodological point of departure, but its aim 
is providing concepts for reforming public institutions for the betterment of 
the lives of all its members, and in this sense it belongs to the common good 
family of theories.
The notion of utilitarianism is associated with the works of Jeremy 
Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill, great social reformers in 18th- and 
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19th-century England. Bentham is credited to have minted the notion of ‘utili-
tarianism’, although the phrase ‘the greatest happiness principle’ was probably 
not his coin. Bentham was also highly concerned with prison reform, and he is 
(in)famous for having invented the panopticon (a word from the ancient Greek 
roughly meaning: ‘all visible’): a design of prisons whereby a warden can see 
every cell every moment. The rationale for the panopticon is that being poten-
tially under the gaze of the authorities at every single moment acts (critics say: 
forces) to redress wrong behaviours, earn early release and ultimately inculcate 
appropriate behaviours. Whether pervasive social control is ‘appropriate’ and 
‘just’ means to this end has been subject of debate ever since (CCTV controls, 
which are nowadays widespread especially in urban areas, are claimed to 
perform a similar function; technological developments like facial recognition 
and the possibility to collect and analyse massive amounts of personal data 
make the formulation of the problem of the panopticon of great actuality).
James Mill put centre stage the pursuit of one’s own interest by individuals 
in social analysis: ‘Like Bentham, he began with the simple thought that all 
of us naturally attempt to pursue our own interest’, which poses a problem 
for good government since ‘any group of persons with the power to do good 
with such means [that is, public powers] has the power to do harm. The central 
problem of government is to reconcile the interests of the public with the 
interests of those who hold power’ (Ryan, 2012, p. 697). Bentham and James 
Mill made a number of contributions, influential not just on English liberalism 
but also on the disciplines of politics and economics alike. By introducing the 
idea of ‘maximisation of utility’ they put the bases for the systematic treat-
ment by economists of the notion of utility, a task carried out in innumerable 
studies (and still counting) over the subsequent two centuries. By putting the 
pursuit of happiness in political thought centre stage, they revisited from a new 
angle the old issue uncovered by Plato: the problematic relationship between 
happiness and freedom. If maximisation of happiness is the goal, then what 
is left of liberty? This was the ground on which Jeremy Bentham refuted the 
criticisms to the panopticon: reducing individual liberty is not an issue if it 
leads to increased happiness because liberty is ultimately instrumental to hap-
piness, and hence liberty can be given up if the prize is increasing happiness 
and avoiding misery. Can there be serious political dissent amongst citizens of 
a political community if all can be reduced to its lowest common denominator 
of maximising everybody’s utility?
Before we examine further these crucial issues, we must turn to the third 
protagonist: John Stuart Mill. His father James was a dedicated yet severe 
mentor to John: at the age of three, John had already been introduced to the 
literacy of ancient Greek, at the age of six it was the turn of Latin. Not unex-
pectedly, John grew up well equipped to deploy reason for the betterment of 
life, but distraught in terms of how to balance the relationship of well-being 
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with liberty, autonomy, vitality, human dignity. John advocated a broader 
notion of utility and investigated the manifold and complex relations between 
people’s character and its political institutions, suggesting fitness between 
the two may be more important than abstract rational design: he was one of 
the first to hail Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America as a work of 
genius, and to realise how different institutions (and American institutions 
were very different from those of Victorian England) may fit the purpose of 
enhancing justice. The ‘national character’ becomes a vague but important 
factor weighed in by Mill, who picked from Hegel the distinction between the 
ethical rules a society actually follows and the rules it ought to follow, called 
‘critical morality’. The ethical rules actually followed form an important part 
of the national character to be taken into account in designing institutions. But 
the most relevant part is the answer to the ‘ought to’ question: according to 
authors like Ryan, ‘[T]he essence of Mill’s utilitarianism was the claim that the 
true critical morality is the rules that would maximise human well-being if we 
all followed them’ (Ryan, 2012, pp. 708–9). This is a ‘thick’ version of utilitar-
ianism: utility here is not confined to the merely useful in the ordinary sense; 
rather it also encompasses the noble, the just, the beautiful, the right. It is the 
combination of all these that forms what Mill refers to as utility – which is to 
say that for John Stuart Mill utility explains the right, the beautiful, the just, 
the noble. This assertion might be heavily criticised (such was and is the case), 
but the idea Mill wanted to put forward is that what the right, the beautiful, the 
just, the noble have in common is that they positively contribute to happiness, 
and for Mill utility is made by all those things and courses of behaviour that 
lead to enhancing happiness.
Within this frame, institutions cannot do much to enhance our lives. What 
they can do is providing individuals with resources (education, security, and 
the like) that may enable the pursuit of happiness; in the words of Ryan (2012, 
p. 719), ‘[W]e cannot become freethinking, imaginative, bold, and interesting 
on order or under tutelage’. This is a task for each individual to pursue over 
her/his life, and the state cannot prevent self-harm, in the forms of living 
a wretched life or simply an inadequate life for lack of commitment to our 
own self-promotion, although institutions perform the important function of 
sheltering our individual pursuit of these ends from the others harming us or 
impeding us to thrive. Mill assigns the state and the political system a much 
less ambitious task than Plato or Aristotle did: a more negative, limited con-
ception of the state pre-empting potential harm done by others on the individ-
ual; a conception to which we are nowadays accustomed to think of in terms 
of the ‘liberal’ state.
Mill adopted a broader notion of utility than other forms of utilitarianism, 
often more concentrated on pleasure and pain, considered as more amenable 
to measurement (but is it so?). ‘Hedonistic’ variants of utilitarianism, in fact, 
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tend to boil down to summation of pleasures and subtraction of pains in an 
attempt to gauge the effect that given interventions – the delivery of policy 
provisions and public services – may have on individuals’ lives. However, it 
is questionable whether we can measure either pleasure or pain, and whether 
these two are commensurable and hence can be added (algebraically: summed 
or subtracted) in an equation conducive to the calculation of the utility of an 
individual. In attempts to overcome these apparently insurmountable hurdles, 
political philosophers like Singer have wrought out an alternative approach: 
to understand utility in terms of desire-fulfilment or preference-satisfaction 
(Singer, 1993). On this perspective, an individual is better off to the extent 
that her/his preferences or desires are satisfied. The advantage of this approach 
lies in that desires – differently from mental states like pleasure or pain which 
require fathoming into somebody’s mind – may be made explicit and are meas-
ured in terms of ‘satisfaction’ or ‘dissatisfaction’, measurements that nowa-
days abound through widespread instruments like ‘satisfaction questionnaires’ 
as widely used in public services as they are in private ones. Sophisticated 
models have grown in this area, combining observation of attitudes as well as 
behaviours, factoring in expectations (expectancy–disconfirmation models, 
e.g. van Ryzin, 2013) and other factors. Such models have accrued to a very 
significant body of knowledge in terms of measurement tools for detecting the 
satisfaction of consumers of public services as well as in terms of analysis of 
mechanisms potentially conducive to increased satisfaction (for an excellent 
review, see van de Walle, 2018).
However, two key conceptual problems remain. The first one is whether 
levels of human ‘fulfilment’ can be measured at all and compared with each 
other in order to be able to somehow rank them. Ultimately, the issue seems to 
be boiled down to a dichotomy: either utility is somehow amenable to meas-
urement and can somehow be ‘scored’, or it becomes ultimately impossible to 
use it as criterion for gauging the effects of political institutions and adminis-
trative arrangements on the promotion of well-being, and hence as justification 
for a political order and its administration, and as a criterion for the design of 
the reforms of it. In fact, designed reforms must have the property of being at 
least potentially capable of bringing about a state of affairs that is ‘better’ than 
the extant one: but how to reckon the betterment if the bottom line – utility – 
cannot be measured for comparative purposes?
One ingenious way to at least partly deal with this issue is the criterion, 
contrived by the Italian engineer and economist Vilfredo Pareto, named 
‘Pareto-efficiency’ or ‘Pareto-optimality’. It indicates an(y) allocation of 
resources whereby it is not possible to make any individual of the system 
better off without making at least one other individual worse off. Different 
formulations of the criterion have been worked out, but the key underlying 
idea in this approach is that ‘utility’ of different individuals do not get aggre-
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gated: the criterion of Pareto efficiency enables to judge optimality without 
resorting to additions and subtractions of utilities of different individuals, 
which may be treated as incommensurable. The utilisation of the criterion of 
Pareto efficiency may be seen as one way for attempting to overcome the dif-
ficulties, inherent in the utilitarian perspective, of appraising aggregate utility. 
However, one critique to the criterion of Pareto efficiency came from 1998 
Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen, who aimed at demonstrating that under plau-
sible conditions, a system reaching Pareto efficiency may produce inequitable 
allocation of resources.
The second conceptual problem, however, still stands, basically in the terms 
set out by Plato and Aristotle: at another and more fundamental level ‘satis-
faction of expectations’ is not synonymous with ‘well-being’ and ‘fulfilment’ 
of one’s life – bringing us in a sense ‘back to square one’ in terms of the fun-
damental limitations of utilitarian approaches. The problem lies in the extent 
to which ‘satisfaction’ may be likened to ‘well-being’, what the ancient Greek 
philosophers referred to as eudaimonia (fulfilment, living a full life) – a notion 
that may be deemed to mean much more than happiness in the sense of an 
aggregate of states of satisfaction.
But what if the idea of rooting in ‘justice’ and ‘the common good’ the 
justification of a political system is abandoned altogether, possibly because it 
is deemed impossible to attain, and perhaps even dangerous? Why not leave 
the floor to the individual in deciding what justifies a political regime (rather 
than the philosopher speechifying about the common good or the economist–
mathematician calculating utility levels)? This is, boiled down to its very gist, 
the logic of contractarian perspectives to justification.
SOCIAL CONTRACT PERSPECTIVES
A range of major philosophers, including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and 
Jean Jacques Rousseau, fall in the opposite camp to the one of ‘common good 
arguments’ – the camp of those who tend to reject the assumption that ‘justice’ 
and the pursuit of the common good may provide justification of the political 
order, and seek the foundation of political institutions in some form of agree-
ment, consent and choice by the constituents of the political community: the 
‘social contract’.
The ‘contract’ in this perspective is purely hypothetical, not historical, and 
the situation in which individuals interact before the state is instituted is called 
by these authors ‘state of nature’. In the state of nature, individuals are prone to 
harm themselves. In this perspective, therefore, the state as political institution 
is in the first instance the product of a certain kind of voluntary agreement 
amongst the individuals who submit to its authority, and the state comes to 
be conceived primarily as a mechanism of dispute resolution, to bring order 
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and ensure peaceful co-existence amongst individuals (each individual should 
willingly submit for the authority of the state to be founded, according to 
Rousseau who introduced in this line of argumentation the notion of ‘general 
will’).
Although some authors like Hobbes seem to argue that the state’s authority 
is unlimited, for other key authors state’s authority is conditional. Kant intro-
duced the key idea that the question should be asked ‘could a rational person 
have contracted into a system that allowed a state to do this?’, and when the 
answer was negative, the authority of the state would end.5
Authors in this strand formulate the argument in bleaker terms than Kant as 
the option between the lesser of two evils: the State is the Leviathan, an almost 
almighty presence intruding into individuals’ lives, yet the establishment of 
the state is condition for overcoming a ‘state of nature’ of perennial violence 
amongst individuals, which is even worse (this position is famously associated 
with the philosopher Hobbes, see Chapter 2). It should further be noted that 
for important authors in this stream the notion of ‘natural rights’ provides the 
underpinnings for both setting some limits to state action that cannot be over-
come (the state cannot infringe natural rights), and for guiding state action (the 
state should safeguard and promote natural rights).
The gist of social contract arguments is that the state and public institutions 
are ultimately founded not on knowledge of what our ‘real interests’ and ‘real 
well-being’ are (a kind of knowledge which, authors in this stream stress, is 
hard and probably outright impossible to attain), but rather on our will, in 
a deliberate (albeit hypothetical rather than historical) choice to surrender to 
the authority of the state in order to preserve certain conditions for our individ-
ual lives – primarily safety and security. It is a choice between these (gloomy) 
alternatives that grounds the legitimacy of the state: the absence of the state is 
deemed to bring about a much bleaker state of affairs than it is for individuals 
to enter the social contract and accept state authority.
What implications can be drawn for the field of PA, and what strands in 
PA thinking are grounded in social contractual arguments? Early philosophers 
in this strand were more concerned with the fundamental relations between 
the individual and the state, and the justification of the very existence of the 
state, than with the everyday interactions between the state administrative 
apparatus and its citizens. However, such interactions are nowadays a major 
focus of analysis, and several studies track the implications for the legitimacy 
of political institutions of everyday encounters with PA by different sections 
and groups within the political system. As an example, Epp et al. (2014) have 
investigated the differences between perceptions of stops by police in the black 
and the white communities in the US and argue that different frequency and 
modalities of execution of such stops may engender a sense of distrust in polit-
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ical institution and ultimately rejection of their legitimacy, notably in certain 
age groups of the black population.
It is only more recently that political philosophers, notably John Rawls, have 
employed social contract arguments, especially those trailblazed by Rousseau, 
to develop an agenda to advance social equity that has been picked up by 
leading PA scholars like Frederickson for its specific implications for the field 
of PA – a theme which we develop in the next section.
The pendulum between common good arguments and social contract 
arguments is of course always swinging, and a range of criticisms have been 
moved to the contractualist approach too. As it has been argued, ‘the con-
tractualist attempt to justify political institutions and arrangements without 
a systematic account of conditions of human flourishing [i.e. abstracting from 
any conception of well-being] are doomed to fail’ (Bird, 2006, p. 96), a line 
of reasoning which brings us full circle back to common good arguments. Are 
there alternatives to these two poles? Or should perhaps they be combined in 
some novel, creative form for providing an agenda for advancing justification 
and legitimacy of political institutions and PA? It is to attempts to tackle these 
questions that we now turn.
RAWLS
In his seminal work A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls makes a major 
attempt to revisit Rousseau’s thought and combine a foundation of society, 
political institutions and governance in a social contract perspective with the 
setting of conditions enabling the flourishing of human well-being, at least 
in the sense of the achievement of what he called ‘social primary goods’: 
rights, liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of 
self-respect. Rawls rejects any utilitarian perspective and focuses on ‘fairness’. 
Rawls’s theory – although centred on the political system as a whole and not 
directly concerned with PA – has major implications for any debate on the 
ultimate justification of public administration and public governance.
Rawls conceives of the social contract as a hypothetical meeting – a thought 
experiment – in which members define the ‘foundation charter’ of their 
society, to which Rawls referred to as ‘the original position’. Rawls intended 
the original position as ‘a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which 
free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair’ 
(Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 12).
Being an imaginary and hypothetical thought experiment, its design is within 
our control (Bird, 2006, p. 90). Rawls worked tirelessly over three decades to 
elaborate the conditions under which a societal and political system makes 
available to its citizens the social primary goods (Rawls, 1971/1999, 1993). 
One notable such condition is proceeding ‘behind the veil of ignorance’: 
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‘Rawls’s hypothetical contractors are deprived of any particular information 
about the society they are about to enter, about the precise social positions they 
occupy within that society, and about their own identifying attributes. The 
individuals in the original position deliberate behind a “veil of ignorance”’ 
(Bird, 2006, pp. 91–2). The purpose of adopting the criterion of deliberating 
behind the veil of ignorance is preventing individuals in the original position 
to advance specific interests and biases, based on their expected location in 
the society to be designed. In this way, the argument flows, individuals in 
the original position can be believed to select ‘correct’ principles of justice to 
allocate social primary goods because their choices would be taken from a fair 
and impartial standpoint from which to evaluate social institutions in terms of 
justice.
Rawls’ philosophy has profound significance for the issue of the ultimate 
justification of public administration and public governance arrangements, to 
which we return in the concluding section of this chapter.
PERSONALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM
An additional perspective can perhaps be suggested. It takes as point of depar-
ture the philosophy of personalism, introduced in Chapter 3, which is based on 
the works of philosophers such as Emmanuel Mounier and owes to the con-
tributions of Neo-Scholastic philosophers like Maritain and phenomenologists 
like Scheler, who applied the phenomenological method to the investigation of 
the essences of moral values. Contemporary authors whose works echo some 
of the tenets of this approach include Taylor (1989, 1997).
Personalism propounds a return to a radical humanism, emphasising the 
flourishing of the totality of the human person as opposed to any reductionism. 
‘Reductionist’ is for Mounier any philosophy that furnishes a one-sided depic-
tion of the human being. A key tenet of personalism lies in the assertion that 
a person can fully flourish and develop her/himself when striving to become 
another and better person. As we highlighted in Chapter 3, ‘quality’ of public 
governance in this frame is not about ‘satisfaction’, it is not about satisfying 
needs or meeting expectations; rather, it is about the flourishing as a person, 
by conceiving of a person, any person, as a ‘project’ in the literal sense of 
‘to throw ahead’: the throwing of oneself beyond the current state (a notion 
in common with existentialism), for the ultimate goal of transforming into 
a better person. This is a conception of the fulfilment of life not dissimilar to 
what Plato and Aristotle referred to as eudaimonia, but in this philosophical 
perspective it takes a more dynamic, transformational accent, emphasising the 
potentiality of any human being of transforming oneself.
It also places a strong emphasis on the relational, inter-personal dimension 
of human life: personalism adopts an inherently relational conception of the 
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human being. It is only in the relations with others and the belonging to mul-
tiple and multi-level communities of persons that the individual person can 
accomplish her/himself and fully develop its vocation. It is a relational rather 
than atomistic conception of the human being and human flourishing.
We ask if this philosophical perspective can lead to a third position – 
a tertium – between common good and social contract arguments, in a similar 
vein to Rawls’ attempt but with a stronger emphasis on the relational dimen-
sion of human life as well as on the transformative potential of multi-level 
communities of people, from the family to humanity? Similarly, to common 
good arguments, personalism adopts an integral conception of human flourish-
ing, and an ambitious one, inspired by ideals of perfection. It is in stark contrast 
with utilitarian notions, especially as manipulated by economists in classical 
economics. It comes closer to John Stuart Mill’s ‘broad’ conception of utility, 
but only up to a point, because while utility is somehow a ‘given’ in utilitari-
anism, the flourishing of the person is in personalism the product of relational, 
interpersonal dynamics, a conception that is instead closer to Follett’s thought. 
Moreover and relatedly, personalism demands a much greater role for politics 
than any utilitarian notion (which ultimately ‘may not know what to do with 
politics’, as Ryan (2012) puts it), although politics also play an ultimately 
subsidiary function in personalism, in the sense that the primacy belongs to the 
basic communities (family, associated life).
Differently from common good arguments, it is less aprioristic in defining 
what is good and just for the self, what enhances lives, because it is based on 
an inherently relational and transformational ontology – although an objection 
might be that such distinction is more a matter of grade than a fundamental 
difference, and along this line of reasoning this approach might be claimed 
to broadly fall into the broad family of the common good arguments for the 
justification of public governance.
Similar to social contract arguments, personalism takes as a starting point 
the freedom of the individual and the voluntary surrendering of part of one’s 
liberty to submit to state authority only insofar as this is necessary to bring 
about order and individuals’ safety beyond lower-level communities. Different 
to contractarian arguments, it conceives of inter-individual interactions not 
primarily as a menace, but rather as a constitutive datum of life and a condition 
of flourishing for any human being. It is by being embedded into communities 
that the human person may flourish. Personalism has in this sense also been 
qualified as a form of communitarianism.
However, before continuing with Mounier’s personalism, it should be clar-
ified that the notion of communitarianism can also be interpreted in radically 
different ways. One such interpretation is nationalist-orientated and inspired 
anti-liberalism. For this perspective, individual liberty must be tempered by 
responsibility towards the community, usually conceived of at the national 
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level, as the national community: responsibility is first of all towards our 
children and our parents (family), then towards our local community, and 
then towards our nation-state. One can think of Carl Schmitt’s writings to this 
regard, in straight opposition to Kantian universalism, somewhat in line with 
Hegel’s notion of the state as a necessary reality to shelter, nourish and foster 
national cultures. In this line of argumentation, responsibility is not towards 
indistinct, universal human beings and human rights, but rather towards those 
with whom ethnic, linguistic or cultural ties can be bonded. This is a radically 
different interpretation of community than the one developed by Mounier, and 
it stands in outright contrast with the notion of open society as conceived of 
by Karl Popper and the Kantian universalist foundation of morality. Mounier’s 
personalism may be intended as an attempt to overcome the limits of the 
atomised individual of liberalism (at least of certain liberal interpretations of 
the individual), in order to account for the relational nature of the human being 
and the consideration that the full flourishing of the human beings occurs 
through relations to the others. However, personalism is also opposed to any 
notion of closed communities and in its ultimate thrust it is compatible with 
the notion of ‘open society’, the idea of one, universal society that is inherently 
open. Personalism gives rise to an open interpretation of community and 
communitarianism that profoundly differs from the Schmittian one, whereby 
community is defined by ethnic, religious or cultural–linguistic ties and bonds, 
which may take the form of the nation-state (nationalism) or ethnic-tribal or 
other bonds. Personalism is an approach to recognising the relational nature 
of human beings within a universalistic foundation of the dignity of each and 
every individual, and at the same time the multiple belongings of each human 
being to multiple communities, and the principle of responsibility towards 
each other that derives from it (in a vein similar to perspectives like the con-
ception of responsibility elaborated by Paul Ricoeur).
DOCTRINES ABOUT PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND 
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVISITED IN LIGHT OF THE 
JUSTIFICATION ARGUMENTS
Doctrines and practices of public governance and management reforms – such 
as the New Public Management (NPM) (Barzelay, 2001; Hood, 1991; Ferlie 
et al., 1996; Boston et al., 1996); the Public Governance approaches (Rhodes, 
1997) and the ‘New Public Governance’ (Osborne, 2010) and the New Public 
Service (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2001/2015); the Neo-Weberian State (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2004, 2000/2011); Digital Era Governance (Dunleavy et al., 
2006); Democratic Governance (March and Olsen, 1995); and others – have 
been centre stage both in academic and practitioners’ debates about the organ-
isation of the public sector and its relation to society and to the public over the 
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past decades. However, to our knowledge, only rarely, and usually in quite 
fragmentary ways, have such doctrines been gauged on the bases of political 
philosophical approaches to justification and legitimacy. The question con-
cerns the underpinning legitimacy criteria for the expected ‘results’ that certain 
doctrines for reforming PA promise to attain; in other words, what dimensions 
of performance do doctrines for reform uphold: what are the performance 
improvements that are predicated to occur on adopting those reforms, by the 
advocates of the reform doctrines considered.
In this section we sketch some initial, tentative analytical elements for 
revisiting these doctrines about the organisation of the public sector in light of 
the common good arguments as well as the social contract arguments, and their 
variants and alternatives.
Although the issue developed in this concluding section of the chapter can 
only be a bird’s-eye view, a number of interesting issues arise from revisiting 
(from the standpoint of century-old, foundational philosophical debates) such 
contemporary topics like the doctrines and practices about how to reform the 
public sector, and very tentative propositions may be brought to the fore.
A first tentative proposition is that utilitarianism may be posited to be at the 
root of much of the (NPM) movement and set of doctrines. We here define 
NPM as a set of doctrines about the organisation (in the broadest sense) of the 
public sector (following, for example, Barzelay, 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2011, Chapter 1). The NPM has been widely debated as a set of loosely coupled 
doctrines; one way of summing it, as Dunleavy and Hood put it (Dunleavy and 
Hood, 1994), is as ‘specialisation plus incentivisation plus marketization’, 
namely a preference for organisational specialisation (the unpacking of large 
public organisations into small, specialised ‘executive agencies’), incentiv-
isation (the systematic usage of incentives linked to extensive and intensive 
measurement of performance, notably along the dimensions of the economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness), and the predilection for the use of market-type 
mechanisms over hierarchy or networks wherever possible in the restructure of 
public services. The customer-user of public services and her/his satisfaction 
becomes centre stage. The well-being of individuals tends to be boiled down 
to them being ‘satisfied’, with a premium often put on those dimensions of 
user satisfaction that are more amenable to some form of measurement. If 
this line of interpretation of the NPM holds, then Singer’s desire-fulfilment 
or preference-satisfaction approach to understanding utilitarianism (Singer, 
1993) appears to be an apt interpretation of the underlying legitimacy crite-
rion of the NPM.6 A counter-claim might be that a thrust towards efficiency 
and efficiency-related values lies at the core of the NPM (Hood, 1991), an 
emphasis on doing more (or at least the same) with less, whereby rather than 
user’s satisfaction it is reducing the amount of resources employed for public 
purposes to drive NPM reforms. If this narrow interpretation of NPM were 
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:35:53AM
via free access
Philosophy and public administration178
adopted, then deeper issues of legitimacy might stop short, and some sort of 
agreement could be found around the basic idea that consuming less resources 
for producing the same output is ‘better’ than consuming more resources for 
the very same output and all else being equal; however, if NPM is interpreted 
more widely – as in our view it should be – as a theory of governing, then 
crucial questions about justification arise – concerns that have been widely dis-
cussed in the literature, but generally not in the terms of political philosophical 
justification (for an exception, Arellano-Gault, 2010). NPM-inspired recipes 
can hardly address the issue of how to improve lives in terms of fulfilment 
(living a full life, the eudaimonia); instead, they can claim to enable to engen-
der some form of happiness in the sense of some aggregate of states of satisfac-
tion. The question thus links to the broad issue of, first, whether ‘satisfaction’ 
suffices as criterion for justification; second, whether increased satisfaction 
has actually been achieved as an outcome of NPM reforms; and, third, whether 
losses along other dimensions which contend with satisfaction as legitimating 
criteria impinge on the legitimacy of NPM reforms and impair its outcomes.
To such challenging questions, NPM advocates may counter that such 
ambitious goals were never pursued by NPM proposers; rather, ‘doing better 
with less’ is the much more modest bar that reformers set for themselves; and 
‘better’ in that frame was conceived as tantamount to ‘having users of public 
services to be more satisfied’. However, at least to the extent the NPM has been 
intended as more than a set of prescriptions for some form of improvement of 
the public sector, but as a theory of governing tout court, then the inability to 
address the issue of how to improve the well-being of everyone in the political 
community raises some fundamental issues in terms of ‘just’ society and social 
justice. Advocates of the NPM may counter that this ingredient – social justice 
– was deliberately left out of the NPM recipe; however, this poses formidable 
questions about the ultimate justification of reshaping the state and public 
governance according to NPM doctrines.
Beyond the debates strictly placed under the label of the NPM, it appears 
that a large part of the burgeoning literature about performance in public ser-
vices (performance measurement, management and governance; for a system-
atic review in comparative perspective, see Bouckaert and Hallighan, 2008; 
van Dooren et al., 2015) tends to adopt utilitarianism as its implicit or, much 
more rarely, explicit philosophical premise. Debating on utilitarianism and 
its capacity to address fundamental questions of justification might thus be 
valuable addition to the performance in public services literature. Indeed, 
a major strand of scientific inquiry – Amartya Sen is a lead author here – aims 
at elaborating a wider array of indicators to capture the notions of ‘human 
welfare’ and ‘well-being’ beyond mono-dimensional (and hence necessarily 
more reductionist) interpretations of it – a strand of inquiry that not by chance 
can be located between economics and philosophy. Also related concepts like 
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those of capabilities – to capture freedom as a constitutive trait of humanity 
and the potential of what a human being can achieve beyond what somebody 
is observed to be factually doing – have been employed to further bridge util-
itarianism with broader conceptions of fulfilment that are inherent in common 
good approaches.
There is at least one strand of thought in contemporary public governance 
and management which, however, may be reckoned to have deep links with 
Plato’s original formulation of the common good argument rather than with 
utilitarianism: this is the ‘public value’ school of thought, initially associated 
primarily with Mark Moore and John Benington (Moore, 1995; Benington 
and Moore, 2011) and which has grown into a full-fledged stream of works 
(Alford et al., 2017; Hartley et al., 2017; Liddle, 2018), also by connecting 
with research on collaborative leadership and advantage (Crosby et al., 2017; 
Huxham and Vangen, 2005). The argument of this school, in a nutshell, is that 
where legislative mandates are weak, ambiguous or flexible, public managers 
have scope for taking strategic action to expand the wider public value of 
their organisations. Moore (1995) starts with a simple example/homily of 
a town librarian wondering about whether to expand the traditional scope 
of the library’s services to meet the wider needs of local children who need 
more intensive support, and in essence whether to act as a social innovator or 
to remain within a narrower prescribed role. Public managers are here seen 
as stewards of public value more than as loyal/unimaginative (depending on 
one’s view) agents of politicians. Here we find a link with the Platonic con-
ception of ‘just’ society: public managers are called to act on the bases of their 
judgement about what is ‘good’ and ‘just’ for society, or at least that portion to 
which they can realistically reach out, and in this way they affect the lives of 
others; their wise judgement and action is a constituent of a more just society.
This attitude by public managers raises two issues. The first one is the 
compatibility of Plato’s argument with the notion of the legal and political 
subordination of the bureaucracy to elected officials, whose legitimacy for 
office-holding in turn emanates not from superior wisdom, rather from con-
sensus and consent: the basic idea of Weberian origin that the bureaucracy is 
subordinate to political organs (ultimately to elective organs, in democratic 
systems) and to the law (in turn ultimately enacted by elective organs – though 
elective organs too have to abide by the law). In sum, the criticism goes, this 
‘Platonic’ notion of how bureaucrats ought to interpret their role impinges on 
democratic accountability and hinders the processes of holding the bureau-
cracy to account democratically. Indeed, the public value approach has been 
critiqued by political scientists (Rhodes and Wanna, 2007, 2008; but see 
Alford, 2008, for a rejoinder) exactly on this ground: for its blurring of the 
politics/administration divide.
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The same authors also critiqued the public value approach on another, 
related but distinct, ground – that of the motivations of bureaucrats. The 
criticism is that the public value approach takes an overly optimistic view of 
the motivations of public managers as unselfish ‘platonic guardians’ (which is 
literally the expression used by Rhodes and Wanna, 2007, although the piece 
does not delve further into the lineage in Plato’s conception of common good 
of the public value approach) and as neutral promoters of the common good, 
rather than as a special interest group, with its own expansionist agenda.
A third critique may be stacked to the other two: this regards the extent to 
which knowledge is actually possessed by the bureaucracy to such an extent 
to make bureaucrats ‘better informed’ than other parties and hence ultimately 
more just in making their decisions. True that one particular form of knowledge, 
technical expertise, is one of the key criteria for the recruitment of tenured offi-
cials in modern bureaucracies, but it is not the only one (for example, political 
appointment is also a criterion – with some empirical studies finding it may be 
on the rise in a number of countries; see Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, Chapter 
4). More substantially, technical expertise is hardly even a remote proxy for 
the platonic ‘philosophical wisdom’ – although it is correct to qualify the 
statement by observing that nowadays hyper-complex societies surely require 
the provision of specialised, technical knowledge of a magnitude unthinkable 
in the epoch of Plato and Aristotle, and nowadays philosophical wisdom, much 
more than in the past, may also need to incorporate the findings of technical–
scientific knowledge, although it is not defined by it.
It is philosophical wisdom – we may argue – that is the point of departure 
of a rejoinder to these critiques from a common good standpoint à la Plato. In 
Plato’s and notably in Aristotle’s conception, philosophical wisdom entails the 
practice of virtues – virtues are meant to shape the motives and behaviour of 
those who are virtuous. Philosophical wisdom is different from modern age 
scientific knowledge which is neutral in its applications and may be bent to 
both heavenly and hellish purposes. Wisdom is about understanding, an under-
standing that shapes the person and infuses its behaviours. ‘Real’ public serv-
ants across the world may have their special interests and advance their own 
agenda, but the common good argument asserts that philosophical wisdom is 
the guide to the common good, and power ought to be entrusted to those who 
wield wisdom, for our own well-being (we continue this line of reflection in 
a next chapter, in which we expand on virtue politics through a commentary to 
Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s famous frescoes The Good Government, where in the 
painting, Wisdom and Justice stand out as central virtues).
This leads to the final and most challenging critique for a Platonic concep-
tion of justice: how are those in power to be selected? This is the element in 
Plato’s argument that has aroused the toughest criticisms – up to the point of 
having been argued that Plato should be held intellectually responsible for 
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the totalitarianisms that have plagued the globe, notably in the 20th century, 
and slaughtered millions of innocent lives. Indeed, Plato’s argument may be 
manipulated by unscrupulous cantors of non-democratic and illiberal regimes 
to justify political decisions in the name of a self-ascertained common good. 
However, a response to this is that common good arguments do not place any 
absolute power on administrators in general, and non-elected bureaucrats in 
particular – conscious that virtues are in short supply and wisdom is hardly 
an easy-to-apply criterion for selection of office holders. Rather, a common 
good argument would call for wisdom to guide public action for those taking 
responsibility in public office, and notably for public servants in the countless 
circumstances where legislative mandates are weak, ambiguous or flexible – 
under such circumstances, public managers have scope for acting for advanc-
ing the common good.
If we now turn to other movements and sets of doctrines for the amelioration 
of public services, we can notice that much more nuanced are instead some of 
the premises underlying the approaches in the literature on Public Governance 
and on Democratic Governance, as well as – though from partly different 
premises – on the Neo-Weberian State, although overall they may possibly be 
leaning towards common good arguments à la Plato or social justice arguments 
à la Rawls, rather than utilitarianism as for the NPM.
The philosophical movement of personalism may also be a source here. We 
observed that ‘quality’ of public governance in the frame of personalism is not 
about ‘satisfaction’, it is not about satisfying needs or meeting expectations, 
rather it is about the flourishing as person, by conceiving of any person as 
a project of life, which is ultimately accomplished by transforming oneself into 
‘a better person’. This is a conception of the fulfilment of life not dissimilar 
from what Plato and Aristotle referred to as eudaimonia. Public governance 
and public services can here be seen as one set of enablers: through educa-
tion, through healthcare, through social care, through cultural services, and 
the like, a person is not just able to satisfy certain specific needs, rather s/
he can ultimately become a better person. This occurs if the person is helped 
by the surrounding community – in this sense, personalism may have been 
a precursor of contemporary ideas about co-production, co-innovation and 
co-governance (Bovaird and Löffler, 2018; Torfing et al., 2012; Voorberg and 
Bekkers, 2018).
The one political philosopher whose thought has been tapped by prominent 
PA scholars for its potential implications for the field of PA is Rawls. Although 
his works are not directly about PA, scholars in the field have made references 
to Rawls’s thinking and how developing on his political philosophy might 
provide the ground for a theory of PA. One such argument is worked out by 
Esquith (2006) by revisiting the work of PA scholars David Hart and, notably, 
George Frederickson, particularly New Public Administration (Frederickson, 
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1980) and related works (Frederickson, 1976; Frederickson and Hart, 1985; 
Hart, 1974). A starting point lies in considering that the principles guiding 
justice as fairness are not only ideal guides for constitutional and legislative 
decisions, but – in the perspective of the ‘modern public administration’ that 
Frederickson advocates – they should also inform the organisational structure 
and designated powers used in public administration, as well as the ethical 
standards of behaviour of public servants. In this perspective …
[T]he new public administrator is not only guided by Rawlsian principles of justice 
and bound by a strong obligation to serve as a public administrator. The new public 
administrator must also be an active participant in a public dialogue that includes 
citizens themselves as well as legislators and other elected public officials about 
the need of citizens … Frederickson does not discuss exactly how the original 
position could serve as a device for guiding moral arguments [but] what was needed 
[Frederickson argued] was a more fine-grained descriptive theory that distinguished 
between different public goods and services. (Esquith, 2006, pp. 537, 541)
… in order for public administrators to be better able to identify distributional 
effects and counter the inequality effects they might have. For example, it may 
occur that rules in PA designed strictly for purposes of increasing organisa-
tional efficiency and effectiveness may engender unintended distributional 
effects, especially to the detriment of future generations: stemming these 
effects is (ought to be) a concern for the public administrator inspired by 
Rawlsian conceptions of fairness.
This line of argumentation seems to suggest that public administrators ought 
to take an active role towards effecting the principles of social justice. How 
practically to settle disagreements about ‘the good of the public and matters of 
fundamental justice in the public domain among citizens’ is open to discussion 
but, as Esquith suggests (2006, p. 544), Frederickson and other PA scholars 
have made a call for the use of ‘free public reason’ to the internal theoretical 
debates in public administration, for a dialogue amongst reasons that are put 
forward to address the constitutional essentials of the political societies in 
which we live and that are offered in a fair-minded, civil and tolerant ways, 
with the ultimate purpose of contributing to the advancement of a theory of PA 
that stems from ‘method of public reflection and self-clarification’ – which is 
another way of describing the Rawlsian original position (see also Denhardt 
et al., 2013).
In passing – but this is itself a theme for a whole other book – it is noticed 
that constitutional thinking across Europe and beyond, with the emphasis 
given to equality principles in the constitutional arrangements of many coun-
tries, is a major source that can be tapped for advancements in the elaboration 
of a theory of PA inspired by Rawlsian political philosophy.
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Finally, radical positions emphasising the ‘minimal state’ as the outcome 
of reforms (for a discussion, see Peters, 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000) 
tend to forgo attempts to entrust a reformed state and its public officials to 
advance any form of common good and instead disparage the significance of 
any attempt to reform it, assuming the minimisation of the state might itself 
lead to the betterment of the lives of the members of the political community. 
How this should occur and whether betterment is intended for all the members 
of the political community or for only some – possibly ‘the fittest’ to survive 
in the environment – is open for discussion.
In conclusion, this chapter aimed at providing an initial overview of the 
foundational issues underlying public governance and any doctrines that have 
the ambition to suggest how the public sector and public services ought to be 
organised, as part of the broader political system. This question is pitched at 
the level of ideas, and the investigation into the legitimacy criteria underlying 
a certain approach concerns mostly the level of the public debate, the rhetoric 
of reforms and the formally enacted reform acts rather than the factual level 
of what happens on the ground as an effect of the implementation of reforms 
of PA inspired by a certain set of doctrines. Methods of investigation here can 
mainly be analyses of text and interpretation thereof (hermeneutics) – akin 
to research approaches widespread in the field of the humanities – as well 
as methods apt at capturing opinions of insiders (and the larger public where 
relevant) in a given area of public debate and public policy, where the policy 
area here is the policy of reform of PA.
The chapter has reviewed common good arguments and social contracts 
arguments, expanding the former to encompass utilitarianism and the latter 
to include Rawls’s account, and then further expanding to discuss whether 
personalism provides an at least partly alternative standpoint. The field of PA, 
we argue, would benefit from engaging in philosophical issues of justification 
and legitimacy of public governance, public administration and public services 
management.
POSTSCRIPTUM: THE PROBLEMATIC LINK 
BETWEEN LEGITIMACY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
AND LEGITIMACY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
In this chapter we have made an attempt to analytically distinguish the legiti-
macy of the PA system in a given jurisdiction (Public Governance: its perfor-
mance and its equity) from the legitimacy per se of the political system into 
which the PA system is embedded. We have dwelt on this point in the opening 
of this chapter, and it may be worth recalling the attention of the reader in 
conclusion. In fact, analytically distinguishing the legitimacy of the PA system 
in a given jurisdiction from the legitimacy per se of the political system into 
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which the PA system is embedded is only possible – if it is at all – to a certain 
extent: to another extent, legitimacy of PA is derived from the legitimacy of 
the political institutions into which it is embedded (of which it is a part7), and 
the two – political system and PA – are intimately interconnected, in such ways 
that changes to one affect the other (for example, a would-be ruler aspiring to 
abolish the guarantees of liberal democracy will effect ‘reforms’ aimed at tar-
geting the decision-making autonomy of public servants and the public service 
in ways that are detrimental to fairness and equality of citizens before the law).
Our claim is not that the legitimacy of the administrative system should be 
disconnected from the legitimacy of the political system; our argument is not 
about de-coupling the two in substantive terms, but analytically distinguishing 
between the two for purposes of investigation and comparative study – across 
diverse jurisdictions – of issues of legitimacy of PA and the reform doctrines 
that over time get proposed to reshape it.
We argue this analytical distinction may be useful, and we hope to have 
shown it throughout this chapter by discussing common good, social contract, 
social justice and personalism philosophical perspectives to the understanding 
of legitimacy of PA. The issue for PA scholars is being able to examine the 
nexus between doctrines of reforms of the public sector and public govern-
ance, on one hand, and legitimacy, on the other hand, by detecting what is the 
underlying legitimising logic and what are the possible estimated empirical 
effects of a reform of public governance which may increase or decrease its 
legitimacy in a given jurisdiction, and to do it to a certain extent irrespectively 
of the distinct issue of the legitimacy of the political system of the jurisdiction 
in which they are applied, though the two issues remain in other crucial regards 
inter-linked. This way, a comparative research agenda on the impact of the 
reforms of the public sector can be made to progress, potentially worldwide 
in its remit as it is able to analytically separate the evaluation of the effects of 
reforms of PA from assessments of the legitimacy per se of the political system 
in which the administrative system is embedded.8 We hope this approach may 
provide a fruitful research agenda for the evaluation of reforms of public gov-
ernance and the doctrines which underpin them.
However, we also warn that PA is a normatively charged field of study and 
practice, and hence we also argue that the scholar-investigator will always have 
to re-connect the two dimensions: the legitimacy of the political system and the 
legitimacy of PA. In this sense, a scholar who believes in liberal-democracy 
(as does the author of this book) will always need to re-connect the two dimen-
sions and eventually (normatively) assess a reform of PA for its broader effects 
on legitimacy encompassing both legitimacy of PA as such and legitimacy of 
the broader political system, from a liberal-democratic standpoint.
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NOTES
1. Another key political philosophical question is why a political community comes 
into existence in the first place, and relatedly what are the bonds tying people 
in a community, why they give allegiance to and accept to be ruled by common 
institutions in the first place. However, these questions are further away from PA, 
as administration presupposes a political community and its core institutions to 
be in place first, before an administration at the service of political institutions is 
developed and reformed over time. Hence for the purposes of this book the core 
question is the legitimacy of public governance and public administration and 
hence of the doctrines that are invoked to change them over time.
2. 12th ASPA–EGPA Transatlantic Dialogue ‘How to Increase the Legitimacy of 
Government in Times of Crisis?’, Ghent, Belgium, 8–11 June 2016.
3. Huge questions have been raised over the centuries about this notion of common 
good. Christian thinkers in a certain sense relativised the thrust towards the 
common good: they did so by introducing a superior order – the divine one. The 
question of the common good became entwined during the medieval age with the 
question of the underpinnings of the justification of the positive law regulating 
a worldly political order residing ultimately in divine law (the law revealed by 
God) and in natural law (the law inscribed by God into the creation). Augustine, in 
The City of God, famously distinguished between the two cities: the City of God 
and the earthly city, the latter being the earthly kingdom which exists to promote 
peace in this world, and about which he stated that ‘[whilst] the goods of this world 
are as nothing to the ultimate good of union with God, they are not to be despised 
[and] earthly success and failure have earthly causes’ (Ryan, 2012, p. 174). The 
enhancement of the self that can be achieved by means of a more just society 
is but a temporary achievement – nothing compared to the enhancement of the 
person that stems from belonging to the Communion of the Saints – and yet is in 
itself a good to be pursued. At the same time, its relative status warns against the 
political system preventing individuals from pursuing the most important goal of 
life, that is, the communion with God – and hence limits have to be imposed on 
state action. It is for this reason that Augustine’s The City of God is also claimed 
to have introduced some of the seeds of toleration in Western society. Although 
toleration came by exhaustion in Europe only over a millennium later, with the 
end of the religious wars of the 16th and 17th century, it has been argued that this 
distinction between a worldly and a heavenly city played a key role in establishing 
religious tolerance and toleration in the way in which it later developed in the 
Western world.
4. I am grateful to Wolfgang Drechsler for having pointed me to this line of interpre-
tation, notably as declined by the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer.
5. To appreciate the logic of this argument, it may be contrasted with its opposite: 
Hegel’s conception whereby the essence of the state is the un-conditionality of 
our allegiance; the state is a necessity, in order to shelter the spiritual freedom 
that cultures promote – it is an instrument of the Absolute Spirit to develop itself 
through religion, art and philosophy.
6. A counter-claim might be that a thrust towards efficiency and efficiency-related 
values lies at the core of the NPM (Hood, 1991), an emphasis on doing more (or at 
least the same) with less, whereby rather than user’s satisfaction it is reducing the 
amount of resources employed for public purposes to drive NPM reforms.
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7. An obvious major implication of this debate is the nexus between liberal-democracy 
and legitimacy: to what extent the legitimacy of a political system derives from its 
meeting the criteria that qualify it as liberal-democratic. Democracy (or absence 
thereof) is a property of the political system, with obvious huge implications for 
PA. The political philosophy literature identifies different forms of democracy: 
representative, deliberative, participatory, and direct – and huge debates surround 
the antecedents, features and effects of each of these forms, and their interconnec-
tions (and the extent to which they can be conceived of being complementary to 
each other, or at least partly displacing one another, e.g. direct democracy displac-
ing representative democracy), and the extent to which it can be spoken of varied 
levels of quality of democracy, or the extent to which democracy is a binary value 
(either a political system is democratic or it is not).
      To make a concrete example of how public sector reform doctrines have at 
times been explicitly tied to the issue of the democratic character of the political 
system in which PA is embedded, we can take the argument made by some key 
proponents of the notion of public value about its explicit and direct links with 
deliberative democracy and the notion of the public sphere (as conceived of in the 
life-long elaboration of these concepts by Habermas, 1987, 1996, whose thought 
has been introduced in Chapter 3). Hartley et al. have argued that one conception 
or approach to conceiving of public value is that ‘it connects public value with the 
contests, debates and dialogues in a democratic society which create and contrib-
ute to the public sphere – the space where public values are explored and contested 
and public value created’ (Hartley et al., 2017, p. 672). Interpreted this way, public 
value is defined as a ‘contested democratic practice’ (Benington, 2015, p. 29) and 
it is argued research using this conceptualisation of public value might focus on 
‘examining whether and how public value is constructed and argued for by dif-
ferent agents and groups, in what organizational, institutional and social contexts, 
deploying what managerial, democratic or public arguments, on what basis, for 
what purposes, what individual or groups are included and excluded in discussions 
about public value in society, with what outcomes … There is considerable scope 
to undertake empirical research on the value added or on value to the public sphere 
… However, the notion of added value leads to the question of what counts as 
valuable, and behind that what is value, which is sometimes presented in terms 
of normative aspirations for a ‘good society’. While performance management 
scholars have examined activities and outputs from public organizations, there has 
been less research about the value created (or destroyed) in terms of legitimacy, 
trust, social justice and so on or on how public value is often co-produced with 
citizens and other partners and stakeholders’ (Hartley et al., 2017, p. 672). This 
excerpt clearly shows how the doctrine of public value has been elaborated in 
explicit reference to notions of democracy, and notably of deliberative democracy, 
as underpinning it, and with explicit consideration of criteria of advancing ‘legit-
imacy, trust and social justice’ as a way to gauge and assess normatively reforms 
of PA that are being proposed.
8. Interestingly, it can be observed this approach seems to be the one taken by the 
World Bank Governance Indicators (Worldwide Governance Indicators, WGIs), 
which aim at assessing certain aspects of the ‘quality of public governance’ 
irrespective of normative considerations about the broader political regime of the 
country being considered.
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6. Philosophy of knowledge perspectives 
and the study of public administration
INTRODUCTION: METHODS, EPISTEMOLOGY AND 
LOGICS OF INQUIRY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PA as an interdisciplinary field of inquiry draws from the social sciences and 
shares the common problems and quandaries of social scientific knowledge 
(Homans, 1967; Little, 1991). Importantly, the meaning of the term ‘explana-
tion’ in the social sciences is always intended to refer both to the understand-
ing of the causes of a given set of phenomena (causation) and the giving of 
meaning to a social phenomenon (Psillos, 2002; Platts, 1970; Salmon, 1998). 
Epistemological concerns have been the subject of many works in the PA field, 
and countless many more in the broader social sciences – it is here treated 
exclusively from the perspectives of the philosophical foundations, referring 
the reader to general works on the topic for the field of PA (Riccucci, 2010; 
van Thiel, 2013).
The specific contribution this book aims to make lies in revisiting logics 
of inquiry in public administration from the perspective of some broad philo-
sophical themes. We have already indirectly dealt with issues of epistemology 
in PA throughout the whole book by discussing key philosophical traditions, 
each having important implications for the philosophy of knowledge: from 
neo-positivism to post-modernism, from critical realism to phenomenology, 
from historicism to pragmatism, and so on. We have also already encountered 
Popper’s philosophy of the social sciences and Kuhn’s notion of the com-
petition of scientific paradigms and the related distinction between ‘normal 
science’, cumulative in nature within a dominant paradigm, and paradigmatic 
revolutions (see Chapter 3). The notion of competing paradigms probably 
represents the terms in which more often epistemological discussions are 
framed within the social sciences. However, it has been strongly argued that 
when it comes to PA, the field is characterised by multiplicity of paradigms, 
and indeed a babel of paradigms, rather than dominance of one paradigm and 
knowledge accumulation (Bauer, 2018; Raadschelders, 2005).
There is also a conventional wisdom that three approaches dominate the 
field: neo-positivism; social constructivism; and critical realism. In line with 
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:36:22AM
via free access
Philosophy and public administration188
other authors, we argue that this is a limited view and instead a multiplicity 
of approaches characterise the field, as this chapter indirectly illustrates by 
reviewing some implications for PA of a much wider range of philosophical 
streams. A wider range of traditions of inquiry and philosophies of knowledge 
is indeed detected by a major review of the field: Riccucci (2010) identifies six 
broad philosophies of science and research approaches in the social sciences 
that are of significance for PA studies, which the author places under the labels 
of empiricism, positivism, post-positivism, rationalism, interpretivism and 
post-modernism/critical theory (Riccucci, 2010, Chapter 4 in particular). In 
widely reviewing the field of PA, the author identifies and discusses key PA 
works located in each of these streams (Riccucci, 2010, Chapters 5 and 6). The 
book ends by arguing for heterogeneity of epistemic traditions being a key 
trait of the field of PA, and an inexhaustible source of richness to be tapped, 
not stemmed.1
A passage in Riccucci’s book is worth noting and recalling here:
The intended purpose of this book is to engage reasonable-minded public adminis-
trationists in a dialogue on the importance of heterogeneity in epistemic traditions, 
and in general to deepen the field’s understanding and acceptance of its epistemo-
logical scope. The field would be more consonant with the recognition that knowl-
edge is derived from impressions on both the intellect and the senses. (Riccucci, 
2010, pp. 2–3)
First, we subscribe to this call for the recognition of the heterogeneity in the 
traditions of inquiry active in the field of PA, and that the valuing of the con-
tribution each of them can make is a more appropriate stance than engaging in 
warfare about the alleged superiority of any one of them.
Second, we’d like to pick up on the concluding sentence, where it’s stated 
that ‘knowledge is derived from … both the intellect and the senses’. Taking 
the very large picture, from a broad philosophical standpoint it might indeed 
be argued that the multiplicity of approaches to the philosophy of knowledge 
might be clustered, at a quite lofty, very abstract and rarefied level, into two 
main intellectual traditions: rationalism and empiricism.
As we have seen, rationalism, in a very basic sense, is the philosophical 
stance that makes the assumption that ideas are, at least partly, innate, and 
hence that reason can proceed, at least to some extent, ‘on its own’ in knowing 
the world (see, in particular, in our succinct review, the philosophies of Plato, 
Plotinus, Spinoza, Leibniz and Wolff, in Chapter 2). In this scheme, the oppo-
site camp to rationalism is empiricism, at least where this term is used to refer 
to approaches assuming that all ideas derive from the senses.2 Indeed, it seems 
that one line of cleavage in PA studies might ultimately lie in where one stands 
with reference to rationalism and what is entailed by it: the significance of 
a priori knowledge, mental ‘experience’, deductive reasoning. Whether these 
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are accepted as sources of knowledge proper alongside the knowledge that 
derives from the senses – or not (in the latter case it is only empirically driven 
knowledge that is granted the status of ‘proper’ knowledge) – might constitute 
a demarcation line between scholarly approaches in the field. Possibly, one 
implication of properly recognising heterogeneity of epistemic traditions in 
PA might then be framed as consisting in accepting knowledge contributed by 
scholars in the rationalism stream as proper and on par with empirically driven 
knowledge, whilst a way of perpetuating the cleavage might lie in discarding 
the rationalist strand, on one hand, or in overstating its clout up to shadowing 
the empiricist strand, on the other hand.
Kant’s philosophy is a way of integrating the two perspectives of rationalism 
and empiricism – although one which quashes key premises of both: differ-
ently from rationalism, Kantian philosophy rejects the possibility that a priori 
ideas are a form of knowledge, as they ‘only’ represent the preconditions for 
knowledge to occur: the a priori enables knowledge, but does not contain any 
knowledge itself (so for Kant the three key ideas of ‘self’, ‘world’ and ‘God’ 
are purely regulatory ideas): it is only judgements based (also) on experience 
that may generate knowledge. This assertion is of course contested by ration-
alists (we have seen in Chapter 3 how critics of Kant turned his system upside 
down just a few years after his passing away), and thence by rationalists in PA.
However, and very differently to radical empiricism and relativism, the 
subject of Kant is capable of knowing in a way that is inter-subjective (rec-
ognised by all subjects, that is by all human beings, indeed more than that: by 
all rational beings – though we should specify the term ‘inter-subjective’ was 
more systematically used by Hegel), hence rejecting any relativism, other than 
the very consideration that knowledge is relative to the subject of knowing, 
the subject – any rational being, any creature endowed with rationality – who 
is knowing.
In the sense thus specified, Kant’s philosophy can be taken as a starting point 
for a philosophy of knowledge for PA – as said, one that is being challenged in 
many ways from opposite sides, still a very useful and relevant starting point, 
because it purports to provide an underpinning to the possibility of knowledge 
which is universalistic in thrust.
One of these challenges to Kantian philosophy lies in the possibility to know 
the essences, a claim asserted by the phenomenological movement; for Kant, 
instead, the essences of things in themselves – the nous – were unknowable, 
and phenomena were not the door into ‘the things in themselves’, whilst for 
phenomenologists they are; it is to phenomenology and its application to PA 
to which we now turn.
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BETWEEN ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY: 
PHENOMENOLOGY AND REALIST 
PHENOMENOLOGY IN PA
The problem of ‘knowing the essences’ surfaced both in Chapter 4 when we 
discussed the ‘existentialist public administrator’ (it is in fact some form of 
in-depth knowledge and understanding of things that drives the urge for the 
‘existentialist public administrator’ to ‘take responsibility’) and in the previ-
ous section where we recalled Kant’s framing of the problem of the limits of 
knowledge and the fundamental question of ‘what can we know’ (also evoked 
by Geert Bouckaert in his preface to this book). A philosophical movement 
that programmatically predicated the ‘return to the essences’ is phenomenol-
ogy (see the dedicated section in Chapter 3). This philosophical perspective 
suggests that phenomena, rather than being the limit of knowledge (as in 
Kant), are conversely the door through which the things in themselves may get 
to be known by the conscience: in each and every experience, the conscience 
gets not just a fact, but an essence; knowledge occurs by means of intuition of 
the essences. Philosophical reflection provides the method for attaining this 
form of knowledge: it is the bracketing of judgement, known as epoché, that 
enables things to manifest themselves. In this perspective, phenomenology 
provides a powerful underpinning for the existentialist public administrator 
to act, by providing a ground for the judgements she/he makes. This comes 
with conditions as well: it is only the rigorous application of the method of 
bracketing of prior judgements that enables the kind of knowledge of essences 
advocated by phenomenology; knowledge which in turn can underpin making 
evaluative judgements for decision-making and action.
Within the phenomenological movement there is a substantial division 
about the foundation of such knowledge of the world. Recalling the distinction 
between idealist and realist phenomenology (Chapter 3), the key question is 
whether subjectivity as the phenomenological residue (what cannot be brack-
eted) constitutes the world in the sense that the world is established by the 
subject (idealist phenomenology), or whether the world is revealed to and been 
given meaning by the subject, but somehow the world pre-exists the subject 
(realist phenomenology). The interpretation of phenomenology more wide-
spread and generally held in PA has been idealist phenomenology; indeed, 
it has possibly been misinterpreted as the only approach in phenomenology, 
and then as such upheld, or blamed, for its radical subjectivism. For the same 
reason it has been the target of the darts of Neo-Positivists, who indicted it for 
adding a ‘morass’ that allegedly impedes ‘scientific and factual’ knowledge, 
and for its radical subjectivism and hence inherent difficulties in providing 
criteria for assessing propositions (judgement criterion).
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In our view, already expressed elsewhere (Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015, Chapter 
9), the distinction between realist phenomenology and idealist phenome-
nology would help the debate, and realist phenomenology, as distinct from 
the idealist variant, could be employed and deployed for a highly valuable 
contribution to come to grips with foundational issues in the investigation of 
social systems, allowing for both better ‘knowing’ and better ‘understanding’ 
of them (where understanding is intended as the organising and making sense 
of what is known, also for practical usages). For example, when we study 
the processes of strategy formation in a public organisation, we benefit from 
collecting factual evidence, labelling and measuring it – but this is only part 
of the picture: we are also dealing with an understanding of what a strategic 
decision is and what it means for whoever is active in the forming of strategy to 
make consistent decisions over time capable of shaping the future of the organ-
isation and affecting the professional life of all the people with a stake in that 
organisation. Realist phenomenology may to this regard provide a more solid 
foundation for evaluative judgements which, although being given meaning 
by subjective interpretation (value-laden, normative judgements calling for 
action), originate in a form of knowledge of the things, of the essences, which 
is beyond intersubjectivity and is anchored to the object, and hence is in this 
sense ‘objective’. Realist phenomenology may thus be a more solid underpin-
ning for the engaged, caring existentialist public administrator (or publicly 
engaged citizen), who is then called to ‘manage strategically’ public services 
organisations for the bettering of the public services s/he cares for (at least this 
is our view, already expressed in Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015, Chapter 9).
Summing up, most of the works so far developed in the field of public 
administration tend to connect phenomenology almost exclusively to social 
constructivist approaches to the study of public administration (Waugh and 
Waugh, 2006; Morçöl, 2005), for the very reason that they – implicitly or 
explicitly – rely mainly if not exclusively on idealist phenomenology, thus 
ruling out other interpretations that connect phenomenology in its realist 
variant to critical realism in the social sciences and its applications to the field 
of public administration. We argue that realist phenomenology might be bene-
ficial for the advancement of the knowledge and understanding of PA.
Moreover, interpretations that connect phenomenology to social construc-
tivist approaches may possibly stretch phenomenology beyond its quarters, 
when they claim it may provide a foundation for social constructivist 
approaches to PA. As noticed in Chapter 3, it may be objected that phenom-
enology is neither ‘social’ (Husserl placed the absolute subject at the centre, 
rather than intersubjectivity) nor ‘constructed’ because in a phenomenological 
perspective the world may be ‘constituted’ by the subject (in the idealist per-
spective), but things can be known in their essence rather than being constructs 
– although admittedly this is far from unproblematic and is in many respects 
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a slippery distinction. A broader and indeed different perspective to the usage 
of phenomenology in PA, which encompasses its realist strand, may provide, 
we argue, a fruitful contribution to the field of PA (as well as possibly other 
fields across the social sciences and the applied professions).
Phenomenology still relies on a strong subject of knowing: the Kantian 
transcendental subject. This is a main target of public governance scholars 
rooted in ‘relativist’ perspectives (e.g. Catlaw and Treisman, 2014). It is to this 
strand – which constitutes an overall limited, but quite vocal, community in the 
field of PA – that we now turn.
RELATIVISM AND POST-MODERNISM
Much of the late 19th- and 20th-century philosophy can also be characterised 
as a reaction and a critique to the Hegelian system and, with it, of the Kantian 
transcendental subject. This has led in an important part of the philosophical 
discourse to the dissolution of the Hegelian system and to a tight querying of 
the very possibility of grounding ethics and knowledge in the Kantian transcen-
dental subject. Key authors whose work has directly or indirectly contributed 
to such outcomes include Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud, 
at times labelled the ‘masters of suspicion’, questioning whether the strong 
subject advocated by both Kant and Hegel (albeit in profoundly different 
terms) actually exists. Instead, it is argued, such strong subject might not really 
exist but be the product of underlying economic structures determining the 
form of social classes and their relationships, and the subject in this perspective 
is in effect only reproducing the system of beliefs of the class to which s/he 
belongs (Marx); or it may be that the subject is the epitome of psychological 
processes that underlie and bypass conscience (the psychoanalysis, founded by 
Freud,3 revealed the existence of psychic activity beyond conscience: the sub-
conscious and its influence on psychic processes); or the irrational, Dionysian 
dimension of the human might constitute the ultimate foundation of human 
life, leaving little or no room for morality ruling the behaviour of individuals.
Although the contribution to sociological and economic analysis of Marx 
or the relevance of psychoanalysis as an established discipline are unques-
tionable, the philosophical implications that have been drawn from the works 
of these authors have been in their turn subject to close critiques. Whether the 
existence of subconscious activity is proof of the dissolution of the subject and 
the impossibility of a transcendental metaphysics, either in the Kantian or in 
the classical metaphysics sense, is highly questionable; analogously, the influ-
ence of economic structures does not necessarily entail a deterministic kind of 
influence on the totality of the behaviour of the human subject (this critique 
can be found also in Marxist intellectuals like Gramsci), and the limits of irra-
tionalism (the appeal to Dionysus made by Nietzsche) have also been vetted. In 
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sum, it is questionable that either modern (Leibnizian, Kantian and Hegelian) 
or classical metaphysics can be easily discarded. However, one of the bequests 
of authors like Marx, Nietzsche or Freud lies in having shaped an important 
part of the acquired wisdom in the contemporary philosophical debate, where 
the dissolution of the strong subject as theorised by Hegel and Kant is widely 
held as common wisdom. Later philosophical movements, like structuralism 
(Chapter 3), further contributed to the widely held assumption about the dis-
solution of the rational subject (in the case of structuralism, into underlying 
social structures), and a vast contribution to this conception was due to a range 
of French (indeed, Parisian) philosophers; in many respects, also the so-called 
Frankfurt School contributed to this process (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1979).
This was the breeding ground of the multifarious philosophical strand that 
goes under the label of post-modernism. The foundation of knowledge and 
morality in the rational, thinking subject (as in Kant’s philosophy) or in the 
order of things in themselves (as in classical metaphysics) is in this philosoph-
ical movement rejected. What remains is ‘relativism’, both cognitive (which 
can be summarised in the statement: ‘all beliefs are true for their holders’) and 
moral (which relativises righteousness and moral values). It should immedi-
ately be noticed that the relativist perspective incessantly opens problems: if 
any possibility of knowing is ungrounded, and any foundation of what ‘ought 
to be’ is deemed to be simply impossible, then what is left is some form of 
intersubjective agreement, an agreed-upon discourse intended as a patchy 
aggregate of fragmentary knowledge (oases of knowledge, each with its own 
only internal justification and ‘paradigm’) whose traits remain undefined 
(knowledge is often conceived of as a process) and whose implications remain 
inherently frail (in terms of what is right and just). We examine this movement, 
notably its expression in the field of PA, in detail in the remainder of this 
section.
Before we delve into the works of authors in this stream, an important qual-
ification is in order: works in this school are clearly pluralist in their thrust and 
engage with a variety of philosophical strands with great mastery. To put them 
all under a label – that of ‘relativism/subjectivism’4 – although capturing some 
important kind of common thread across the works, is a strained interpretation 
that may belittle and in a sense caricaturise their wide-scope, often provocative 
and stimulating, ‘thinking-out-of-the-box’ contribution to the field. The key 
authors in this school have made a contribution to a critical appreciation of 
public administration: they have opened new paths of inquiry by providing 
a critical and original viewpoint on PA themes. They, however, share common 
traits in terms of rejecting the rational subject of Kant or the knowability of the 
world through reason inherent in classical metaphysics. We discuss these traits 
after having introduced their work. We review, in a necessarily selective way, 
some of the most significant contributions in this stream.
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A major contribution has been furnished by the works of Box (2005a, 2005b 
and 2007) and by Fox and Miller, and notably their joint work (Miller and 
Fox, 2007, which was dedicated to the memory of Fox who passed away in 
May 2004). Their book provides a very sharp, abrasive at times, critique of 
representative democracy by challenging the ‘orthodoxy’ of the majoritarian 
mode of democracy (pp. 4–5). According to such orthodoxy, the people are 
assumed to be aware of what they want and need, and choose a representative 
for elective office by comparing alternative packages offered by competing 
candidates and parties. In turn, once in office, laws are voted that reflect 
the people’s choice, and a vigilant populace pays enough attention to the 
governors’ choices to be able to judge the elected representatives as either 
successful or wanting. Finally, the outcome of the subsequent election will be 
decisively affected by the people’s judgement over the incumbent’s quality 
of the job done whilst in office. This is what they refer to as the ‘representa-
tive democratic accountability feedback loop’ or, in short, the loop model of 
democracy, that the book demolishes – technically: deconstructs – showing its 
allegedly mythical character.5 Three main alternatives are then discussed: the 
neo-liberal response (which replaces people’s will with market mechanisms), 
the constitutional response (which substitutes the constitution and the effecting 
of constitutional principles for the electoral victors of the moment), and the 
communitarian response, or tendency (which ‘seeks to replace the loop with 
direct interface between administration and the citizenry’, p. 30).
Miller and Fox’s (2007) book then shifts from the pars denstruens (the 
critique to extant theories or ideologies of representative democracy) to 
the pars construens, the constructive part of the book, which in this case 
is primarily a frame for the deconstruction of reality through the notion of 
media-infused hyper-reality borrowed from communication studies (notably 
from Baudrillard). The book then works out the social construction of gov-
ernment, mainly patterned on Berger and Luckmann’s classical The Social 
Construction of Reality (1966), although a key inspiration is also Anthony 
Giddens’s theory of structuration, which the authors espouse especially where 
it aims to ‘avoid ascribing to human constructions the immutability that 
makes institutions seem like granite mountain ranges’ (Giddens, 1984, p. 84; 
however, it may be reckoned that Giddens’s work is not social constructivist 
in thrust and effectively represents an alternative frame, with which the main 
social constructivist pattern of Fox and Miller’s book ends out to be blended). 
A key passage from Giddens (p. 2, cited in full by Miller and Fox, 2007, p. 84) 
is that:
One of my principle ambitions in the formulation of structuration theory is to out 
an end of these empire-building endeavors. The basic domain of study of the social 
sciences, according to the theory of structuration, is neither the experience of the 
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:36:22AM
via free access
Philosophy of knowledge perspectives and the study of PA 195
individual actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social prac-
tices ordered across space and time.
It may be noticed that although Giddens’s approach is far afield of Hegel’s 
all-embracing (empire-building) thrust, a theory of structuration does not nec-
essarily lead to social constructivism (institutions are created by social action, 
and yet they may have a relative stability and endurance – ‘objective’ in its 
nature – without this entailing them to be conceived of as granite-like: a critical 
realist research agenda may well encompass among its inspirations Giddens’s 
theory of structuration – see next section).
In Miller and Fox (2007), institutions become conceived of as ‘habits’, 
and the authors’ analysis of their workings owes much to Michel Foucault’s 
works, notably to the notion of governmentality (Foucault’s coin), an 
instrumental-rationality, disciplinary knowledge-based approach to governing 
which, according to Foucault, arose in 16th century Europe. What we are left 
with in our understanding of institutions is the authors’ exclusively idiographic 
accounts (as opposed to nomothetic – on the notion of idiographic and nomo-
thetic, see the illustration of the thinking of Windelband in Chapter 3). The ide-
ograph is the new unit of analysis suggested by Miller and Fox (2007, p. 120):
ideography is the arena of symbolization in which a democratic pluralism of 
discourse formations become possible. This discursive approach to a hopefully 
democratic public administration does, we think, imply a way to subtend incom-
mensurability and neotribalism. But within incommensurability is the spark of 
difference; difference implies the collision of ideographs that can stop the action or 
redirect it.
Incommensurable, and yet potentially influential and mind-opening, narratives 
are what we are left with in our attempts to give shape to public governance, 
according to Miller and Fox.
The authors also very neatly take side in the dispute over the nature of the 
universals we have dwelt on in Chapter 2: as clearly stated by the authors, 
‘a constructivist epistemology/ontology is radically nominalist. The names 
that interactive human groups give things are ultimately arbitrary’ (Miller and 
Fox, 2007, n.p.). A radical nominalism is the position that social constructivist, 
relativist epistemologies and ontologies should take. This point brings to the 
fore the actuality of the medieval debate over the nature of the universals: 
indeed, where we stand in that debate may be very closely linked to where we 
stand in conceiving of the social sciences in general and of public governance 
specifically. Realist positions in the conception of the universals appear hardly 
compatible with radical social constructivism, which tends to be aligned with 
a nominalist conception of the universals; and it appears the opposite may 
also hold: nominalist positions in the conception of universals are difficult to 
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reconcile with realist positions across the whole gamut (this important point is 
further discussed later in the chapter).
Farmer (1995, 2005, 2010) is another key author providing a major con-
tribution to the strand of inquiry in the relativist and social constructivist 
tradition. His 2005 book is a fascinating, vertiginous tour through re-imagining 
public administration, ultimately mooring to ‘post-traditional governance and 
bureaucracy’. The tour unfolds guided by the works of philosophers, artists 
and poets through three main themes: thinking as play; justice as seeking; and 
practice as art. Farmer 2010 is a powerful revisiting of what the author singles 
out as the five key elements or functions of PA: planning (what does planning 
mean?); management (what does management mean?); the underlying of PA 
(values, beliefs, ideologies, symbols and languages); the nature of the field of 
PA; and the role of imaginative creativity in PA (and one can find here similar-
ities with Weick (1989) on the nature of theory and theory building we recalled 
in Chapter 3 when discussing alternatives to Popper’s epistemology). The 
rediscovery of these five elements occurs through the perspective of a wide 
range of disciplines: business and management, economics, political science, 
critical theories, post-structural theories, psychoanalysis, neuroscience, femi-
nist theories, an ethical perspective and a ‘data perspective’.
Probably the most influential work is Farmer’s earlier 1995 book. The 
starting point is the assumption that PA theory and facts are socially con-
stituted and the public administration observer is an image co-creator. The 
book then challenges established ways of thinking through the analysis of the 
relationship between language and PA – in other words, through analysing 
the language of PA. The book eventually moors to proposing a post-modern 
account of PA, whereby ‘play’ replaces ‘purpose’, ‘chance’ replaces ‘design’, 
‘process/performance/happening’ replaces ‘finished work’, ‘signifier’ replaces 
‘signified’, ‘irony’ replaces ‘metaphysics’(!), ‘immanence’ replaces ‘tran-
scendence’ (although one may wonder whether it was necessary to invoke 
post-modernity to replace transcendence with immanence, given modernity 
is already about the displacing of transcendence from this world, as so lucidly 
pointed out by theologians like Dietrich Bonhoeffer). The challenge goes on 
with ‘imagination’ that should replace ‘rationalisation’, and with the uphold-
ing of deconstruction, intended as ‘a reading that accepts that a sign in the text 
has no referents’ (Farmer, 1995, p. 185; targets of Miller’s deconstruction are 
Simon’s grand narrative that equates good PA theory with objectivity, and 
better theory with more objectivity, p. 187; and that assumes that efficiency 
is a viable goal for public administration practice), de-territoriality, intended 
à la Deleuze (the removal of the coding or grid that is imposed on the study 
of issues or situations), and alterity, referring to the moral other – for Farmer 
the post-modern is characterised by openness to the other, values diversity, 
a basic stance of incredulity towards metanarratives, and a radical opposition 
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to the established order. Farmer’s book represents a fascinating challenge of 
the constituted order in the study of PA, although at times it seems that it aims 
at a target that is manufactured to be the straw man, more than representing 
PA as it is studied and practised. From a methodological standpoint, the 
reader of Farmer might also wonder whether the logic of radical replacement 
of allegedly ‘old’ categories with new ones will ultimately lead to ‘better’ 
knowledge, better understanding and better practice of PA. All in all, it appears 
that post-modernity is in many respects a sort of moral stance, a radical – and 
radically critical – judgement of previous stances: and we are left wondering 
what provides the authoritativeness for such stances to topple other approaches 
from the pedestal of PA.
The work by Abel and Sementelli (2004) provides one of the most system-
atic elaborations and critical examinations of the – highly problematic – onto-
logical groundings of approaches in the relativist school: it is for this reason 
that a critical review of their work may provide an example of the significance 
of spanning across philosophers and philosophies over the ages for a finer 
grained discussion of the foundations of contemporary public governance 
and administration. Abel and Sementelli (2004) make a strong claim about 
the ontological status of a theory of PA: they argue that the ‘intersubjective 
experience of good governance’ is the foundation of a theory of PA. Let’s vet 
their argument. Starting with the consideration that administrative theory and 
practice are concerned with good governance, they argue that
… most agree that what counts as good governance depends upon a ‘consensus atti-
tude’ toward governmental institutions and actors that is worked out by the citizenry 
through continued dialogue about competing attitudes, values and beliefs. Hence, 
good governance is a matter of intersubjective agreement upon how to characterize 
the experience one has of governmental institutions and actors. This intersubjective 
experience, though fluid and cognitively less certain than positivist ontology might 
anticipate, is nevertheless ontologically constituted and therefore the subject of ‘first 
order’ theory … Hence, taking the intersubjective experience of good governance as 
its subject matter lends ontological status to empirical theory in public administra-
tion (it is thus theory) and provides an ontological grounding for normative critique. 
(Abel and Sementelli, 2004, p. 4)
By leveraging on this assumption, they argue that the apparently unbridgeable 
theory–practice gap in PA (which according to them neither the Enlightenment 
hope of applying theory to practice (of enlightening practice through knowl-
edge) nor the Hegelian vision of theory merged to practice (through dialectical 
synthesis) have been able to overcome) can indeed be filled. The fragmentation 
in irreconcilable streams and the apparent inapplicability of theories to prac-
tice might thus be remedied. The authors aim to overcome the unsatisfactory 
indeterminacy of post-modernity. They argue that what they call ‘evolutionary 
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critical theory’ (drawing on the work of Thorstein Veblen) may be synergistic 
across traditional social science, institutionalist and hermeneutical approaches 
to PA: ‘our thesis [is] that public administration synergistically employs the 
methodologies of traditional social science, institutionalism and hermeneutics 
by using a reconstructed critical theory as synergistic agent’ (p. 160, emphasis 
in original). This approach allows identifying public administration’s subject 
matter as the intersubjective experience of good governance, and ‘since public 
administration’s role is to foster the intersubjective experience of good govern-
ance, the discipline is responsible to society and the public as a whole, rather 
than to some particular political construct such as Congress or the presidency’ 
(p. 9), which the authors argue to provide practical as well as theoretical legit-
imacy to public administration as a field.
It may be appropriate to dwell on the argument wrought out by Abel and 
Sementelli in light of a broader philosophical approach to show how the 
systematic employment of philosophical thought may be beneficial to PA, as 
a minimum to provide broader perspectives from which to vet the arguments 
under discussion. First, intersubjectivity is a notion central in the thought of 
one of the less relativist of philosophers, namely Hegel, whose philosophical 
system is predicated on the category of necessity of being (Chapter 3). Second, 
this is combined with a Darwinian argument: ‘the theory–practice gap closes, 
since societies either adapt and change (adopting fitter institutions and pro-
cesses), or stagnate and die’ (Abel and Sementelli, 2004 p. 161); an argument 
which lies in between the Darwinian ‘survival of the fittest’6 and Hegelian 
necessity (what that is, necessarily is – see Chapter 3): in other words, the argu-
ment the authors put forward may perhaps overcome the frustration encoun-
tered by the Enlightenment hope of applying theory to practice when it comes 
to PA (for which theory appears so estranged), but it may be much closer than 
the authors reckon to the Hegelian vision of theory merged to practice (p. 11).
Dwelling a bit more on the ontological assumptions: ‘we do not experience 
the world but only have experiences of it’ (p. 36 and many other occurrences); 
a sentence which is prone to some ambiguity, for example when the conse-
quence that ‘our cognition cannot be of things in themselves [… and] As the 
world in itself cannot be confronted, any intersubjective experience of it must 
be either ontologically given (transcendentally or mundanely) or contingently 
accomplished by our historical and contextual practices’ (p. 41). The authors 
go on to argue that the idea that intersubjectivity is given transcendentally 
is ultimately a matter of faith; and that socialisation arguments are not ulti-
mately grounded, thus ‘we are returned to the conclusion that intersubjectivity 
seems an irreducible and non-deducible “datum of everyone’s lifeworld”’. 
Interestingly, in four pages the authors do away with ontological possibilities 
discussed over centuries, in most cases without even mentioning them, and 
ultimately after this brief tour end up relying on Husserl’s idealistic phenom-
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enology (plus some indirect reference to the Heidegger of Being and Time) as 
the philosophical foundation of intersubjectivity: Husserl is evoked to explain 
how the transcendental ‘I’ connects with the experience of other ‘Is’, how 
the experience of ‘the other’ enters the consciousness of the individual and 
constitutes part of the consciousness of the subject. This occurs after having 
dismissed the Kantian a priori categories of the mind as a leap of faith. This 
is interesting – even more so given the great intellectual rigour of the authors 
and the transparency of the flow of their argumentation, which engages with 
critiques with both total intellectual honesty and great competence. However, 
the questions remain: in what sense Kant’s foundation of the possibility of 
knowledge in the mind is ‘a leap of faith’ (p. 44)? Indeed the argument in Kant 
(see Chapter 3 for a wider discussion) is that in order to have experiences (for 
example, of change) there has to be something permanent; this is not an object 
of experience, it is the unifying subject of experience that makes experience 
possible – in this sense, it is rather the opposite of an act of faith.7 Moreover, 
why is Cartesian foundation through methodological doubt (cogito ergo 
sum) not even mentioned, given it is the starting point of modern philosophy 
that seeks in the self the foundation of ontological statements? Why is the 
perspective of rationalism (that ideas may at least partly be innate) ruled out? 
For example, the pre-established harmony of Leibniz is exactly an attempt 
to explain accord amongst the ‘experiences’ of units (monads in Leibniz’s 
terminology) in the absence of any foundation of intersubjective interactions: 
why not considering Leibniz’s explanation of intersubjectivity?8 Here we con-
fined to philosophers and philosophies that share the ‘modernist’ assumptions 
about the subject, or self, as the only possible starting point of philosophising 
(Aristotle has no problems in grounding intersubjectivity in the very knowabil-
ity of the essence of things by human beings).
It is also interesting to draw some parallels between post-modern authors 
and the Sophists in ancient Greece. The Sophists conceived of philosophy 
as a continued critique of the commonly held wisdom, and produced an 
original body of philosophical thought, which produced ideas that were rev-
olutionary at the time, such as that of the centrality of the subject in knowing 
and even in setting what is and what is not (Protagoras famously stated that 
‘man [the human being] is the measure of all things’) or put forward radical 
challenges to human knowledge (like Gorgias’s famous statement concerning 
the unknowability and incommunicability of being9). Nowadays the word 
‘Sophist’ (usually in lowercase: sophist) carries a pejorative denotation, but 
this is not appropriate when considering sophism (and the associated giants 
of philosophy like the mentioned Protagoras and Gorgias) in its proper his-
torical perspective. This philosophical movement10 brought with it a powerful 
humanism as well as a critical, unorthodox for the time, imaginative and cre-
ative scepticism towards the then widely held common wisdom. There seem 
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to be striking similarities (alongside, it goes without saying, very important 
dissimilarities) between the poignant critiques to the society of their age made 
by the Sophists and many positions of contemporary ‘post-modern’ social 
constructivists – and this parallel should not be seen in any derogatory sense. 
If one reads public administration works in this tradition – like Jun (2006), 
Farmer (2005), Abel and Sementelli (2004), Box (2005a, 2007), Miller and 
Fox (2007) – can easily spot striking similarities: the praise for imaginative 
and creative thinking that unveils the hidden side of the functioning of public 
administration; the emphasis on relativism; the urge to bring about a dialectical 
bridging of manifold viewpoints as part and parcel of the scholarly work (the 
call for ‘intersubjective agreements’ in the absence of a proper knowledgeabil-
ity of things). These ‘calls’ may be self-depicted as post-modern, but closely 
resemble arguments made well over two millennia ago in ancient Greece.
There are, however, also crucial dissimilarities. The ethical stance and 
thrust of the manifestos of the interpretive, social constructionist approach in 
public administration is directed towards the building of consensus enough for 
good governance and an ethical grounding of it (like in Abel and Sementelli, 
2004). This is something that was of little concern – if at all – for the Sophists. 
However, we should not be oblivious of the big contextual differences: the 
Sophists were not perceived, nor did they see themselves, as a fatal threat to 
the survival and prosperity of their political community. In ancient Greece, 
the rift amongst and within city-states (known as ‘polis’, whose plural is 
poleis) did not undermine the fundamental political unity both within each 
city (often with less than 20,000 citizens – the rest being slaves who were void 
of most rights) and across the whole of the Hellas, that is, the entirety of the 
Greek poleis, which conceived of themselves as belonging to one common 
civilisation, the Greek civilisation, even if they were scattered throughout the 
Mediterranean sea and at times quite far away from the geographical borders 
of nowadays Greece (Sophists used to wander from one city to the other rather 
than belonging on a permanent basis to one community). This identity had also 
been strengthened notably in the face of the Persian menace and the fight for 
freedom that the Greek people undertook and that is epitomised at the victory 
of Marathon. By contrast, nowadays complex political systems are made up of 
millions of citizens, as well as migrants often without citizenship, and they are 
characterised by multiple cultures or subcultures and are often rife with divi-
sions about the ultimate values. Nowadays political systems are, in a nutshell, 
hugely more heterogeneous than Ancient Greek city-states or even the whole 
of Hellas, and hence, for the philosophers of the time, the critique of the mores, 
the conventions and the widely accepted ways of thinking did not mean acting 
to undermine the ultimate cohesiveness of the homeland.11 Building an ethical 
community – a community with an accepted ethical grounding and working 
notion of good governance – was not an issue in the ancient Greece that had 
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emerged as victorious in the wars against the Persians, whilst the concern for 
an ethical foundation and agreed-upon notion of good governance is indeed an 
issue in contemporary troubled political communities. Stripped of these differ-
ences, certain similarities are, however, striking: admittedly the Sophists had 
a weak vision both of governance and of knowledge – a sort of interpretivist 
lowest common denominator – and this is not that far from most relativist, 
post-modern thinking in public governance and administration. Indeed, their 
stance was very distant from Aristotle’s view: and an analogous gulf may 
probably be found nowadays between social constructivists and critical real-
ists, to whom we now turn.
We have delved at quite some length into the ‘post-modern PA’ stream of 
thought, which is quite visible in the field of PA,12 whilst other philosophical 
approaches probably tend to be less vocal and remain under the surface, 
implicit in the scientific work of scholars in these schools but rarely up front 
and centre stage in their publications. The most important is probably critical 
realism, and it is to this that we now turn.
POSITIVISM, NEO- AND POST-
We introduced positivism in Chapter 3. Positivism purports a primacy of 
‘scientific knowledge’, devoid of any reference to metaphysical knowledge. 
Scientific knowledge, patterned on the natural sciences, is considered the only 
accessible form of knowledge, and the method(s) of the natural sciences is 
generally assumed as pattern for the social sciences as well. In this perspective, 
the (allegedly) self-evident, incontrovertible ‘fact’ acquires the status of the 
only solid foundation of knowledge. This total reliance on scientific knowl-
edge is coupled with a very optimistic view of the benefits that can derive 
from progresses in such knowledge: a progressive vision of the impact that the 
accumulation of scientific knowledge may have on humankind and its capacity 
to overcome the problems that afflict it.
Nowadays we mostly refer to neo-positivism, a powerful revival in the 
20th century of the 19th century initial positivism, which addressed some of 
the more naïve initial claims. A key promoter of this revival was the ‘School 
of Vienna’, led by such figures as Moritz Schlick (1882–1936) and Rudolf 
Carnap (1891–1970). Carnap developed highly influential analyses of the 
structure of language and his work is associated with the ‘logical syntax of 
language’, a systematic statement of the rules that govern a given language 
and the consequences that follow from those rules, according to the criterion 
whereby
[a] theory, a rule, a definition, or the like is to be called formal when no reference is 
made in it either to the meaning of the symbols (for examples, the words) or to the 
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sense of the expressions (e.g. the sentences), but simply and solely to the kinds and 
order of the symbols from which the expressions are constructed. (Carnap, 1937, 
n.p.)
The language of physics was to express a pattern in this respect. His work 
aimed at ‘purifying’ the usage of language for scientific purposes from impre-
cisions and abuses which in everyday language – and in philosophy – impede 
the proper formulation of ‘verifiable propositions’, that is, propositions 
that express a potential state of fact, whose actuality or not can be verified 
empirically.
The struggle for a formal language met the challenge of conventionalists, 
as we have seen (Chapter 3), whilst the procedures for verification – how 
to verify a proposition – was and continues to be a major methodological 
problem, as even a very large number of ‘verifications’ cannot confirm a prop-
osition, whilst just one falsification can decry it (see the critique by Popper of 
the principle of verification and the proposed replacement with the principle 
of falsification in Chapter 3). An important part of the second half of Carnap’s 
intellectual career was spent on examining the foundations of inductive logic.
The reason why we have dwelt on this philosopher is – connected to the 
purposes of this book – for his influence on Herbert Simon, a leading influence 
in PA and himself an acolyte of Rudolf Carnap and during his formative years 
in the profession heavily influenced by the neo-positivism of the exponents 
of the Vienna circle, many of whom had left Europe for the US to flee Nazi 
persecutions. In the School of Vienna variant, the influence of neo-positivism 
on Herbert Simon is apparent. Simon entered the PA field in the aftermaths 
of WWII and his impact has been likened to the explosion of a nuclear bomb 
(Riccucci, 2010), and the radioactive waste of the burst are still there in PA, 
although his later research work was mostly carried out in other disciplines, 
mainly in the fields of organisation science, cognitive psychology, economics 
(he won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1979), and the philosophy of the 
design sciences (the so-called ‘sciences of the artificial’).
The recurrent calls for purification and rigour in language and methods 
that enable the ‘testing’ of propositions rigorously controlling for auxiliary 
assumptions (for an early example, see Perry and Kraemer, 1986) and the 
rise in influence and impact of journals which put a strong premium on 
research pieces centred on ‘verifiable’ propositions (like the Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory) can also be seen as the long wave of 
that explosion which had led to the lingering influence that neo-positivism 
has wielded on the field of PA, especially in the US and, more recently and in 
important respects by means of ‘importation’ from the US, in countries with 
large PA communities like South Korea. It can safely be stated that, since 
Simon, neo-positivism has been an enduring influence in the field of PA (see, 
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for example, Rainey, 2001). Notable representative examples – to mention but 
a few – include many of the works authored by George Boyne, Kenneth Meier, 
Laurence O’Toole and Stuart Bretschneider.
The lingering influence of positivist attitudes also takes an aesthetic hue, 
with an emphasis placed in works in this tradition for expressing concepts 
through mathematical formulas and for elaborating analyses in ways patterned 
on mathematical modelling.
It is also spoken of a post-positivism, with notable significance in PA 
(Riccucci, 2010, pp. 84–9). Like all ‘post-’ philosophies, it retains something 
but also rejects something else of the philosophy from which it originates. 
What is retained is the ‘objectivity’ of the facts somehow lying outside the 
subject. What is discarded is the almost fetishist allegiance to the ‘fact’, and 
the pretension that social sciences can ultimately be patterned on the natural 
sciences. Post-positivism also stems many of the excesses and overly optimis-
tic claims about the progress of science and its implied utterly positive impact 
on mankind, or more limitedly and notably for the purposes of this book, any 
overly optimistic claim about the impact of scientific knowledge on the bet-
tering of public governance and administration. Critical realism has been seen 
as the most notable manifestation of post-positivism (Riccucci, 2010, p. 84), 
although, as we have argued, besides representing the ‘overcoming’ of positiv-
ism it may also be interpreted as having roots in other, and older, philosophical 
approaches, which is why we prefer not to classify critical realism under the 
label of post-positivism but as a self-standing stream and approach (we discuss 
critical realism in a subsequent section).
REVISITING THE CONTEMPORARY ‘POSITIVISM’ 
VS. ‘INTERPRETIVISM’ DEBATE FROM A BROADER 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
The roots of social constructivism/interpretivism may be found in 19th-century 
philosophical critiques to the strong knowing subject of Kant and the phil-
osophical system of Hegel (Chapter 3), and the critiques of positivism. 
Nietzsche’s assertion that ‘there are no facts, but only interpretations’ is key to 
‘weak thought’, and thence radical interpretivism, and to the nowadays wide-
spread, up to the point of having asserted itself as common sense, relativism.
However, when seen from the perspective of the history of philosophy, the 
dichotomy between positivism (however neo- and post-) and interpretivism 
appears quite narrow, and indeed the interpretation of critical realism as an 
intermediate point between the two appears quite narrow. New realism (an 
exponent of which is the contemporary philosopher Maurizio Ferraris) and 
‘minimal realism’ (asserting there exists as a minimum a ‘bottom line’ reality 
nobody can ‘talk her/his way around’, like the immediacy and evidence of 
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what basic health or education services provide to the life of every human 
being) are worthy lines of argumentation, but possibly too shy insofar as they 
search for an intermediate point between interpretivism and positivism, or to 
reject their extreme consequences (that reality ‘does not exist’ other than in the 
fragmented mirror of each individual, that the ‘fact’ is the ultimate reality), but 
entail an acceptance of the basic ‘playing field’ set up by the interpretivism–
positivism dichotomy. Indeed they are but the latest embodiment of a long 
history of fundamental epistemological reflection that gets well beyond this 
simplistic dichotomy: the object of intellection – from classical metaphysic 
(see Aristotle’s ‘active intellect’) to Thomism and neo-Thomism, to Kant’s 
noumenon and neo-Kantism, to Hegel, the notion of object of intellection 
supersedes both the (in our view misleading) notion of the ‘pure fact’ and 
the (in our view equally misleading) notion of the ‘subject’s interpretation’ 
disjoined from any substantive object of intellection. It is in this line of argu-
mentation that we now turn to critical realism.
CRITICAL REALISM AND ITS FOUNDATIONS: BACK 
TO THE TRANSCENDENTALS AND ARISTOTLE’S 
FOUR CAUSES
Critical realism is an ontological–epistemological approach, whose roots can 
be found in the works of the philosopher Popper (see Chapter 3), and whose 
exponents include amongst others Archer (2003), Bhaskar (1975), Hartwig 
(2007). A contemporary leading exponent is Pawson and, in the field of public 
administration and management, some of the key proponents are Bouckaert, 
Pollitt and Talbot (Pawson, 2006; Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Pollitt and Dan, 
2011; Talbot, 2005, 2010). Critical realism is grounded in the assumption that 
reality does not lie entirely in the subject, but it is ‘out there’ and somehow 
knowable as such, albeit with major limitations (a line of reflection originally 
in Xenophanes and then worked out systematically by such philosophers as 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, see Chapter 2). The knowability of things, 
of the ‘object’, as opposed to reality lying exclusively in the subject and the 
way in which the subject constructs it, is a key tenet of critical realism (the 
root word for ‘real’ and ‘realism’ is the Latin res, which means ‘thing’). At 
the same time, this approach is sensitive to the role the subject performs in 
knowing, and (also) in this respect it represents a reaction to positivism and 
neo-positivism, which rather tend to confine the role of the subject to give 
pre-eminence to the ‘fact’ (see next section). However, reality is not an exclu-
sive creation of the subject, but rather an objective ontology is centre stage 
in this perspective, as for example in this passage by Pawson referring to the 
nature of public programmes and how to analyse them: ‘The vital ingredients 
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of programme ontology are thus its “generative mechanisms” and its “contigu-
ous context”’ (Pawson, 2002).
Pawson, to our knowledge, does not make explicit reference to where he 
stands in the philosophical ‘dispute over the universals’ recalled in the previ-
ous section when discussing the links between post-modern, relativist stances 
in PA and a nominalist position in the dispute over the nature of the universals 
(introduced and discussed in Chapter 2), but it seems quite appropriate to 
assume that critical realism is more aligned with the realist position in conceiv-
ing of the nature of the universals. Also, to continue to refer to theories already 
debated in the preceding section with reference to relativism and constructiv-
ism, it does not appear inappropriate to evoke the theory of structuration put 
forward by Giddens for a foundation of a critical realist stance.
Finally, although this may be deemed to be a highly contested claim, it may 
be argued that a critical realist perspective ultimately entails that the categories 
of being ‘are meaningful’, either grounded in the rational subject or in the 
object, that is, in things in themselves. These categories are what classical 
metaphysics and – with a different twist – Kant referred to as the ‘transcenden-
tals’; they are (recalling here the Kantian frame of the categories of being13 as 
outlined in the Critique of Pure Reason – see Chapter 2): Unity, Plurality and 
Totality (referring to the higher-level category of Quantity); Reality, Negation, 
Limitation (referring to the higher-level category of Quality); Substance and 
Accident, Cause and Effect, Reciprocity (referring to the higher-level category 
of ‘Relation’); possibility/impossibility, existence/non-existence, necessity/
contingency (referring to the higher-level category of Modality). It is in fact 
almost inescapable that if propositions about things have a truth value, they 
have to rely on the categories of being: of what can be predicated of being, 
of the possible meanings or significations of being. These categories in turn 
may be founded (they may ultimately be grounded) either in the rational 
subject (the Kantian foundation of knowledge) or in the object, in the things in 
themselves (the foundation of knowledge in classical metaphysics). In sum, it 
seems there is some form of alignment or, better, continuity between classical 
metaphysical thinking and critical realism in the social sciences.
Following up on this, we argue further that in this perspective the category 
of relation, and notably the category of causality in the way it has been origi-
nally formulated by Aristotle, namely distinguishing four kinds of causes (see 
Chapter 2), (re-)becomes centre stage. Our argument is in line with recent calls 
in the social sciences for the rediscovery of the explanatory framework orig-
inally worked out by the philosopher of Stagira (Kurki, 2008; Pollitt, 2012). 
These considerations are further discussed in Box 6.1.
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BOX 6.1 THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF 
ARISTOTLE’S FOUR CAUSES FOR PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES
Aristotle identifies four types of causes: material, formal, efficient and fi-
nal (see Chapter 2). The material cause is the material element of which 
a thing is made. The formal cause is the form or essence of a thing, what 
gives something the form that makes it be what it is. The efficient cause is 
what makes change happen, the forces for change. The final cause is the 
goal or end: the why, what is the reason why something is brought about. 
Nowadays social sciences tend to treat causality mainly in reference to the 
efficient cause in Aristotle’s terminology, and to subsume the others into 
this category. For example, the motives or ‘reasons why’ a social actor is 
observed to behave according to a certain pattern are intended mainly in 
the terms of the drivers of a certain behaviour, which in turn produces an 
observable course of action, which – in conjunction with other ‘factors’ – 
makes something happen: the final goal or end tends to be placed outside 
of the scope of the ‘observable’, or outside the scope of investigation of the 
social sciences, and hence either disregarded or bent to become part of the 
‘efficient’ cause.14 Conversely, Aristotle had a broader view of causation: 
for him, cause (archè in Greek, which means primarily ‘condition’ or ‘foun-
dation’ of something) concerns not just the process whereby something is 
brought about, but also its ultimate meaning and rationale (final cause, the 
teleology: why something is brought to being) as well as its inherent es-
sence or form, the what it is of something. Ultimately, the efficient cause 
is but a part of the explanation of the causes of things. According to an ap-
proach informed by an Aristotelian thinking, the formal, material and final 
causes sit alongside the efficient cause. In order to ‘explain’ a phenomenon 
in this broader sense, it is required to attain an understanding of the nature 
of the object being studied (formal cause) as well as of both the material 
cause (intended, as we have seen, as enabler, as the potentiality of becom-
ing something: ‘matter’ here is not intended as the res extensa of Descartes, 
rather as potentiality in the original sense of the word as used by Aristotle, 
whereby matter is what enables the process of individuation of universal 
ideas, is what, literally, makes an individual to be individuated, for example 
an individual human being to be a concrete individual and not just an image 
of the idea – in the Platonic sense – of human being), and the final cause, 
whose systematic adoption means that teleological thinking has a central 
place in the human-made world.
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This larger array of causes is employed in critical realist accounts: Kurki 
(2008, pp. 210–34), researching in the field of international relations, ar-
gues that Aristotle’s typology is highly valuable for the kind of inquiry she 
sets forth for realistic accounts of social phenomena, and Pollitt (2012, 
pp. 42–3) revisits the system of the four causes for the field of public man-
agement. It is worth dwelling a moment on what these four causes may 
mean in the field of PA. The analysis of efficient causes is a very sensible 
starting point: to mention Pollitt’s example of a public service, to say that 
doctors performing an operation in order to save a road accident victim may 
‘cause’ the saving of the patient’s life is appropriate, but it is only part of 
the picture. The prior material existence of a purpose-built operating theatre 
with suitable equipment, supporting staff and so on is also a cause of the 
rescue of a life: thus, material and social structures are part of the explana-
tion (material and formal causes). As are the actors’ intentions and ultimate 
goals part and parcel of the explanation: the commitment of clinicians; the 
civic-ness of passers-by who didn’t scurry away but instead called Accident 
and Emergency to get the ambulance promptly; and, decades before, the de-
cisions by policymakers to establish and develop a national health service. 
Indeed, Aristotle would probably go beyond the intentions of social actors 
and add to this the very care for life – its perpetuation and development – 
also inherent in living beings as a final cause. These intentions of social 
agents in the present moment as well as in a long-gone past that still produc-
es its effects, and the very striving for perpetuating and promoting life by all 
living beings, which in human beings may also take the form of altruistic 
behaviours and the care for the anonymous fellowmen, are the final causes 
that are part and parcel of the explanation of the episode of the saving of 
a life in jeopardy after a road accident. As another example, the study of 
Epp et al. (2014) investigating the motives and dynamics of police stops 
carried out in the US is amenable to being treated according to Aristotle’s 
four causes. Two types of road police stops are considered: traffic safety 
stops and investigatory stops. The authors found that although in the former 
category there are no significant differences between socio-ethnical groups, 
for the latter category blacks have up to three times the probability of being 
stopped by police for investigation than white people (the study is set in the 
US). Although this institutionalised practice of investigatory stops may help 
prevent crimes, it begets a profound sense of discrimination in the black 
community, with significant impacts in terms of social inequality. There is 
a statistically significant difference in the perception of being treated fairly 
by blacks and whites, with impacts on the sense of belonging to the polit-
ical community, and hence ultimately with profound effects on the way in 
which citizenship is lived and conceived of. In the terms of the four causes, 
the effecting of stops by the police is the efficient cause; the machinery 
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:36:22AM
via free access
Philosophy and public administration208
by means of which this occurs (institutionalised socio-technical practices 
– thereby including the material resources as well as the legal entitlement 
by the police to effect stops) is the material cause; the expected and unex-
pected objectives or ‘reasons’ being pursued (preventing crime, but also 
engendering a sentiment of discrimination) is the sphere of the final causes; 
the very nature of the phenomenon, the exercise of superordinate powers by 
the government as the monopolist of the use of force in the modern state, is 
the formal cause.
Asking the reader one more droplet of patience in following this jour-
ney into the contemporary significance of Aristotle’s thought for PA in par-
ticular and the social sciences in general, let’s consider another profile of 
Aristotle’s system of causation and the way in which it contrasts with, and 
may shed light over, contemporary approaches to causation. Let us consider 
for a moment modern-day Neo-Positivistic approaches favouring statistical 
methods and ultimately probabilistic causation – a distinction can in fact be 
drawn between deterministic and probabilistic causality. In deterministic 
causality, the presence of the cause, alone or in conjunction with others, by 
itself leads to the effect.15 In probabilistic causality, ‘the distinction between 
necessary and sufficient conditions largely tends to disappear’ (King et al. 
1994, p. 87): claims identify a causal variable and assert that this variable 
increases the probability of a given outcome; this claim cannot be translated 
into a claim about the necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcome 
(in the example reported by King and colleagues, the claim was about poor 
communication among superpowers during crisis increasing the likelihood 
of war). These tend to be applied not only to quantitative but also to quali-
tative phenomena.16
How does the very idea of ‘probabilistic causation’ fit with Aristotle’s 
system of the four causes? It is meat for the teeth of professional philoso-
phers to delve into the problematics of this dimension of Aristotle’s thought 
on episteme and logic. We should add that our question is intended to be 
provocative, for eliciting reflections that may shed light on contemporary 
approaches in the social sciences rather than for anachronistic comparisons 
(the hindsight of centuries of philosophical thought and the dramatic chang-
es brought about by the ‘modern’ sciences and contemporary social scientif-
ic inquiry make this exercise just this: a provocative reflection). However, 
this mental exercise may shed light on unexpected parallels with contem-
porary debates. It is doubtful the Greek philosopher would content him-
self with the search of some sort of correlations as an adequate explanation 
for ‘the causes of things’. Indeed, Aristotle had a very different approach 
from both Sophists’ scepticism about the possibilities of human knowledge 
and from a conception of causation as the search for some sort of ‘correla-
tion’ detached from ‘explanation’ of the underlying causal mechanisms.17 
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Searching in an integrated way for the essence of things (the formal cause), 
as well as the teleology of things (the final cause), and not least for a ratio-
nal understanding of the agent of change (the efficient cause), is a different 
research agenda from either of the two previously mentioned approaches. 
Aristotle did not content himself with ‘weak’ thought and patchy and frag-
mentary knowledge. In this respect, it does not appear too far of a stretch 
to consider that the fundamental thrust of contemporary realists and critical 
realists (à la Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Kurki, 2008 – and Christopher Pollitt 
or Geert Bouckaert in the field of PA) bears resemblances with Aristotle’s 
fundamental thrust, and the contentions contemporary critical realists have 
with (especially) radical social constructivists displays close parallels with 
the contentions Aristotle, and Plato before him, had with the Sophists.
THE CONTEMPORARY MEANING OF THE DISPUTE 
OVER THE UNIVERSALS
In Chapter 2 we already noted the enduring significance of the nature of 
universal concepts, a debate which concerns the issue of whether universal 
concepts are real and exist as (ideal) objects, or are real and the product of 
a procession of abstraction by reason, but only individuals are real in the 
proper sense, or are not real at all.
What are, then, deliberately engineered social systems for the running of 
a public organisation, like a strategic planning system, a management account-
ing and control system, a human resources management system, a total quality 
management system, and the like? Are they the same thing anywhere in the 
world (and any time), just intermingled with haphazard elements that blur 
the pure nature of the ideal object? This position may appear implicit in quite 
a number of pieces of scholarly inquiry: public management and administra-
tive systems tend to be treated as ‘objects’ (of thought) virtually tantamount 
across contingencies, although performing differently or displaying different 
features depending on the circumstances.
Or are a strategic planning system, a management accounting and control 
system, a human resources management system, a total quality management 
system, and the like a mere flatus vocis, utterance of the voice: whoever talks 
or writes about such systems utters the same sounds or scribes the same graph-
ical picture (if s/he is talking or producing a written piece in the same English 
language which nowadays is the lingua franca, vehicle language), but in the 
mind of each individual beholder different things are meant by the same sound 
or script. This has been stated quite explicitly by a number of scholars, notably 
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in the post-modernist school (Farmer, 2005; Abel and Sementelli, 2004; Miller 
and Fox, 2007).
But is it the whole story, or does a strategic planning system, a management 
accounting and control system, a human resources management system, a total 
quality management system, and the like mean (signify) something more? 
A moderate realist/critical realist would argue that what exists are individual 
strategic planning systems, human resources management systems, total 
quality management systems, and the like, but reason can distinguish, separate 
and, in a sense, abstract the characteristics that qualify and are in common to 
all these individual things belonging to the same genus or category (or class or 
set, to use modern logic terminology).
As discussed earlier (see in particular the section on post-modernism and 
relativism), the actuality of the medieval debate over the nature of the univer-
sals is witnessed by the observation that where we stand in that debate may be 
very closely linked to where we stand in conceiving of the social sciences in 
general and of public governance specifically. Importantly, it may be claimed 
that in multiple respects where a PA scholar stands in terms of her/his concep-
tion of the nature of the field of PA depends on her/his philosophical stance 
over the nature of universal concepts. This dispute is in many respects still 
raging nowadays.18
NOTES
1. An argument that assumes and most welcomes, but in a sense goes beyond, the 
call for methodological pluralism, arguing for plurality of philosophies of inquiry 
lying at the heart of the field.
2. One notably radical empiricist position is that of the philosopher David Hume (see 
Chapter 2). Hume has been an influential figure for the social sciences, and one 
important concept he has introduced in the scholarly debate is the notion of beliefs 
formation, which is so central to contemporary cognitive and social psychology, 
and it is widely applied across the social sciences; the notion of beliefs formation 
makes an important contribution to the field of PA via representing a conceptual 
tool for theories of policy learning, on one hand (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2018) and 
behavioural PA, on the other hand (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017; Olsen et al., 
2018).
3. Based on intuitions of philosophers like Leibniz, who first noticed how there is 
a wider range of perceptions than those that receive the attention of our vigilant 
conscience and that all impact on our psychic activity.
4. A clarification is required about the notions of ‘relativism’ and ‘subjectivism’, 
which are used in this section to refer to post-modernism (and in a later section 
to refer to one perspective in phenomenology applied to PA). The point is clearly 
made by Raadschelders (2005, pp. 622–3) and we borrow definitions from him: 
‘relativism as used in this article includes both cognitive (i.e., all beliefs are true 
for their holders) and moral relativism (which relativizes rightness and moral 
values). While I use the concepts of subjectivism and relativism as related, they 
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are distinct concepts. The relativist observation that there are no “correct” answers 
is not subjectivist, for it does not refer to a particular time and context. The sub-
jectivist observation that soft drugs ought to be legalized is not relativist, for it is 
an opinion that can find support with some and resistance among others in one 
time and context (i.e., country). Postmodernism has both subjectivist and relativist 
features.’
5. The critique of the democratic loop is a topic widely debated in political science 
(recently Achen and Bartels, 2016), although much less often with a focus on 
drawing implications for the theory and practice of PA, as Fox and Miller set out 
to do.
6. Darwin only introduced the notion of ‘survival of the fittest’ in the fifth edition of 
On the Origin of the Species, and generally left the answer quite open to the issue 
of what determines certain genetic mutations to thrive and reproduce.
7. Hegel went much farther in cutting the knot by postulating the creative activity 
of the mind occurring on a cosmic scale rather than at the level of individual con-
sciousness, and hence our possibility for knowledge is indeed the result of reason 
having created the world, and Reason (in capital) created the world for the very 
reason that Reason itself is an episode in the life of the all-embracing Spirit.
8. Similarly, it appears as a minimum overstated the claim (2004, p. 171) that ‘Eaton 
[e.g. 1923 – our note] arguably made one of the first reasonable efforts to examine 
knowledge outside of the teleological boundaries created by being a critical 
realist, neorealist, or idealist … particularly if we consider that knowledge might 
be a knowledge of appearances, not realities themselves (!). In addition, he argues 
that truth is based on agreement (!)’ (our exclamation marks): we are struck by 
invoking Eaton (not the most known of philosophers) for a decisive solution to 
millennia-old debates: the argument that ‘knowledge might be knowledge of 
appearances, not realities’ is nothing new (what’s the difference between this 
claim and the sceptical philosophy of the Hellenistic period? And isn’t Kantian 
categorisation a reaction to Hume’s radical empiricisms, exactly to limit knowl-
edge to phenomena (the absolute in Kant can be gained by human beings only 
through the adherence to moral tenets and the aesthetic experience of sublime)? 
And for Hegel realities are in the mind exactly because he (claims to) overcome 
the Kantian notion of ‘noumena’, of the things in themselves as the unknown. And 
as regards the claim that ‘truth is based on agreement’, Sophists were arguing in 
a similar vein over two millennia ago – indeed they also drew some self-interested 
implications and asked for compensation for teaching the sons of the wealthy how 
to argue effectively to convince the multitudes to agree on what is convenient for 
themselves – a good reminder of the dangers of rejecting any criterion of truth. In 
sum, providing an ontological grounding to constructivist approaches to PA (and 
beyond) is a very problematic task, and a task that has not yet been accomplished 
(if ever it will be – something we strongly doubt).
9. Indeed, Gorgias even stated that ‘nothing is’, arguing that either the being is, or the 
non-being is, or both the being and the non-being are: but the non-being is not – by 
definition – whilst the being either is eternal or generated, or both. If it’s eternal, 
it’s infinite, but the infinite is in no place, and hence it is not. If it’s generated, 
either it’s been generated by the non-being or by the being; but the non-being 
cannot generate anything, and the being, if it is being, should already be and hence 
only nothingness is – indeed an example of a Sophistic argument.
10. Not to be confused with the – linked – subsequent philosophical movement of the 
scepticism that thrived during the Hellenistic period.
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11. Admittedly this is mostly a notion produced by later epochs – like the patrie of 
the French revolution – albeit a strong sense of a common civilisation is generally 
considered to be a defining feature of ancient Greece.
12. We have discussed the works of Fox and Miller, Farmer, and Abel and Sementelli 
because they are highly representative of this stream of thought, but it should be 
noted there are many other important works in this strand, to which we cannot do 
justice for reasons of brevity.
13. Aristotle, who first fully theorised the ‘categories of being’, identified the follow-
ing ones: substance; quality; quantity; relationship; acting or action; ‘passion’ (in 
the – etymological – sense of being subjected to something, of receiving the effect 
of an action as opposed to acting); place; time. These are the main categories; 
Aristotle also additionally mentioned ‘having’ and ‘lying’, but these are seldom 
used elsewhere by Aristotle, and reference is usually made to the first eight.
14. One standard social science definition of ‘causal effect’ is as ‘the difference 
between the systematic component of observations made when the explanatory 
variable takes one value and the systematic component of comparable observa-
tions when the explanatory variable takes on another value’ (King et al., 1994, 
pp. 81–2). In King et al.’s approach, the explanatory variables are referred to as 
the ‘causal variables’ (revealingly also called the ‘treatment variables’: their status 
hinges upon the manipulator rather than enjoying the status of cause by them-
selves) and are distinguished from the control variables. This definition is close 
to the notion of efficient cause in Aristotle’s framework, whilst the other causes, 
and notably both the final cause and the formal cause, tend to disappear from the 
horizon of the investigator.
15. It is further distinguished between necessary and sufficient conditions: a necessary 
condition, or cause, must be present for the effect to manifest itself, but by itself 
is not enough and other conditions must be present as well; a sufficient condition 
means that its presence by itself determines the ensuing of the effect.
16. This is the core argument of King et al. (1994, p. 87). We also recall here the 
definition of ‘causal effect’ put forward by King et al. as ‘the difference between 
the systematic component of observations made when the explanatory variable 
takes one value and the systematic component of comparable observations when 
the explanatory variable takes on another value’ (King et al., 1994, pp. 81–2).
17. It goes without saying, many research works resorting to the notion of probabilis-
tic causation do attempt to provide explanations for the social phenomena and do 
not limit themselves to asserting a probabilistic link – the reference here is to those 
that refrain from such attempts and content themselves with having established 
some sort of correlation.
18. Bhaskar (1975), a leading scholar in realism, and Elder-Vass (2010, pp. 44‒7 in 
particular) develop a similar line of argumentation and, in our view, they address 
the same issue outlined by the dispute over the nature of universals albeit with 
a different terminology, thence reinforcing our claim about the vivid actuality of 
this issue.
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7. Ambrogio Lorenzetti, Niccolò 
Machiavelli, Thomas More: on 
virtues, realism and utopian thinking 
in public administration
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we present the masterpieces of three authors – Ambrogio 
Lorenzetti (1290–1348), Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), Thomas More 
(1478–1535) – as entry point to discuss three themes of major significance for 
PA: the role of virtues (of governors and citizens alike) in public governance, 
the meaning of realism (about power, about the human nature) in politics and 
PA, and the significance and potential of utopian thinking for PA.
Why these authors, and what are their enduring messages? The selection of 
thinkers is a very subjective choice by the author of this book, although not 
a casual one. Continuing our journey through philosophical thinking and PA 
through the study of these works may enable us to touch on three key, yet pro-
foundly different, perspectives that continue to shed light on politics at large 
and PA in particular, even if five centuries and more separate us from the time 
when they were wrought out.
Starting from utopian thinking, scholars of public administration may prob-
ably associate the word and be more familiar with the notion of ideal-type, 
as minted by Weber (1978/1922). Ideal-types (to which we return later in 
the chapter) are pure forms within the world; More’s utopia is a whole world 
‘other’. However, its otherness does not prevent, but rather enables the critique 
of this world and as such becomes a tool for a constructive critique, a means 
capable of driving behaviours towards perfection, or at least improvement, in 
this world. Teleological thinking may be a source of betterment: this is one key 
message conveyed by the masterpiece Utopia written by Thomas More and 
published first in Leuven, Belgium, in 1516.
By contrast, Machiavelli’s masterpiece, The Prince, is about this earthly 
world, where power and violence are upfront – irrespective of any moral 
judgement we may formulate. Lorenzetti’s Allegory and Effects of Good and 
Bad Government (a painting rather than a book in this case) is about this world, 
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albeit a world in which the things as they are and the things as they ought to be 
are intimately connected: Lorenzetti’s masterpiece is about the two destinies 
of this world when, respectively, the exercise of virtues is upfront or it is the 
dominance of vices to take roots in public governance; the former is a destiny 
of ‘good government’ and its effects on the fulfilment of the lives of its inhab-
itants; the latter is a story of bad government and its detrimental effects.
In this chapter we first ponder on Lorenzetti’s masterpiece and its enduring 
teachings about the function that virtues and virtuous behaviour perform. We 
then turn to the ‘realism’ taught us – in quite crude, disenchanted terms – by 
Machiavelli. Finally, we mull over the meaning and possible usages of utopias 
for contemporary PA. The final part of the chapter discusses the insights from 
these works in light of concepts and notions to which the contemporary PA 
discourse is more accustomed, like that of ideal-type (a notion first worked out 
by Max Weber).
There are two preliminary important caveats for the reader, before plunging 
into works that date back centuries from now. The first caveat is that the notion 
of the separation between politics and administration, the (highly contested) 
Wilsonian notion of the distinction between a political sphere and the sphere 
of administration, and the conception of the legal–rational bureaucracy as 
the most rational form of political domination of Weberian ascendant (nicely 
summed up and discussed, for example, by Rosser, 2018), are late 19th and 
20th century conceptions that are utterly absent from the horizon of the works 
of the three selected authors. Politics and administration are totally intermin-
gled in these works (but maybe this is also the case nowadays?), and the reader 
is asked to adjust her/his lenses to accommodate this perspective. As a second 
caveat, the reader should be alerted to the fact that rather than focusing on 
the huge influence these authors have wielded over subsequent (successive) 
philosophers, philosophies, the social sciences and social practices (a daunting 
task undertaken by many scholars whose works fill the libraries), this chapter 
aims at providing a journey ‘back to the source’, to the original writing (or 
painting) of these fascinating thinkers. For reasons of brevity we do not delve 
at any length into their time and historical–political context (there are books 
for this: see Ryan, 2012); instead, we focus on their most famous work, their 
masterpiece. And eventually we will rediscover the continued significance of 
the messages contained in these masterpieces for contemporary PA.
AMBROGIO LORENZETTI, THE GOOD GOVERNMENT 
AND THE ROLE OF VIRTUES FOR PUBLIC 
GOVERNANCE
We start from the set of murals painted by Ambrogio Lorenzetti in the Hall 
of the Nine Governors (the ‘City Hall’) of the Italian city of Siena between 
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1338 and 1339. It is the first piece in the history of Italian art to have a civic 
theme. Lorenzetti was the most famous painter active at the time in the then 
self-governing republic of Siena. He was highly trained in philosophy (Argan, 
1969, p. 34) and was intimately acquainted with the Aristotelian–Thomistic 
philosophy and political philosophy (see Chapter 2), which in manifold 
respects his masterpiece represents through artistic means. The work is a series 
of frescoes – very well conserved thanks to restoration works in the final part of 
the 20th century – entitled Allegory and Effects of Good and Bad Government 
(we will refer to it in short as The Good Government in the remainder when 
generally referring to the entirety of the four frescoes). The paintings occupy 
three of the four walls of the town hall, whilst sunlight is let into the room 
through the fourth wall.
The first of the four paintings is the Allegory of Good Government (see 
Figure 7.1). Some translate this to ‘Good Governance’ because the Italian 
(or the Latin) language does not provide for a distinction like the one the 
English language enables between ‘government’ and ‘governance’. We prefer 
the translation ‘government’ here, for reasons discussed in this section, but 
acknowledge that both carry explanatory value. (Ongaro and van Thiel, with 
the invaluable aid of over a dozen colleagues, have recently conducted an 
analysis on the ‘words of public governance and management’ and the ways 
in which certain key English words are utilised in the national PA discourses 
in various European languages; Ongaro and van Thiel, 2018a.) The other 
painting is entitled and represents the Effects of Good Government in the City 
and the Countryside: it is a very large painting – ca. 14 metres – about equally 
split into the two parts of the effects of good government in the city and the 
countryside respectively; the last fresco is the Allegory of Bad Government 
(allegory and effects on the city and the countryside). The Allegory of Good 
Government is dominated by virtues, on top of which are the theological 
virtues (those that are made possible by the Faith in Christ) and then the 
cardinal (or ‘human’) virtues, placed alongside justice and the symbol of the 
Municipality (in Italian language translated as Comune, a word whose root is 
‘common’ or ‘community’), whilst at the bottom are represented the army and 
the citizens: the people of the Republic of Siena in times of war and peace. 
‘Divine Sapience’ is at the apex and ‘Justice’ stretched towards it, as if it were 
straining to draw from its source. Concord stems from justice in the form of 
ropes joined together by angels and passed to the first citizen. Various virtues 
are represented throughout. A peaceful and thriving city life is represented 
in the Effects of Good Government in the City, and a prosperous and secure 
countryside is depicted in the Effects of Good Government in the Countryside. 
Finally, the Allegory of Bad Government and the Effects of Bad Government 
on the City and Countryside are depicted one next to the other, forming the 
fourth main fresco. The representation of vices dominates the Allegory of Bad 
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Government. The landscape takes on an ethical dimension in Lorenzetti: it is 
not the undifferentiated space made of dull matter of Descartes (Chapter 2), it 
is rather a man-shaped place, a place made better or worse by the value-imbued 
choices taken by the citizens: space too is either virtuous or vicious.
Before we delve into the significance of this work for contemporary PA, 
we should address a preliminary methodological question: can we use artistic 
works, and notably works from the past, for advancing our knowledge and 
understanding of PA? What is the philosophical foundation of using a work of 
art, in the case a work of visual art (a series or cycle of paintings) dating back 
about seven centuries, to advance knowledge and understanding of contempo-
rary PA? Following Drechsler, we argue that we can, because:
[T]his is superbly explained by none other than Hans-Georg Gadamer: ‘art is the 
overcoming of the past. All is presence in art. It becomes presence’ (Gadamer, 
1997: 25). This is so because art is only ‘there’ during ‘the act’– interpretation, in 
the sense of engagement, is what makes the work of art. This is a-temporal; if we 
look seriously at, and engage with Lorenzetti’s fresco – … it becomes alive at that 
moment, and on a level that is neither merely aesthetic nor purely intellectual or 
historical. (Drechsler, 2001a: 7/8)
A related way of arguing about the significance of art flows from Martin 
Heidegger’s conception of every work of art, every masterpiece as a whole 
world, where the unveiling of Being occurs through the engagement of the 
beholder with the masterpiece.
Works of art may be verbal (like in poetry) or non-verbal, like in the figura-
tive arts. Not all knowledge is verbal; indeed, an essential part of knowledge 
and understanding is inherently non-verbal,1 and possibly PA has drawn too 
little from non-verbal knowledge (although, just to mention familiar examples 
in the cognate field of private management, Mintzberg et al. (2009) widely use 
graphic, non-verbal communication as a form of expression of knowledge). 
Hence, an understanding of public governance and public administration 
may be enriched and enhanced by engaging with artworks, and notably also 
non-verbal artworks.
In recent times, this approach has been advocated and efficaciously pro-
pounded by scholars like Wolfgang Drechsler2 and Gjalt de Graaf. Through 
the works of Drechsler and de Graaf, debating Lorenzetti’s masterpiece has 
become a mainstay in the PA literature (Drechsler, 2001a; de Graaf and van 
Asperen, 2018). Drechsler and de Graaf use Lorenzetti’s frescoes not as an 
illustration, but as the core of the argument (Drechsler, 2001a). De Graaf’s 
main research question is:
How can Lorenzetti’s frescoes of Good Governance inspire our modern-day 
conception of good governance? [and] In the search for insight into the concept of 
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good governance, our goal is to see whether the frescoes can help us develop a fresh 
perspective on what makes governance, good governance. We use the hermeneutics 
of art. (de Graaf and van Asperen, 2018, pp. 40‒8)
In further elaborating on the possibility of using art in PA scholarly work:
Following this line of thought, under the right circumstances the analysis of a work 
of art can lead to inspired insights. In art history, images – paintings, statues, prints 
or miniatures – do not serve as illustrations of ‘how it used to be.’ On the contrary, 
the image, its context, and its intended audience(s) are the points of departure which, 
combined with other archival, literary, and visual sources, expose the concepts and 
practices of its day, both intentionally and unintentionally. Works of art show ways 
of looking at the world that might seem strange to modern eyes. They offer an unfa-
miliar view, and that is exactly why they can be inspiring. In the case of Lorenzetti’s 
fresco on good governance, the discussion should involve both art historians and 
public administration scholars. Only when an argument integrates a thought – 
through interpretation of iconographic detail and a vision which goes beyond the 
purely historical, does it become a serious discussion about the inspirational power 
of imagery. (de Graaf and van Asperen, 2018, pp. 408‒9)
What teachings can therefore be drawn from a contemporary reading of The 
Good Government for the purposes of advancing contemporary PA – by inspir-
ing and generating understanding?3
Key virtues in the Christian tradition, both ‘civic’ and ‘human’ tout court, are 
Prudentia (Prudence), Fortitudo (Fortitude), Magnanimitas (Magnanimity), 
Temperantia (Temperance), and these are deeply linked to Iustitia (Justice) 
and Pax (Peace) and Concordia, which can be translated as Harmony or, pos-
sibly better in the context of this work, Unity or Concord (the Latin etymology 
of concord being: the hearts lying together, the togetherness of hearts). The 
key ‘argument’ (expressed in visual form) of the Good Government is that the 
common good can be achieved only when these virtues are practised, notably 
by the governors (the painting is in the ‘Room of the Nine’, the meeting room 
where the nine governors of the Republic of Siena of the time met and deliber-
ated on the governing of the city, in their duty of office taken up on a rotating 
basis). The judgement of the author has been left open about how much the 
practice of virtues by the citizens is also decisive for the positive effects of 
good government to manifest themselves (as it seems to be suggested by the 
fact the rope that is passed from the Justice realm via Concordia by the citizens 
ties the hand of Good Government that holds the sceptre4), or whether ‘vir-
tuous government’ may remedy the lack of public engagement and commit-
ment to the common cause by the citizens – although evidently Lorenzetti is 
concentrated on the effects of governmental action, and hence on the practice 
of virtues by governors. For this reason, the represented virtues are primarily 
intended as the governors’ virtues: the very location of the murals in the City 
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Hall is testimony to this meaning. However, the people of Siena are widely 
represented throughout, and hence virtues might well be interpreted as being in 
equal measure citizens’ and governors’ virtues – a message that echoes ancient 
Greek philosophers on the constitutive linkages between individuals’ virtues 
and civic virtues, and hence on virtues of all citizens,5 as well as echoing 
modern and contemporary republican thinking on the requirement of citizens 
practising civic virtues and exercising their ‘positive freedom’ and partake to 
the common sorts of the political community.
The qualification of ‘good’ government may also be noted – not ‘best’, 
‘excellent’, ‘cool’ or whatever other superlative tends to be fashionable now-
adays. ‘Good’ is inherently a non-comparative concept, which is not ‘better’ 
than somebody else’s government or ‘best’: the practice of virtues leads to the 
common good across places and times, although the magnitude of the effects 
may be variable depending on the relative wealth of the country, the proclivi-
ties and talents of its citizens, and the like.
The depiction is also about ‘government’, not governance. This may be due 
simply to the consideration that as a matter of fact the distinction between gov-
ernment and governance is not expressible through two distinct words in either 
Latin or the Italian language (this also applies to 14th century Italian), but the 
emphasis on the well-functioning army (typically an area where, it may be 
argued, governmental direct action does matter) as a condition for the secure 
development of the political community is testimony that the emphasis is at 
least on par on governmental action as it is on the broader good governance.
Logical connections may be drawn amongst the virtues. It is primarily from 
Wisdom and Justice that stem the conditions leading to the common good 
and a thriving political community. However, once this status is provisionally 
achieved, in order to maintain and protect it over time Fortitude is required, to 
maintain incorrupt behaviours and ultimately protect the common good from 
enemies arising both from the outside and from within the community. In 
fact, unity in the community is highly valued and upheld, also by physically 
placing it centre stage in the painting: this is indication of the significance 
attributed to the virtue of Concord. The significance of concord may be better 
appreciated in light of an interpretation of the world-famous Palio di Siena, 
the competition that every year sees all the districts of Siena, or contrada as 
they are called, in a horse race in the municipal square, Piazza del Campo (an 
architectural masterpiece; see Figure 7.2). This is a heart-felt competition, very 
far from fair play, and the jockey is either extolled if he wins or lampooned 
by district-fellows, even ostracised, if he fails to win (ostracism, at least sym-
bolically if nowadays not physically, happens to all jockeys,6 but the winner 
– because second place is no consolation – and only the allure of being the idol 
and icon of the contrada drives youngsters to train as jockeys in defiance of the 
likelihood to become forever labelled as ‘loser’). This race dates back to about 
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one century before Lorenzetti painted his famous fresco, and it can be stated 
that the spirit and the inner dynamics of life in Siena as they manifested them-
selves in the Palio were surely well-known to him (although other historians 
disagree as to the significance of the Palio as we know it today during the times 
of Lorenzetti; Drechsler, 2001a). How to keep the city of Siena united in the 
presence of so intensely felt local, district-level identities, and in spite of such 
harsh competition between its constituencies? The key message stemming 
from the painting – which would sound like music to the ears of ideologists 
of federalism and federal polities in the larger sense – is that the autonomy of 
local units, their self-organisation, their role as provider of ‘welfare-related’ 
services, and last but not least their capacity to generate what in contemporary 
terms (and to mention a famous study whose field evidence comes from Italy; 
see Putnam et al., 1993) is labelled ‘social capital’ are highly valuable things 
– subject to only one, yet crucial, condition: that they do not undermine the 
overall unity of the superior political order, the city itself. Hence, the promi-
nent place given to the virtue of unity, or concord, in the painting. Indeed, you 
win absolutely nothing at the Palio: it is an identity-building exercise, but also 
an opportunity to channel rivalry into games, rather than having divisions to 
seriously undermine the substantive unity of the city.
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Figure 7.2 Piazza del Campo, Siena, Italy
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A final question may appropriately be asked: who pays (Drechsler, 2015a)? 
In much more recent times the Italian banking sector ran into trouble due to 
the hypertrophy and expansionist appetites of one of its largest banks, and the 
oldest bank not just of Italy but of the entire world: this is the historical bank of 
Siena (named Monte dei Paschi di Siena). The reason of this recent-times near 
bankruptcy lay also in the greedy behaviour of those in charge at the time, at 
least some of them: vice replaced virtue, notably replaced the fourth of the car-
dinal (main) virtues: temperance. Commerce and services, thriving at the time 
in Siena, contribute to the well-being of the political community by bringing 
wealth, the much-needed wealth that pays for public welfare and services as 
well – but these arts require to be practised under the guidance of the virtue 
of temperance, without ever giving in to greed: a rule of behaviour, which of 
course equally if not primarily applies to those in charge of ruling the city.
Alongside cardinal virtues, Lorenzetti’s frescoes also give much emphasis 
to the so-called ‘theological’ or biblical virtues. Before concluding, it is worth 
dwelling on the consideration of the significance of theological virtues in the 
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Allegory. We leave the floor to de Graaf, who aptly noticed and elaborated on 
this point:
As a departure from other public administration studies on images of good govern-
ance (with the notable exception of Drechsler, 2001), we begin here with an analysis 
from the art historian’s perspective. A careful examination of that part of the fresco 
that depicts the Allegory of Good Governance reveals that there are some elements 
in the fresco that have so far received little attention in secondary literature, despite 
the extensive scholarly awareness of the fresco. These underexposed aspects are 
the biblical virtues of faith, hope and charity. Today these virtues are often ignored 
in governance studies that mention the frescoes (e.g. Hendrik and Drosterij, 2012; 
Drechsler, 2001; Liebling, 2010), probably because they don’t fit current views 
of what good governance entails. In the literature of art history, they have been 
noted, but have been branded as ‘less central’ than the other virtues, ‘somewhat 
removed from the main scene’ (Rubinstein, 1958: 180). Even those scholars who 
have recognized the important position of the biblical virtues more fully (e.g. Von 
Thadden, 1951) have not tried to establish why these were incorporated at a time 
when faith, hope and charity had not previously been components of the imagery of 
good governance … In our view, the biblical virtues are more vital to the fresco than 
generally recognized in art history (or public administration or political science) 
studies. Every last element in the fresco has been carefully chosen and there is no 
reason to assume that the biblical virtues were incorporated without thinking them 
through thoroughly: Lorenzetti incorporated them for a reason … The biblical 
virtues deserve careful consideration here, too, because they offer a different and 
supplementary view, not just of the fresco itself, but also of what was regarded as 
good governance. (de Graaf and van Asperen, 2018, pp. 409‒10)
Representing good government was not unique to Lorenzetti’s frescoes. But 
Siena was different from kingdoms and empires where the ruler was entrusted 
absolute power: Siena was a city state, an innovative form of administration 
in which at least a portion of the population, the aristocratic families, were 
actively engaged in government, notably through a mechanism or rotation 
into high office. Power had become more impersonal, it was not embodied by 
one person, the emperor or king, but rather transferred to institutions. These 
institutions, however, were to be run by human beings, on whose virtuosity of 
behaviour the well-being of the community depended. For this reason:
In order to depict good (and bad) governance, Ambrogio Lorenzetti adapted the 
traditional ruler portrait to represent a group of people instead of only one person 
(Rubinstein, 1958: 181). As in traditional ruler portraits, an enthroned male figure is 
surrounded by female personifications of the virtues that were associated with good 
governance. But unlike former and contemporary ruler portraits the male figure 
is not an historical person, nor a living ruler; he has divine features reminiscent 
of images of Christ ruling the world as Saviour (Skinner, 1999: 11–14). In short, 
Lorenzetti was depicting a personification of the Good Ruler, a secularized counter-
part of the heavenly king … He is both a figure of authority and a visualization of 
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that community to which the governors should subordinate their own interests. He is 
both ruler and servant. (de Graaf and van Asperen, 2018, pp. 410‒11)
And how does the behaviour of the ruler relate to the biblical virtues? The 
nexus is for Lorenzetti constitutive, in fact:
Lorenzetti depicts the three theological virtues [Faith, Hope, Charity]. Lorenzetti 
gives them pride of place with charity at the top according to St Paul’s ranking: 
‘And now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three: but the greatest of these 
is charity.’ (I Cor. 13.13) … But what, then, does charity entail to merit such an 
important place in Lorenzetti’s fresco and to suggest that it is a significant element 
in good governance? Today, charity is mostly regarded as the love of one’s fellow 
man. Charitable acts are directed towards fellow human beings. In Augustinian 
times, however, the virtue of charity was regarded as the love of one’s neighbour, 
but also as the love of God (Augustine, Narrationes in Psalmos, Patrologia Latina 
XXXVI.260: ‘Amor Dei, amor proximi, charitas dicitur’). Without the love of 
God, it is impossible to love one’s neighbour, and the other way around. These 
are two inseparable sides of one coin. Augustine regarded charity as the virtue to 
uplift mankind and reflect man’s closeness to God, because the love of man was 
a reflection of God’s love of mankind . Christ had offered himself for the sake of 
human beings. Only the grace of God’s love makes it possible for human beings to 
love. By loving one’s neighbour, a person could imitate Christ and get as close to 
God as humanly possible. The virtuous life thus transcends earthly boundaries; it 
conducts the soul to God, where it longs to be, as Augustine argues (Augustine, De 
Civitate Dei, esp. ch. 6, PL 41, cols. 757–760). In Lorenzetti’s fresco, charity is not 
only depicted as the most important Christian virtue, as Paul had emphasized, but 
the most important virtue of a Christian ruler … Guided by charity, both the love 
of God and the love of mankind, inextricably connected as warp and weft of one 
fabric, the governors could elevate the commune and all her members and bring 
them closer to God. This ideal, heavenly, state is anticipated in charity’s upturned 
gaze. Depicted at the top of the pyramid of virtues, she is the link between God and 
men. What is the purpose of it all? What would be the outcome if those involved 
in government let themselves be inspired by the picture of the ideal that Lorenzetti 
painted for them? In the middle of the fresco, between divine justice and the Good 
Ruler, Lorenzetti added the personification of peace which is the effect or outcome 
of good governance. The preservation of harmony and peace was certainly consid-
ered the most important task for the nine who presided over the commune of Siena. 
At the beginning of the oath of office taken by the nine they swore to ‘provide that 
the commune and people of the magnificent city of Siena are, and are preserved, 
in good peace and concord’ (Waley, 1991: 47; Bowsky, 1981: 55). In his allegory, 
Lorenzetti shows the council members how to contribute to this peaceful state. The 
presence of peace underlines that his is not just a guidebook containing rules that the 
governors of the city state should follow in order to be ‘good,’ but he is providing an 
image of ‘good governance’ that incorporates both its prerequisites and its effects. 
To sum up, good governance results from virtuous governors who place charity 
before everything else. From charity all other virtues follow and without charity 
the other virtues are meaningless. The love of God and the love of men that make 
governors a reflection of the supreme judge are both essential to the achievement 
of peace on earth, of an earthly paradise. (de Graaf and van Asperen, 2018, p. 413)
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In sum, de Graaf’s and Drechsler’s arguments are about tying together 
ontology, behaviours and effects: good virtues lead to good government and 
governance, which manifest themselves in the well-being of the community; 
conversely, vices lead to poor, even wicked, governance. Within this frame, de 
Graaf’s argument emphasises the actuality of benevolence and altruism, and 
their roots in the virtue of charity (in a Christian perspective). This topic might 
seem afield in PA, but it is not: ‘PA scholars like Frederickson and Hart (1985; 
also Frederickson, 1980, 1997; Hart, 1974) argue for an ethic of civic human-
ism centered on the virtue of benevolence’ (Esquith, 2006, p. 537). To make 
their case, and referring to contemporary democracy in the US, Frederickson 
and Hart (as aptly summed up by Esquith, 2006, pp. 538–9):
[U]sing the striking comparison between Nazi bureaucrats and Danish civil servants 
during World War II, they argued that while the former had lost any feeling of moral 
responsibility to a regime that was a corrupt charade, the Danes under Nazi occu-
pation continued to feel a ‘profound commitment to the democratic values of their 
nation and genuine love of the people’ … Therefore … The ‘special relationship’ 
that must exist between public servants and citizens in a democracy is founded upon 
the conscious knowledge of the citizens that they are loved by the bureaucracy.
This position (which in a number of respects comes close to that of the ‘exis-
tentialist public administrator’, see Chapter 4) predicates of public administra-
tors to interpret the fundamental ‘regime values’ of the country and to always 
gauge the way in which they are carrying out the policies they are enjoined to 
effect against these values – suggesting that ultimately the ‘glue’ that enables 
public administrators to effect those values is benevolence. The centrality of 
charity for ‘good governance’ is both a contemporary concern and a theme 
of active investigation. It is a mainstay in politics and PA that has long been 
recognised, not least by Lorenzetti’s masterpiece.
Finally, it may be claimed that virtue-inspired government and governance 
has only the sky as its limit: it is literally about striving to achieve ‘perfection’. 
The thrust towards perfection is inherent in the virtue discourse and present 
since Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophical speculation on the just society. The 
masterpieces all around in Siena and elsewhere across Italy, in public spaces 
and churches, acted as powerful reminders – to Ambrogio Lorenzetti and also 
to his fellow citizens – of a common, diffuse effort to strive towards perfection 
and the divine that was driving the minds and hearts of the peoples of Italy 
during a period in which signories and city-states were flourishing across the 
peninsula (paving the way to the Italian Renaissance).
The roots of virtue politics – and virtue administration – are commonly 
ascribed to Aristotle. Aristotle distinguished between moral virtues (in which 
reason tempers emotions and passions and finds the proper balance of the 
opposite poles to steer the behaviour of humans as ‘rational animals’) and 
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intellectual virtues (in which reason pursues its own goal: contemplating 
truth and being; and thus the human being as ‘rational animal’ fulfils itself 
by achieving contemplation), arguing that both are necessary for a happy 
life – where happiness is fundamentally intended as the fulfilment of our very 
human nature (the notion of eudaimonia discussed in the previous chapter). In 
this perspective, practical and contemplative wisdom figure prominently in the 
painting: in contemplating the eternal Being (in capital), human beings partake 
of the very eternity of Being. It is a philosophical tenet that would be widely 
taken up during the Renaissance.
Continuing a tradition dating back to the ancient age,7 virtues are centre 
stage in medieval thought as the basis of any good government, harmonised 
with Christian values and derived in a deductive fashion (from the Bible or 
by means of reasoning). In the late Middle Ages, theological and cardinal 
virtues come to be flanked by more mundane virtues (like liberalitas, magnif-
icentia, majestas – liberality, magnificence, majesty – in De Principe Liber 
by Giovanni Pontano), and in this expanded conception continue throughout 
the Renaissance to be centre stage: the centrality of the practice of virtues and 
wisdom is reasserted in works like Erasmus’s The Education of a Christian 
Prince.
It is during the Renaissance, however, that some form of divorce between 
the virtue discourse and ‘realism’ starts to creep in: Renaissance writers asked 
questions that would be treated later in an unconventional (at the time) way 
by Machiavelli: is it better for the prince to be beloved or feared? Are ‘public’ 
virtues distinct from ‘private’ virtues? (as argued by Francesco Patrizi in De 
Regno et Regis Institutione Libri IX). It is in this cultural climate of questioning 
the virtue narrative that Machiavelli would sharply distinguish moral virtues 
from political virtues, as we shall see.
The debate in the Renaissance in Italy was also about whether virtues hold 
an ‘absolute’, unconditional merit in producing ‘good effects’ or whether and 
to what extent they need to combine with the ‘appropriate’ constitutional form 
of the state (e.g. republic or principality)? Put shortly, the question was about 
what matters more: the virtues of the prince (the governors in general), or 
the constitutional form? Questions like these laid the ground for the birth of 
‘modern’ political science, and, on a more mundane and everyday level, they 
are still echoed throughout manifolds strands of the contemporary social sci-
entific literature, for example over the relative bearing of ‘leadership’ versus 
‘organisational design’ – although the roots of these debates in Renaissance 
thinking are seldom recognised, and such oblivion is hardly beneficial to the 
social scientific contemporary discourse.
The contemporary reader will find the virtue debate very much broader and 
‘loftier’ than the one s/he is accustomed to, which is more often framed in 
terms of ‘public values’ and ‘value systems’ in the public sector (see Bozeman, 
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2007; Frederickson, 1997). Jørgensen and Bozeman (2007) have produced 
a detailed inventory of values in the public sector. The ‘public values’ 
discourse is partly close to virtue discourses in the classic, medieval and 
Renaissance sense, which continues on to our days – but contemporary social 
scientific research has added an attention to the empirical implications of prac-
tising values (virtues) in the contemporary, hyper complex administrative and 
societal systems. Authors have pointed to public value conflicts (e.g. between 
procedural values and performance values, see de Graaf, 2014; the special 
issue edited by van der Wal et al. 2011; van der Wal and de Graaf, 2010) 
and the problem of prioritising values and clusters of values (Rutgers, 2008a, 
2008b; Jørgensen and Rutgers, 2015). Van Wart (1998) highlights certain 
properties of value systems in the public sector: they are especially complex, 
they derive from multiple sources – individual, professional, organisational, 
legal, public interest; they also serve as instruments to accommodate multiple 
interests; they change over time; they are subject to competition and they are 
contested. These ways of conceiving of public values is surely more attuned to 
the ears of the contemporary reader in their being drawn from different sources 
and ‘bespoke’ to different target groups and goals – but it may miss important 
teachings of the virtue discourse as has been practised during the Middle Ages 
and Renaissance.
One of the many reasons why such is the case is that, with the encounter 
of modern age, virtue philosophy also (re-)encountered hedonism, relativism 
and the centrality of individual subjective preferences, perspectives that are 
at odds with the virtue discourse. Interestingly, hedonism was also the main 
target of Aristotle’s discourse, thus perhaps suggesting that in the terrain of the 
foundation of what is ‘proper’ behaviour for the promotion of the well-being 
of a community it is hard to set the debate on entirely new ground, and much 
of the foundations have been laid over the past two-and-a-half millennia. It is 
true, however, that in the encounter with the modern age, virtue philosophy 
has also met novel challenges: one is the analysis of (unintended) social conse-
quences, like in Adam Smith’s classical argument about the pursuit of private 
interest serving the needs of people better than public virtues – although it is 
hard to imagine Lorenzetti contenting himself with the statement of fact that 
the butcher maximising her/his interest may serve her/his country fellows 
better than the virtuous governor. Instead, Lorenzetti would remind us of the 
bad effects to be expected if greed dominates citizens’ lives. However, it is 
unquestionable that social scientific investigations shedding light on such 
realities as ‘unintended consequences of purposive social action’, the influence 
of economic structures on social behaviour (as in both Marxian and some 
neo-liberal, economistic trends), and the like, may have a displacing effect on 
the virtue discourse, and that somehow such discourse has lost the upper hand 
over the past few centuries, and is struggling to recover the centre of the stage. 
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A state of affairs that the author of this book thinks is a major loss: for public 
discourse, for the well-being of public communities, and for the field of PA.
There are, of course major attempts at incorporating the virtue discourse into 
contemporary social scientific research on public ethics, by such authors as 
Lawton, van der Wal, Hubert (see recently Lawton et al., 2016). Some authors 
make explicit reference to the virtue discourse and its place in contemporary 
public administration and management (Lynch and Lynch, 2006). The public 
ethics discourse has taken multiple directions: from public service ethos to the 
status and significance of code of conducts or the meaning of the oath of office; 
from individual behaviours to integrity systems, coupling ethical concerns and 
a systems theory approach, in order to analyse and ‘manage’ integrity in the 
public services, and so forth (Macaulay, 2018).
Possibly the one application of the virtue debate that is of highest con-
temporary visibility and resonance in the public debates is the one on (anti-)
corruption: what behaviours should be effected for contrasting corruption 
in the public sector? Suggested remedies range from additional regulation 
and enhanced oversight to enforce the rules; to economics-based analysis of 
‘convenience’ of corruptive/corrupt behaviours to try to design systems that 
provide disincentives to corrupt behaviours; to social-psychology approaches 
pointing out value-formation processes and critical junctures in the profes-
sional life when values held by the individual may shift; to the influence the 
organisational environment wields on values and behaviours. Such social 
scientific, analysis-based recipes are of utmost importance for describing 
social phenomena and identifying causal links and chains that lead to more 
(or less) desirable outcomes, thus potentially enabling remedial interventions. 
However, the masterpiece of Lorenzetti – and broadly the millennia-old reflec-
tion of virtues in government – act in this frame as a powerful reminder of the 
importance of not losing sight of the broader perspective: good government 
and good governance require more than properly engineered systems (e.g. for 
combating corruption, for ensuring compliance with the laws, for instilling 
‘appropriate’ behaviours in public servants, etc.), however important they may 
be (and they are extremely important). Wisdom and justice, temperance and 
prudence, and charity, remain of overarching significance for the advancement 
of the well-being and for political communities that enable and nourish the 
fulfilment of lives.
Two final remarks conclude this section. First, a note to distinguish between 
public values ‘in the plural’ – the subject of the virtue discourse developed 
throughout this section – and public value ‘in the singular’. Public value in 
the singular concerns the ‘outcome’ of public organisations, the ‘results’ or 
impacts generated and delivered to the (variously denominated) citizens, users, 
customers, clients and the like. It brings with it issues of how to ‘measure’ 
the outputs of public organisations and their impact: the valuing process and 
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encompassing whom in such process. Public value is probably nowadays most 
famously associated with an attempt to measure the impact of public action on 
public needs, collectively identified and selected through democratic means, 
put forward by Mark Moore (1995). Various authors have worked on this and 
related themes, notably in the Benington and Moore (2011) edited work, who 
also emphasise the collective good of future generations, an attention which 
resonates widely in the virtue discourse, as already discussed in Chapter 5; 
notable works in the public value stream of inquiry include Alford et al. (2017); 
Hartley et al. (2017); and Talbot (2010, 2011). Interestingly, the very notion of 
public value is in this stream of scientific inquiry defined in both ‘subjective’ 
and ‘objective’ terms: public value is defined as ‘what the public values’ as 
well as ‘what is objectively of value’. In the first perspective, a subjective 
take on the question ‘what is public value?’ is adopted by answering ‘what 
the public values’ (Benington and Moore, 2011, pp. 42‒3) and by deploying 
the distinction between market value and use value, asserting the position that 
the public value approach resorts to the notion of use value: what is the value 
of usage for somebody, not how much somebody would be ready to pay for it 
(also on the grounds that public services are generally delivered in non-market 
contexts, without a selling price). Second and complementarily, an objective 
take on the question ‘what is public value?’ is taken by answering that public 
value is ‘what adds value to the public sphere’ (see pp. 43‒6), stressing that 
public value is not concerned only with individual interests and some sort of 
aggregation thereof, but also and crucially with the wider public interest and 
the longer-term public good, including the needs of the generations to come. 
It is especially in this second meaning that the notion of public value becomes 
broader than the measure of the individual outcomes (as are the notions of 
‘use value’ alongside the one of market value). Also, in revisiting Moore’s 
1995 work, it is not only public managers to be creator of public value, rather 
a wide range of stakeholders. Key notions here are those of co-production 
and co-creation: so for example, car-sharing arrangements may create public 
value by providing both effective transportation services (what the public 
values) and benefits to the environment, and thence also to the future gener-
ations (what adds value to the public sphere), and this occurs by having local 
public authorities and residents working together to co-produce the service of 
car-sharing, and preliminarily to that, to co-create the governance arrangement 
of car-sharing, by contriving the best form the delivery of the service can take.
Attempts have been hinted at suggesting how to bridge the public value 
debate with public values and indeed public virtues (an interpretation of the 
public value creation approach associated to Moore is that ‘at the core he 
sought to understand what citizens expect from public managers and how 
the pursuit of virtue is incorporated in executive activities’, see Liddle, 2018, 
p. 9698). This appears to be an important and promising path of inquiry.
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In concluding this section it is required, from a social scientific standpoint, 
to pinpoint the nexus between social action and the virtue discourse. Following 
the analysis developed by Virtanen (2018) about the ontological–logical struc-
ture of practical situations in administration, we may question what is the link 
between the virtue discourse as predicated across the epochs – from Aristotle 
to the Stoics during the Hellenistic epoch, to the Middle Ages and Renaissance 
and onto our times – and social action and administrative behaviour as we are 
more accustomed to intending it, after the seminal works of the fathers of con-
temporary PA like Max Weber and Herbert Simon. Condensing the issue into 
a question: how do virtues – to the extent they are a ‘property’ of the person 
who exercises and practises them – transform into social action and ultimately 
engender social effects? We can, in the space available here, only take the very 
large brush and sketch a few elements that may be useful to tackle this big 
question.
Social action is a key, defining notion for the discipline of sociology as well 
as across the social sciences, including PA, which has as one of its main foci 
the understanding of administrative action and administrative behaviour. Max 
Weber (1978/1922, p. 4) defines social action as follows: ‘We shall speak of 
“action” insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his 
behaviour – be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence. Action is “social” 
insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behaviour of others and 
is thereby oriented in its course.’
Intentionality plays a key role in this perspective, as does the assumption of 
instrumental rationality whereby the actor chooses a means in order to achieve 
an end. To the extent the actor’s behaviour follows his or her understanding 
about which course of action contributes to the achievement of the end, the 
action becomes evidently understandable. It is intentionality about what ends 
to pursue combined with the rational selection of means conducive to the 
valued end that explain the actor’s behaviour. Only in instances where the actor 
does not follow his or her beliefs and knowledge about effective action, do we 
need a causal explanation: the observed deviation from rational-instrumental 
action may be attributed to such factors as ‘misunderstanding, strategic errors, 
logical fallacies, personal temperament, or considerations outside the realm of 
strategy’ (Weber, 1978, p. 21).
If we interpret intentionality in the virtue perspective, the virtuous governor 
or citizen will have her or his value judgements inspired and shaped by virtues 
and the pursuit of perfection, and the course of action that follows will mainly 
lie in the selection of the instrumentally more apt behaviours, out of the range 
of the alternatives available to the limited rationality of the decision-maker, 
that allow fulfilling virtuous behaviours – virtuous in both their judgements 
about values and their factual judgements. Crucially, these alternatives will 
be reviewed in light of the inspiration stemming from the practice of the 
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virtues: is the provisionally chosen course of action inspired by prudence? Is 
it informed by criteria of justice? Is it enlightened by a wise understanding of 
the situation? The task of the social sciences, and notably the field of PA in 
our case, in this perspective lies in explaining deviation from rational action 
and behaviour, either due to a fault of instrumental rationality, whereby the 
selected means turned out to be inadequate for the task because of misunder-
standing, lack of knowledge, fallacies, or else; or due to deviation from virtu-
ous intentionality, whereby value judgements turned out to be flawed – fault 
ultimately being detected by the perverse effects the ensuing course of action 
begets, as in the second part of Lorenzetti’s painting where the effects of bad 
government are illustrated. Bad effects may be due to a fault in factual judge-
ments (instrumental rationality) as well as in value judgements (intentionality), 
and the two are intermingled in the virtue perspective. Virtues inspire value as 
well as factual judgements, and the two are in a sense ‘kept together’ by the 
practice of virtues.
A sharp distinction between value judgements and factual judgements is 
instead drawn by Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon and nowadays permeates 
the social sciences and PA. For Simon, value judgement is about ‘ought to 
dos’ – what should be done or made to exist; and ‘you can’t get an “ought,” 
by any manner of careful reasoning, solely from a set of pure “is’s”’ (Simon 
1947/1997, p. 68). Value judgements and factual judgements belong to two 
distinct dimensions, and the analysis of one (factual judgements, the remit of 
social science) can commence only when the other (value judgements) ends. 
Does this statement hold from the viewpoint of the virtues perspective? Can 
the virtue discourse be sub-divided between factual judgements (instrumental 
rationality) and value judgements in so sharp a way as Simon has claimed? 
Very tentatively, perhaps it may be put forward that the virtue perspective goes 
the opposite way: it rather strives to integrate the two kinds of judgement, or at 
least it has an overarching thrust towards keeping the two forms of judgement 
together: the ‘oughts’ and the ‘is’s’ are inextricably linked. Is this one reason 
why ‘modern’ social sciences (at least in the notion generally accepted by the 
followers of Simon) and millennia-old virtue discourses seem not to be able to 
communicate with each other? Is this the root of the chasm, the gulf between 
the two (and between the followers of Simon and those of Dwight Waldo, 
whose work might be interpreted as in closer continuity with the millennia-old 
‘public virtues’ discourse)? Those are crucial questions, and huge ones – to 
be much more fully tackled by other books, by other authors – but revisiting 
the works of virtue philosophers, and painters like Lorenzetti, represents firm 
ground on which to stand for tackling such questions.
There is another major challenge to the virtues discourse: it comes not (only) 
from distinguishing the realm of ‘values’ from the realm of ‘facts’, but instead 
it questions the extent to which virtues inspire behaviours. The realism critique 
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of the virtue discourses is a warning about the meanness of human nature and 
the ensuing impracticability of virtues, particularly when it comes to public 
behaviour, at least as much as it is a warning about the risks of overlooking 
instrumental rationality when virtues are placed centre stage. The intellectual 
work of Niccolò Machiavelli is an all-rounded manifestation of such question-
ing of the virtues discourse: it is to his foundational work we now turn.
NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI AND REALISM
Machiavelli is a sharp critic of the sustainability and expediency of the 
exercise of ethical virtues for the cause of building and safeguarding states. 
Niccolò Machiavelli9 was born on 3 March 1469 in Florence and passed away 
on 21 June 1527. He was appointed secretary of the Republic of Florence in 
1498 and lasted until 1512, when the republic fell and Florence re-became 
a Principality with the Medici family re-instated in power. He since never 
returned to public office, notwithstanding many attempts pursued with sheer 
determination. It was in the aftermath of having been toppled from office that 
he conceived his masterpiece, Il Principe – The Prince, which takes the form 
of a letter addressed to the new ruler of Florence, Lorenzo de’ Medici, having 
the purpose of providing him with advice for the most effective exercise of his 
role. Implicitly, The Prince is also a plea to be re-instated in office.
In his attempt to re-gain access to office, Machiavelli was less effective than 
his contemporary and country fellow Francesco Guicciardini, like him genius 
of the art of government, who after serving in the Republic of Florence later 
managed to serve in roles in the re-instated principality of Florence under the 
Medici family and for the Holy See. Machiavelli and Guicciardini represent 
one of the first examples, indeed exemplars, of the ‘technician’, the person 
whose skills and ingenuity in the art of the state and the possession of technical 
knowledge is put at the service of different political masters, always with the 
intent of perfecting, or at least improving, the workings of the state.10 The two 
main works of Machiavelli are The Prince and Discorsi sopra la prima Deca 
di Tito Livio (Discourses on Livy). The latter, mostly complete before The 
Prince, are reflections on the lessons that can be drawn from the works of the 
Roman historian Titus Livius (Livy), and notably on how to run a republic. It 
is not unlikely that Machiavelli conceived of the Discourses on Livy as a work 
whose utility also lay in preparing the politico-administrative elite in the event 
of a successful re-instatement of the republican form in Florence (his links 
with the cultural environment of the Orti Oricellari, an elite circle aiming at 
re-instating the republic in Florence, are well documented). Discourses on Livy 
tackle the problem of how to make an already existent state work: it is about 
the qualities a people must possess in order for its state and political commu-
nity to thrive in an insecure and perilous world. The Prince (written, for the 
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most part, at breakneck speed in 1513, just after having lost his post at the helm 
of the administration of the Florentine Republic of 1498–1512) is a reflection 
on the qualities that an individual, the Prince, must possess to gain and main-
tain power under different political regimes. It is intended as a textbook about 
how to set up a state and the role and function of the Prince as demiurge of the 
process. The backdrop of this is the prefiguring of the Italian state, beyond the 
many conflicting and weak principalities that populated the landscape of Italy 
in the 16th century, and that were under the de facto domination of the king-
doms of France and Spain. Ultimately, the inspiration and motivation of The 
Prince is idealistic and patriotic,11 inspired by the dream of the unity of Italy 
(which would materialise only three-and-a-half centuries after Machiavelli), 
and yet the content aims at being value-neutral: to teach the art of getting to 
power and maintaining it, and practising those qualities and behaviours that 
are required to achieve such goals. Within the setting of the problem of how to 
establish a new state, Machiavelli addresses the specific questions of ‘how to 
get to power?’ and ‘how to keep power?’.
The Prince is articulated in thirty-six chapters, through which the argu-
ment unfolds as follows. Chapters I–XI outline a typology of principalities: 
they may be inherited or new acquisitions, self-standing or parts of wider 
domains, acquired by means of armies – owned or mercenary – or conquered 
by virtue or by chance. The one Machiavelli is most interested in is the brand 
new principality, as such would be a unified Italy under a prince. As we have 
hinted at, the main thrust and overarching motivation in writing The Prince 
and dedicating it to Lorenzo de’ Medici lies in the fact that the Medici family 
was in power both in Florence and in Rome, and hence presenting a window of 
opportunity for the two most substantial powers in central Italy to coalesce and 
‘rescue’ Italy from warfare, to ultimately re-unify it. Machiavelli was inspired 
in this vision by the consideration that the glories of ancient Rome, whose 
empire stretched across a huge expanse from the Middle-East encompassing 
the entirety of the Mediterranean basin to reach out to territories like nowadays 
England, first lay in a unified Italy under its control.
Chapters XII–XIV discuss the respective merits of mercenary versus own 
militias: the main argument here is that own militias – a proper state army – is 
a prerequisite for maintaining power. Chapters XV–XIX vet the virtues and 
behaviour proper for a prince: a well-specified definition of virtue is here 
adopted, far away from the notion of virtues depicted by Lorenzetti: virtuous 
behaviours are those that are useful for ruling the state – an instrumental 
notion of virtue in stark contrast with the medieval virtues discourse and any 
notion of harmony between moral behaviour and political behaviour. For 
Machiavelli, immoral patterns of action, like cruelty in deeds and deceit in 
words, may be functional to the goal of ruling the state, and in this sense may 
be considered as ‘virtues’. This was not something unknown to rulers before 
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him, but Machiavelli was the first to formulate the functionality of immoral 
behaviours for the purposes of ruling the state in both lucid and crude terms. 
Chapters XX–XXIII provide a range of precepts on appropriate behaviours 
for the prince vis-à-vis his advisors, courtiers, flatterers, and so on – putting 
a strong accent on the importance for the prince to avert flatterers. Chapter 
XXIV gauges the responsibility of the extant Italian princes and the reasons 
why they lost control of their states.
Chapter XXV is a most famous chapter. It contains a reflection on the 
relative influence of virtue and chance in shaping the course of human events: 
what is the clout of human action in shaping the course of things, as opposed 
to chance ruling events and the fortunes of the world? Machiavelli famously 
stated that ‘fortune is the arbiter of half our actions, but that it lets us control 
roughly the other half’, by which he meant that the outcomes of our intentional 
(social) actions are for a half determined by chance, but for the other half are 
shaped by our actions. He then sways in the way in which fortune is depicted; 
at times it is seen as a natural force, like the flooding of a river, which cannot 
be controlled when it bursts, but it can be controlled when the river is not in 
flood, provided men are industrious and savvy enough to take the proper pre-
cautions. It is, therefore, only idleness in taking precautions that makes chance 
have such a great say in the course of human events. Other times, however, 
Machiavelli appears more akin to conceive of fortune as a sort of zeitgeist, 
the spirit of the time or the set of circumstances in which the social actors 
operate. In this second perspective, it is the fit between the circumstances, on 
the one hand, and the temperament, natural inclinations and qualities, skills 
and mode of operation that is more congenial to somebody, on the other hand, 
that determines whether he or she will be successful. Certain epochs or sets 
of circumstances are more appropriate for prudent, reflective people; others 
require impetuous personality and audacity to be tamed. Whether we are born 
in a time that fits our natural inclination or not is a matter of chance, and it 
affects our fortunes in the pursuit of power. The chapter ends with a statement 
that it is more often the impetuous and audacious that win power, formulated 
through the famous (or infamous, for the sexist thrust of the prose, which does 
cause our eyebrows to lift) assertion that
fortune is a woman, and if you wish to control her, it is necessary to treat her 
roughly. And it is clear that she is more inclined to yield to men who are impetuous 
than to those who are calculating. Since fortune is a woman, she is always well 
disposed towards young men, because they are less cautious and more aggressive, 
and treat her more boldly. (The Prince, Chapter XXV)
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The final chapter, XXVI, is a passionate exhortation to free Italy (this chapter 
was written and added some years later, as was the dedication in the preface of 
the book to Lorenzo de’ Medici).
Some key philosophical issues and quite strong assertions emerge with 
vigour from the works of Machiavelli. First, a negative assessment of human 
nature. The reckoning of the viciousness of human nature is in Machiavelli to 
be recognised as a ‘matter of fact’, something which whoever is involved in 
the business of the state must take into account for formulating more pertinent 
judgements. These judgements about the meanness of human nature apply to 
the political and administrative spheres as well: it is a lesson of pessimism 
about the motives and the behaviour of those who pursue a career in the 
public sphere, as well as about the motives and behaviours of citizens, those 
whom certain approaches in public governance and management pretend to be 
‘involved’, engaged’, ‘committed’, as well as disciplined and rational users of 
public services. This trait of human nature becomes in Machiavelli a datum, 
a matter of fact to simply accept: an approach that denotes a ‘social-scientific’ 
attitude towards political phenomena, which is why some credit Machiavelli as 
the founder of political science.
Second, a ‘principle of realism’ whereby facts have to be considered and 
treated in their own terms, as they present themselves and not as we wish 
or desire them to be, and hence a conception of politics as ‘the science of 
the state’, the body of applied knowledge functional to the establishment, 
development and ‘maintenance in operation’ of the state. This is a notion from 
which it is not difficult to derive that behaviours that are ‘proper’ are those 
functional to these overarching goals, and behaviours that are ‘improper’ are 
those that are dysfunctional to these goals – even when such behaviours are 
morally or ethically ‘good’. There is here a sharp distinction and disjunction 
of ‘honour’ (meaning in the context of the epoch: moral, honest – honestum 
in Latin) and expediency (useful, utile), of what is honourable and what is 
expedient: a departure here from contemporary 15th/16th century works and 
treatises for governors and princes that were collations of moral and ethical 
virtues. Moreover, ‘even more unnerving is his seeming uninterest in seeking 
a justification beyond political success … Machiavelli’s insistence on the 
tension between the demands of morality and the demands of political practice 
is more than plausible, but it is unnerving because he left that tension visibly 
unresolved’ (Ryan, 2012, p. 358).
As a footnote, it arises from this picture that the simplistic statements made 
by duplicitous politicians citing Machiavelli as excuse for the light-hearted 
undertaking of behaviours of dubious morality find no ground in Machiavelli’s 
original work (whom they are very unlikely to have ever read). Nowhere in 
Machiavelli’s work can be found the sentence ‘the end is justification for the 
means’ (in itself quite a stupid statement: a means is a means to an end by defi-
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nition); rather, the reader is left brooding on this unresolved tension between 
the logic of morality and the logic of expediency, the latter being the one that 
seems to hold the keys to the course of action that in this earthly world leads to 
grabbing and keeping power.
Third, grabbing power and achieving glory (which Machiavelli intended 
as ‘entering History’, in capital letter) is the key driver of human behav-
iour for Machiavelli, or at least for that portion of human beings who are 
keen to enter the political arena. For Machiavelli, ‘power’ and ‘glory’ are 
the unquestioned ultimate goals and criteria driving value judgements for 
‘politicians’ – not improving public services or fulfilling ethical values, not 
even just the pursuit of the extraction of some advantages. The extraction of 
advantage as overarching goal – utility maximisation – is generally predicated 
by theories rooted in economics like the public choice theory (in this regard, 
whilst Niskanen’s (1971, 1973) model of the bureaucrat as budget maxim-
iser still bore some resemblance to power maximisation, Dunleavy’s (1991) 
sophisticated bureau-shaping represents in a sense a departure: hiding and 
lurking in the shadow, exploiting information asymmetries to extract benefits 
is the behaviour of bureaucrats depicted here). Machiavelli reminds us that 
although there are those who adopt such courses of action when holding public 
office, there are also others in the political arena who more simply aim for the 
maximum of power and glory, for entering History; and this is a dimension of 
human action we need to cope with, and include in any understanding of public 
governance dynamics.
A fourth key theme in Machiavelli is the place that violence occupies 
in politics (and in PA): indeed, ‘the readiness to say that political success 
demanded an unflinching willingness to violate every moral precept appropri-
ate to private life as sharply as Machiavelli did was novel in Christian Europe’ 
(Ryan, 2012, p. 358). Machiavelli brought to the fore violence in politics to an 
extent that was not unknown, but it was unspoken before him, it was some-
thing tacitly known (the ancient Romans didn’t care much – at all – about the 
violation of their neighbours’ human rights when they expanded their territory) 
but never made explicit, at least not as explicit as Machiavelli did, as in the 
famous (infamous from a moral viewpoint) statement: ‘men should either be 
caressed or crushed, because they can avenge slight injuries, but not those that 
are very severe’.
Fifth, Machiavelli reminds us of the role of chance in human affairs: 
something that perhaps large swathes of contemporary social sciences tend to 
underestimate, possibly espousing at least implicitly a logic of determinism 
(even in its ‘probabilistic variant’) in the form: from X will follow Y under 
conditions Z. Chance is tamed under statistical treatment as ‘noise’ or ‘unex-
plained variance’. But in most complex phenomena where social action occurs 
chance does play a role, as some of the most perceptive scholars remind us. 
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(For the role provided for chance – chance events as catalysts or hindrances to 
reform – see Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, Chapter 2) in their model of public 
management reform; for the usage of the notion of potential as distinct from 
the actuality of what happened in a given set of circumstances to account 
for ‘success’ or ‘failure’ in the analysis and extrapolation of practices in 
public management, see Bardach (1994, 1998); as aptly noticed by Bardach, 
successful cases perhaps happened by chance, but the same chance might 
not be replicated elsewhere – or vice versa a practice may have potential and 
be worthy of replication elsewhere, but things simply went wrong on that 
occasion, literally, ‘by chance’: which does not entail to dismiss the potential 
a practice may have.)
Sixth, Machiavelli makes a strong assertion about the immutability of human 
nature. Machiavelli, throughout the two works The Prince and Discourse on 
Livy, amasses evidence that such is the case when comparing ancient episodes 
with his contemporary 15th/16th century Italy. From this, for Machiavelli, 
also derives the meaningfulness of learning from the ‘successes’ of the ancient 
Romans, both the republic and the empire, in their colossal state-building 
exercise (to which Discourse on Livy is dedicated). The immutability of human 
nature over time is for him the grounding of the very possibility of learning 
from the past, which in social phenomena would otherwise become pointless. 
We return to this point in the next chapter.
Finally, trivial as it may sound, Machiavelli reminds us that enlightened 
governors and administrators must, as a minimum, get to power and keep it 
for a sufficiently long time span before they are able to exercise the noble and 
sought-after reforms of public governance and public services for the better-
ment of citizens’ lives.
THOMAS MORE AND UTOPIA
A radically different approach to the question of how to better public govern-
ance comes from the tradition of utopian thinking. The very usage of the word 
is to be credited to Thomas More’s Utopia. This masterpiece was written in 
Latin mostly in 1515, although a part possibly could have been drafted earlier 
in 1510, during a summer spent in Antwerp in the company of Peter Giles, an 
acolyte of Erasmus of Rotterdam, the great humanist and close friend of More. 
Its full title is De Optimo Reipublicae Statu deque Nova Insula Utopia (‘On 
the Optimal State of a Republic and the New Island of Utopia’), and the first 
English translation dates in 1551 by Ralph Robinson, followed ‘with more 
literary skill’ by Gilbert Burnet in 1684, the version to which we refer here (but 
see also among others the version edited by George Logan, Robert Adams and 
Clarence Miller and published by Cambridge University Press, 1995). It was 
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:36:56AM
via free access
Philosophy and public administration236
first published in Leuven in 1516, then in Paris (1517) and Basel (1518), but its 
publication in England occurred only after the passing away of More.
The term ‘utopia’ is derived from the Greek outopia, which means ‘no 
place’ nowhere; additionally, as wittingly noted, ‘More exploits the punning 
ambiguity inherent in its similarity (especially if read in the English language 
pronunciation, our note) to eutopia, or “the good place”’ (Ryan, 2012, p. 312, 
emphasis added). Although the mint is Thomas More’s, there are illustrious 
predecessors to Utopia in the literary strand of utopian thinking, indeed as 
far back to Plato’s The Republic, already encountered in the discussion of 
the common good foundations of governance, a work which was one of 
the powerful inspiration of Utopia. More’s Utopia is explicitly inspired by 
Plato’s The Republic, and indeed intellectually dedicated to the Greek giant 
of philosophy. The Republic is also a discussion about the significance of 
entrusting government to philosophers (or at least to governors well trained 
in philosophy). The main characters in the work, who are the same Thomas 
More and Raphael Hythloday, debate at length about Plato’s recommendation 
(both characters display awareness of the same scepticism that Plato had about 
the feasibility of his own suggestion that philosophers be governors). Thomas 
More can, however, be credited to have been the first to have not just coined 
the term ‘utopia’ but deployed in full this conceptual tool. He was followed 
suit by other literates, including Tommaso (Fr Tomaso, born Giandomenico) 
Campanella who authored La Città del Sole (The City of the Sun, 1602).
The character of Raphael Hythloday in the plot is assigned the role of the 
person who, whilst travelling across the world, eventually moored in the island 
of Utopia and became acquainted with their mores and governance practices; 
he then reports to the same Thomas More what he discovered of this political 
system so altogether different from any other.
The book illustrates the governance arrangement of Utopia: the distribution 
of authority and procedures of appointment of the magistrates; the configu-
ration of its towns, and the capital Amaurot in particular; the organisation of 
labour of Utopians (the inhabitants of Utopia) and their trade arrangements; 
their manners of life (some of them scary to the eyes of modern people, and 
not just them: for example the practice that family life is in common, whereby 
men never leave their house and women join them when they get married; 
or the compulsory permission to travel, which has to be granted by public 
authorities if a citizen wants to travel across the island, although the author 
immediately adds that ‘if any man has a mind to visit his friends that live 
in some other town, or desires to travel and see the rest of the country, he 
obtains leave very easily …’ (p. 42)). The way in which Utopians deal with 
neighbours and manage war (the ‘foreign and defence’ policy of Utopia) is 
also discussed at length, as is their religion, and notably how they apply (with 
some qualifications) a regime of religious tolerance, wholeheartedly praised in 
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Utopia. The significance of More’s intellectual stance on religious toleration 
can only be reinforced by later events: Thomas More was beheaded by King 
Henry VIII and died a Catholic martyr for not forfeiting the Catholic faith and 
remaining loyal to the principle of the primacy of Papal authority. The utopia 
of religious tolerance, which had no place during More’s lifetime, however, 
would eventually win the hearts, minds and constitutions of the peoples and 
the states all over Europe.
What is the ‘usage’ or ‘function’ of Utopias in PA? In Utopia, public gov-
ernance enables the full-fledged development of all citizens, placing utopian 
approach firmly in the camp of common good notions of justification of public 
governance. In this line of teleological thinking, utopias may be seen as per-
forming the function of driving behaviours towards ‘perfection’ and escaping 
decadence in the form of path-dependency sub-optimality.12 In this sense, 
utopias may be interpreted as ‘guiding ideas’ or regulatory ideas suffused with 
a normative tone: utopias enter policymaking, thereby including in modern 
times the reform of public governance, the state and public administration, as 
an ideational source.13 Utopias may perform a normative function about what 
could be done for bettering public governance. They do so because of the other 
function utopias perform: the function of a critique of the extant state of affairs 
by providing a comparator in the form of a world other, from which to critically 
revisit the extant governance arrangements of this world, of the given political 
system which is being examined (in the case of More’s utopia, the governance 
arrangements under critique were those of early 16th-century England, which 
More depicts and harshly criticises in the first part of the book). The two func-
tions performed by utopias – normative and critical – are complementary and 
mutually co-existing, with one enabling the other. One way of interpreting this 
link is to consider utopias as an alternative, holistic vision of public govern-
ance, which may be used for critique of extant governance arrangements, and 
then, based on value judgements and evaluation, a utopia may be used as a set 
of (more or less loosely connected) guiding ideas for purposefully changing 
the extant governance arrangements.
It is, in our view, important to emphasise that utopias may be seen as elic-
iting critical reasoning, and hence performing a maieutic function. Almost all 
aspects of the functioning of More’s island of Utopia, far from being uncrit-
ically accepted, are questioned in his book. Later interpretations of utopian 
thinking (see recently Erickson, 2015; Jacoby, 2005) distinguish between 
blueprint utopias (fixed models of what perfect governance looks like) and 
iconoclastic utopias (sketched models that stimulate critical thinking beyond 
contingencies and escaping path dependency traps by acting as stimulus for 
critique of the extant arrangements). This conceptual tool has been employed 
for distinguishing ‘good’ and ‘bad’ utopias: in this reading, Plato’s Republic is 
categorised as blueprint utopia, a fixed model which ultimately demands to be 
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effected as it is, to be superimposed on pre-existing governance arrangements, 
which are for disposal. Iconoclastic utopias are instead aimed at eliciting 
dialogue and future-orientation, a forward-looking attitude that may enable 
‘thinking out of the box’ and escaping path-dependency and repetition of the 
extant sub-optimal solutions; iconoclastic utopias are ultimately a tool for 
eliciting critical reasoning. Whether Plato’s Republic falls under the blueprint 
rubric, and whether and to what extent a neat distinction may be made between 
these two kinds of utopias, is for the specialists to debate. However, there is no 
part of the story narrated in Utopia that falls neatly into the iconoclastic cate-
gory: the inhabitants of Utopia cannot travel without permission and everyone 
is acutely conscious of being after the eye of everyone else.14 After Orwell’s 
1984, mutual surveillance means to us Big Brother, and restrictions to liberty 
‘seem to us much too high a price to pay, even for the peace and security it 
offers’ (Ryan, 2012, pp. 318–19). We cannot know what More might have 
thought of this, but we may well reckon that an inherent risk of drift towards 
blueprint thinking is inherent in any utopian approach and, in this sense, the 
thought-eliciting work of More is a reminder of the ubiquitous risk that utopias 
become totalitarian by their very nature (a number of the features of More’s 
Utopia do display totalitarian traits).
Indeed, the dystopias that have been put into effect over the 20th century 
have led to all sorts of slaughters and horrors against the most basic human 
rights. It is against this backdrop that poignant critiques of utopian thinking 
have to be set. Such critiques were famously expressed by the likes of Hannah 
Arendt (1971), Isaiah Berlin (1991), and Karl Popper (1963), who all saw in 
Plato’s Republic – the ancestor of all utopias – the germ of totalitarianism and 
made the Republic the ultimate target of all the critiques to utopian thinking, 
deemed responsible of having inspired earthly hells, like Nazi death camps, 
the killing fields of the Khmer Rouge, the Soviet gulags, or the Maoist 
counter-revolutionary campaigns.
It may be claimed that it is mainly for this reason – the tragic evi-
dence of utopian thinking leading to hell on earth – that utopian thinking 
has been side-lined and replaced by ‘incremental’ thinking, the kind of 
‘practice-that-work’-based thinking which is nowadays internationally dom-
inant. But what about the original Utopia as More conceived of it? Can it be 
indicted as the source of dystopian thinking that followed? A large debate 
has arisen on More’s work, and my foray into the topic is but a sympathetic 
one that will stress the facets of the original More’s Utopia which, from this 
slant, seem to indicate that antibodies and remedial indications to pre-empt 
dystopias were already in his book. Other and more expert authors may well 
argue against this sympathetic view of Utopian thinking as it originates from 
More’s Utopia; no doubt, though, the irony that suffuses More’s Utopia and 
its comic element present throughout clearly point to its iconoclastic nature, 
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critical of the laws and practices of the time – early 16th-century England. This 
seems to be the prevalent thrust (the first part of the book is entirely devoted 
to running a harsh critique of England’s economic and political arrangements 
of the time, which are vetted, perused and heavily criticised in the book before 
the two fictional characters start discussing the arrangements of the island of 
Utopia). To build the argument for More’s Utopia incorporating antibodies 
against dystopian outcomes, it should further be noticed another trait of More’s 
Utopia: its realism. For example, More expounds in detail on how Utopians 
defend themselves from non-Utopian neighbours: Utopians have engaged 
with ethical and moral issues and found arrangements that attempt to strike 
a balance between such contradictions, but leave it open to different solutions. 
Importantly, Utopia is what a famously entitled book call ‘the learning organi-
sation’ (Senge, 1990/2006): Utopia is said to have learnt from past encounters, 
notably with the ancient Egyptians and the ancient Romans, and have updated 
its institutions as a result of these exchanges.
In sum, utopias are, at least potentially, useful and beneficial if they are 
realist, dynamic and open to critiques. They are useful if they deal with real 
problems and outline solutions that are, at least to a significant extent, within 
the realm of what is possible, or might become possible under relatively 
realistic conditions (e.g. about certain technological developments). Utopias 
are also likely to lend themselves to positive usages if they are dynamic: they 
allow for change over time in responding to problems, rather than prescribing 
a fixed solution to extant problems. Finally, utopias are useful contrivances 
if they are open to critiques: More’s book ends by commenting on the likes 
and dislikes of how the island of Utopia works. They are, in sum, sources of 
learning for imagining new ways forward for the open society (à la Popper), 
rather than blueprints for the superimposition of allegedly ‘best’ institutions. 
The dialogue between the two main characters of the book sways between 
conflicting poles on many important issues that are continuously brought to the 
fore, with light touch, irony and humour (in a passage of exquisite irony, the 
reader is made aware that in Utopia only kids play with that strange, glowing 
metal which is called gold; adults refrain from such childish play because they 
devote themselves to the important things in life – work, family, study – and 
not to the ludicrous activity of pursuing the acquisition of the strange yellow 
metal – a practice which incidentally also enabled the island of Utopia to 
accumulate so much gold as to be able to bribe the armies of their enemies 
before they attack Utopia, and hence over millennia they had almost always 
entirely avoided war!). And irony and humour, alongside being inherent traits 
of English character, are surely effective antidotes towards dystopias, which 
usually tend to treat themselves very seriously.
There is, however, another antidote to utopias turning into dystopias that 
might be suggested: it is that utopias are better when they are in the plural, 
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more than one, offering different perspectives to engage with the big issue of 
how to improve public governance and administration in worldly contexts. 
Plurality of utopias is better than having just one utopia. This is the argument 
put forward by a symposium in Administrative Theory and Praxis (2015, issue 
37(2); see Surak, 2015), where ‘Polytopian philosophy approach’ is the chosen 
label for arguing in favour of plurality of utopias (see also Stanisevski, 2015): 
multiple narratives, open narratives, eliciting critical thinking from different 
angles.
Wrapping up on the story developed throughout this chapter, the master-
pieces of three key authors, made centuries ago, provide three perspectives 
that all bear enduring significance for PA. The ‘call to realism’, thereby 
encompassing the gloomiest aspects about human nature and the courses 
of behaviour we might expect of public officials and citizens alike, made 
by Machiavelli over five centuries ago is still a powerful reminder to social 
scientists and food-for-thought nourishing the scientific and critical study of 
political and public life. The call to get beyond the extant circumstances and 
contingencies, made by the utopian thinking triggered by More’s masterpiece, 
still pushes scholars and policymakers alike to the continued rediscovery of 
the reversed perspective that consists in taking the move from the point of 
destination, rather than the extant circumstances, and then applying a logic 
of ‘backwards mapping’ to chart the route that may lead to the betterment of 
public governance, thus avoiding the pitfalls of getting stuck in path depend-
ency. The image of the effects of public virtues and the good government, set 
forever in the frescoes of the City Hall of Siena by Lorenzetti, urges whoever is 
involved in the public service to rediscover the significance of virtues in public 
life. Together, they furnish a repertoire of conceptual tools from which to tap 
for the betterment of the study and practice of PA.
NOTES
1. I am grateful to Elke Löffler and Tony Bovaird for having drawn my attention to 
this.
2. Drechsler’s keynote speech at the IASIA Annual Conference in Paris centred on 
Lorenzetti’s masterpiece and was supported only by visual slides, with no text 
added to the presentation: the meta-message was indeed that the community of stu-
dents of public governance and administration does have to rediscover non-verbal 
knowledge, and non-verbal communication as part and parcel of its methods 
of inquiry. The text of the speech is available in the e-journal Development in 
Administration (Drechsler, 2015a).
3. We here follow mainly Drechsler’s reading of Il Buon Governo (Drechsler, 2001a, 
2015a) and de Graaf for the interpretation of the role of theological virtues for 
‘good governance’.
4. I am grateful to Wolfgang Drechsler for pointing this aspect of the painting to me.
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5. Although scale may play a role here because Athens’ polis was a very small 
community in terms of size. Notably only a portion of the population enjoyed the 
status of ‘citizens’ and most were ‘slaves’, even after the important constitutional 
reforms introduced by Solon in the 6th century bc and Cleisthenes in the early 
5th century bc, which paved the way to the zenith of the ‘democratic Athens’ that 
has been admired over the millennia. Siena at the time also encompassed a small 
population, at least by comparison with modern jurisdictions regulating the lives 
of millions of people.
6. Although it should be noted most jockeys are not local (I’m grateful to Wolfgang 
Drechsler for having pointed out this aspect).
7. The ancient age saw a number of authors elaborating on virtue politics (most 
famously, Cicero’s De Republica – ‘On the Republic’ – a thorough examination 
of how virtues sustain the prosperity of the political community).
8. However, it should also be noticed that ‘[R]esearch on public value is highly con-
tested territory, and prominent scholars have critiqued Moore’s early definition on 
its normative and empirical reasoning; its loose definition of public management; 
the inability to understand the regulatory activity of states or power relationships 
between state officials and other agents; primacy afforded to entrepreneurial 
managers in shaping policies; down-grading of party politics; deference to private 
sector management models that fail to deal with accountability and democratic 
politics, and more significantly how limited its utility is in Westminster models 
of government where there is a sharper distinction between politicians and public 
servants (Rhodes and Wanna, 2007). Rhodes and Wanna were then challenged for 
mis-representing Moore’s early work on public value, for misunderstanding the 
complexities of policy making and for drawing on “outdated text book theories of 
separation of politics and administration” (Alford, 2008)’ (Liddle, 2018, p. 969).
9. We refer mainly to Guglielmino and Grosser (1987) for the biographical informa-
tion on Machiavelli.
10. Critiques of amorality have been addressed to both Guicciardini and Machiavelli, 
but these may be partly misplaced. We discuss Machiavelli’s thought in greater 
length, here noticing about Guicciardini that he was a fervent promoter of the 
republic and a democratic form of government. However, through his vicissitudes 
and changing fortunes, he also matured a disenchanted consciousness of the 
corrupt nature of human beings – in Judeo–Christian terms: of the fall of mankind 
– and the likelihood of immoral behaviours and fallacious judgements; he then 
developed an acute sense of the necessity of proper constitutional arrangements to 
at least partly offset this state of affairs. For this reason, he opted for also putting 
his technical expertise to the service of non-republican forms of government, 
conceiving of the bettering of the functioning of the state as something worth 
pursuing, even when the configuration of the state did not reflect his preferred 
constitutional regime.
11. Although this may be a sweetened interpretation of Machiavelli: an alternative 
interpretation is that his thrust was simply – and ruthlessly – to discover the ‘laws 
of power’ to the benefit of the Prince: how the Prince can grab and hang on to 
power. Whether the ultimate motivation of the pursuit of power is the achievement 
of lofty ideals or, rather, purely and simply the enjoyment that comes with power 
and with entering History (in capital) is more conjectural than in Machiavelli’s 
writing.
12. I’m indebted to Geert Bouckaert for this way of conceiving of utopias in PA.
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13. One additional clarification is appropriate. Utopian thinking is not moral law nor 
foundation of morality; these are two distinct dimensions. Kantian thinking as 
expressed in The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and 
the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) is not Utopia. The logic of the Kantian 
categorical imperative lies in urging the rational human being to behave as if 
categorical imperatives were universal laws of behaviour, and to adhere to such 
laws even if fully effecting such laws (that is, perfection in moral behaviour) is not 
attainable in this world. This logic of straining towards perfection in the individual 
conduct though conscious of its unreachability lies on an altogether different 
plane than the logic of the iconoclastic usage of utopias for purposes of critique 
of society and extant governance arrangements (for this reason we disagree with 
Garofalo and Geuras, 2015, pp. 81–6: whilst integrating moral thinking with 
utopian thinking may be lofty goal, placing Kantian foundation of morality – the 
‘kingdom of ends’ – under the label of utopia and utopian thinking is misplaced). 
The misunderstanding may originate in the consideration that both categorical 
imperatives and utopias have in common the feature of not being realisable in full 
in this world, but similarities end here. Kantian ideals have a regulatory function 
that orients practical action towards perfection, they establish the conditions for 
the possibility of practical human action to be regulated by perfection, and they 
furnish a measure against which to gauge the distance of actual action: even if 
ideals do not enjoy the status of real entities as such, they are not chimeras, they 
are the conditions for practical human action to occur; they are the ‘ought to’ 
that constitutes human action as the action of a rational subject. Reason needs 
a measure of perfection in its own order to judge concrete behaviour and guide it. 
Regulatory ideals are transcendental, that is they are beyond experience because 
experience by itself cannot guide what ‘ought to’ be. Utopias are the outcome 
of an imaginative process, but they are not an ideal. And they are conceived and 
crafted on the basis of knowledge acquired through experience (in More’s case, 
16th-century England). Moreover, categorical imperatives guide individual behav-
iours; utopias concern the governance of whole socio-political systems.
14. A feature that seems to anticipate Jeremy Bentham’s famous Panopticon.
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8. Utopias, ideal-types, paradigms, 
models and ‘good practices’: 
repertoire of conceptual tools for 
public administration?
INTRODUCTION
We have concluded the previous chapter with More’s masterpiece which 
introduced the notion of utopia and utopian thinking as a way of practising 
teleological thinking in the study of public governance. In Aristotle’s frame-
work of the four causes (introduced in Chapter 2 and examined for application 
to PA in Chapter 6), this approach entails starting the analysis from the final 
cause – that is, the goal or end, the reason why something is brought about – to 
then turn to the other causes, like the material cause (what enables a thing to 
be transformed from a potentiality into actuality) and the efficient cause (the 
forces that bring about change). A utopian approach also entails taking as 
incipit of the analysis the potentiality (what might be, but does not yet exist in 
actuality), rather than actuality (what exists here and now).
At the opposite pole we can find the notion of a practice that works, 
a practice (too often and erroneously qualified as ‘best’ in much of the grey 
literature and consultancy papers) which exists in actuality and is predicated to 
produce certain effects, at least in the given context where it is operating. ‘Best 
practices’ or ‘good practices’, as they are often called, exist in actuality rather 
than in potentiality like utopias, and the starting point is the efficient cause: 
the causal mechanism which brings about the effect the practice produces. 
Conceptually, ‘practices’ can be seen to lie at the opposite pole than utopias: 
practices exist in actuality (here and now), utopias exist as potentials; practices 
are characterised primarily by a logic of efficient cause, utopias by a logic of 
final cause.
We can also consider there are other conceptual tools that enjoy currency in 
PA that are located at intermediate points in-between utopias and practices (see 
Figure 8.1). These are the notions of: model, ideal-type, and paradigm (defini-
tions are provided later in the chapter as the concepts are introduced and exam-
ined in turn). In this chapter, we revisit these five notions – utopias, paradigms, 
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ideal-types, models and practices – and their usages in PA in an integrated 
way. We argue that the combined use of these notions may be beneficial to the 
progress of PA, and we observe that over time in the PA debate attention may 
shift and the emphasis may be placed on one or the other of these notions to 
the risk of overlooking the others: we hope that revisiting in a joint way these 
conceptual tools for PA may enable scholars and practitioners to resort more 
systematically to the whole gamut, and to employ these conceptual tools in 
a complementary and integrated way for tackling complex public governance 
problems. We start from the notion of utopia and its possible usages in PA.
UTILISING THE NOTION OF UTOPIA IN PA
Is utopian thinking utilised in contemporary PA discourse? It is hard to answer 
such a question because it would demand wide-scope textual analysis of public 
discourses, and compellingly defining what exactly could be placed under the 
label of ‘Utopian thinking’. However, a tentative, possibly provocative, state-
ment put forward in this book is that, with a few notable exceptions (one defi-
nitely being the contribution by Bouckaert, 2020, aimed at reviving Utopian 
thinking in and for PA, also drawing on Achten et al., 2016; see also Jacoby, 
2005), utopian thinking is limitedly used as a systematic conceptual tool for 
the critique and reforming of PA, and yet, at the same time, both utopias and 
dystopias surface copiously in contemporary PA debates.
Some of these utopias/dystopias are worked out by practitioners. As noticed 
by a practitioner intervening on the debate on the usage of utopias in PA, one 
recurrent utopia is the ‘smart’, small (mid-sized) city, socially inclusive, highly 
innovative and well-administered (Lucas, 2015). Interestingly, if we look at 
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a network of (self-asserted) ‘forward-looking’ cities which was promoted 
between the end of the 1990s and the debut of the 2000s by the Bertelsmann 
Foundation (a German-based foundation active in supporting applied research 
in the field of public governance and management) and called ‘The Cities of 
Tomorrow’,1 it is worth noticing almost all of them were medium-sized cities. 
Since the 2010s, the main rhetoric revolves around the appealing label of 
‘smart cities’. It may be worth considering whether these notions of ‘the cities 
of tomorrow’ and the ‘smart cities’ are all utopias (dystopias?) floating around 
in disguised forms.
If the ‘mid-sized smart city’ might be an example of a practitioner-made 
utopia, two more categories may be envisaged:2 scholar-made utopias (and 
dystopias); and institutions-made utopias (dystopias). In both cases, unfor-
tunately, dystopias may be more abundant than utopias. Starting from 
scholarly-made utopias/dystopias, one may think of ‘governance without 
government’: this might obviously be just a catchy slogan mainly coined to 
convey a strong message, but to the extent that government is imagined to be 
useless to good governance, it may swiftly translate into a utopia or, for those 
who think public administrative apparatuses and governmental action are 
necessary to good governance, in a dystopia. Certain depictions of the citizens 
as ‘honest plus smart plus engaged’, the citizen ‘maker of good governance’ 
also appear to display rather more the trait of blueprint utopia easily morphing 
into dystopia than providing an appropriate characterisation of real citizens (as 
perhaps shown by the rise of populism in the 2010s in the Western world and 
beyond). It may be noticed that these utopian/dystopian representations are far 
from the carefully crafted governance arrangements adopted by More’s Island 
of Utopia to regulate the relationship between government and citizens.
Other examples of scholarly-made utopias are more thoroughly crafted and 
also more explicit in adopting utopian thinking as a conceptual tool. Garofalo 
and Geuras (2015) identify a number of utopias including ‘a covenant between 
practitioners and scholars’, which ‘encompasses the hopes and concerns of 
public administration scholars and practitioners about their lack of connection 
with one another … in which they collaborate to frame and resolve manage-
ment and organizational problems’ (Garofalo and Geuras, 2015, p. 86, drawing 
on Posner, 2009). This utopia is iconoclastic in its thrust to enable the critique 
of current ways of mutual engagement between practitioners and academics 
conceived as a means to identifying ways forward to better bridge PA scholars 
and practitioners.
There are, fortunately, a number of examples of scholarly-made utopias 
that point to constructive usages of utopian thinking as conceptual tool for 
critical analysis and forward-looking thinking. These include at least some 
of the contributions to envisioning the future of PA that came out of the 
Minnowbrook conferences (for the first Minnowbrook, see Marini, 1971; for 
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the third Minnowbrook held in 2008, see O’Leary et al. 2010, amongst others), 
and ambitious research programmes like the ‘European Perspectives on Public 
Administration’ (EPPA): the Humboldt Foundation-sponsored project of the 
European Group for Public Administration (EGPA) led by Geert Bouckaert 
and Werner Jann (Bouckaert and Jann, 2020), which also developed probably 
one of the best wrought out and most self-conscious usages of the notion of 
utopia and utopian thinking in and for PA (Bouckaert, 2020).3
Turning to institution-made utopias, one obvious, and major, example 
are the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations. One 
might also wonder whether such ambitious charts of principles and goals are 
useful or useless utopias. The first set of the United Nations ‘Millennium 
Development Goals’ that were to be achieved by 2015 looked in a number 
of respects like a blueprint, which did not always allow for learning and 
adaptability, which did not cope with inherent contradictions or trade-offs, and 
which were hardly usable to consider critically the local circumstances as the 
point of departure for improvement and development. So, were those goals 
a useless utopia? Possibly but not necessarily. The 2015 version of the goals, 
the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals to be attained by 2030, may 
represent a different story. In fact, a more optimistic view sees them as one 
of the most ambitious collective undertakings of humankind ever attempted 
(to achieve a better world), underpinned by multilateralism and by a vision of 
humanity taking its destiny in its hands collectively (very much in line with 
Kant’s framing of multilateralism as a condition for the attainment of condi-
tions of peace in the world, as in Kant, 1795/2013, ‘On Perpetual Peace’); and 
significantly, Sustainable Development Goals have been approved by all UN 
Member States. Seen in this way, the Sustainable Development Goals can be 
interpreted as positive utopias: a way of both challenging the current state of 
affairs in the world and of envisioning a world which is other from the extant 
one, a way of thinking teleologically starting from the ultimate goals to attain 
rather than the extant circumstances. In this sense, they might be interpreted as 
positive utopias, and not just as a form of ‘Management by Objectives’ (dys)
topian list. As part of these utopias, Sustainable Development Goal number 16 
concerning the development of strong and resilient public institutions enabling 
peace and justice might be interpreted as a collectively endorsed utopia inspir-
ing PA scholars and practitioners alike to envisage paths for the betterment of 
PA.
There is a link, but also a clear distinction, between foresight and utopian 
thinking. Strategic and policy foresight and other forward-looking exercises 
developed by public institutions (as may be the case with think tanks or policy 
units, at times outside government but influential over it, at times embedded 
into the very administration of the core government, as it happens in some 
countries, or the supranational polity of the European Union: for example the 
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European Political Strategy Centre of the European Commission, or the policy 
lab of the Joint Research Centre, again of the European Commission, which 
produces foresight studies and scenarios on the future of government and of 
citizen-government relations) are ultimately driven by an attempt at forecast-
ing, at anticipating futures with diverse grades of likelihood and resemblance 
to the present. Utopian thinking deliberately breaks all the bridges with the 
extant state of affairs to enable re-thinking, a thinking afresh of how govern-
ment and society could be organised.
From the perspective of the notion of utopia, we can revisit three other most 
famous concepts used in the field of PA as well as across the social and natural 
sciences: these are the notions of ideal-type, paradigm, and models – these 
notions have a huge history and range of usages: consistently with the purposes 
of the book, we confine this revisiting of the three notions to the application to 
the field of PA.
REVISITING THE NOTIONS OF IDEAL-TYPE, 
PARADIGM, AND MODEL
Given the significance for the PA debate, it may be worth distinguishing 
utopias from the notion of ‘ideal-type’, famously associated with the work 
of Max Weber. Interestingly, Weber mentions that ideal-types are in a sense 
a utopia:
It [the ideal type] is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous 
means of expression to such a description … An ideal-type is formed by the 
one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great 
many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete indi-
vidual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized 
viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual 
purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere 
in reality. It is a utopia. (Weber, 1949, p. 90, emphasis added)
It should be noticed that here ‘ideal’ does not mean ‘normative/prescriptive’ 
(that is, something that ought to be achieved), it simply means that it is mental, 
and in its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically 
anywhere in reality. It is in this specific sense that Weber referred to it as 
utopia.
Ideal-types are culturally meaningful, value-laden representations of social 
phenomena, but yet, different to the utopias as delineated in the previous 
section of this chapter, ideal-types are not whole worlds ‘other’ from this 
world; rather, they keep their umbilical cord with the social phenomena, of 
which they represent a unified analytical construct. The ideal-type is not 
a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression 
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to such a description: its usefulness lies in that ideal-types can be used as yard-
sticks – investigators can arrive at interpretative understanding of a concrete 
empirical observation by comparing its differences with the initially con-
structed yardstick. Weber famously theorised the ideal-type of ‘bureaucracy 
under legal domination’ (that is, where legitimacy lies in the supremacy of the 
law, rather than in charisma or tradition).
The process of ideal-typing is a matter of imagining and contrasting the 
worked out analytical construct with experience: ‘It is a matter here of con-
structing relationships which our imagination accepts as plausibly motivated 
and hence as “objectively possible” and which appear as adequate from the 
nomological standpoint’ (Weber, 1949, p. 92, emphasis added). It has to 
do with generic patterns (behaviour and structure) of culturally significant 
features (that are necessary for understanding causal relationships, and are 
significant for the social scientist or a larger social-cultural group), which are 
given a unique meaning (these are indicated as the genetic features that make 
the ideal-type unique: an ideal-type is a unique ‘creature’ in the realm of the 
ideal). In this sense, Ideal-typing may be claimed to be an approach to theory 
building. The ideal-type is based on logical coherence, at logical and value 
(axiological) level, which entails that the set of values upheld by the social 
scientist must be made explicit to the reader.4
As aptly summed up by Stout (2010), in order to engineer the ideal-type 
method, first a specific social phenomenon of interest must be identified. 
Second, a culturally significant organising characteristic must be chosen and 
specified as the frame of reference. Third, the generic elements essential for 
identifying causal relationships must be identified; the set should be culturally 
significant, as comprehensive as possible, and the manner in which these 
elements are thought to be related must be explicated in a logical manner. 
Fourth, mutually exclusive meanings of each element must be interpreted so 
that the genetic character of the ideal-type is clear. These meanings must also 
be logical and coherent in their relationships with one another and plausible in 
comparison to experience (Stout, 2013).
The art of working out new ideal-types might be deemed to be a lost art 
rather than something into which contemporary PA scholars are engaging, but 
Stout and Love systematically resort to the use of ideal-typing to work out their 
ideal-type of ‘integrative governance’ as a synthesis of four primary govern-
ance approaches (Stout and Love, 2019, pp. 46‒9 in particular). Their work is 
thus an example both of ideal-typing as a practised and contemporary art in 
public governance, and of a book-manifesto which makes explicit the philo-
sophical foundations of the proposed argument, indeed in which philosophical 
knowledge underpins and informs the argument: an example of philosophy of 
public administration, in the framework worked out in Chapter 1 (incidentally 
it may be noticed my ontology is different from the authors’, yet this consid-
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eration does not detract anything from my appreciation for writing one of the 
rare books in recent times proposing a philosophy of public administration).
Both ideal-types and utopias may be used for framing empirics and gaining 
insights, although ideal-types are more geared to theory building while utopias 
are also meant to arouse passions and social action for change towards a dif-
ferent state of affairs than the extant one; utopias are a radical way of utilising 
teleological thinking. Both are rather context-insensitive, but ideal-types are 
amenable to mental experimentation of what would happen when placed in 
context ‘A’ or context ‘B’, while utopias set their own context, and replace the 
real ones. Utopias totally reverse the logic of path dependency; they embody 
the converse of historical institutionalism.
Both utopias and ideal-types are to be distinguished from the notions of 
‘model’ and of ‘paradigm’. A model can be defined as a selective reduction 
of reality in order to highlight key relations and connections for purposes of 
understanding and highlighting key causal relations as well as for guiding 
action. Models are ubiquitous in the study of PA; at times they aim at pro-
viding description, explanation and interpretation of administrative phenom-
ena; other times they take up a normative and prescriptive thrust and aim 
at providing guidance for change and reform of public administration and 
management. The ‘New Public Management’ (Hood, 1991), the ‘New Public 
Service’ (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2001/2015), the ‘New Public Governance’ 
(Osborne, 2006, 2010), the ‘Digital Era Governance’ (Dunleavy et al., 2006), 
the Neo-Weberian State (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000/2011), the ‘stewardship 
model’ patterned on a revisited conception of the traditional British public 
administration (Rhodes, 2016), and so on, may be labelled as models (more 
or less internally consistent), with differential emphases and either leaning 
towards the descriptive and explanatory (descriptive–analytical models), or 
towards the prescriptive and normative (prescriptive models). Modelling, when 
it takes a normative thrust, is for action: it is a form of bracketing wider aspects 
of reality to focus action on those aspects that are causally more directly linked 
to the expected outcomes to be attained, purposefully forgetting that reality 
is more complex than what the model depicts (the main problem here lies in 
the fact that the forgotten part of reality sooner or later strikes back). When 
models also take up a normative dimension, they can be likened functionally 
to ideal-types and utopias in that they can be used as yardsticks for the critical 
analysis of the present situation in view of the pursuit of a travel – a reform 
trajectory – towards a more desirable destination (the obvious problem applies 
– desirable for whom? – which brings us back to the issue of the legitimacy of 
a governance system discussed in Chapter 5).
The notion of paradigm is pitched at a different level: a paradigm can be 
defined as a coherent pattern of core ideas and premises (assumptions or 
hypotheses) that governs scientific inquiry in the discipline at a given time: 
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these are scientific paradigms (Kuhn, 1962; Riccucci, 2010). The notion of 
paradigm may also take a normative and prescriptive thrust, and thence in 
PA paradigms can be defined as sets of core tenets about how to organise 
the public sector. Drechsler has called attention to the significance of three 
main paradigms in PA, from a historical viewpoint: the Western PA para-
digm (itself highly composite, and as a very minimum it should be distin-
guished Anglo-American PA from continental European ‘Weberian’ PA), 
the Confucian PA paradigm, and the Islamic PA paradigm. Over more recent 
centuries the (highly composite and varied) Western paradigm of PA has 
spread widely across the world, and in many respects it has been either coer-
cively forced upon far-flung countries (‘far’ as seen from Western Europe, of 
course), or more or less willingly adopted by a number of countries because of 
its alleged qualities and attributes (one can think here of the Meiji revolution/
restoration in 19th-century Japan, or post-WWII processes of Westernisation 
of institutions and administration in South Korea). However, at least from 
a historical perspective, it is possible to observe that in the history of PA there 
have been at least two paradigms distinct and possibly ‘alternative’ to the 
Western one: the Confucian PA paradigm and the Islamic PA paradigm (the 
reader can find more on paradigms in PA and their usage in the postscript by 
Wolfgang Drechsler at the end of this book).
The border between ‘model’ and ‘paradigm’ may be not so easy to draw in 
practice. Some authors use the notions of paradigm to work out what they refer 
to as the contemporary ‘public governance paradigms’ (Andersen et al., 2020) 
to outline the features of doctrines about the reform of PA that we have in this 
book placed under the label of models (namely: New Public Management, 
Neo-Weberian State, Digital Era Governance, Public Value Management, 
and New Public Governance). Interestingly, they refer to public governance 
paradigms as ‘quasi-paradigms’: they retain the property of having a core of 
propositions (like a paradigm) and then a set of declensions of these core prop-
ositions can be made to flesh out the implications drawn from the core tenets. 
They are defined as ‘relatively coherent and comprehensive norms and ideas 
about how to govern, organize and lead the public administration’ and opera-
tionalised along five dimensions, defined as follows (Andersen et al., 2020): 
the extent of centralised control (the degree of recommended centralised 
control in the vertical chain of command); the emphasis placed on horizontal 
coordination (the degree of recommended horizontal interagency coordination 
and collaboration); the extent of use of value articulation (the degree to which 
public governance should be based on the articulation of public values); the 
extent to which it is resorted to the use of incentives (the degree to which public 
governance should be based on conditional positive and negative incentives); 
and the extent to which societal involvement is resorted to (the degree to which 
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private for-profit or non-profit actors, including citizens, should be involved in 
public governance). According to the authors, these quasi-paradigms
[are not] paradigms in the Kuhnian sense of the term. However, we agree with 
Dunleavy and Margetts (2013) that public governance paradigms behave like ordi-
nary paradigms in two important respects. First, they tend to have two levels, with 
an overall macro-level theory based on a few propositions that pull together and give 
direction to a wider range of supplementary concepts, detailed recommendations 
and preferred methods. Second, they develop in response to the problems of their 
predecessor, enter a period of relatively successful ‘normal governance’ and are 
problematized by the accumulation of problems to which they cannot provide an 
appropriate response. These resemblances to Kuhnian-type scientific paradigms 
serve to justify the notion of public governance paradigms. (Andersen et al., 2020, 
n.p.)
The introduction of the notion of ‘quasi-paradigm’ points to the consideration 
that the border between what constitutes a paradigm, on one hand, and what 
constitutes a model, on the other hand, may be porous, and intermediate con-
cepts may be usefully wrought out and employed.
PRACTICES: GOOD AND BEST
Utopias, ideal-types, paradigms and models have crucial significance for 
the field of PA. However, words like utopias, ideal-types, paradigms and 
models have been looked at with suspicion in more recent times, partly as 
a sensible reaction to the failures of utopian-inspired social designs as well 
as (on a smaller scale) the apparent lack in fulfilling the expectations raised 
by models of PA reform like the New Public Management and a spate of 
others which followed suit. It is also partly as a reaction to reform models 
having been deemed to have fallen short of the expectations they raised that 
international organisations like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), which was very active in spreading ‘global models 
of public management reform’ during the 1990s, seem to have more recently 
orientated themselves towards the opposite approach, namely: the search for 
‘practices that work’, which are often in practitioners’ discourse called ‘best 
practices’.
It seems that nowadays the practices approach – the extrapolation-based 
approach – is the prevailing one, notably in practitioners’ discourse; its core 
tenet can be summarised as: ‘rather than looking for new models (paradigms, 
ideal-types, utopias), we must search for practices that work and extrapolate 
them for replication (properly adapted) elsewhere’. There is much more than 
meets the eye, however, and the logic of best practices may be both seductive 
and highly misleading: first, truly ‘best’ practices are (very) rare and, second, 
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the process of extrapolation and transfer of a practice (better: of the mecha-
nisms that, incorporated into the practice, enable it to achieve certain results 
in the extant situation) to a target domain in order to replicate the results 
elsewhere is a major, complex process that may also lead to unexpected conse-
quences (Bardach, 1994 and 1998, Chapter 2; Barzelay, 2007; Bretschneider et 
al., 2005; Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015, Chapter 8). It is for these reasons that many 
academics have claimed it better to conceive of the search for ‘good’ or ‘smart’ 
practices, rather than allegedly ‘best’ ones, that is, the search for practices that 
work well enough and can be replicated elsewhere, provided context and con-
textual influences are appropriately taken into account (Behn, 1991; Bardach, 
1998; Barzelay, 2007; Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015).
The practices approach is appealing to practitioners, notably for its apparent 
sensibleness and ‘pragmatism’. However, even when taking into account the 
warning against the seductions of naïve interpretations of the logic of ‘best’ 
practices, the practice approach may soon reach its limits. This occurs for 
a deeper reason: a practice-driven focus is unlikely to be equipped with the 
intellectual resources for escaping the traps of path-dependency. The practice 
agenda is inherently likely to be drawn into the scouting of the nearby terrain, 
and lose sight of the possible alternative views about PA and how the public 
sector could – and should – be organised. An approach self-confined to 
detecting practices that work and not complemented by the other approaches 
is unable to provide breakthrough solutions, or to furnish guidance on how to 
organise public governance that can anticipate major economic, societal or 
environmental changes (Pollitt, 2016b).
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH: UTOPIAS, 
IDEAL-TYPES, PARADIGMS, MODELS, AND 
PRACTICES AS REPERTOIRE OF CONCEPTUAL 
TOOLS FOR THE BETTERMENT OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION
The history of public governance and public administration has been made 
by the combined usage of different, complementary approaches; in this sense, 
nowadays partly neglected approaches like the usage of models, paradigms, 
ideal-types and utopias bear continued significance for the field of PA, as does 
the approach of practices extrapolation which seems to enjoy wide currency at 
the time the second edition of this book is being completed.
We might indeed see the whole gamut of these approaches as amenable to 
being ordered in function of the emphasis on either of the four causes first out-
lined by Aristotle (see Chapters 2 and 6). Those who ascribe to the Aristotelian 
approach stress that it is the joint application of the four causes to enable a full 
understanding of the phenomenon investigated. However, different agendas of 
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research and epistemic approaches may place a different emphasis on either of 
the causes. We argue that the logic of the extrapolation of practices is primarily 
grounded in an emphasis on the efficient (and the material) cause. Conversely, 
utopias and to a certain extent ideal-types, paradigms and models embody tel-
eological reasoning and take the final cause as the starting point of the inquiry. 
Finally, all these approaches are concerned with the formal cause (if you 
subscribe to the Aristotelian approach); however, we would put forward the 
tentative claim whereby the ‘teleological’ approaches – utopias and to a certain 
extent paradigm and ideal-types – strive to more directly define the ‘nature’ of 
the object they conceive and work out, that is, they are more interested with 
the formal cause (the essence or nature of the entity), whilst practice-based 
approaches are more focused on the apparent properties of the entity with an 
inherent orientation to disregard issues of ‘essence’ and ‘form’ (formal cause) 
as deemed to be ultimately of limited ‘pertinence’ and ‘usefulness’.
We can hence now return to Figure 8.1, where we present utopias, para-
digms, ideal-types, models, and practices as a range of conceptual tools which 
may also be seen in a combined way as a function of, first, the extent to which 
they take the move from actuality (what exists here and now) or potentiality 
(what may be brought to exist, but does not exist in actuality: it is not entele-
chy, in Aristotle’s terminology, see Chapter 2); and, second, from the relative 
emphasis on either of the four causes that is placed when utilising these 
notions. Utopian approaches clearly take the move from the final cause, to then 
turn to tackling the issue of ‘how to get there’, that is, the enablers (material 
cause) and the forces (efficient cause) that may lead the system towards the 
end-goal (to the extent it is desirable – not dystopian – and taking into account 
that utopias perform more of an iconoclastic function as critique of the present 
state of affairs to identify ways forward than as a blueprint).
Approaches centred on learning from practices and extrapolating practices 
from one context for adaptation to another one take the move from the effi-
cient cause (what is the mechanism that brings about the effect observed in 
the practice) and the material cause (what provides the conditions and enables 
something to happen).
The formal cause – what is the nature or essence of the object of investiga-
tion – is the starting point in modelling, ideal-typing and conceiving of para-
digms, with an emphasis on ‘what brings about certain effects’ in modelling 
(efficient and material causes), and at least implicitly an emphasis on what the 
ultimate goal is (final cause) in ideal-types and paradigms.
NOTES
1. The network was later dissolved, and the Bertelsmann Foundation initiative is not 
to be confused with the homonymous EU programme.
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2. I’m indebted to Geert Bouckaert for this way of categorising utopias/dystopias.
3. Reference is specifically made to the ‘European Perspectives for Public 
Administration: Futures Seminar’ at KULeuven, Leuven, Belgium, 20‒21 October 
2016, held on the occasion of the Leuven city festival ‘500 YEARS UTOPIA’ 
dedicated to Thomas More’s Utopia published in 1516 in Leuven.
4. A lesson brilliantly taken up by the works of the Italian scholar Masini (1979), 
when he built up a theory of azienda which, although formally not inspired to 
ideal-typing as outlined by Weber, seems to contain many defining traits of it; in 
a similar vein on profiling the notion of the public sector as a system of interrelated 
organisations, see Borgonovi (1984).
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9. Elements (fragments) for the 
philosophical foundations of a theory 
of public administration
INTRODUCTION
This book has reviewed (Western) philosophical thought in Chapters 2 and 3 
and proposed a range of applications to the study and practice of PA, with an 
emphasis on ontological issues in Chapter 4 and on the political philosophy 
of PA, around the key issue of legitimacy, in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 revisited 
epistemological issues from a philosophical standpoint, while in Chapter 7 
a number of key themes in PA have been delved into through an intellectual 
tour of three authors – Ambrogio Lorenzetti, Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas 
More – and their masterpieces, that elicit an enduring intellectual fascination 
and provide an inexhaustible source of inspiration. Chapter 8 then went on to 
discuss the usage of a range of conceptual tools – from ‘good enough’ prac-
tices to utopias, paradigms, ideal types and models – for PA.
As we noticed in Chapter 1, this book has taken the opposite perspective 
than other reviews of the field of PA interested in a philosophical approach: 
rather than starting from the organisation of the field of PA and then pointing 
to how different philosophical streams might be employed to discuss one or 
the other sub-areas of the field, this book has taken as starting point the history 
of philosophical thought and the ‘big’ authors and schools in philosophy, to 
then revisit how these philosophical schools of thought might be applied to 
shed a different light on PA debates and streams of inquiry. In this chapter, we 
initially revert to a more conventional approach and we start from a mapping 
of the field of PA along four intellectual traditions, to then discuss how broad 
philosophical perspectives may be employed to further our understanding of 
these intellectual traditions in PA. In doing so, we work out a set of tentative 
propositions for sketching an initial draft of a ‘theory of PA change’, a reflec-
tion – inchoate and open to contributions and integrations from different 
intellectual standpoints – on the ideational basis of PA, on how revisiting the 
intellectual foundations of PA might lead to approaches on how to change 
public governance. Finally, in the next chapter we will pull the threads and 
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discuss how to advance researching the topic of ‘philosophy for PA’, and 
how to integrate philosophy for PA into the teaching of PA in university 
programmes, at all levels from undergraduate to PhD level and executive 
education.
What are intellectual traditions in PA? In a number of works, Raadschelders 
(2005, 2008, 2011) has suggested that four intellectual traditions – defined as 
broad approaches under which most theories in use can be categorised – can 
be identified in PA. According to this classification, PA can be conceived of 
as practical wisdom, as practical experience, as scientific knowledge, or as an 
interpretivist venture. Alternative classifications and conceptualisations may 
be proposed: we pluck this one for its capacity to capture some important traits 
of PA, and because it has become quite conventional. The first question we 
here address is how the philosophical perspectives introduced throughout the 
book can contribute to these four traditions: how we can review each of these 
traditions from the multiple philosophical perspectives reported throughout the 
book. The four intellectual traditions outlined by Raadschelders as characteris-
ing PA scholarship,1 at least in the Western world, are the following:
• PA as practical wisdom: it is the oldest approach to PA that relies on an 
understanding of government ‘through moral reasoning and logical argu-
ments applicable to the widest possible range of phenomena, and through 
reflection, interpretation, and comparison of time and context in an inter-
disciplinary manner’ (Raadschelders, 2008, p. 941); we argue the role of 
philosophy is constitutive and integral to this intellectual tradition.
• PA as practical experience: it is an approach
interested in instruments and techniques to help day-to-day administration and 
hands-on experiential learning. It has a heritage that goes back to the late Middle 
Ages [the forming of the nation states in Europe, ndr] and has its contemporary 
representatives in Fayol (1987), Gulick and Urwick (1937), Taylor (1997), and 
all those scholars who develop and test theories on the basis of case studies. 
(Raadschelders, 2005, p. 606)
 Philosophical thought is ubiquitous in this approach, also given PA in this 
strand is not straitjacketed into the strict boundaries of a well-defined, 
independent science, but quite the opposite: practical reasoning is porous 
to a multitude of ontological, ethical and epistemological issues, which 
a philosophical perspective may aid to unveil.
• PA as scientific knowledge is characterised by the pursuit of scientific 
knowledge. This approach tends to adopt a ‘narrow’ definition of science, 
patterned on the natural sciences, striving towards the ideal of a science of 
administration to become like a natural science, that is, with an identifiable 
and clearly demarcated set of theories, concepts and methods. Simon is its 
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ultimate advocate. It is closely associated to positivism and neo-positivism 
(see Chapters 3 and 6). Philosophy beyond the positivist/neo-positivist 
stream can shed light on the strengths as well as the limits of these phil-
osophical schools and act as a powerful reminder of the at times quite 
narrow boundaries of this approach.
• Relativism and the post-modernist vision of PA: differently from the 
other three intellectual traditions, which are open to incorporate different 
philosophical perspectives and are quite lay in their basic stance, the 
relativist stream is more closely aligned with being a specific philosophy 
of administration, drawing on a specific strand of philosophical thought 
(post-modernism, see Chapter 3) and applying it consistently to PA. 
A feature of this tradition is that
its advocates emphasize that truth varies from individual to individual, that 
human values are contradictory, and that there is no ‘right’ answer (Hardy, 
1999). This approach emerges in public administration in the 1990s, with Farmer 
(1995) and Fox and Miller (1996) as representative authors of an affirmative 
postmodernism that wishes to augment the scientific approach with attention for 
interpretations, values, judgment, feelings, and emotions. (Raadschelders, 2005, 
p. 606, emphasis in original)
The argument made by Raadschelders and colleagues (notably in a 2005 
symposium in Administrative Theory & Practice) is that scholars in each of 
these traditions tend to emphasise, and at the extreme to see exclusively, some 
aspects or facets of PA, to the detriment of the others:
[when] scholars survey a study, Positivists will notice ‘scientific’ disorder (i.e., lack 
of unity in theories and methods); practice oriented scholars will lament the lack 
of usable knowledge (i.e., lack of attention for applicability); those who work in 
the practical wisdom approach argue that there is too little reflective understanding 
(e.g., attention for, e.g., history and philosophy); postmodernists point to the lack of 
attention for interpretation and the relativity of truth claims. Each hammers away at 
improving respectively these theories and methods, applicability, reflective under-
standing, and interpretation. But it comes at the price of losing sight of how their 
activity helps that other goal of scholarly pursuit: to enhance the comprehensive 
understanding of government. (Raadschleders, 2005, p. 623)
There are understandable reasons why this happens: the growth of ‘govern-
ment’ across the world over the 20th century has placed demands for special-
ised knowledge about the functioning of government to be attained. Intra- and 
inter-disciplinary specialisation serves the experts – and with the growth of 
specialised knowledge begotten by the experts, a wider and wider range of the-
ories with diverse underlying paradigmatic and methodological premises has 
mushroomed. In sum, it is more and more difficult for any individual beholder 
of PA phenomena to be trained in such a way as to be able to master all four the 
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perspectives. The educational and professional background, and the demands 
placed for publication in journals or books, tend to make scholarly pieces 
combining all four the perspectives almost impossible to write – and to get 
published. As a result, integration or at least connection of knowledge to arrive 
at a better understanding of government in the real world is seriously hindered.
However, considerations about the challenges of bridging research tra-
ditions in PA shouldn’t lead to giving up such ambition. We agree with 
Raadschelders’s (2005) core argument and advocacy of dialogue and inter-
change as remedial action. The starting point is the diagnosis that PA proceeds 
with different methods and epistemological premises, which make scholars 
operate in silos, and as a consequence findings are not made to contribute and 
cross-fertilise each other. Indeed, the overall thrust of Raadschelders (2005, 
p. 602) is to furnish ‘metaframeworks and metalanguages on the basis of which 
compartmentalized knowledge about government can be linked better’ and we 
generally side with him in evoking practical wisdom as a basis to perform the 
bridging function:
practical wisdom in a broader and more contemporary sense considers the merits 
of the four approaches for understanding and/or even explaining government. This 
expanded practical wisdom not only accepts but actively explores the merits of the 
four approaches … In no way is this statement to be understood as a resignation to 
the solid advances of scientific knowledge, to the experiential learning generated 
through practical experience, to the historical configurations of practical wisdom 
in the narrow sense, or to the reasonable doubts expressed by affirmative postmod-
ernists. Practical wisdom in the broader sense is common sense, since it emphasizes 
the need for discourse between advocates of the idealtypical approaches … It is 
a middle-of-the-road wisdom worthy of Aristotle that embraces the qualities of each 
approach and seeks complementarity rather than exclusiveness. (Raadschelders, 
2005, p. 621)
However, the core question and argument here is another and it is complemen-
tary to the one set forth by Raadschelders: it is that within and across these 
intellectual traditions, philosophy sheds light on interpreting the results of 
research work conducted within each stream, inspires different perspectives 
to researching PA in these traditions, and ultimately helps the pursuit of the 
advocated bridging function.
We discuss from this broad philosophical perspective these four intellectual 
traditions in reverse order, starting from the one which introduces the biggest 
challenge to the possibility of grand narratives and consistency of knowledge 
and understanding, namely the relativist/interpretivist strand, to then turn to 
PA as scientific knowledge (in some respects nowadays mainstream in PA), 
to finally discuss the two perspectives that put centre stage the dimensions 
of PA as ‘art and profession’ (and that seem to maintain the highest porosity 
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with philosophical thought): PA as practical knowledge, and PA as practical 
wisdom.
REVISITING THE INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS IN PA
We have delved at length into the relativist and post-modernist vision of PA in 
Chapter 6. We have emphasised the plural approaches detectable within this 
tradition, and the manifold contributions it has made, thanks to the works of 
such authors as Miller and Fox (2007), Farmer, (1995, 2005, 2010), Abel and 
Sementelli (2004), amongst others (see also Bogason, 2001).
In the relativist tradition a strong interpretivist approach is taken, integrative 
ideals are discarded as unattainable, and inter-subjective agreement on what 
constitutes ‘good governance’ is deemed to be the maximum achievable, 
out of a conception whereby fragmentary knowledge is the broad picture: 
‘understanding is regarded as a potentially unlimited range of “interpretations” 
about some aspect of “reality” through intuition, selective judgement, feelings, 
imagination, creativity and play and through uncovering and/or deconstructing 
diversity of values, cultures, traditions, and styles of life in a nondisciplinary 
manner’ (Raadschelders, 2008, p. 941).
These works are important contributions, nicely crafted, a continuous 
reminder of the limits of both received wisdom and supposedly ‘scientific’ 
claims, and a call to never relinquish a critical stance. However, research in 
this tradition begs the fundamental question: is fragmented knowledge the 
only kind of knowledge that is attainable in PA? Is groundlessness and inde-
terminacy all we are left with? There is an important strand in philosophical 
thought – named in different ways, and yet often referred to as post-modernism 
(perhaps better qualified as post-industrialism, see the works of Lyotard, e.g. 
1984) which has brought about the argument about the incredulity of the con-
temporary man (woman) towards meta-narratives (a strand that includes such 
authors as Lyotard (e.g. 1984), Derrida, Baudrillard (1975, 1983), Foucault 
(e.g. 1980, 1982), amongst others – see Chapter 3). The big narratives that 
have developed over the human history about God, the world and human 
nature are seen with suspicion and ultimately incredulity by the ‘post-modern’ 
man (woman). Indeed, fragmentation is extolled as the breeding ground of 
novel and ingenuous thinking, almost a primordial soup for creativity. When 
applied to the field of public governance and administration, this condition of 
the post-modern man becomes the incubator of opportunities for exploring 
possibilities of transforming PA in novel and unexpected ways:
I expect that postmodern thought can be reconstructed into a force that transforms 
traditional institutional practices into pragmatic and culturally based alternatives by 
reasserting the critical roles of individuals in organizations, the inclusive aspect of 
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discourse analysis, the importance of plurality and difference, and the significance 
of citizen participation in the process of making public institutions more democratic. 
(Jun, 2006, pp. 54–5; see also Jun, 1994)
The question, of course, is whether these worthwhile goals can only be 
achieved by preliminarily tearing down the whole edifice of Western philos-
ophy because this – the critique goes – necessarily leads to an instrumental 
rationality emphasising technique/technical knowledge over human flourish-
ing. But is it so? Is instrumental rationality emphasising technical knowledge 
over human flourishing the (only and necessary) outcome of Western thought? 
This line of argumentation resembles in many respects Heidegger’s critique of 
Western philosophical thought. However, the German philosopher did not end 
up with post-modern thinking (although later post-modern thinkers traced back 
links of post-modernism to Heidegger’s thought); instead he advocated a return 
to the pre-Socratics in order to let Being reveal itself beyond the subject’s 
will of power which, he argued, is implicit in the ‘vision of ideas’ of Plato: 
ultimately, the revealing of Being itself is the altogether different outcome of 
Heidegger’s critique of instrumental rationality, at sidereal distance from the 
post-modernist inter-subjective agreement. More generally, is the outcome of 
Western philosophical thought the assertion of the primacy of instrumental 
rationality, or is this but one of the outcomes of Western philosophy, and there 
is much more to it, which can nourish human flourishing, if only the contri-
bution of Western philosophy is appropriately gauged and tapped (from Plato 
to the Renaissance, from Augustine to Bergson)? In sum, the relativist and 
post-modernist vision of PA starts from a quite narrow set of assumptions, and 
adopts one and only one philosophical stance, which represents only a small 
part of Western philosophical thought. This focus on one hand provides con-
sistency to this vision of PA, but on the other hand it may be a limiting factor.
Prominent scholars in public administration (see, for example, Stillman, 
1991/1999, drawing also on the foundational work of Dwight Waldo) have 
argued for the possibility to achieve an understanding of change and continuity 
in the theory and practice of PA: this suggests that the ambition towards big 
narratives – ones that go beyond the relativist and post-modernist vision – is 
present in the scholarly community of the public administrationists, as well as 
in the practice community of the public administrators. Probably the ‘biggest’ 
narratives can be found in the PA as practical wisdom approach. Before 
delving into that tradition as well as the PA as the practical experience tradi-
tion, we first turn to what seems to be more and more the ‘standard’ in social 
sciences: the PA as scientific knowledge approach.
PA as scientific knowledge is an approach that tends to adopt a ‘narrow’ 
definition of science, patterned on the natural sciences as they emerged in the 
16th and 17th century in Europe. The ideal to which this approach aspires is 
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that of a ‘science of administration’ that may become like a natural science, 
characterised by identifiable and clearly demarcated sets of theories, concepts, 
and methods and conscious that although
laws or lawlike generalizations cannot be found in every sphere of social life, 
science represents at the very least a pursuit of knowledge by means of a common 
method (Gill & Meier, 2000). Scientists of administration are focused on developing 
a formal object or focus of the study, and they concentrate on developing a coherent 
and consistent epistemological and methodological approach … Scientific knowl-
edge is concerned with the development of knowledge for the sake of knowledge 
itself. This implies that determining whether academic knowledge is relevant to 
practice is a matter outside the realm of the scientist and his/her academic speciali-
zation (Simon, 1966, p. 35). (Raadschelders, 2005, pp. 610–11)
There is in this approach a strong influence of positivism via, especially, 
neo-positivism and the seminal work of Herbert Simon (see Chapters 3 and 6).
A simple browsing of the main journals in the field may suggest this 
approach is in certain respects ‘mainstreaming’ in the field of PA: its clout 
seems to have enlarged over the past twenty years or so, possibly also because 
of recruitment criteria in universities which, patterned on disciplines like 
economics, have widely spilled over into the PA scholarship. It certainly does 
have a core group of fierce advocates within the field of PA who, at least 
implicitly, are quite confrontational in their stance:
Some believe that this approach to knowledge is superior to any other approach. 
A small but strong group of scholars in public administration hold that the study 
of public administration has not tried hard enough to develop a scientific approach 
(e.g., Dubnick, 1999) … Positivists regard scholars working according to a different 
approach and/or with an objective that goes beyond science (such as, e.g., applica-
tion or understanding) as pseudo scientists. That is, positivists hold to a narrower, 
natural science ideal for public administration … Those who identify with the 
scientific approach are most insistent upon the notion of a hierarchy of knowl-
edge where theoretical physics represents the pinnacle and ‘opinion’ the bottom. 
Positivists regard the social sciences as being close to the bottom. (Raadschelders, 
2005, p. 612)
This approach has multiple merits. Scholars working in this approach have 
generated valuable insights and made it possible to work out theories or 
models that have contributed to the advancement of the field of PA (one can 
think of the development of the theory of ‘Public Service Motivation’), which-
ever way one measures ‘progress’ in science.2 Positivism forced scholars in the 
field to raise the bar in rigour of conceptualisation and research design, and to 
search for proof of the assertions made that demand the most solid procedures 
in the description of the phenomenon of interest. It has been, and is, in sum, 
a powerful force pushing towards higher standard of inquiry in the field.
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The limits of positivism and neo-positivism as brought into the field of PA 
are probably the same of this philosophical school at large, widely debated (see 
Chapter 3). First, in positivism there is a strong assertion that, ultimately, the 
methods of the natural sciences are the model for the social sciences as well. 
A foundational question for this approach, therefore, is how far the methods 
of the natural sciences travel easily into the realms of the social sciences: the 
extent to which they do may indeed demarcate a limit to the efficacy of natural 
sciences-derived methods (see for a crucial counter-argument the demarca-
tion between the natural sciences and the sciences of the spirit delineated by 
Dilthey, Chapter 3).
Second, the very progresses in physics – the pinnacle of knowledge and 
‘science’ according to this approach – seems to have shattered a number of the 
assumptions about the objectivity of the ‘facts’ upon which 19th-century posi-
tivism heavily relied (a review of these critiques with an eye on PA is reported 
in Drechsler, 2011 and 2019). Albeit for different reasons, both the theory of 
relativity at the macro-level of the cosmic scale and the particle physics at the 
micro-level have granted the subject, the beholder of the phenomenon under 
investigation, an influence on the very process and outcome of generation of 
scientific knowledge.3 The subject determines what can be observed and how 
it is observed. A critic of the PA as scientific knowledge school might well 
claim that if this assertion holds in physics, much more so is the case in the 
social sciences and in an applied field like PA, which deals not with stars and 
particles but with the man-made world of public institutions and processes.
Third, in the early Positivist thinkers, induction (as developed especially by 
John Stuart Mill) was upheld as the form that knowing takes. This claim was 
to be seen in the context of the harsh polemic against Aristotelian syllogism 
and its inherently deductive structure. As more widely reported in Chapter 
3, Popper developed a harsh critique of induction in knowledge. For Popper, 
knowledge instead takes the form of the testing of a theory, and theories may 
originate from anywhere (not least, metaphysical assumptions). This may lead 
to a third limit of positivism, at least in its early formulations: an exclusive 
reliance on induction as the form of knowledge. As noticed in Chapter 3, 
the debate is far from being over, and it may well be said that contemporary 
research work in Neo-Positivistic strands takes on board methodological 
pluralism on this crucial point, accompanied by more and more sophisticated 
techniques for both theory generation from data and theory testing against 
empirical evidence.
Conventionalism has brought about a fourth major challenge to positivism: 
the ‘theories built on facts’ statue of Positivistic flavour are drained off the 
pedestal by the methodological critiques of the authors in this movement. 
For Mach, theories do not have, and do not need to have, an intrinsic validity 
in terms of detecting the causes: they are just functional relations capable of 
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predicting certain phenomena; they are adequate conventions (see more widely 
in Chapter 3 the section on conventionalism and Popper). Poincaré high-
lighted how more theories, contradictory amongst themselves, may co-exist 
in explaining different phenomena, or even in explaining different aspects or 
properties of the same phenomenon. However, this may no longer be a major 
limit for research in this tradition: it may well be said that these critiques 
have now been mainstreamed in the natural as well as the social sciences 
and these alongside other notions of philosophy of the science worked out by 
conventionalism have become widely accepted by scholars carrying out their 
research work in the field of PA specifically. Indeed, conventionalism may 
be said to have placed relevance above rigour in the natural sciences, or at 
least to have stricken a different balance which puts them on par: and if this 
is significant for the natural sciences, more so for the social sciences and even 
more so for the field of PA (Drechsler, 2019). These and other developments 
have nowadays entered the toolkit of social scientists at large, and PA scholars 
specifically, and have enriched the repertoire and epistemological pluralism of 
the ‘PA as scientific knowledge’ approach.
A fifth challenge to this school has been brought about by those philosoph-
ical perspectives emphasising the ultimately fallacious conception of the very 
notion of ‘time’ employed in research work (see the philosophies of Heidegger 
and Bergson, Chapter 3), a critique which has been picked up by eminent 
sociologists (e.g. Abbott, 1992a, 1992b). From this philosophical perspective, 
the very initial assumption, apparently self-evident, usually formulated as ‘at 
t = 0’, may be flawed.
In concluding on this tradition of research and inquiry, it should be noticed 
that other approaches to PA diverse from neo-positivism, more or less explic-
itly evade the relatively strict boundaries defining what is ‘scientific’ by adopt-
ing an expanded definition of science. It is a definition closer to the notion 
conveyed by the German term Wissenschaft, which refers to a wider ‘branch 
of knowledge’, including ‘science’ in its contemporary and more restricted 
meaning together with various other intellectual traditions (Raadschelders, 
2008, p. 925). Science as Wissenschaft is an approach that encompasses 
a systematic consideration for values and meanings in the study of social 
phenomena (Gadamer, 1960/1975; Weber, 1978/1922, 1949). It is this notion 
that helps understand both the conception of PA as practical experience and the 
vision of PA as practical wisdom.
In relation to PA as practical experience, the roots of this approach can be 
traced back to the first writings on administrative practices and administrative 
arrangements, in ancient Greece with the works of Plato and Aristotle (see 
Chapter 2).4 In Europe, it is around the 12th/13th century, with centralisation 
processes starting to unfold in what will later become the European nation 
states, that administrative arrangements become the subject of some attention 
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(see Brannon, 2006, for the case of England). Closer to our time, in a more sys-
tematic way this approach developed originally in the German principalities and 
then the unified state of Germany and in France, and the practical knowledge 
accumulated in the process of building these two states then became extolled 
as exemplar for the US administrative state (famously in Woodrow Wilson’s 
seminal article, 1887), for Japan (administrative arrangements having been 
part and parcel of the ‘Meiji restoration’ which aimed at importing Western 
technologies and practices to ‘modernise’ the Japanese society, economy and 
the state) and later on almost anywhere else where the building of substantive 
amounts of administrative capacity became a political priority. These devel-
opments are known in France as the sciences administratives (administrative 
sciences)5 and in Germany under the label of Cameralism (a key author in 
the German cameralist tradition is J.H.G. von Justi). However, an important 
strand of historiography tracks the early development of the science and theory 
of PA in Germany back to the thought of Christian Wolff in the 18th century 
(Drechsler, 2001b; see also Jann, 2003) and to the developments in the 19th 
century Hegelian tradition of the notion of Staatswissenschaften, in the strand 
of thought represented by Lorenz von Stein, a stream of thought drawing from 
Hegel to provide a philosophy of PA.6
The continuation of this approach in the 20th century can be found in 
training programmes offered to practitioners by training agencies, universities, 
research institutions and ‘national schools of public administration’ – organ-
isations generally endowed with strong local connections that have as a core 
area of their business to develop practical tools and to transmit applied knowl-
edge bespoke to the needs of public officials. In the second half of the 20th 
century, notable national schools of administration, like the well-known Ecole 
Nationale d’Administration in France, became institutional venues for the gen-
eration and transmission of practical knowledge to public officials, a task now-
adays also often accomplished by schools of public policy (like the Kennedy 
School of Government at Harvard University in the US) and, since the end of 
the 20th century, schools of public management (like the SDA Bocconi School 
of Management in Italy). It is worth noticing that in this intellectual tradition of 
PA, practitioners can exercise influence over the academic work and, to some 
extent, affect academic research agendas.
In this approach to PA there is an emphasis on providing practitioners with 
the appropriate tools for administering and managing. Embodying applied 
knowledge into utilisable tools is a distinctive focus of this school – a bit 
like the way engineers incorporate their multiple bodies of knowledge into 
a gizmo, a functioning machine that serves practical purposes. As method, case 
studies are considered to be a key instrument for generating and transmitting 
this ‘practical’ knowledge, linking theoretical knowledge and circumstantiated 
decision-making. Also core in this perspective is advancing the ‘best practices 
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in public management’ agenda: detecting ‘practices that work’, understanding 
the socio-technical mechanisms making them produce desirable outcomes, 
extrapolating those mechanism for replication elsewhere is a central thrust 
of PA as practical knowledge (some of the most sophisticated critical works 
in this tradition emphasise the opportuneness of abandoning the misleading 
term of ‘best’ to qualify such practices – which might more appropriately be 
referred to as ‘good enough’ practices, as we have widely discussed in Chapter 
8 – and rather focus the problematics of how to extrapolate the mechanisms 
that make a practice produce certain effects under given context conditions in 
order to be able to replicate them elsewhere; see Bardach, 1994, 1998, 2004; 
Barzelay, 2007; Barzelay and Campbell, 2003; Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015, 
Chapter 8; Ongaro, 2006).
Authors that may be ascribed to this intellectual tradition include Taylor 
(1911), Gulick and Urwick in the US and Fayol in France. Contemporary expo-
nents include, for example, John Bryson, whose lifelong research agenda on 
conceptualising and developing strategic planning for public and not-for-profit 
organisations conceives of strategic planning as a form of practical reasoning 
(Bryson, 2018), and Kettl (2002) in the US, and Borgonovi et al. (2008), 
Drumaux and Goethals (2007), Joyce (2000, 2012), amongst many others, in 
Europe. In recent times, authors in this tradition qualify the field more often as 
public ‘management’ rather than ‘administration’.
Although this tradition is inherently multidisciplinary, drawing from differ-
ent disciplines in a partly unstructured, ad hoc way, a qualification is required 
in that the discipline of management tends to have a pre-eminent role and 
be a main source of theories, case examples and imagery in this intellectual 
tradition. In a sophisticated work, Barzelay (2019) qualifies it explicitly as 
public management and elaborates a conception of PA as public management 
as a design-oriented professional discipline, drawing on a synthesis between 
the notion of the sciences of the artificial as wrought out by Herbert Simon 
(1996) and the Harvard tradition of professional management, notably includ-
ing case-method teaching.
Philosophical thought is ubiquitous in this approach, given the reticence of 
authors in this strand to draw strict boundaries to the field and to set up the 
home of PA as an independent science, with its own well-defined problems, 
concepts and methods, as in the previous approach. Quite the opposite, practi-
cal reasoning lies at the heart of this approach, which is porous to a multitude 
of ontological, ethical and epistemological issues that a philosophical per-
spective may aid to unveil. Examples of key issues in practical reasoning that 
are of high philosophical bearing include: the nature and extent of individual 
agency that is predicated of the agents or actors that are purported to ‘act on 
the problem’ and ultimately fix it (for example, improving a given public 
service or certain public governance arrangements for engaging citizens into 
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collective decision processes: what kind of freedom do actors have? What kind 
of ‘agency’ are they endowed with?); the assumptions about the immutability 
of human nature and its implications for the very ontological possibility of 
drawing lessons from past experiences (this is a central tenet of Machiavelli’s 
thought, see Chapter 7);7 the foundations of morality claims that guide practi-
cal behaviour in its normative, ‘ought to’ dimension (as in Kant’s perspective 
outlined in his second critique, the critique of practical reason, see Chapters 3 
and 4); and so on.
The intellectual tradition of PA as practical experience emphasises the 
significance of learning from cases: what a philosophical perspective may 
bring to scholars working within this approach is a set of conceptual tools 
for tackling the longstanding issue of what we can learn from history, that is, 
past ‘cases’ and ‘episodes of history’, for addressing contemporary pressing 
problems. Machiavelli’s works, not just The Prince but also the Discourses 
on Livy, are imperishable testimonies of the deeper issues entangled in the 
exercise of learning from the past (Chapter 7). The Jesuit Fathers over the 17th 
and 18th centuries worked out a sophisticated method, named ‘casuistry’, to 
treat morally charged, value-laden problematics of individual and collective 
free choice under the mutable circumstances of life. Analogical reasoning, as 
originally worked out in Medieval Europe, is an enduring point of reference for 
the problem of applying knowledge acquired in one domain to another domain 
and set of circumstances (see Chapter 2).
Philosophical thought, which is so centre stage in the approach to PA as 
practical knowledge, is even more quintessential in the fourth intellectual tra-
dition in PA, to which we now turn. PA as practical wisdom can be effectively 
defined by the three fundamental questions it tackles:
(1) Where are we going?; (2) Is it desirable to go there?; (3) What can we do to 
get there? (Flyvbjerg, 2001). To answer these questions, a ruler must understand 
the social context in which he decides to take action; understand the nature of the 
actual and desired relation between ruler and ruled; and have some command over 
knowledge about government. (Raadschelders, 2008, p. 929)
To the extent there is a ‘science’ of government in this tradition, this is 
intended in the broad sense of a branch of knowledge as Wissenschaft. It is an 
understanding close to Weber’s conception of the social science as necessarily 
subjective (guided by the researcher’s value-driven selection of the ‘relevant 
phenomena’ out of the virtually infinite world of social phenomena) and pro-
ducing a value-laden knowledge, descriptive-analytical as well as normative. 
It should be noticed that the notion of science as Wissenschaft does not at all 
entail that this kind of knowledge is less theory-intensive than when science is 
intended in a stricter sense (like in the PA as scientific knowledge perspective), 
Edoardo Ongaro - 9781839100345
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/04/2020 08:25:44AM
via free access
Elements (fragments) for the philosophical foundations of a theory of PA 267
or that the process of generation of such knowledge is less demanding in terms 
of rigour and researcher’s discipline.
It is also the oldest approach:
This approach has a heritage that goes back to Aristotle who regards phronesis as the 
necessary characteristic to any leader whether of households or of states (Aristotle, 
1976, p. 209). Phronesis is usually translated as practical wisdom, practical common 
sense, and/or prudence. The latter translation is interesting for prudence is derived 
from a Latin word which means ‘far-seeing’. (Raadschelders, 2005, p. 606)
It explicitly relies upon philosophical understanding, political theory, and 
historical and comparative content and embraces moral reasoning, judgement, 
and interpretation (Raadschelders 2008, p. 932). Tellingly, the virtue of 
Prudence sits in the place of Honour as core virtue for good government in the 
first Lorenzetti fresco (Chapter 7).
Works – masterpieces – in this approach may be found throughout the 
centuries (one may think of Erasmus’s The Education of a Christian Prince).8 
Modern representatives include Frederickson (1980; also Frederickson and 
Smith, 2002), Hood (1998), Pollitt (2003, 2016a), Stillman (1991/1999), 
Waldo (1948/1984) and Weber (1946). Christopher Hood in The Art of the 
State (1998) uses cultural anthropology as the main theoretical source to then 
weave the overall argument into a broader philosophical tissue.
This tradition embodies an approach that upholds a conception of PA far 
away from the notion of science as patterned on the natural sciences. Quite at 
the opposite, it conceives of PA as a field whose problems cannot be unprob-
lematically stated, concepts are not uncontroversially standardised, and con-
sensus for the methodology of solution is largely absent, hence not as a science 
setting up home independently of philosophy, but rather PA is, in a number of 
respects, still a branch of philosophy. If PA is ultimately closer to philosophy 
than is the case for other fields of the social sciences, which have ‘set up home’ 
as almost independent sciences, then the role of philosophy is constitutive for 
this approach: philosophy is the reference body of knowledge in this field.
One area in which this is manifest is the philosophical debate over virtues. 
There is a long tradition astride between political philosophy and ethics that 
reflects on the governors’ and the citizens’ virtues required for addressing the 
three questions introduced as the outset: where are we going? Should we go 
there? And if so, how to get there? Ancient, medieval, Renaissance are epochs 
that bequeathed the posterity with classical texts on the role of virtues and 
wisdom for governing. Chapter 7 provides luminous examples, from the role 
of virtues in governing as outlined by Lorenzetti in his most famous painting 
The Good Government to the savvy advice on the skills required of the Prince 
delineated by Machiavelli. Philosophy of the soul and mind, political philoso-
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phy, philosophy of cultures and the kindred discipline of cultural anthropology 
are amongst the other bodies of knowledge whereby philosophy constitutively 
contributes to give shape to PA as practical wisdom.
Each of the approaches may acquire a more or less relevant position in the 
academy and in the practice of PA, depending on a range of circumstances. 
Differences across regions of the world are notable: European handbooks 
(recently, Ongaro and van Thiel, 2018b) seem to show that public admin-
istration continues to have a holistic identity in Europe and its scholars are 
much less confrontational than their American brethren, possibly because of 
the more explicit acceptance of the interdisciplinarity of the field. In Eastern 
Asia, where the Confucian paradigm has historically had a dominant position, 
or the Islamic world, the traditions of PA as practical knowledge and prac-
tical wisdom have probably been historically prevailing (Drechsler, 2015b), 
although in more recent times contacts with the West, especially with the 
US scholarship, have brought to the fore the perspective of PA as scientific 
knowledge and, to a lesser extent, may have led to read traditional PA debates 
through the relativist/interpretivist tradition.
There remains a question to which Raadschelders provides an articulate 
answer: to whom are these approaches useful? One way of answering is that:
Practical wisdom is of pedagogical value since it provides a broad and interdisci-
plinary basis of knowledge upon which the contemporary role and position of gov-
ernment in society can be assessed. Hence, it is useful to (under) graduate students, 
public servants in elected and appointed positions, as well as citizens. However, it 
is also useful to the pure scientist, someone who should not avoid thinking about 
the potential social consequences of theory. Given the need for applicable skills, 
practical experience is attractive to policy- and decision-makers from the lower to 
the higher levels. Some are specialists and some are generalists, but all are manag-
ers who must match means to ends and costs to benefits. This approach is equally 
useful in the classroom since it brings the real world of government closer to the 
student through cases and examples. Scientific knowledge is of course important 
to researchers pursuing science: it also provides an important approach in the 
classroom, but perhaps less so at the undergraduate level and more so at the grad-
uate (especially doctoral) level. The practitioner may find some use for scientific 
knowledge, but it is up to that practitioner, and not the scientist, to see how it can 
be applied to the real world (Simon, 1969, p. 34). Finally, relativist perspectives are 
important if only because academics and practitioners must be willing to question 
the value and challenge the strength of convictions and orthodoxies. (Raadschelders, 
2008, p. 941)
TOWARDS THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF 
A THEORY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CHANGE?
In this section we make use of the notion of intellectual traditions in PA for 
an ambitious purpose: sketching a possible overarching frame of a philosoph-
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ically informed ‘theory’ of PA change. Kattel, in a book review of the first 
edition of this book, notices that:
[F]rom welfare economics to public choice to cost–benefit analysis, economics has 
provided what can be called a substantive theory of change for public administration 
… Noticeably, public administration as a scholarly field has been unable to provide 
its own take on the theory of change, at least none that has taken hold of practition-
ers’ imagination as economic theories have. Perhaps the most profound efforts stem 
from the late Christopher Pollitt, his two … books (2008 and 2012) mapping space, 
technology and time as key drivers of change in public administration … in these 
footsteps now follows [the first edition of this book, which] seeks to open a new and 
enormous source of ideas for discussing theories of change in public organisations. 
(Kattel, 2018, pp. 137‒8)
What Kattel suggests is that from the systematic application of philosophical 
ideas to the field of PA can, at least potentially, stem a range of theories for PA 
change. In what sense do we speak in this context of theory? Consistently with 
the overall perspective of this work, and with our interpretation of Kattel’s 
suggestive exhortation to the PA scholarly community, we use the term theory 
as being about ‘the causes of things’ in the broadest sense and consequently 
we refer not just to the efficient causes, but also to the final causes, the goals 
or ends which provide sense to human action, the teleology of things; and we 
also consider the nature of the object of investigation, the essence of things 
and hence the meanings of things, as part of the (admittedly very broad and 
partly unconventional in contemporary social sciences) notion of theory we 
aim to employ here: in sum, we refer to Aristotle’s four causes as a compre-
hensive system to resort to for a theory of PA change (see Chapters 2, 6 and 8). 
Continuing along this line of reasoning, we might also ask in what sense are we 
evoking in this context a theory of and for change? In a sense this is tautolog-
ical because theories are about explanations of the causes of certain outcomes, 
and hence of change or the absence thereof (stability), by definition. However, 
it is in a slightly more specific sense that we talk of a theory of change in this 
frame. In fact, while from the treasure trove of philosophical ideas virtually 
all kinds of theories can be derived (to then be elaborated and tested through 
scientific methods, to the extent they are amenable to being tested with the 
standard scientific methods), we would like here to emphasise that bringing 
philosophical thought into PA may infuse the field of PA with ideas about 
a radically diverse public administration than what can be observed (see e.g. 
the section on Thomas More’s Utopia in Chapter 7, and the discussion of 
utopias as conceptual tools in Chapter 8 of this book and in Bouckaert, 2020), 
or a diverse conception of decision-making in public organisations (i.e. one 
in which wisdom and ethicality are explored through the language of virtues, 
and this is done also by means of visual rather than just verbal media, like 
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in Lorenzetti’s frescoes: see Chapter 7) and thence, ultimately, that different 
visions of PA may take shape out of these intellectual exercises, producing 
causally informed alternative visions of PA. In short, bringing new and diverse 
ideas drawn from various strands of philosophical thought may inform theo-
ries of PA change. In other words, working out a theory of PA change out of 
philosophical reflections on intellectual traditions in PA means bringing to 
the fore the ideational component of change, moving from the consideration 
that change may stem also from novel ideas and novel ways of seeing things, 
and that ideas about meanings and ends may matter as much as ideas about 
methods and tools.
Equipped with these conceptual tools, in this section we pursue two aims, 
both ambitious yet located at two different levels: first, we aim to work 
out some potential implications of revisiting the claims of each intellectual 
tradition in PA in the light of core philosophical perspectives, thus hope-
fully contributing to ‘enlighten’ certain implications of conceiving of PA 
and researching and practising it within one or the other of these traditions; 
second, based on delving into some of the philosophical underpinnings of 
these intellectual traditions, we aim to put forward some tentative propositions 
about how possible paths forward for the advancements of PA may be brought 
about, within each intellectual tradition as well as by bridging traditions. It is 
this second bit of the analysis that fits the criteria required to make the con-
tribution of philosophical thought to PA bring about the ideational bases of a 
‘theory of and for PA change’, in the sense alluded to by Kattel. Thence, in 
this sense revisiting intellectual traditions in PA from the perspective of their 
varied and differentiated philosophical underpinnings, and reflecting over how 
philosophical thought may contribute to profiling the premises and the impli-
cations of PA intellectual traditions, may contribute some ‘bits and pieces’ – to 
which we refer as ‘fragments’ – towards forging a ‘theory of PA change (in the 
sense specified above), a theory that is explanatory in the sense of shedding 
light on both meanings and causes – where by cause we refer to all four of the 
causes in Aristotle’s classical classification (efficient, material, formal and 
final cause, Chapters 2 and 6). Ultimately, along this path we hope to be able 
to elicit a debate which may lead to envisioning alternative possible ways of 
conceiving of PA, and hence lead to the sketch a theory of and for PA change. 
This ‘theory of PA change’ will then have to be fleshed out through knowledge 
provided by the many disciplines of PA (see Chapter 1), and it will have to be 
effected through the skills developed in the civil services all over the world, by 
performing both the ‘art’ and the ‘profession’ of PA (Chapter 1).
Consistently with the overall thrust of this book – which aims at discussing 
philosophy for PA, and not to propose this author’s philosophy of PA – we will 
not go down this path to work out our very own theory of PA change, rather 
in this book we outline the contours of the path (pathway) that can be walked 
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by resorting to the treasure trove of philosophical ideas for outlining theories 
of PA change – elaborating specific ‘philosophies of PA’ is a task for other 
books, by other authors.9
Table 9.1 reports the effort to work out some potential implications of 
revisiting the claims of each intellectual tradition in PA in the light of core 
philosophical perspectives, offering a very schematic (and necessarily over-
simplified) framing of some interconnections between key issues of ontology, 
political philosophy and epistemology and key tenets of each intellectual 
tradition. These are mostly to be intended as entry points to reflect critically on 
how traditions in PA look when seen from a thick philosophical perspective, as 
would be looked at from scholars professionally trained and educated in phi-
losophy. The subsequent tentative propositions illustrate the attempt to deline-
ate some fragments of a theory of and for PA change: they are to be intended as 
working propositions, to be employed and critically appropriated by whoever 
– scholar or practitioner – engages into the elaboration of a philosophy-driven 
(or at least philosophically-inspired) theory of PA change.
A couple of considerations immediately arise from the consideration of 
the philosophical underpinnings of the four intellectual traditions in PA as 
outlined in Table 9.1 – not before having recalled to the attention of the reader 
once more the consideration that the contents of Table 9.1 are necessarily 
oversimplified, and even more importantly that this whole exercise is to some 
extent deliberately provocative, in order to elicit a critical consideration of the 
intellectual perspectives that most scholars and most practitioners implicitly 
adopt in their thinking of PA. The first consideration is that the table clearly 
shows that it is not just political philosophy to be an intellectual source domain 
for PA, rather ontological and epistemological considerations are centre 
stage; this consideration reinforces the central message of this book about the 
significance of systematically and comprehensively applying philosophical 
thought across some of its main areas to the field of PA. The second consider-
ation is that the framework of analysis we propose aims at unearthing at least 
some facets of how philosophical thought, articulated along the lines of the 
themes identified in the previous chapters from 4 to 8, may be employed for 
supplementing the four intellectual traditions in PA, in view of sketching some 
contours of a theory of PA change.
Based on these considerations, what follows is an initial sketch of the frame-
work – a work-in-progress – of how these conceptual elements might provide 
ideational bases underpinning an envisioning of paths for thinking differently 
– conceiving differently – of PA: an intellectual exercise which may pave the 
way for fresh (re-)thinking of how PA is studied and how PA could or should 
be conceived of, and hence re-organised. Tentative propositions on certain 
implications that may be drawn from considering philosophical underpinnings 
of the four intellectual traditions for delineating the contours of a theory of PA 
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Table 9.1 Philosophical underpinnings in intellectual traditions in 
public administration – a schematic framing
 PA as Practical 
Wisdom
PA as Practical 
Experience
PA as Scientific 
Knowledge
Relativist/
post-modernist 
vision of PA
Ontology – 
nature of being/
categories of being/
transcendentals 
(necessity or 
possibility, 
potentiality and 
actuality)
Ontological 
considerations 
inform the 
understanding of PA 
and the making of 
decisions in public 
governance – the 
reflection on what 
is possible (to 
change) and what 
is necessitated 
(impossible to 
change) is centre 
stage (wisdom as 
awareness of what 
can be changed and 
what cannot)
An ontology of 
potentiality (what 
might happen) and 
possibility (what 
happened might 
also not have 
happened/what will 
happen depends 
on us) underpins 
the drive to make 
use of experiential 
knowledge for 
effecting change
Some 
epistemologies 
in this approach 
may adopt 
an ontology 
of necessity 
(what happened 
necessarily 
happened) and 
be unable to 
treat potentiality 
(what might 
happen/might 
have happened 
is excluded as 
an object of 
inquiry)
A subjectivist 
ontology as the 
(explicit and 
vocal) basic stance 
– nature and 
categories of being 
deemed outside 
of reach of human 
mind
Ontology –human 
nature and 
motivations of 
human behaviour 
– ontology of 
the subject of 
knowledge (what 
can we know?) 
and the subject of 
moral judgement 
(what must we 
do?)
A strong assumption 
about the capacity of 
the human subject to 
know and to make 
moral judgements is 
assumed – aspiration 
to betterment/
reachability of 
perfection through 
the practice of 
virtues – awareness 
of dark/evil side of 
human nature
Optimism about 
human capacity 
to attain ‘enough 
knowledge’ to fix 
practical problems 
(though generally 
less ‘grandiose’ 
conception of 
human nature than 
PA as Practical 
Wisdom)
Optimism about 
human capacity 
to attain ‘enough 
knowledge’, 
more agnostic 
(implicitly 
indifferent 
position?) about 
whether public 
administrators 
have the moral 
posture to 
successfully 
cope with 
the lure of 
temptations or 
engage with 
wicked issue
Pessimism about 
human capacity to 
attain knowledge; 
‘optimism of the 
will’ to overcome 
the ‘pessimism 
of the reason’ in 
attempting to build 
consensus on what 
is ‘better public 
governance’
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 PA as Practical 
Wisdom
PA as Practical 
Experience
PA as Scientific 
Knowledge
Relativist/
post-modernist 
vision of PA
Ontology – social 
ontology (social 
structures, agency, 
power, institutions, 
and culture)
Broad vision 
whereby social 
structures, individual 
agency, institutions 
and culture combine 
to shape the political 
system and society
Nature of social 
ontology rarely 
problematised.
Relative 
influence of 
individual agency, 
institutions, 
culture, and 
analysis of 
power rarely 
problematised; 
however, emphasis 
on the capacity of 
the individual to 
deploy experiential 
learning for 
problem-solving
Nature of social 
ontology rarely 
problematised.
Relative 
influence of 
individual 
agency, 
institutions, 
culture, and 
analysis of 
power varies 
depending on 
social-scientific 
strand (rational 
choice, 
behaviourism, 
institutionalism 
…)
Assumption 
widely held that 
social structures 
only exist within 
the individual 
human being.
Possible emphasis 
on conditioning 
influence of social 
structures, in the 
track of thought of 
Foucault. 
Ontology – 
conception of time 
and space
Conceptions of 
time and space get 
problematised, e.g.:
- Time as the 
unfolding of Being 
(historicism, Hegel)
- Time as the 
unveiling of Being 
(Heidegger)
- Time as the lived 
time of the human 
psyche (Bergson)
- Space as 
Lorenzetti’s 
ethical place of the 
manifestation of 
virtues and vices
Conceptions 
of time and 
space mostly 
assumed from 
common-sense 
experience and 
non-controversial/
non-problematised
Conceptions 
of time and 
space mostly 
Space and time 
as socially 
constructed
Ontology – the 
existentialist 
ontology of human 
being as caring (for 
the others and the 
world)
A possible 
intellectual source
A mostly implicit 
assumption 
A mostly 
irrelevant notion
An intellectual 
source, especially 
in interpretivist/
social 
constructivist 
interpretations
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 PA as Practical 
Wisdom
PA as Practical 
Experience
PA as Scientific 
Knowledge
Relativist/
post-modernist 
vision of PA
Political 
Philosophy/
Legitimacy of 
Public Governance
A central concern 
in this tradition. 
All philosophical 
approaches to the 
issue of legitimacy 
centre stage 
(common good, 
social contract, social 
justice, personalism)
Mostly in the 
background
A concern 
only to the 
extent it can 
be empirically 
investigated 
(e.g. studies 
on citizens’ 
trust, citizens’ 
satisfaction 
with public 
institutions)
A key concern 
Epistemology –
realism, relativism, 
positivism
Realism Mostly Agnostic – 
realism by default
Positivism 
(mostly)
Relativism
Epistemology – 
rationalism and 
empiricism
Both (rationalism 
central)
Both (mostly 
empiricism)
Empiricism Critical of both – 
emphasis on limits 
to what can be 
known
Epistemology 
– (realist) 
phenomenology
Phenomenology 
may be a relevant 
approach
Phenomenology 
may be relevant 
(implicit, 
non-problematised)
Phenomenology 
mostly discarded 
as non-scientific
(Possibly) Idealist 
phenomenology
Epistemology – the 
nature of universal 
concepts
Moderate realism Likely moderate 
realism (implicit, 
non-problematised)
Mostly non- 
problematised
Nominalism
Conceptual 
Tools – the usage 
of the notions of 
practices, models, 
paradigms, 
ideal-types, utopias
Paradigms (culture) 
and teleological 
thinking (utopias) are 
centre stage
Emphasis on 
practices and on 
normative models 
(tools for effecting 
change)
Emphasis on 
explanatory 
models (as 
conducive 
to the aimed 
at ‘scientific 
theories’)
 
Conceptual tools 
used for critical 
purposes.
Deconstruction of 
concepts
Conceptual tools 
– the four causes 
(material, efficient, 
formal, final)
Comprehensive 
usages of the four 
causes, emphasis 
on formal and final 
cause
Emphasis on 
material and 
efficient cause
Emphasis 
on efficient 
causation
(renouncing the 
search for causes)
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change may then be put forward. They are presented in the remainder of this 
section.
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Proposition 1: An ontology of possibility pertains primarily to the intellectual 
traditions of PA as Practical Wisdom and PA as Practical Experience; it is 
mainly in these traditions that the treatment of potentiality and the demarca-
tion between what is necessitated and what is possible is problematised and 
upheld, therefore enabling research into the usage of the notion of potential 
in PA.
This tentative proposition stems from reflection on categories of being, notably 
of potentiality and actuality (Chapter 4) and the transcendental disjunction 
whereby something is either possible or necessary (on the notion of transcen-
dental, see Chapter 2), in each intellectual tradition.
Implications for a theory of PA change: Eugene Bardach and other scholars 
have argued about the usefulness of including and treating potentials in PA; 
notably, he considered the problem of what can be learnt from a ‘practice’ 
that ‘could have worked well’ due to its inherent mechanism, even if in the 
observed case it did not factually work well due to chance events hindering the 
deployment of its potential (Bardach, 1994; the issue is also discussed in Ferlie 
and Ongaro, 2015, Chapter 8). Avenues for further research in PA might be 
opened and developed through more systematically resorting to the notions of 
potentiality and contingency.
Proposition 2: Assumptions about the capacity to know (what can we know?) 
and to make moral judgements (what must we do?) of the human subject vary 
widely across the intellectual traditions in PA.
These variations reflect the varied philosophical stances in contemporary 
society, and the proposition is based on pondering the prevailing underpinning 
conception of human nature in each intellectual tradition. There might have 
been a partial neglect in the field of PA in engaging upfront with issues about 
the moral posture of public administrators, though public ethics and integrity 
systems are key foci of inquiry.
Implications for a theory of PA change include re-engaging into a wider 
debate about underlying assumptions on the human subject of knowledge and 
moral judgement (a useful starting point being the implications of Kantian 
philosophy for PA, introduced in Chapters 4 and 6) as the subject of social 
agency in PA.
Proposition 3: Issues of social ontology are rarely problematised in PA as 
Practical Experience and PA as Scientific Knowledge, while they get problem-
atised and underpin PA as Practical Wisdom and the Relativist Vision of PA.
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We have noticed in Chapter 4 how the philosophical stream of structuralism 
and more recent developments in social ontology may drive a resurgence in the 
consideration of social structures in explanations in PA.
Implications for theory of PA change include bringing the analysis of social 
structures more systematically into the frameworks employed in PA research.
Proposition 4: Underlying ontological conceptions of the nature of time and 
space-place are rarely problematised in PA as Practical Experience and PA 
as Scientific Knowledge, while they get problematised and underpin PA as 
Practical Wisdom and the Relativist Vision of PA.
We have discussed quite at length in Chapter 4 how different notions of time 
and conceptions of the dynamics of History may shape the interpretation of 
research findings in PA.
Implications for a theory of PA change include opening up a wider range of 
interpretations of research findings in PA – much in the line of the conception 
of ‘explanation’ not just as the process of identifying the causes of something 
but also as the process of attributing meaning to something (see Chapter 1).
Proposition 5: The perspective of the Existentialist Public Administrator is 
a possible (undertapped?) intellectual source in PA as Practical Wisdom and 
PA as Practical Experience, and a vivid one in the Relativist Vision of PA.
This intellectual perspective, while probably nowadays out of fashion as 
a full-fledged conception of the profile of the public administrator, may rep-
resent a stimulating perspective through which to critically revisit notions of 
the public leader, the public administrator and the public manager, as well as 
understandings of public accountability.
Implications for a theory of PA change include broadening the range of 
perspectives from which to delineate the figure of the public administrator and 
how decisions are made in public organisations and the public services, and to 
critically revisit notions of public accountability.
Proposition 6: The topic of the legitimacy of public governance figures in each 
intellectual tradition, albeit with varied salience.
We have elaborated in Chapter 5 an approach to revisit and critically assess the 
legitimacy of PA reform doctrines.
Implications for a theory of PA change include broadening the range of the 
meta-criteria employed for assessing doctrines for reforming the public sector, 
thence contributing to the scholarly and policy debate on how to reform public 
governance and public management (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017).
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Proposition 7: The different Intellectual traditions are underpinned by diverse 
epistemologies – critical realism, (neo- and post-)positivism, relativism and 
radical social constructionism – and by a diverse stance about whether to 
integrate rationalism or prioritise almost exclusively empiricism as dominant 
philosophy of science.
These issues of epistemology have been widely dissected in Chapter 6.
Implications for theory of PA change include the recognition of the hetero-
geneity of epistemic traditions to be a key trait of the field of PA and conceiv-
ing of this heterogeneity as an inexhaustible source of richness for the field, 
to be tapped, not stemmed: the beneficial cross-fertilisation brought about 
by integrating epistemic traditions in investigating PA topics – argued for by 
various authors (Raadschelders, 2011; Riccucci, 2010) – may nourish novel 
and original approaches to PA theory and change. One example of this may lie 
in integrating methods of inquiry drawn from phenomenology into large PA 
research programmes and projects.
Proposition 8: The different Intellectual traditions are underpinned by diverse 
stances vis-à-vis the problem of the nature of universal concepts.
The problem of the nature of universal concepts is introduced in Chapter 2, and 
its significance for PA examined in Chapter 6, where we noticed an alignment 
between where the investigator stands in conceiving of the nature of universal 
concepts and her/his epistemology of the social sciences in general and of 
public governance specifically; notably, realist positions in the conception of 
the universals appear hardly compatible with radical social constructivism, 
which tends to be aligned with a nominalist conception of the universals; and 
nominalist positions in the conception of universals are difficult to reconcile 
with realist positions in epistemology, which tend to be aligned with moderate 
realism in the conception of the universals.
Implications for theory of PA change include recognising a possible risk 
area here, that is, the forming or the deepening of a cleavage between research-
ers endorsing a realist position and those endorsing a nominalist one – with 
possibly a large mid-terrain represented by a large majority of scholars who do 
not problematise the issue (possibly most of them implicitly assuming moder-
ate realism as the default position).
Proposition 9: The usage of conceptual tools from utopias to practices (that 
is: practices, models, paradigms, ideal-types, and utopias) varies significantly 
across each intellectual tradition.
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We have devoted Chapter 8 to a full review and examination of the notions of 
practices, models, paradigms, ideal-types, and utopias and their application to 
the field of PA, providing an interpretation of these as complementary tools, 
whose integrated usage may benefit the field.
Implications for theory of PA change include rediscovering the ‘lost arts’ 
of ideal-typing and of thinking beyond path-dependency (teleological-utopian 
thinking), as well as abstracting to the level of guiding ideas and principles 
through contrasting alternative PA paradigms, thus widening the repertoire of 
the conceptual tools and theoretical approaches deployed in the study and the 
practice of PA.
Proposition 10: The relative emphasis on either of Aristotle’s four causes 
varies significantly across each intellectual tradition.
The four causes wrought out by Aristotle as a framework for explaining the 
causes of things are examined in Chapter 2 and discussed at multiple points 
throughout the book in relation to their application to the field of PA (notably 
in Chapter 6).
Implications for theory of PA change include the recognition of the worthi-
ness of rediscovering and deploying the full range of the system of the four 
causes in PA and broadly in the social sciences – although it is recognised 
that this argument, put forward by a number of scholars in PA and the social 
sciences at large (Kurki, 2008; Pollitt, 2012) may be contested depending on 
the epistemological stance of the researcher.
Summing up on the terrain traversed in this chapter, we have revisited the 
notion of the intellectual traditions in PA elaborated by Raadschelders (2005, 
2008, 2011) in light of the multiple philosophical perspectives reported 
throughout this book. We have done this in the pursuit of two aims. The first 
one has been to work out implications that can be drawn from revisiting the 
claims of each intellectual tradition in PA in the light of core philosophical 
perspectives, thus hopefully contributing to ‘enlighten’ certain implications 
of conceiving of PA and researching and practising it within one or the other 
of these traditions. The second goal has been to work out some tentative 
propositions that may constitute an attempt to lay out some initial, possible 
and tentative, tesserae – to which we have earlier referred to more pertinently 
as ‘fragments’ – of a mosaic for sketching the ideational bases of a ‘theory of 
PA change’.
NOTES
1. The four intellectual traditions are qualified by the proposer as ideal-types.
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2. Popper suggested six ‘unsystematic’ criteria whereby it may be claimed that 
a theory ‘T2’ represents a form of progress over ‘T1’: (1) T2 makes more precise 
claims than T1, and such claims pass more rigorous tests than T1; (2) T2 takes 
into account and explains more facts than T1 does; (3) T2 describes or explains 
facts in more detail than T1; (4) T2 has overcome tests that T1 has not; (5) T2 has 
suggested new experimental controls that were not taken into consideration before 
T2 was first formulated, and it has passed these tests; (6) T2 has unified or at least 
connected problems that before T2 was formulated were not connected or unified 
(reported in Reale and Antiseri, 1988, vol. 3, p. 748).
3. The principle of indeterminacy of Heisenberg is ‘A principle in quantum mechan-
ics holding that increasing the accuracy of measurement of one observable quantity 
increases the uncertainty with which another conjugate quantity may be known’ 
(from the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, 
2009, Houghton Mifflin Company). In short, the perturbation introduced by the 
subject who measures properties of particles in quantum mechanics determines 
a situation whereby the more precisely the position (as an example of a property) 
of the particle is known, the less precisely the speed vector (direction and speed of 
movement, as an example of a conjugate quantity) of the particle is knowable. The 
Schrödinger equation (the integral of the distribution of the probability of presence 
of the particle applied to the whole universe) leaves us with only one ‘certainty’: 
that the particle is somewhere in the universe(!) (the integral, in fact, equals 1).
4. Parallels can be found in developments notably in China, in the writings of 
Confucius in the 6th and 5th centuries and the development of administration 
from about the 4th century bc, about the time when government became subject of 
philosophical reflection also in India (with the writings attributed to Kautilya).
5. The International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS), in its French denom-
ination Institut International des Sciences Administratives, is a Brussels-based 
international governmental organisation set up by a number of countries during the 
1930s and still very active nowadays. It owes its name to the then consolidating 
discipline of the ‘administrative sciences’ as were intended and referred to in the 
French tradition.
6. I am grateful to Wolfgang Drechsler for pointing out these articulations.
7. Catlaw and Treisman (2014) question whether ‘man’ is still the subject of admin-
istration and work out three challenges to why this could not be the case any more 
in the future. These challenges leave the author of this book very perplexed, but 
yet such challenges vividly illustrate the significance of debating foundational 
philosophical claims for the field of PA.
8. It may be noticed, however, that one of Erasmus’s concerns was about the 
legitimacy of the absolute rule by the Prince that is legitimated by wisdom, and 
modern-day believers in democratic values might find themselves uneasy with 
such a stance that pursues wisdom ultimately for the justification of absolute rule.
9. Nor is the purpose of this book to examine how ideas generated in intellectual 
circles (and notably in the PA scholarly community) trickle down to the policy 
circuits and policy sub-systems which may translate these ideas into public policy: 
the topic has been treated in innumerable other books. In this book we focus on the 
substance and the contours of some of these ideas per se.
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10. Researching and teaching philosophy 
for public administration
INTRODUCTION
This final chapter addresses the key issue of ‘what next?’ after having intro-
duced and worked out a philosophical perspective to PA, and it tackles two 
key issues: first, how to advance the researching of philosophy for PA; second, 
how to introduce philosophy for PA into the teaching and learning of PA, that 
is, into teaching curricula at higher education level. The chapter then turns to 
briefly discuss the challenges posed by new technologies and the new media 
to PA and indicates how taking a broad philosophical perspective may be 
a vantage point to look at these challenges. Finally, the chapter wraps up on 
the journey made and returns to the main argument of this book: the enduring 
contribution that philosophical thought may provide to PA.
RESEARCHING PHILOSOPHY FOR PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION
We have argued throughout the book, and notably in Chapter 9, that philosoph-
ical thought may better equip public administrators and scholars of PA alike 
to face the challenges of the 21st century. Bringing philosophy into public 
administration (better: bringing back philosophy into public administration, as 
it originally was in scholars like Weber or Waldo) may trigger and enable new 
paths of research. It is to this task that the present section is devoted: outlining 
possible paths (pathways) for the development of research work aimed at 
bringing philosophical knowledge into public administration.
The core argument throughout this book is that PA may benefit from adding 
philosophy to its constituent disciplines (although strictly speaking philosophy 
is not a ‘discipline’ in the sense modern disciplines are, rather it is a body of 
knowledge and understanding about reality as such, built upon the attempts 
made by philosophers over the millennia to gain a better comprehension of 
reality – as discussed in Chapter 1). This section outlines some ways in which 
research work can be carried out to bring more systematically philosophical 
knowledge into PA, and hence improve our understanding of the field.
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Based on the conceptualisation introduced in Chapter 1, we identify four 
approaches, or ‘strategies’, to more systematically bring philosophical knowl-
edge and understanding into the field of public administration and public 
governance, with the ultimate purpose to inform research developments and 
advance knowledge of the field. We call these approaches:
• Mapping Backwards from PA towards philosophy – it is based on survey-
ing the field of public administration to detect and unearth the underpin-
ning philosophical stances in the PA scholarship.
• Going Foundational – it is centred on proposing new conceptions of 
public governance and administration by taking the move from an explicit 
ontology or political philosophy: it coincides with working out one’s own 
philosophical foundations upon which to build up new perspectives to PA: 
it is philosophy of PA as delineated in Chapter 1.
• Revisiting Selectively – by focusing key topics of contemporary signifi-
cance for PA and inquiring into them from a philosophical standpoint – it 
is an approach somehow in-between philosophy of PA and philosophy for 
PA.
• Philosophising Systematically: applying in as much a systematic way as 
possible philosophical thought to PA with the purpose of building up the 
edifice of philosophy for PA (this is the overarching approach and thrust 
of this book).
These approaches are elaborated and illustrated in turn. As noticed in 
Chapter 1, this book must be placed in the fourth approach – Philosophising 
Systematically / Developing Philosophy for PA – where its overall thrust lies. 
However, hopefully, the review of philosophical thought for PA carried out 
throughout the pages of this book may also be helpful to those engaged in any 
of the other three approaches that we here delineate, and which we review first, 
before returning to the ‘philosophy for PA’ approach of the present book.
The first approach, which we label ‘Mapping Backwards’, consists of sur-
veying the field of PA, for example by reviewing strands of literature according 
to the topic or the geographical area (so, ‘European’, or ‘US’, or ‘Chinese’ PA 
research), with the purpose of detecting and mapping the implicit or explicit 
philosophical underpinnings contained in the PA debates. To illustrate in more 
operational terms, this could occur by scouting the publications appearing in 
the scientific journals currently ranked in the ISI-Thomson index under the 
category ‘Public Administration’ and querying, with a defined grid which may 
then interactively evolve, certain key implicit philosophical assumptions con-
tained in the publications. The rationale of this approach is to unveil and make 
it more explicit the very often implicit assumptions that guide researchers in 
the field of PA.
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To make an example that draws from the topic discussed in Chapter 5, 
an application of this approach would lie in questioning what are the legit-
imacy underpinnings of propounded reform models like the New Public 
Management, the New Public Governance, the Neo-Weberian State, the 
Stewardship model, the New Public Service, or any other body of doctrines 
about how the public sector ought to be organised, that has been proposed and 
codified in the literature; that is, to discuss the justification that makes a reform 
of public governance ‘legitimate’, be it in terms of the common good approach 
originally worked out by Plato, or the social contract arguments in the line of 
Rousseau and other ‘liberal’ philosophers, or the philosophy of social justice 
promoted by Rawls. We have argued in Chapter 5 that asking these questions 
is not otiose: quite conversely, such questions may enlighten the public gov-
ernance and public management reform discourse. As another example, it may 
be considered the implications for public administration studies of revisiting 
certain foundational issues lying in the very notion of ‘time’ as it has been 
debated in philosophical thought (see Chapter 4).
This first approach, or research strategy, to bringing philosophical notions 
into PA thus lies in revisiting the extant scientific or grey literature in PA to 
shed light on otherwise overlooked aspects and implications of the ways in 
which administrative phenomena are studied, and interpretations and mean-
ings are given. A wide range of other ontological issues might, in a similar 
way, be introduced into the picture: these issues range from the conception of 
the human nature to ontological notions of ‘social structures’ or of ‘essence’ of 
things, and so forth. This way, philosophical thought may be brought into the 
framework of analysis and enable exploring profiles so far under-investigated 
or outright ignored.
A possible second line of development in bringing philosophy to the fore 
into public administration is what we have called ‘Going Foundational’. In 
this perspective, philosophy and the philosophical stance become the starting 
point, and new conceptions of public governance or the public administrative 
dimension are proposed by taking the move from philosophical stances and 
ontologies. This approach is the ‘Philosophy of PA approach’, in the sense 
that scholars engaged in this intellectual path aim at working out their own 
philosophical interpretation of public governance, or of certain aspects or 
dimensions of it (we have examined the difference between philosophy for 
PA and philosophy of PA in Chapter 1). An example is the work by Stout and 
Love (2019), who have wrought out an outright ‘manifesto for integrative gov-
ernance’, predicated on process philosophy à la Whitehead and a distinctive 
form of panentheism, that is, on a full-fledged ontology and Weltanschaung, 
a conception of the world.
This approach may beget most welcome additions to the field by nourishing 
the debate, through bringing into the scholarly and the public discussion fresh 
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novel conceptions of contemporary public governance and administration. It 
also has the virtue of bringing philosophical conceptions to the fore and indeed 
upfront, by taking ontological considerations as the starting point, rather than 
confining them to the background. By making the philosophical foundations 
of the proposed argument explicit, books in this approach can enable the most 
fruitful of dialogues to unfold amongst scholars and practitioners, irrespec-
tive of whether the ontological point of departure of the authors is similar or 
dissimilar (the latter is the case for the author of this book, whose ontology 
is different from that of Stout and Love), thus powerfully contributing to the 
development of the field of public governance and administration.
A third approach to bring philosophy into PA, which we call ‘Revisiting 
Selectively’, starts from the actuality and ‘burning issues’ in contemporary PA, 
and thence aims at bringing philosophy into public administration. It focuses 
key topics of contemporary significance for the field, and queries into them 
from a philosophical standpoint. The main difference with the first approach 
outlined above lies in the focus: the emphasis in this third approach does not 
lie in reviewing the scientific literature in the field of public governance and 
administration to ‘uncover’ the unexpressed philosophical underpinnings of 
the authors who contributed to the literature (like in the first approach), but 
rather in carrying out a critique of salient issues in the public debate – a trait 
which makes this approach in some regards akin to the so-called ‘critical 
theory’ approach. For example, Fox and Miller, notably in their joint work 
(Miller and Fox, 2007 – already reviewed in Chapter 6), provide a very sharp, 
abrasive at times, critique of representative democracy by challenging the 
‘orthodoxy’ of the majoritarian mode of democracy, to then discuss three 
main alternatives: the neo-liberal response (which replaces people’s will with 
market mechanisms), the constitutional response (which substitutes the con-
stitution and the effecting of constitutional principles for the electoral victors 
of the moment), and the communitarian response, or tendency (which ‘seeks 
to replace the loop with direct interface between administration and the citi-
zenry’, Miller and Fox, 2007, p. 30). As shown by this example, this approach 
is less concerned with reviewing the social scientific literature as it stands in 
order to shed light on issues of contemporary significance and actuality – like, 
as in the example, to argue about fundamental flaws in representative democ-
racy (and its implications for public accountability, a key theme in the field of 
PA). Indeed, this approach – which as practised at times shows quite abrasive 
traits – might be employed to demystify a number of oft-held assumptions, or 
at least to critically revisit a number of topics in the field: from the mechanisms 
at work in public accountability to the problematic links between ‘populism’, 
popular mandate, and the moral dilemmas of the accountable public admin-
istrator and public manager, and so forth. In sum, this represents a valuable 
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third strategy for advancing a research agenda aimed at bringing philosophical 
thought and critique into the field of PA.
A fourth approach, the one which we have labelled ‘Philosophising 
Systematically’ is the one closest to the overall thrust of the present book (see 
also Whetsell, 2018). The point of departure here is the body of philosophical 
thought as it has been codified in the academia and vetted by scholars over the 
decades and centuries. This body of knowledge, understanding and wisdom 
is then applied in as much a systematic way as possible to the field of PA. 
Different strands of philosophical inquiry are systematically referred to, in 
turn, to explore the potential of each of them to shed light on one or the other 
aspect or profile of the field of PA, conceived of in mostly academic terms, as 
the body of knowledge that is being produced, accumulated (to the extent it is 
cumulative in nature) and reproduced in Public Administration Departments 
in the academia. The main thrust of this collective effort is directed towards 
building up the edifice of ‘philosophy for public administration’, where the 
preposition ‘for’ indicates the fundamental thrust of this approach, which 
lies in employing philosophical speculation to enlighten facets of the study 
and the practice of public administration, and by means of it finding new 
viewpoints on administrative themes and issues. As recalled at the outset, the 
starting point is indeed the body of philosophical thought produced over the 
centuries through philosophical speculation; however, the basic requisite lies 
in knowledge of the field of PA and the charting of it: philosophical thought is 
then deployed for critically revisiting and rethinking contemporary PA themes 
and issues – as this book has attempted to do (see in particular Chapter 9). The 
main actors in this approach are scholars of PA, not scholars of philosophy: the 
former map the field of PA and identify the areas where philosophical thought 
may usefully be tapped; the latter provide the wells of knowledge as well as 
the methodological rigour in how philosophical debate at the highest academic 
standards is conducted, for application to the field of PA.
These approaches concern the problem of how to advance knowledge in PA 
by bringing philosophy back into it: they are about knowledge generation. We 
now turn to the problem of knowledge transmission: the teaching of philoso-
phy in PA programmes.
TEACHING PHILOSOPHY IN PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION PROGRAMMES1
In the previous section we worked out a research agenda for integrating 
philosophical knowledge into PA. This section argues that philosophy as an 
academic field of knowledge should be incorporated also – and equally impor-
tantly – into the teaching of PA, and that this may occur at all levels of tertiary 
and lifelong education. The rationale for this is the argument, developed 
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throughout the book, that philosophical knowledge provides a distinctive and 
constitutive contribution for an improved understanding of PA, alongside and 
beyond the specific bodies of knowledge furnished by the disciplines that con-
stitute the field of PA (like management, law, organisation science, political 
science, sociology, social psychology, or economics – see Chapter 1).
In order to systematically include the teaching of philosophy for PA in 
educational and training programmes, a range of practical questions about the 
place and contents of the subject ‘philosophy for PA’ require being addressed:
• Questions about positioning: what could and should be the place of phi-
losophy in PA curricula? At what level should philosophy be taught, that 
is, should it be confined to the upper levels, like masters and PhD, or be 
present also at undergraduate level? And should it be confined to longer 
programmes (one year or more), or should it also be included in shorter 
programmes for public administrators, like executive education courses for 
top managers?
• Questions about contents and tools: what could and should be the key con-
tents of philosophy for PA that are being taught? How to choose the core 
topics when constraints about the configuration of the educational pro-
gramme require selection and prioritisation? What are available teaching 
tools (books, handbooks, other readings, and the like) which may support 
the teaching of philosophy for PA?
• Questions of consistency: what should and could be the relations of phi-
losophy for PA with the other courses being taught in a PA programme?
• Questions of methods: what teaching methods should be employed to teach 
philosophy for PA?
We address these questions in turn. First, the positioning of themes of philos-
ophy for PA in the curriculum/syllabus of a PA programme. There are three 
basic options here. The first one consists of introducing topics of philosophy 
for PA within already established modules in PA programmes; such courses 
could be – where present – modules of public ethics and public values, or 
modules of epistemology and research methods in the social sciences. The 
main risk with this approach is that the introduction of topics of philosophy for 
PA may easily come to be perceived as just a marginal addition, or be inter-
preted in a biased and narrow way, for example, if it is introduced in a module 
of research methods, students might get the perception that philosophy coin-
cides with epistemology, which is instead but one branch of philosophy. The 
second option consists of introducing philosophy for PA as part and parcel of 
the introductory courses of the BSc/MSc in PA or MPA or PhD programme, 
that is, those courses typically devoted to introducing PA as a subject and 
a field of study to students whose background may be highly varied. The third 
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option could be to set up a distinct module of Philosophy for PA alongside 
other more conventional modules in the syllabus. All three options have pros 
and cons, though the second and third ones appear more promising in terms of 
bringing philosophy for PA more centre stage in the overall learning experi-
ence of the students.
A related question concerns the level – undergraduate, postgraduate, or 
research/PhD – at which it may be deemed more appropriate to introduce the 
study of philosophy for PA. There is no univocal answer to this question, as it 
may depend on a range of other contextual factors, not least the extent to which 
philosophy is being taught at secondary school in a given country. To mention 
two examples at the opposite poles, philosophy is extensively studied in Italy’s 
secondary school, in which at least 40 per cent of the student population 
attaining the highest level of secondary education – the ‘academic-orientated’ 
share of the student population amongst which most pupils continue to uni-
versity degrees – are exposed to three years of study of philosophy, in most 
instances prepared by the five-year study of Latin, and for part of them also 
ancient Greek – both languages being extremely significant for the study of 
(Western) philosophy. At the opposite pole, philosophy is virtually not taught 
in Britain’s secondary school, hence any development of it at tertiary educa-
tion level would require introducing the students to the basics of philosophy 
before delving deeper into the matter. In this regard, introducing the study of 
philosophy for PA at undergraduate level might be easier in those countries 
where philosophy is systematically being taught at secondary school, whilst it 
might be more uphill an undertaking where it is not.
We would further argue that elements of philosophy for PA may be of sig-
nificance also beyond the more structured and longer university undergraduate 
and postgraduate degrees, and that it is highly significant also in executive edu-
cation courses. This might appear like a puzzling statement, since executive 
education is considered to be the ‘practical’ form of education par excellence, 
thence the expectation that philosophical thought, with its speculative nature, 
is not amenable to being taught in these courses. Quite the contrary: as we have 
seen in Chapter 2, it was the philosopher Aristotle who first introduced the very 
notion of ‘practical reasoning’ (notably in his writings in the Nicomachean 
Ethics) and who outlined the meaning and the contours of practical reasoning. 
Aristotle also wrought out the difference between the contemplative reason 
and the calculative reason, the latter being the one which weighs the means in 
function of the ends to be attained. Thus, we argue that philosophy for PA is 
of significance also for executive education programmes, and philosophical 
notions may resonate very well with the lived experience of PA practitioners 
and spark thoughtful discussions and illuminate the dilemmas and the quan-
daries that the street-level bureaucrat and the public managers have to face in 
managing public organisation and public services (Parker, 2019).
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Shifting to the second set of questions about the contents to be taught, the 
main question is what could and should be the key contents of philosophy for 
PA? And the complementary question is what extant tools are available that 
can provide the practical support for enabling the teaching of philosophy in 
PA programmes? The most immediate (and admittedly very parochial) answer 
to the latter question is – of course – that this very book aims to be a tool and 
to provide the repertoire of readings required for introducing philosophy for 
PA to a university-level audience, and to do so in one, compact textbook, that 
while referring to a wide range of scientific works in both the realm of philoso-
phy and the domain of PA studies for the readers willing to further deepen the 
topic, also aims at synthesising the main elements and provide easy-to-access 
guidance to introducing philosophy for PA for both students and teachers. It 
goes without saying, the other many works encountered and discussed through-
out this book could provide valuable entries, like the Lynch and Cruise (2006) 
edited volume we discussed in Chapter 1 and recalled throughout this book. 
A number of books examine specific profiles of philosophical thought applied 
to PA, like epistemology (for an exemplar, see Riccucci, 2010). Dedicated 
chapters apply philosophical analysis to public administration, notably the 
foundations of administrative action (Virtanen, 2018). Contributions appear-
ing in two notable scientific journals: Administrative Theory and Praxis and 
Public Voices provide another entry point. Some sparse yet relevant papers in 
mainstream PA journals also contribute like the de Graaf and van Asperen, 
2018, article which discusses the use of images and the art with philosophical 
contents, for the study of PA, and then examines in detail Lorenzetti’s mas-
terpiece, The Good Government, which we have commented on in Chapter 7.
Having dealt with the question about tools, we can now turn to the main 
question of the substantive contents to be given prominence in bringing 
philosophical knowledge into PA programmes. Two main approaches may 
be outlined. The first lies in focusing on selected branches of philosophy, 
identified as the ‘most pertinent’ for the purposes of shedding light on aspects 
of PA, or at least as those thematically closest to the topics and issues tradi-
tionally debated in PA. Examples of such branches could be: epistemology, 
which then becomes epistemology of research methods for PA; or public 
ethics and notably the ethics of public officials; or political philosophy, with 
a focus on the role of public administration in political and policy processes 
and structures. The second approach centres on philosophy as such, and aims 
at discussing in their full breadth key philosophers and philosophies, to then 
apply these bodies of knowledge to PA. The second approach is basically what 
this book attempts to do throughout all chapters, and notably from Chapter 4 
to Chapter 8, on the assumption that this more systematic approach is also the 
most potent one, since it can enable at its utmost the ‘mind-opening’ benefits 
that derive from philosophical thought applied to PA, and that may instil in 
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students the kind of critical reasoning that is becoming more and more impor-
tant for the performance of the job of public administrator in times in which 
certainties are crumbling and issues that appeared settled re-emerge in all their 
thorny complexity. However, it is only fair to say that both approaches have 
their pros and cons: ultimately, what matters is the alignment of the contents of 
philosophy for PA with the other contents and modules of the PA programme, 
and on top of this the alignment and consistency with the learning objectives 
and the broader pedagogical concerns underpinning the PA programme.
This consideration brings us to consider the question of consistency, the 
consistency of the topics of philosophy for PA that are chosen for being taught 
with the other themes and more broadly learning objectives of the programme. 
This is in a sense the most challenging question, but also one which we can 
only limitedly discuss in the framework of this book as the answer, obviously, 
depends on the specific features of the teaching programme under considera-
tion, and the related learning objectives it pursues. What could be said from 
the standpoint of this book is that philosophical thought may also act as an 
integrative force, a way of linking together the diverse thematic areas of PA, 
by showing the deeper interconnections across disciplines and topics; for 
example, the issue of human liberty and individual agency is a cross-cutting 
issue to many social sciences, thereby encompassing those social sciences con-
stituting PA as the interdisciplinary study of government – see Chapter 1 – as 
well as for vetting real-life issues of decision-making by public administrators 
and managers: thence, any improved understanding of this central topic can 
contribute to a better and more integrated understanding of a range of related 
issues, scattered throughout the courses of the PA programme.
The final set of questions are those about teaching methods and approaches. 
What combination of learning methods is most appropriate for the teaching of 
philosophy for PA? And, relatedly, what would be the most appropriate teach-
ing team for such contents? One teacher versed in both, or two teachers, one 
more versed in PA and the other in philosophy? Starting from methods, one 
initial distinction, however crude, may be drawn between an approach empha-
sising class discussions and ‘case studies’ and other interactive methods to 
introduce philosophical problematics,2 on one hand, and an approach placing 
frontal teaching at the centre, and then complementing it with more interactive 
methods, on the other hand. Some of the pros of interactive methods lie in 
that they may stimulate reflection upon the topic and a sense of ownership by 
learners, while amongst the cons it may be counted that the starting point of 
students in terms of knowledge of philosophy may be low in many countries 
(e.g. because students are not trained in philosophy), and hence introductory 
elements presented through frontal teaching may be indispensable. Indeed, an 
upside of frontal teaching lies in its capacity to provide students with an intro-
duction and overview of the main topics, a learning requirement likely to be in 
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large demand amongst PA students exposed to these contents. Thus, it seems 
to us a conclusion that may be drawn on this point is that a combination of 
frontal teaching and more interactive learning methods may be optimal, with 
different degrees and combinations of the two methods as a function of the 
overall learning objectives of the programme, and also of the didactical exper-
tise and skills available – Solomonic as this conclusion may look like. (And it 
goes without saying our considerations apply equally when the programme is 
delivered through distance learning methods, in which ‘frontal teaching’ and 
‘interactive learning methods’ are incorporated into the employed distance 
learning means.)
To conclude, this section addresses a range of issues involved if the teaching 
of philosophy for PA is included in PA programmes, at all levels of higher edu-
cation, from undergraduate to research degrees, as well as in lifelong learning. 
We argue that the integration of philosophical knowledge may enable students 
of PA programmes to acquire a more critical stance towards the various 
disciplines that contribute to PA as the interdisciplinary study of government 
(Raadschelders, 2005), by means of shedding light on the ‘philosophical 
residue’ contained in each of them – from law to economics, from political 
science to management (Chapter 1). The inclusion of philosophy in PA 
education and training may better equip present and prospective public admin-
istrators to decipher the complexity of the current world and interconnect 
better and deeper the varied contributions – valuable but by their very nature 
fragmentary – provided by the different disciplines that underpin PA (law, 
economics, political science, management, sociology, social psychology, etc.), 
for the ultimate purpose of the betterment of public governance, public policies 
and the public services. Philosophy may also provide a distinctive contribution 
in shedding light on otherwise under-explored profiles of PA, notably when it 
comes to addressing issues of value-based judgements enabling the making of 
decisions in executive roles: an issue of relevance for executives in all sorts 
of organisations – public or private (Hodgkinson, 1978) – and yet possibly of 
special significance for public administrators.
THE CHALLENGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Philosophical thought may also shed light on the huge impact of new tech-
nologies on PA, like any other aspect of human life: one may think here of 
Heidegger’s reflections on how technology affects the relationship between 
humankind and the revealing (the hiding, for Heidegger) of Being. We 
briefly hint here at two developments: genetics and the Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICT) and the related development of new 
media and the social media.
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Developments in genetics seem to open up the possibility for individualised 
treatments, up to the point that some PA scholars have evoked the perspective 
of transhumanism, referring to ‘the question of whether new biotechnologies 
enable humans to overcome the determinism of their biological inheritance 
and actively participate in its expression’ (Catlaw and Treisman, 2014, p. 441). 
Brought to the extreme, post-humanism claims the possibility of the death of 
death. Whether this is feasible in any meaningful sense is an issue for medicine 
and medical knowledge (conversations I had with medics noticed how indi-
vidualised treatments for postponing the death of an individual would require 
systematic and continued interventions on the person’s body, a treatment 
which would more resemble the cruellest of tortures than the enjoyment of 
some form of immortality). But it is not only an issue for the field of medicine. 
Is the death of death compatible with the second principle of thermodynamics 
(‘the most metaphysical of physical laws’, see Bergson, 2005) whereby every 
closed system increases the level of dis-order over time (although life may also 
be seen as an attempt to locally counter this universal tendency, see Bergson, 
1907)? At a more strictly metaphysical level it may be questioned whether 
the perspective of the death of death is compatible with any philosophy of 
becoming? And from an existentialist perspective, it may be asked: wouldn’t 
this attempt to overcome death by technological means make death even more 
constitutive of existence (in an approach à la Heidegger, see also Waterlot, 
2019)? The existentialist interpretation of anguish as the experience of noth-
ingness would also lead to interpretation of such experiences as revealing the 
irreducible, constitutive openness of existence to being through death.
Philosophical arguments may be brought to show the impossibility – and the 
absurdity – of the claim of the death of death. However, leaps in postponing 
death cannot be ruled out, opening up scenarios that bring us well beyond the 
kind of ‘ageing population’ phenomenon we are experiencing (itself so much 
underestimated by policymakers and public managers, see Pollitt, 2016b). 
How can the field of PA re-imagine itself and its future developments, the 
study and practice of PA, against the backdrop of such scenarios? Scientific 
and philosophical imagination should be brought to the fore to cope with such 
challenges.
To hint at another example, we may heed the changes brought about by the 
impressive – and often appropriately qualified as disruptive – changes driven 
by Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), which go under 
the label of ‘digital government’, which has grown into a full-fledged field of 
inquiry in PA (think of the applications of Artificial Intelligence – AI – and 
algorithmic governance), and the tumultuous development of the new media 
and the social media, especially now that social media and new media are 
being mainstreamed in PA studies (Criado et al., 2013; Mergel, 2013). What 
modifications may social media induce in life, in its social dimension and 
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its biological dimensions (the prosthetic function of new media, see Kember 
and Zylinska, 2012)? Has the Internet brought about a revolution in commu-
nication as did the shift from the oral to the written form of communication, 
or the invention of the press? If so, what new possibilities are opened for the 
investigation of reality by the human mind? What are the implications of 
the hyper-reality in which we live in terms of the way it reshapes the public 
space? What is the significance of philosophical knowledge and the forma 
mentis that the study of philosophy brings with it for ‘navigating’ the ocean 
of information made available by the Internet? And specifically, what are its 
implications for the study and practice of PA? What public functions will be 
utterly transformed by the dis-intermediating potential of Internet-based tech-
nologies and reshaped by algorithmic governance and artificial intelligence, 
and how can the tapping of collective intelligence be enabled by Internet-based 
technologies? And what do these transformations mean for the practice of PA? 
these questions lead us to the issue of how a broad philosophical perspective 
can better equip and enable us to understand e-governance and e-government 
‘in perspective’ and ‘in context’.
These are questions and issues – tackled by innumerable contemporary 
studies in the humanities and the social sciences (from the field of communi-
cations studies to the field of social medicine) – that only rarely and indirectly 
surface in the ‘core’ PA scholarly literature, but yet they are likely to matter 
a lot for years to come.
A broad philosophical perspective might be part and parcel of the concep-
tual repertoire required of the PA scholar and practitioner alike to tackle the 
daunting task of coping with such huge challenges and issues.
CODA AND OUTLOOK
This book makes the argument for the significance of the systematic applica-
tion of philosophical thinking to the field of PA, and it advocates the contri-
bution philosophy may bring to PA in terms of inspiration and enlightenment. 
In doing so, it also suggests the possibility to engage in ‘big narratives’ about 
public governance and administration – that is, about our possibility of both 
understanding and knowing continuity and change in the fundamental char-
acters of public governance and administration. Indeed, this book urges the 
PA scholarly and practitioners community to engage in ‘big narratives’ about 
public governance and administration – that is, in big narratives enabled by 
the possibility that we have to attain knowledge and understanding about the 
fundamental characters of public governance and public administration. We 
thus argue that those engaged in the study and the practice of PA should not 
content themselves with ‘zooming in’ on specific problems and issues to be 
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investigated with relatively well-specified methods; instead, the big picture 
should be aimed at – by scholars and practitioners alike. 
This book also advocates the search for consistency across the various 
findings of the research work. Scientists like the biologist Edward Wilson 
have urged scholars to strive for unity of the knowledge generated in different 
disciplines and fields (Wilson, 1998), a struggle for consistency3 of the various 
findings, insights, forms of knowledge and understandings of reality; and this 
call has not been without echoes in PA (see Talbot, 2010). This is a thrust 
which, we notice, is at the heart of most of the philosophical endeavours we 
have encountered throughout this book, at least since Plato and Aristotle. 
This book stems also from the effort to achieve – however tentatively and in 
a patchy way – some form of enhanced consistency within the field of PA and 
between PA and the field of philosophy. It stretches well-beyond the comfort 
zone of contemporary PA scholars (surely of this PA scholar) in order to try to 
reach out and indicate a direction of travel which – it is deemed – is of utmost 
importance for the field of PA.
To briefly review in conclusion the journey undertaken, throughout the 
book, and notably in Chapters 4 to 8, we have delved into key themes stem-
ming from the application of philosophical thought to PA. Notably, in Chapter 
4 we reviewed some possible applications and implications for the field of PA 
of such philosophical streams as: structuralism and themes in social ontology; 
Neo-Marxism and the thought of Antonio Gramsci; existentialism and the pro-
filing of the existentialist public administrator and citizen; historicism. Other 
philosophical perspectives fraught with implications for PA that are discussed 
in Chapter 4 include metaphysical contingency and ontologies of possibility 
(as opposed to ontologies of necessity), for their significance on the ways in 
which notions like ‘potential’, ‘possibility’ and ‘chance’ are treated in the 
social sciences at large and in PA specifically;4 and the possible implications 
of philosophical speculation about the very notion of time for the ways in 
which PA is studied. Last, but by no means least, we delved into the enduring 
significance of the Kantian foundation of the transcendental rational subject, 
and on issues about human nature, which are foundational to PA.
In Chapter 5 we turned to the issue of justification of a(ny) governance 
system, debating the two overarching perspectives of the ‘common good’ 
and the ‘social contract’ for the grounding of public governance, and the 
promises and limits of the Rawlsian and the personalist approaches as ways to 
supplement and complement the two dominant perspectives. We then applied 
these perspectives to the issue of the legitimacy underpinnings of public sector 
reform doctrines.
In Chapter 6 we examined philosophical-epistemological issues, thereby 
also revisiting interpretivist, (neo- and post-)positivist, and realist approaches 
to the study of PA. The contemporary meaning for PA studies of the dispute 
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over the nature of universal concepts has also been reviewed, noticing how in 
multiple respects where a PA scholar stands in terms of her/his conception of 
the nature of the field of PA depends on her/his philosophical stance over the 
nature of universal concepts: a dispute that lingers from the medieval time into 
our contemporary epoch and continues to be relevant and of extreme actuality.
In Chapter 7 the enduring significance of the virtue discourse in public 
governance has been re-proposed by means of the power of the art (Ambrogio 
Lorenzetti’s masterpiece The Good Government) and its capacity to create a 
‘world other’, yet inspirational for us. The notion of alternative worlds has 
also brought us back to the original conception of utopia and utopian thinking 
as worked out by Thomas More. We then reviewed the conceptual weaponry 
that public administrationists are endowed with by expanding the repertoire 
of tools to encompass paradigms and ideal-types. We were then brought back 
with our feet well planted on earth by Machiavelli’s lucid scrutiny of human 
nature, which also puts to the centre of the stage the theme of the immutability 
of human nature. We have also been reminded by Machiavelli that renouncing 
the ‘assumption’ of the immutability of human nature has ground-shaking 
implications – and that Machiavelli in his studies found confirmations of this 
assumption. His work stands as a continued challenge for those who assume 
the opposite hypothesis (mutability of human nature) to put forward a demon-
stration of it, and deal with its implications.
In Chapter 8 we revisited in a comprehensive way the notions of: ‘practice’; 
‘model’; ‘paradigm’; ‘ideal-type’; and ‘utopia’ and discussed how these repre-
sent powerful conceptual tools for the study and practice of PA, notably when 
seen in an integrated way.
Finally, in the previous chapter, intellectual traditions of PA have been 
revisited in light of their broader philosophical underpinnings by showing how 
each tradition relies on, and taps from, a range of philosophical perspectives. 
We have thus set the relativist/post-modernist tradition against the faltering of 
both the Hegelian system and the Kantian foundation of the human being as 
the rational subject, and discussed the limits of going too far in the opposite 
direction and too easily dismissing the inheritance of Western philosophy. 
We then discussed the tradition of ‘PA as scientific knowledge’ against the 
backdrop of the philosophical streams of positivism and neo-positivism, as 
well as conventionalism and Popperian notions of scientific knowledge. In the 
perspective of PA as practical wisdom, we noticed how philosophical thought 
is quintessential to it and has accompanied this tradition over the millennia. 
In the tradition of PA as practical experience, we have noticed how practical 
reasoning is porous to a multitude of ontological, ethical and epistemological 
issues, which a philosophical perspective may aid to unveil.
In applying philosophical thinking to PA, we have adopted a broad concep-
tion of PA as being, in a combined and integrated way: a science (an interdis-
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ciplinary field, in which a variety of social sciences are applied in a combined 
way); an art (as administering is inherently a human activity with an artistic, 
‘craftsmanship-like’ component); a profession (indeed a range of professions 
interconnected by the obligations and rights that come with the exercise of 
public functions and the delivery of public services); and a form of humanism 
(administering as a value-laden human activity, a conception very much in the 
line of Waldo’s conception of PA).
Ultimately, to the extent PA is science, we conceive of science as episteme – 
rigour – and as wissenschaft – a field of intellectual inquiry which draws from 
the social sciences (and also from other bodies of knowledge) and that shares 
with them the common problems and quandaries of scientific knowledge. 
Yet the nature of PA as also and in an integrated way an art, a profession and 
a form of humanism is part and parcel of its nature, and hence PA is a field of 
intellectual inquiry which taps also from the humanities, as well as from the 
(often tacit and uncodified) forms of knowledge that are embodied in an art 
and a profession.
In conclusion, this book has engaged with the daunting task of providing 
an introduction to the complex and multifaceted interconnections between 
fundamental philosophical issues and the field of PA, and it has pointed to 
some facets of its enduring quest for philosophical foundations. It is our hope 
to have been able to profile some lines of application of philosophical streams 
of inquiry to themes of relevance for contemporary PA. The significance 
of spanning across philosophers and philosophies over the ages and going 
back in time – rather than confining to the most recent strands – for a deeper 
understanding of philosophical issues in PA has been highlighted during this 
journey through philosophical thought. Paths for finer grained examinations 
and critical discussions of contemporary public governance and administration 
and its foundations in philosophical argumentation have been pointed out. 
We hope these paths – pathways – will be taken up by the PA scholarly and 
practitioners’ community, and that philosophy – the body of philosophical 
knowledge and understanding engendered by philosophical speculation over 
the millennia – will be recognised more and more as a reference of central 
significance for the development of the field of PA.
NOTES
1. In this section we elaborate from the article Ongaro, E. (2019) ‘The teaching of 
Philosophy for Public Administration Programmes’ published in Teaching Public 
Administration.
2. The approach of case studies is in philosophy technically called casuistry when 
applied to moral philosophy: casuistry is a method elaborated by the Jesuit 
Fathers and to which modern-day case study techniques owe more than is usually 
recognised.
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3. Wilson has introduced the term ‘consilience’ to indicate the linking of knowl-
edge generated across disciplines to achieve common ground for explanations. 
Wilson adopted the term ‘because its rarity has preserved its precision’ (1998, 
p. 6). Wilson upholds a strong vision of the possible unity of knowledge, mostly 
patterned on the ways in which the natural sciences may (allegedly) achieve it. We 
uphold a vision which is at the same time even more ambitious and much less so. 
It is even more ambitious in the sense that it relies on philosophy as unifying per-
spective; it is less ambitious in the sense that we aim for exchange of knowledge 
and bridging of understanding rather than unity. It is also for these reasons that we 
prefer to stick to the term ‘consistency’.
4. The warning formulated by Thompson is that ontological shifts in emphasis can be 
an effective method of theory generation, but also a source of confusion when they 
turn into ontological drifts out of alignment (Thompson, 2011).
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Postscript to the second edition: 
philosophy in and of public administration 
today, global-Western and non-Western
Wolfgang Drechsler
I had concluded the first version of these reflections, the postscript to the 
first edition, by stating that Edoardo Ongaro’s book on Philosophy and 
Public Administration (PA) came at a crucial time, and that it filled the gap 
of a missing book – modestly yet assuredly, with style and competence. It 
addresses, indeed, one of the most crucial issues of PA today, and that is the 
one of bringing the philosophical discourse into the picture – and well into the 
centre of it. I hoped that the research agenda it proposes, the filling-in of the 
lacunae in the matrices displayed in the first chapter, would be accomplished 
by PA scholars soon enough, and that it would enable and encourage the estab-
lishment of courses in, or at least covering, the subject of Philosophy and PA. 
Our discipline, but more crucially our administered world, as I said, would be 
better for it, both in equity and in performance.
And while some of these changes may still be in progress, the facts that, so 
soon after the first, there will be this second edition; that a very impressive set 
of translations is in the works; and that the reviews and general professional 
discussions of Ongaro’s arguments have been positive indeed, render it quite 
unnecessary to repeat here in all detail why there was such a need. I will 
therefore focus, in and for this second edition, on a few supplementary, com-
plementary thoughts, and my placing the book into context, from the first one 
that might still be interesting given the current situation. I have retained the 
original text wherever possible and amended it wherever needed.
Edoardo Ongaro’s book entered the stage at an auspicious moment for 
such an enterprise, and with not only impressive but also crucial credentials. 
His many publications, in more empirical, mainstream PA, paved the way for 
the scholarly community to more readily accept this work as the product of 
‘one of us’; the very fact that he has served for six-years and the maximum 
allowed length of the two full terms as the President of the European Group 
of Public Administration (EGPA), which today is not only the leading learned 
PA society in Europe, but also one of the, if not arguably the, first such organ-
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isation globally, gave it considerable weight. Having edited a very compre-
hensive Handbook of Public Administration and Management in Europe (with 
Sandra van Thiel), he has one of the best perspectives on what is going on in 
European PA at the moment, and who does what. Maybe this should not matter 
in an academic context, but of course it does – inevitably, who says something 
and to whom is part of what is being said, often as crucially so and sometimes 
more than the plain text itself.
The book is an introduction and a beginning, as the author keeps underlining 
– and wisely so, not out of false modesty, but because this is the appropriate 
frame, even in its now substantially amended and developed format, the result 
of the discourse about and with the first edition. But Philosophy and PA is 
a huge field, not only because of the contents itself, but also due to the many 
traditions of Philosophy, which can and does lead to serious infighting – many 
Continental philosophers would claim that Analytical philosophers are no 
philosophers at all, and vice versa even more so. Ongaro is able to bridge 
that gap almost effortlessly, and he allows adherents of all traditions to have 
a say and an impact. Schooled in the Continental tradition, he now works 
in a scholarly environment that is part of the other dominant tradition (the 
Italian higher education institution where he grew up scientifically is also very 
friendly to Anglo–American thought). His versatility and erudition, unusual 
for a 21st-century PA scholar, in many languages, including the ancient ones, 
make such an approach possible.
By taking a pars pro toto approach, Ongaro can classically focus on the long 
lines, the broad brushstrokes and the long run – but without sacrificing details 
by also presenting specific thinkers close up. Since he is very explicit about it, 
a general synthesis – to which we however now come closer – is not lacking, 
but its absence is part of the story, and the result should be palatable to many. 
The effect is that it becomes obvious where the lacunae are – both in what this 
book does not cover and what contemporary scholarship into Philosophy and 
PA is lacking. There is quantitatively not that much of this, but there is some 
rather good work, such as Norma Riccucci’s and Jos Raadschelders’s, which 
Ongaro extensively takes up – but he goes beyond them in scope, as regards 
both types and roles of Philosophy in and of PA. This is why this book is at 
the same time an introductory text for students and a research programme for 
scholars.
And this is really important – the discipline of PA, which is often without 
foundation today, needs to assert itself for its own and society’s sake, but how 
to do so without an introductory textbook – which we now have. How many 
students will graduate with a Master’s degree in PA without ever having seri-
ously considered what Aristotle and Hegel have to say about public service? 
(How many will not even have read Max Weber’s short passage on what really 
constitutes Weberianism in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1922)?)
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Prima facie, this seems like a very European perspective, as compared to the 
apparently so polytechnical, purely quantitative, mistaking-evidence-as-proof 
American PA. Of course anything on Philosophy and PA will be European 
before, say, the 1690s, that is, before the earliest beginnings of any PA thought 
in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, which was seminally independent from 
England and thus from Europe. But in fact, as ever so often, this is not the case 
– while some of the more doctrinaire American journals (including top-ranked 
ones) will not allow scholarly discussions about Philosophy and PA, it is actu-
ally in the American special-interest journals, conferences, working groups 
and panels where one finds more, if still very little, about the topic, rather than 
in Old (let alone New!) Europe. So far, virtually all attempts to discuss, in 
a structured way, Philosophy and PA in Europe have failed. It may be worth 
considering why, but the fact remains, for the moment at least – although the 
discussion about Ongaro’s book has surely pushed this debate forward in 
a very constructive way.
In the last paragraph, I said that ‘of course, anything on Philosophy and PA 
before, say, the 1690s will inevitably be European’. This remark is as stupid 
as it is blind, of course – unless one takes the position that there is one global 
way of doing PA, that PA is not contextual, and that indeed what is now global 
PA is without alternative, like engineering or plumbing. This view, which 
would be considered massively offensive and indeed absurd in many other 
social science disciplines, still holds sway in PA, and much of consultancy and 
advice by international organisations to non-Western countries is based on it. 
But if PA is the implementation of public policy, there must be different ways 
that all are legitimate – as Aristotle points out in Politics. Global PA = Good 
PA = Western PA = Modern PA is, put this way, as bizarre as it is autistic, but 
the fact is that the alternative way of thinking, that is, recognising that there is 
such a thing as Non-Western PA (NWPA), is only slowly (re-)surfacing and 
entering the mainstream PA discourse.
The current book is largely global-Western– but it is consciously so. If 
consciously done, this is fully legitimate; what is intellectually and ethically 
terrible, and really not up to scratch for the 21st century anymore, are works 
on global PA (or political science, political philosophy, etc.) that are really 
not global but Western – carrying the White Man’s Burden into the new 
millennium, as it were. But there are no areas left in the world, including the 
carrier countries of NWPA, which are not ‘contaminated’ by global-Western 
PA, which has a very wide, internally contradictory scope anyway (e.g. 
the anti-state destructionism of NPM versus state-affirming, citizen-focused 
approaches such as the Neo-Weberian State). Therefore, what underpins 
global-Western PA is also interesting for NWPA students, and so is this book.
It is here where an addition to and enlargement of the current book might be 
possible as further steps or volumes. Carefully considering NWPA alternatives 
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to the global-Western mainstream has the dual effect of both qualifying and 
illuminating the latter, making it possible to have a more thorough and more 
relevant approach to global-Western PA, potentially enabling scholars and 
practitioners to reposition themselves regarding more appropriate advice and 
reform. Alas, however, there is very little left as regards currently working, 
successful forms of NWPA. I would argue that much of the sorry state of 
PA reform in some non-Western countries is related to this – countries were 
not allowed to develop their own strengths based on their own traditions, but 
were told to adopt Western formats, or else (that is, otherwise they would not 
receive vital funding). But on the level of Philosophy and PA as treated in 
this book, there actually is a rich, multifaceted, and indeed exciting fundus of 
NWPA, some in dialogue with Western Philosophy, some quite independent, 
and both highly relevant.
Just to mention the two perhaps most important NWPA traditions still 
alive today, that is, those that form genuine challenges to the universalism 
of the global-Western approach. The first that comes to mind is the Islamic 
one. This is the main NWPA tradition bordering, and thus challenging, the 
West, and one that is often perceived, once again, as based on a threatening 
ideology. It calls out the non-connectedness of religion and PA as a choice 
(and a wrong one), not something ‘given’, and it is something the West might 
have to react to beyond facilely insisting that it should not be so. Much of 
Islamic state thought, however, has developed in close conjunction with the 
Greek philosophers, and institutional Islamic PA is usually ‘moderate’. In PA 
itself, the non-delegatability of responsibility that is prominent, for example in 
the Nizam-ul-Mulk, or the highly sophisticated and philosophically grounded 
Ottoman PA with its insistence that – yes – the welfare of many is worth the 
sacrifice of the few; with its legacy of ‘creative low-level discrimination’ to 
preserve social peace; with its emphasis on good-enough governance (better 
much less taxes received than levied than no taxes at all), arguably derived 
from Islam’s rapid expansion; and with a civil service that in many ways was 
‘super-Weberian’, may serve as illustrations.
But it surely is Confucian PA that is the main philosophical challenge, the 
intellectual ‘other’ to the Western paradigm, not least because it was earlier 
and because it did and does work so well. The fact that it is problematic for 
some to call it ‘Confucian’ rather than ‘Classical Chinese’ PA already indicates 
some pitfalls here because we have Confucian PA not only in Mainland China 
but also in Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam and Singapore; his-
torically also – and quite philosophically grounded – in pre-Meiji, Edo Japan. 
The idea of a state that is an extension of, rather than a juxtaposition to, the 
family; the unquestioned supremacy of the bureaucracy even in fine arts and 
culture; dealing with human flaws such as nepotism and other forms of corrup-
tion institutionally rather than by demanding that the human person changes; 
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and the focus on performance, so strongly so that an originally legitimate 
government can be removed even by force if it does not deliver, are aspects 
that underline both otherness and parallelism. And while Neo-Confucian phi-
losophy of PA (Neo-Confucianism was the state ideology of Imperial China 
from the 800s until its demise) is independent from Western thought, New 
Confucian Philosophy is not, but it is also quite distant from PA – not surpris-
ing for a philosophical direction that emerged precisely as a reaction to the fall 
of a state and its management in the first years of the 20th century.
I hasten to say that these traditions are, by and large, not much taught in their 
carrier countries today either, at least not in PA – the top PA schools in, say, 
Turkey, China and so on are only gradually adding their own traditions to their 
curricula, if at all, and if they include any Philosophy as connected to PA, in 
general, it is global-Western. NWPA is still an uphill-battle approach even in 
the non-Western countries, but the philosophical enrichment and the potential 
as described supra remain, for all sides, and it appears that this at least – to mix 
metaphors – is a train that is going into the right direction.
Speaking about performance, Geert Bouckaert has occasionally differenti-
ated between two aspects of good PA: Equity and Performance. This simple 
dichotomy has always struck me as heuristically the most helpful one for 
conceptualising what good PA actually is. It is already a great advance if, in 
the context of NWPA for instance, we recognise that top marks in the two 
categories do not automatically go together (they often do, but it is crucial to 
realise that ‘often’ is very different from ‘always’). The shallowness of the 
current PA discourse is perhaps best indicated by the fact that we have no 
theory, no texts, no classes, no discussion of intentionally bad PA in the sense 
that either universalist or even local norms are consciously broken – and/or 
delivery is not done! – in order, for example, to keep a regime in power that 
is mostly interested in just that, for its own selfish reasons. These are courses 
of action that typically are enmeshed with self-justifications, of course: 
cynical exploitative tyrannies self-asserting themselves as such are rare. PA, 
as we saw, is also derivative to a considerable extent – it implements public 
policies – and the question is whether, in the face of a given government with 
exploitative attributes, it is up to PA to say whether that regime should be 
successfully administered, or rather subverted. The independence of a classical 
Weberian PA vis-à-vis the government, often seen as a disadvantage, turns into 
an advantage once a regime considered ‘bad’ comes along – just as NPM, as 
‘reactionary modernism’, is not coincidentally often so appreciated by author-
itarian regimes. But how can we even hope to address such basic issues of PA 
without recourse to Philosophy?
In this context the derivativeness of PA has a theoretically positive side 
as well. In Philosophy as a scholarly discipline, as in the Humanities in 
general and in some of the less-applied social sciences, there is a ‘wussiness’, 
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over-conceptualisation and scholastic production of ethical–theoretical quag-
mires that make it much more complicated than it has to be to have a mean-
ingful discourse. This, in PA, is not the case – it errs on the other side. For 
instance, NWPA, to the extent that it exists, has, almost elegantly, bypassed the 
self-serving fashion of the ‘Orientalism’ discourse (not the original question 
as raised, but the exclusivity-mongering use of it by tertiary adherents of the 
concept for their own interest). This means that in several respects, the PA 
discourse is, or can be, better than the one in contemporary Philosophy itself – 
less introverted and more fruitful.
Along the same lines, the necessary connection that PA as a scholarly disci-
pline has to practice, a feature that is certainly more pronounced than for many 
of the other social sciences, is not non-philosophical, but quite the opposite; 
it is potentially a pre-condition for good Philosophy, as not only Aristotle and 
Kant, but also Plato and Hegel emphasised again and again – if it is not true in 
practice, the corresponding theory must be abandoned as well. The inherent, 
necessary practicality of PA has been questioned most recently by approaches 
prescribing more modelling, more ‘theory-driven’, open- and (apparently) 
big-data- or even AI-based, economics-imitating approaches that would like 
to see, also in PA, less relevance and more rigour (which, as Albert Einstein 
said in his 1921 Prussian Academy of Science lecture, are indeed enemies of 
each other), but at the core of PA lies a theory–practice balance and intimate 
connection, as long as the theory is and can indeed be connected to practice.
Beyond this, and as a final thought, the change of the way of life, indeed 
of the human person and of how they identify and conceive of themselves, 
through the Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) revolution 
is the main issue for PA in our time. It is also a ‘fashion’ and a hype – and 
appropriately so; ‘believe the hype’ – to which funded science and higher 
education are always extremely sensitive. With its technical propensity, ICT 
marginalises different approaches to PA even more – but in fact, ICT-based PA 
in its current stage needs Philosophy, if anything, more, not less. The crucial 
changes and shifts ICT creates are best addressed outside of e-Governance 
itself (which is often e-PA), which cannot – and usually does not even 
want to – pull itself out of the mire of Philosophy by its own hair. In fact, 
e-Governance is usually even more removed from Philosophy than PA, assum-
ing both a millennial, indeed crusading rhetoric and a set of highly emotional 
value assumptions that are so internally inconsistent that they are only bearable 
if cognitive dissonance becomes a principle – privacy, openness, tolerance, 
safety, self-determinedness, control, uniformity, participation, agency, and so 
on, do collide, and it is difficult to see how one could balance them or at least 
sort them out without Philosophy.
Altogether, reflection on PA on a much wider and deeper level than that of 
the unquestioned assumptions remains both more necessary and more urgent 
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today than it has been for a while. We live in an administered world; the reality 
humans inhabit is to a considerable extent an administered one. To be aware of 
its foundations is crucial in a time when what we thought were the foundations 
of our life together all of a sudden break away, both in a technical sense and in 
a philosophical one, and a technical approach simply is insufficient for coping 
with, let alone for managing or even for ordering, reality for the polis in the 
times to come. I am, once again, very glad that Edoardo Ongaro’s book has 
already so impressively contributed to this, and I am certain the success of the 
first edition of this book will be replicated by its translations addressing new 
and different audiences, and even further increased by this second edition.
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